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I. Introduction 
 
This book is written primarily for Western readers and political actors, with the 
purpose of making ’Balkan phenomena’ (instability, nationalism, corruption) more 
comprehensible, and to highlight the fact that even thorough knowledge and 
preparedness cannot be considered a guarantee for success (only as an essential but 
not sufficient condition). Attitudes towards the Balkans are often extreme. Beyond 
those who ignore the Balkan question (either because of disinterest, or because of 
considering the situation hopeless) there were and still there are so-called experts 
“who arrived yesterday with the resolution to solve problems by tomorrow,”1 who have to 
face the challenge that solutions offered by Western civilization do not always work, 
because of deep-rooted cultural differences. One of the morals of the numerous 
attempts to settle disputes in the Balkans is that solving problems is almost 
impossible without the involvement of experts of local origin (but trained in the 
West) simply because, due to their knowledge of local circumstances, they identify 
different phenomena as the key problems. And as any political system tends to rely 
on local agents and local social basis in the long run, knowledge of local 
circumstances is essential: the peace restoration attempts in the Balkans in the last 
decades proved that the improper selection of allies often led to the emergence of 
warlords, smugglers, etc., who managed to legitimize their informal power owing to 
their cooperation with Western decision-makers (the Kosovo experience). 
European Powers have tried to settle disputes several times in the past too, but 
interventions often failed partly because of their deep involvement (power interests, 
balance of power) in the Balkan question, and partly because what was problematic 
for a Western observer was not considered problematic by local societies and vice 
versa. An example of the failure of this approach, called ’humanitarian imperialism’2 (a 
combination of humanitarian intervention and classical colonization – to bring 
modernization through occupation), is the Austro-Hungarian experience in Albania. 
“We wanted to establish a colony. Our megalomaniac dreams have almost been fulfilled. This 
masterpiece of the art of violence, hurry, clumsiness and the lack of principles was observed by 
the author of these lines from the first row, because he was appointed as civil governor of the 
                                                 
1   Quotation from the sarcastic article on the Albanian policy of Austria-Hungary by Rubin, László. ‘Albánia 
állammá alakulása.’ Huszadik Század 20, no. 3 (1919): 135–41.   
2    For the different interpretations of this term see: Bricmont, Jean. Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights 
to Sell War; Chomsky, Noam. Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right. Monthly Review, 
2008. September, https://chomsky.info/200809__/. In Macedonia ’selling war’ was not the case, intervention 
was propagated in order to avoid the escalation of the conflict and the unilateral intervention of one Power. 
The idea of intervention reasoned by securing peaceful conditions and the development of the ‘savage’ was 
doctrined by John Stuart Mill, and Benjámin Kállay also used up this theory to reason Austro-Hungarian 
presence in Bosnia. 
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area in the name of General Können-Horák, who rather acted like a twit ’Tischlermeister’. The 
main goal was the establishment of bureaucratization. The new statehood was manifested 
indeed in bureaucratization. Albania soon became flooded by so many military officials that 
the proportion of officers reached one for each hundred of sheep. The highest levels of 
administration were immediately established. In Scutari hundreds of k.u.k. officers were 
deposited and garrisoned who grew ideas and produced documents. You could see them 
hurrying in the streets, holding plans under their arms, each was ’Albanienkenner’, who 
arrived from the West yesterday to solve the Eastern Question by tomorrow. For these plenty 
of officers new palace-like barracks were erected to store these documents. The age of 
documents has arrived to a country where nobody could write and read. Hundreds of orders 
were issued, which were not executed, because nobody could read them, and no one dared 
enter the central parts of the country called ’Sauland’. The structure of administration was 
similar to an upside-down pyramid. … In Scutari each case, like collecting turtles, forestry or 
mining had a special reference person, but nobody collected frogs and turtles, nobody dared go 
to the woods, and the mines did not exist at all.”3 The left-leaning scholar Ervin Szabó 
interpreted this “scientifically confirmed superiority and ’chosenness’ that gave 
authorization to intervene into Balkan affairs” as a false indoctrination that could lead to 
incomprehensible failures. Though Austria-Hungary was among the most prepared 
states in its knowledge of the peninsula with sufficient field-experience, and its 
contribution to the creation of the Albanian nation and state was inevitable, by the 
time the fruits of her activity were ripened, these efforts became out of date (from a 
political perspective), as the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist by that time. It seems 
that strong political determination was an essential but still not sufficient condition 
for success in creating ’Lebensfähig’4 entities, as the same remedy – creating a 
suprareligious national community based on common language regardless of 
religious tensions – simply did not work for Bosnia.5 The Macedonian reform 
movement represented another type of humanitarian intervention because of the 
involvement of all the Powers, but it also failed – partly because of mutually 
opposing interests, partly because of the overly short time period6 – confirming again 
our thesis regarding the inapplicability of a ’general model’.  
                                                 
3    Ibid. 
4  ‘Viable’. Creating a structure is one thing, but maintenance of an entity is another problem that needs 
investment of time, invention and money. Albania was consolidated by Italian money between the two World 
Wars, and the same method is applied by the EU to its peripheries. 
5    In case of Albania there was no attraction exerted by a ’mother nation’, unlike in the case of Bosnia, where the 
existence of Croatia and Serbia was attractive enough to divide Slavic speakers. 
6   Brooks, Julian. ‘A ’Tranquilizing’ influence? British ’Proto-peacekeeping’ in Ottoman Macedonia 1904–1905’. 
Peace and Change 36, no. 2 (2011): 172–90. 
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The last hundred years have seen several more unsuccessful interventions. The 
events in Bosnia in the last decades proved that even the lack of power interest cannot 
help solve problems. Because of the cultural difference, Western public opinion is 
and was susceptible only to certain types of affairs reaching their response threshold, 
for which the press has great responsibility, such as in offering simplistic, one-sided, 
easily interpretable or balanced approaches. This was also true at the turn of the 20th 
century (and probably even now), as contemporary observer, Edith Durham 
recognized. “When a Moslem kills a Moslem it does not count; when a Christian kills a 
Moslem it is a righteous act; when a Christian kills a Christian it is an error of judgment 
better not talked about; it is only when a Moslem kills a Christian that we arrive at a full-
blown ‘atrocity’.”7 (This trend reversed – but only temporarily – due to the Bosnian 
experience after 1992, and the pendulum swing back again with the appearance of al-
Qaida and ISIS). 
But this present work does not intend to investigate either the history of these 
interventions in the Balkans or the causes of these failures. Nor do we offer a general 
remedy for conflict management, but rather we emphasize the opposite: remedies 
offering a cure for problems in other regions do not necessarily work for the Balkans. 
Readers may feel our approach one-sided or narrow, as our goal was neither to 
compare the relevance of numerous interpretations, nor to analyze the reliability of 
the literature (either being patriotic or hypercritical).8 
Not even the Macedonian question (as a part of the complicated Balkan question) 
is grasped in its full complexity here – it has already had a substantial analysis from 
different perspectives.9 At the centre of our interest remains (1) the so-called 
komitadji-phenomenon, which is considered as a destabilizing factor, among many 
others (we refrain from judging how much their political ideas were progressive or 
justifiable or not), and (2) the different responses of society (survival strategies) and 
(3) reactions to the central power to this challenge (these reactions could either 
contribute to the escalation of the violence or mitigate tensions, depending on the 
type and scope of the response). This way we investigate the interactions and 
                                                 
7   Durham, Edith. Burden of the Balkans. London: Arnold, 1905. 4. This type of approach characterized the liberal 
Balkan Committee led by the Buxtons. See Perkins, James Andrew. British liberalism and the Balkans, c. 1875-
1925. PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London, 2014 accessed through ORBIT. 
8    As the institutionalization of history writing was realized within the frameworks of nation states, nation-
centric and nation-state-centric thinking determined historical writing in the Balkans. This limits the liberty of 
research (including topics, transnational or comparative character, tone-style and argument), thus distorting 
the perception and understanding of events in Macedonia. 
9   Lange-Akhund, Nadine. The Macedonian Question 1893–1908. From Western Sources.  Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1998. Soward, Steven W. Austria’s policy of Macedonian Reform 1902–1908. East European 
Monographs, 260. New York–Boulder, Col.: Columbia University Press, 1989; Gounaris, Basil K. ‘The 
Macedonian Struggle 1903–1912. Paving the Way for the Liberation.’ In Modern and Contemporary Macedonia, 
vol. 1, edited by I. Koliopoulos and I. Hassiotis, 508–29. Thessaloniki: Papazisis–Paratiritis, 1992. 
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feedbacks between these three actors10 (including local-central tensions, which could 
also invoke violence) rather than the history of the Macedonian question. 
 
Concepts, goals, methods 
 
While the complexity of the komitadji phenomenon offers a broad range of 
interpretations, none of them is holistic or claims to cover the ultimate truth: the 
concepts rather focus on investigating the phenomenon from different perspectives, 
putting the question into different context. The komitadji phenomenon includes 
various themes loosely connected together: the formation of collective identities and 
political culture; processes of state-building and state-failure; social movements and 
political organizations; social banditry and racketeering; revolutions and 
insurgencies-rebellions; organized crime, individual and collective violence, and 
ethnic conflicts and ethnic cleansings as pointed out by Alp Arslan Yenen in a 
conference held recently at the Middle Eastern Studies of Department of Social 
Sciences, University of Basel.11 Hakan Yavuz listed several issues to be addressed: the 
problem of conceptualizing and the typologies of komitadji, the transformation of the 
komitadji, emergence of a new political language that attributes redemptive value to 
violence, the relationship between Ottoman state and borderlands, and the problem 
of sources. Yavuz interpreted the phenomenon of the komitadji by framing it as part 
of a new political consciousness and as activities, which reshaped the boundaries of 
identity or identities and helped overcome the fear of the state through resistance 
and violence. Others, like Ramazan Öztan, suggested challenging the role of ideology 
and methodological nationalism in the study of late Ottoman political movements. 
Esmer claimed12 that empires did not usually have a monopoly over violence (cf. 
pirates becoming privateers in 16th c. British seafaring networks), and thus the 
boundaries between the conventional and the unconventional, the legitimate and 
illegitimate violence were open to contestation. Neither komitadji as a phenomenon 
nor the loss of state monopoly over violence is unique: patterns could be even traced 
back to the Jalali revolts, the Kirdjali era is similar period and organized violence also 
appeared in India. 
                                                 
10 This triangle can be even broadened by the interference of Powers and Small states, but from among the 
numerous possible interaction types we only analyze those pointing to the komitadji and the local 
community. In other words, diplomatic affairs are not investigated. 
11 The Age of the Komitadji. Entangled Histories and Political Sociology of Insurgencies in the Ottoman World 
(1870s-1920s). 22-24. January 2015, University of Basel Conference convened by Middle Eastern Studies, 
Department of Social Sciences, University of Basel, Turkish Studies. 
12 Esmer, Tolga (CEU). ‘Criminals’ Policing Empire: Trans-regional Networks of Violence, Governance, and 
Confessional cum Ethnic Boundaries in the Ottoman Nineteenth Century.’ In: The Age of the Komitadji. 
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The komitadji phenomenon is considered rather multifaceted, with different roots 
and behavior patterns ranging from banditry driven by social resistance 
(Hobsbawm) through business enterprises (Elwert) to flag-bearers of the national 
idea and rights. The conflicting aims and ideas of IMRO’s radical political wing (with 
their nationalist or radical socialist ideas) against their Christian warlord partners 
and their traditional notions of religious solidarity, manhood and individual 
retribution are also worth discussion.13 
The Macedonian (or Armenian) experience of the Young Turk officers influenced 
their military and political behavior as well, and thus the impact did not remain 
isolated. The practices and experience helped the Young Turk and Kemalist 
movement to defend state power, but also made the Turkish political cultural more 
manipulative and aggressive.14 The anti-liberal and semi-legal activities of 
intimidation, public defamation and mob mobilization became general practices 
during the constitutional era15 (the Young Turks themselves were not interested in 
the mass participation of the Ottoman people in politics, because the Macedonian 
case proved its risks). Getting acquainted with unconventional guerrilla warfare, the 
Young Turk officers usually shared their admiration towards komitadji activities 
(including both organizational questions and propaganda) and their devotion to the 
national causes. The rise of anti-imperialist sentiments in the face of foreign 
interventions in the Ottoman Balkans was also the product of this era (see the failure 
of the Mürzsteg reforms), and the nationalism of the četa fighters also contributed to 
the development of modern Turkish nationalism.16 
As for the Western literature, the interpretation of violence and the komitadji 
phenomena – before the evident turn mentioned above – was long influenced by the 
concept of ’social banditry’ as propagated by Hobsbawm,17 though we consider the 
phenomenon more complex, of which ’social banditry’ forms only a part. Hobsbawm 
states that banditism is a primitive or archaic (without a negative connotation) and 
rural form of social agitation/resistance against central authorities or certain classes.18 
                                                 
13 Kostopoulos, Tasos. ‘Between Primitive Rebellion and National Exclusiveness: Macedonian Christian Warlords 
in the Service of IMRO and/or its Rivals’, lecture given in the same conference and seminar. 
14 Arisan, Mehmet. ‘Komitacilik: A Basis or an Obstacle for Nation-State Building?’ 
15 Lecture by Ileana Moroni (University of Basel)’s: ‘The CUP and Civil Komitacılık after 1908: Some First 
Remarks and Research Questions’ in the same conference. 
16 Excerpt from Murat Kaya’s (University of Basel) lecture in the same conference. 
17 Hobsbawn, Eric John. Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Manchester, 1959, Manchester University Press. I. Introduction, 1-12., 28. 
18 The resistence of industrial workers against industrial society is also included into this type such as opposition 
to state institutions (police, taxation). The leaders are considered honorable persons (like the ‘Balkan celebi’ by 
Brophy and St.Clair) attributed by idealtypic terms. The social bandit is often heroized either by 
contemporaries or even by historiography: as he represents the social justice even murder does not 
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He considered the ‘social bandit’ (the Robin Hood archetype) to be positive, as an 
intermediary step in the history of development of rural protest and resistance, a 
’bridge’ between the purely mercenary activity of rebel bands ’trading with violence’ 
and the revolutionary works of nationalist organizations. The less conscious 
members of Macedonian bands were also considered social bandits, because the 
revolutionary organizations practised vengeance against the official authorities. But 
the truth is that vengeance against official authorities was only one among many 
other forms of violence. Furthermore, Hobsbawm considers banditism as a rural 
phenomenon – while in our case četas are active in urban places as well. Many of the 
Serbian četa leaders lived in urban communities of South Hungary previously. 
Hobsbawm also states that it is social injustice that they fight against first, and 
advertising political goals is another step in their ’natural evolution’, but this model 
not always fits Macedonia, where among the more than 100 bands (1907) with 
various aims, each stage of development can be observed. 
Contrary to Hobsbawm, Anton Blok considered all bandits as parasites of a 
community, whose appearance merely resulted in the duplication of burdens and 
coercion (beyond the coercion practised by state authorities). Stefano Petrungaro19 
also denies the views of Hobsbawm, stating that bandits cannot be heroized20 - 
heroization appeared not only in leftist but also in nationalistic historiography. He 
emphasized the role of rough geographical conditions, offering a terrain and numerous 
niches for violence and for the persistence of competing ideologies/traditions. On the 
one hand the spread of new theories and idea(l)s were hindered by geographical 
obstacles, like mountain ranges, and therefore neither of these could become 
exclusive by completely outcompeting the other. On the other hand the Macedonian 
borders were surrounded by small states and thus were also exposed to the 
infiltration of new, different ideas. Therefore external factors also influenced the 
patterns. As Macedonia was a geographically dissected area, this resulted in 
heterogeneity (splintered territorial patterns) and numerous fault lines both in 
ideology and traditions. Beyond territorial fragmentation, social cleavages also 
appeared in the form of an urban-rural dichotomy. Petrungaro claims that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
illegitimate his positive role. The frequency of resistance of this type has significantly grown by the 19-20th 
century, while premodern forms of banditism were gradually transforming in this era. 
19 Petrungaro, Stefano. Balcani. Una storia di violenza? Roma, 2012, 16., 71. 
20 Isa Blumi adds further that the stereotipization of bands (the thesis that Muslim rebel bands are 
counterrevolutionary, while Christian četas played positive role and were fighting for national goals is flawed) 
simplifying the task of former history writing has to be abandoned. Some of the Muslim Albanian groups 
were also fighting for national goals at the same time opposing Christians also fighting for national goals, 
bands of the CUP fighting for still revolutionary, but different aims (constitutionalism, Ottomanism) and the 
official army. As a counterpoint, some Christian groups showed no nationalistic attitude at all. Some of the 
bands could only be classified on the basis of fighting against rather than that of fighting for. 
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radicalized form of the četa is of Serbian origin and spreads from 1903 on - so he 
considered the pre-Ilinden forms a different type, while Keith Brown finds a general 
lineage between the pre- and post-Ilinden types, with only their tactics having 
changed.21 On the other hand it is true, that ethnic tensions played significantly 
greater role after 1903 than before (when social tensions were as important). 
Another approach (using the methods and terminology of sociology) is offered by 
Georg Elwert, through his interpretation of violence - within the frameworks of 
’Gewaltgemeinschaften’ and ’Gewaltmarkt’ - as an ’enterprise’.22 In our study we 
decided to use this latter approach (discussed below in detail), as our goal was 
neither a moral judgement on events (who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter) 
nor a criticism or comparison of different (national-,23 supra- and transnational)24 
historiographies, but to reveal the laws and patterns (if there are any) of violence and 
destabilization processes – in order to give guidelines on how to handle a possible 
future conflict and to restore peaceful conditions, while also pointing to the dangers 
of miscalculated interventions.25 This does not mean the refusal of nationalist 
approach, rather the implementation of other aspects that have to be calculated with. 
We do not undertake to analyze all questions and discuss thoroughly the 
relevance of all interpretations mentioned in the above pages, but we try to reflect on 
these new ideas and approaches - as much as our sources have made this possible. 
Our focus is centred on the use of sources, and not on one well-defined question. 
                                                 
21 Brown, Keith S. Loyal unto Death: Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2013. 
22 See details below. Elwert, Georg. ‘Gewaltmärkte, Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt.’ In 
Soziologie der Gewalt. Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, ed. Trutz, von 
Trotha. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997. 86–101. 
23 For example, for the Bulgarian point of view see: Елдъров, Светлозар. Сръбската въоръжена пропаганда в 
Македония (1901–1912). Sofia: ВК "Св. Георги Победоносец", 1993; Елдъров, Светлозар. Тайните офицерски 
братства в освободителните борби на Македония и Одринско 1897–1912. Sofia: Военно издателство, 2002; 
Елдъров, Светлозар. Върховният македоно-одрински комитет и Македоно-одринската организация в 
България (1895–1903). Sofia: Иврай, 2003. Георгиев, Георги. ‘Спомени на Евгим Янкулов за Балканските 
войни и Охридско–дебърското въстание (1912–1913 г.)’ Македонски преглед 36, no. 4 (2013): 119–129; 
Георгиев, Георги. ‘Бежанският въпрос в Албания и българската хуманитарна акция през 1913 г.’ 
Македонски преглед 35, no. 1 (2012): 39–67; Георгиев,  Величко - Трифонов, Стайко. Гръцката и сръбската 
пропаганда в Македония (Краят на ХІХ – началото на ХХ век). Нови документи. Sofia: Македонски научен 
институт, 1995. 
24 Lory, Bernard. ‘Schools for the Destruction of Society: School Propaganda in Bitola 1860–1912.’ In Conflcting 
Loyalties in the Balkans, edited by Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer, and Robert Pichler, 46–63. London–New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2011. 
25 For example, the reforms of the gendarmerie failed in Macedonia between 1903-1908, but not because the 
selected persons were unsuitable for armed service. We are convinced that the application of Kosovar people 
to a supranational army for the EU would decrease tensions and the appearance of violence in the region, 
while it could stabilize a local society through permanent occupation, thus mitigating the risks of a shift 
towards religious radicalism. At the same time it would increase the EU’s ability to handle any conflict, 
decreasing its dependency on NATO (in Bosnia this worked: Muslim Bosniaks were the best soldiers of 
Austria-Hungary during WWI). 
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Thus our work is not a synthesis, but rather an analysis of certain sources, and it is 
also a methodological experiment – an investigation into what could be concluded 
from a certain amount of available material written by different persons (belonging 
to different groups and states) from different perspectives on the same topic.26 
Neither did we undertook to broaden the circle of sources and involve new material 
in order to find answers to questions that remained unresolved using our sources, 
and thus the scope of our conclusions is not universal. We can not offer an ’ultimate 
truth’ as most of our conclusions are spatially limited; only a broader selection of 
sources can validate the representativeness of our work. Our goal was simply (1) to 
draw the attention on the benefits of using different source-types that (1a) could offer 
different interpretations for the same event (see the different intrepretations of the 
conflict around Slepče and Zrze monasteries in pro-Serbian newspapers and in 
Bulgarian consular reports, or the Dečani question), or (1b) could be used for mutual 
control (either confirming or challenging old topoi); (2) to illustrate the versatility of 
violence and strategies of survival (their diverse scientific interpetations, spatial and 
temporal aspects) and (3) to compare the relevance of different methods of analysis. 
The present book focuses on the period after the Ilinden Uprising until the 
outbreak of the Balkan Wars, and aims to identify certain social dividing lines, 
fractures and motivations that accelerated the escalation of ’everyday violence’.27 In 
our study we do not intend to evaluate the evolution of ideas or the ideological fights 
                                                 
26 Research in the Austrian State Archives was conducted within the framework of the project ‘Politics and 
Society in Late Ottoman Kosovo. An Edition of Austro-Hungarian Consular Reports from Kosovo, 1870–1913’, 
funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (Projekt No. P 21477-G18; project leader: Prof. Oliver Jens Schmitt; 
main researcher: Eva Anne Frantz; part time co-worker in 2010–11; Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics, part time co-
worker (2013-), and Daniela Javorić.  
27 The term is later discussed in detail. The methodological approach and idea of this study to focus on everyday 
violence in the Sanjak of Skopje stems from Frantz, Eva Anne. ‘Gewalt als Faktor der Desintegration im 
Osmanischen Reich - Formen von Alltagsgewalt im südwestlichen Kosovo in den Jahren 1870–1880 im Spiegel 
österreichisch-ungarischer Konsulatsberichte’, Südost-Forschungen 68 (2009): 184–204, esp. 184–187. Different 
forms of coexistence including violence in the Vilayet of Kosovo is also the topic of Frantz, Eva Anne. 
‘Muslime und Christen im spätosmanischen Kosovo: Lebenswelten und soziale Kommunikation in den 
Anfängen eines ethnopolitischen Konflikts, 1870–1913’ (PhD-diss., University of Vienna, 2014). On this 
question see also Frantz, Eva Anne. ‘Religiös geprägte Lebenswelten im spätosmanischen Kosovo - Zur 
Bedeutung von religiösen Zugehörigkeiten, Eigen- und Fremdwahrnehmungen und Formen des 
Zusammenlebens bei albanischsprachigen Muslimen und Katholiken.’ In Religion und Kultur im 
albanischsprachigen Südosteuropa, edited by Oliver Jens Schmitt. Wien: Lang, 2010. 127–150, and Frantz, Eva 
Anne. ’Violence and its Impact on Loyalty and Identity Formation in Late Ottoman Kosovo: Muslims and 
Christians in a Period of Reform and Transformation.’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 29, no. 4 (2009): 455–
468.  
A German research group investigating the comparative historical and sociological interpretations of the role of 
communities based on trading in violence also served as an inspiration to the authors. The logic and 
terminology of the present study are based on the questions, investigated subjects and frameworks defined by 
Forschergruppe ‘Gewaltgemeinschaften’: Finanzierungsantrag und Forschungsprogramm 1. Juli 2009 bis 30. 
Juni 2012. November, 2008, Justus-Liebig-Universität-Giessen. 15–39.  
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between the different factions of the revolutionary organizations, because the 
komitadji phenomenon has other, less traditional and underinvestigated approaches.  
This study is a supranational or denationalized story, which investigates the 
phenomena and consequences of general breakdown and dehumanization in human 
behaviour. Beyond this general approach our goals include the analysis of the 
organization and tactics of the komitadji before and after the two turning points, 1903 
and 1908, and beside these the identification of some microsocial strategies at the 
family and community level – considered as responses to local coercion and 
governmental repressions. We investigate both territorial and cultural patterns of 
violence, specific and general motives, as well as the contribution of foreign 
intervention (including both the attempts of the Great Powers to settle the question 
and the propaganda activity of the neighbouring Small States) and local traditions 
(customary law) appertaining to the nature and extent of violence. Beside the 
typization of forms of violence, the authors have also examined changes in the 
support policy of neighbouring small states, including its profitability and local 
acceptance at a time when the selection of an identity no longer entailed only 
advantages, but also imposed threats to the individual and the community.  
 
 
The location 
 
Macedonia as an area was very heterogeneous. The French (anarchist) geographer 
Reclus wrote that Macedonia is an ’impossibly complex unfriendly terrain’, and 
therefore physical geographical boundaries cannot be applied to separate ethnic 
groups from each other. Its area was c. 70,000 km², including the Kosovo, Manastir 
and Selanik Vilayets with approx. 2 million inhabitants, surrounded by the Šar 
Planina in the North, the Rhodopi Mts. in the East and Lake Ohrid in the West. Its 
population was ethnically diverse too, as none of the (numerous) groups exceeded 
50% of the total population using either religious or ethnic categorization, partly 
because of the fluid and multiple identity patterns, and partly because of the 
unreliability of statistics and their different interpretations. Religious, ethnic and 
linguistic borders did not coincide here.28 With its intermingling communities, 
Macedonia was an ’impossibly complex unfriendly terrain’ for the national idea as 
well – simply unsuitable for the emergence of a nation state without major changes. 
Having a central location (situated at the crossroads of the N-S Vardar-Morava axis 
and the E-W route of Via Egnatia), the Ottoman (Muslim Turk) settlement was 
                                                 
28 Demeter, Gábor – Zsolt Bottlik – Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics. The Role of Ethnic Mapping in Nation-Building and 
its Influence on Political Decision-Making across the Balkan Peninsula. Regensburg, in press, 2018. 
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significant here. Husbandry and land cultivation played an equal role (within the 
latter, čiftlik lands played a key role in creating social tensions); land use sometimes 
showed ethnic and social patterns as well (Albanian and Vlach shepherds; Muslim 
large estate owners and Slavic sharecroppers), sometimes not (Muslim and Slavic 
smallholders, Muslim landlords smallholders and sharecroppers in Albania). The 
urban population was under 20%, of which the Aegean port of Saloniki had the 
greatest share. Beyond the state, the Church and the local leaders (through the 
traditional customs) also had informal power, but neither was great enough to 
overcome and outcompete the others. 
One of the locations to be investigated is the Sanjak of Skopje in Kosovo Vilayet 
(organized in 1875–78) between the years 1903 and 1912, with an outlook over the 
neighbouring territories to assess the specific or general character of the events 
evaluated. The study area is suitable for analyzing the problems related to the birth 
of modern nations: due to the ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the Sanjak of 
Skopje, tensions within and between its Eastern Orthodox and Muslim communities 
can be easily identified and demonstrated (Map 1, Table 1). Moreover, the sanjak was 
located close to the borders of Bulgaria and Serbia, both with territorial pretensions 
toward this administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire, which made the situation 
more complicated. Furthermore, the area lied near the Austro-Hungarian sphere of 
influence, and therefore the interests of a Power (Austria-Hungary) also had an effect 
on events. This also means a variety of available sources: the investigation made use 
not only of the archival material of the Bulgarian consulate in Skopje, but also that of 
the Austro-Hungarian consuls, which offers a more detailed and balanced approach. 
As it would be methodologically incorrect to generalize our results based on the 
investigation of only one region, we decided to select another district (Prizren Sanjak) 
and use it as a control area. There were numerous differences between the two 
sample areas. The ethnic distribution of the population was less diverse in Prizren 
(but still not homogeneous enough as to neglect interethnic and interreligious 
conflicts). While the Skopje Sanjak had a central localization in terms of physical 
geographical features (it reached the Morava-Vardar Axis and hosted the centre of 
the Vilayet), but at the same time was limitrophe with two of the competing small 
states, in the Prizren Sanjak the situation was different. Owing to its localization the 
rivalry of small states (neither Serbia nor Bulgaria was limitrophe with the region, 
limiting the possibilities of direct cross-border interference) was supposed to be less 
intense. Though the interference of the Powers (the Mürzsteg convention omitted 
this area from the zones controlled by the Powers) was also supposed to be limited, 
we will see – through the example of Austrian-Russian rivalry – that it was greater in 
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fact when compared to Skopje Sanjak (Prizren lied at the crossroads of Austrian and 
Serbian aspirations towards the Vardar Axis on the one hand and to the Adriatic Sea 
on the other). The period investigated was also different (rather broader), and the 
types of conflict were supposed to be dissimilar. Our hypothesis was that due to the 
larger proportion of Muslims and due to the fact that religious and linguistic 
cleavages coincided more (in Prizren Muslims predominantly spoke Albanian, and 
had their specific customs and economic habitat, while in the Skopje Sanjak the 
Muslims were Albanians, Slavs and Turks; and were both urban dwellers and 
villagers), here ethnic conflicts were supposed to be more frequent, but less diverse 
in type. Unlike the urbanized Skopje, Prizren town was only a local centre with 
different level of administration and number of officials or soldiers, which might 
induce different governing methods; the different composition of the population 
would require different tactics to tackle these different problems. 
In our study Macedonia is considered a frontier not only because the 
contemporary observers like Frederick More were of the same opinion (using the 
word trail for the region in 1906).29 The main features of the ’frontier’– budget 
deficits, a high proportion of military and administrative-bureaucratic costs relative 
to the total expenditure of the province,30 a high ratio of deviant (imprisoned and 
handicapped) persons,31 alternative sources of power (beyond central government), a 
high migration rate and solutions or reactions differing from generally accepted 
social norms – were characteristic of Macedonian regions as well. 
Beyond being a frontier zone, Macedonia was in a borderland position too.32 
Borderlands represented special frontier zones, either separating political entities (thus 
functioning as buffer zones) or divided between states (disputed areas), far away 
from centres. On the one hand, the centre was unable to maintain and assert its 
power here, but on the other hand neither could local authorities - contesting central 
power - manage to gain full legitimation (either rational or traditional, in Weberian 
terms). This implies that the operation of the state and the coexistence of social 
groups showed various patterns and was based on several models (whether 
autochthonous or not), which made it impossible to live according to ubiquitous, 
standardised rules. As there was no consensus about the established, accepted forms 
                                                 
29 The same word that was adapted to the US frontier-zone. Moore, Frederick. The Balkan Trail. London: Smith, 
Elder and Co., 1906. 223-224. 
30 K. u. K. Ministerium des Äussern. Diplomatische Aktenstücke über die Reformaktion in Mazedonien 1902–1906. Wien: 
Druck der K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. 1906. 166–174. No. 160. 29. 04. 1906. 
31  Demeter, Gábor. A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és gazdasági és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század 
végétől a 20. század közepéig  II. Budapest: MTA BTK TTI, 2016. 
32 Wolff, Larry. Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: 
Stanford Univ. Press, 1994, vii, xi, 4, 6–8, 41, 284–331, 357. 
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of coexistence, borderlands as transition and friction zones of cultures hosted 
numerous interactions (with different responses) and were characterized by multiple, 
parallel, but often constrained (elite-less) and fragmented societies. Fault lines were 
not only determined by ethnic and religious categories, but were also overwritten by 
social differences (state officials-subjects, urban-rural, landlord-peasant, etc.). Such 
societies are able to coexist in parallel relatively peacefully for centuries, but without 
real integration, mutually freezing their conflicts.33 Borderlands are often exposed to 
external challenges, too, which complicates the situation further. In our case this 
meant both imperial challenges and challenges from nation states (manifested in 
different ideologies). The latter proved to be more attractive, as these were new,34 
expansive and radical (aggressive, in fact - there was a difference between the 
attitude of empires and nations states towards minorities: the (modern) imperial 
attitude (unlike the national paradigm) was not intolerant to minorities). The 
spreading of nationalism changed identity and loyalty patterns (such as imperial 
challenges were able to modify them),35 and thus it redefined the terms ’community’ 
and ’minority’, as well. This was a huge shock for these already polarized and 
incomplete societies: new patterns appeared and surpassed, overwrote old 
differences without making the latter disappear, thus increasing the number of 
potential conflicts.  
Being the collision zone of at least four nation states and three empires, the 
geographically and socially fragmented Macedonia was a special border zone. The 
parallel existence of several external centres functioning as attraction zones made the 
integration of the three vilayets impossible. Not only did they differ from each other 
in an economic sense (in Kosovo and Monastir the taxes came from land tax, while in 
Saloniki the share of land taxes was of secondary importance) – while they were 
similar in showing low per capita (central) incomes compared to neighbouring 
countries – but the centrifugal tendencies slowly tore their connections apart 
(neighbouring countries were characterised by lower tax rates!). As the central power 
was unable to come up with an acceptable integrative ideology (Ottomanism failed), 
and the era of relative economic wellbeing was also over by 1878 (prosperity could 
                                                 
33 Bartov, Omer - Eric D. Weitz. ‘Introduction. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and 
Ottoman Borderlands.’ In: Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and 
Ottoman Borderlands, edited by Omer Bartov - Eric D. Weitz. Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2013. 1, 2, 4, 9-11. 
34 The inhabitants of Macedonia have already been subjects of an empire for centuries, thus had experience about 
being integrated into a large inhomogeneous, multiethnic and multiconfessional entity where the feeling of 
supracommunal togetherness usually manifested only in the dynastic rule.  
35  Russian and Austrian penetration was able to generate cohesion for sub-groups by creating the notion of 
enemy or ally on the one hand, but on the other hand it was unable to unify the people of the Ottoman Empire 
any further. 
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hold together parts with different character even when there was no common 
ideology), the cohesive forces vanished. Macedonia became a ‘no man’s land’, where 
the power vacuum manifested in its entirety, implying the emergence of a new 
(social) order based on local power (violence), which was supported by persisting 
archaic (pre-Christian) traditions and customs. Violence in Macedonia exited from 
the interpretative frameworks of statehood in the beginning of the 20th century: 
Ottoman authorities lost their monopoly over power and violence. Ottoman imperial 
structures still existed, but the ’state’ did not refer to ’law and order’ any more (either 
for the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire or for the neighbouring Christian states). 
This book investigates the events when this exit from the interpretative 
framework of the state had just begun. The spread of violence after the turn of the 
century was not a consequence of wars;36 on the contrary, wars were the consequence 
of the unresolved situation culminating in a clash involving the four small states and 
the three powers (similarly as happened after 1875 during the Great Eastern Crisis). 
Furthermore, violence spread neither along fixed nor along continuous fault lines: 
front lines moved with incredible intensity within and between the groups of 
Macedonian society. These fault lines were only temporarily delimited by and 
manifested in the fights of irregular bands. The cleavages even reached the basic 
building blocks of society: families and settlements became divided or had to face 
several different types of conflict, often at the same time (class fight, ethno-religious 
tensions, economic differences and more often a mixture of these). Under these 
circumstances, ’nation-building’ or the ’maintenance of order’ easlily became only 
political slogans that sometimes even the bands and the state forgot to emphasize 
when applying coercive measures.  
Macedonia, this ’shatterzone of Empires’,37 became a borderland: its external 
boundaries surrounding the forsaken land of chaos and desolation delimited the end 
of the civilized area (the rule of law defined by central power).38 (People living here 
were originally grouped into the ’savage’ category by Western observers, but as the 
dominating Darwinist evolutionary approach was extended to other disciplines of 
scholarly enquiry - including the evolution of nations, of which the final form is the 
nation state - by the turn of the century the inhabitants were considered ’half-civilized’ 
because of the presence of national consciousness and of the ongoing national 
                                                 
36 In this sense the phenomenon differs from those observable after WWI. 
37 Bartov - Weitz: ‘Introduction’; Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. 
38 Beyond the generally smaller tax rates and more balanced societies of the small states, the feeling of security 
was also attrative for the inhabitants of Macedonia. And when we are talking about the attractiveness of the 
national idea, we do not have to forget about these practical considerations and circumstances – most of the 
dwellers of Macedonia saw the national idea as appealing not because of its unquestionable ideological-
intellectual content, as most of them were not susceptible to political philosophy. 
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struggle pointing towards the formation of the nation state.)39 But even this chaos 
was somehow systematic, with its own rules and trends. This book traces just these 
rules and patterns focusing on the organization, institutionalization and 
nationalization of violence (regarded as a marketable product) in the first part, and 
investigates the reactions of society (strategies of survival) and the central state in the 
second part.  
As the book partly deals with forms of violence, a typization of the latter and the 
clarification of different terms used here is necessary. Soward claims that more than 
8500 persons were killed in 1903-1908,40 during the era of the international 
intervention (this high number also points to the failure of the latter) and ’only’ 3500 
of the killed were members of revolutionary organizations or bands. This means that 
the remainder of victims could either have been non-armed members of these groups 
(legalen člen), who played an important role in supplying the bands with shelter, 
information and food (discussed later), or collaborators with the central authorities 
(civilian enemies, targets) – but they could have been innocent civilians as well. In 
our study we mainly deal with conflicts where at least one of the participants (either the 
victim or the perpetrator or both) is considered civilian. (As civilian involvement in 
revolutionary movements often remained unknown to the investigating Ottoman or 
foreign authorities, these atrocities with hidden political character were inseparable 
from the ’pure’ group of ‘everyday violence’, and thus were also included in our 
investigation.) Among the atrocities we make a distinction between murders and 
other forms of injury as two major sub-groups. Cases were categorized along socio-
economic and religious fault lines, too. The investigation also includes a spatial and 
temporal comparison of the different forms of violence (and their clearance rate) in 
order to trace which type was more frequent prior to, during and after the 
international intervention.  
So, in using the expression ‘everyday violence’, the authors refer to those acts of 
violence which took place among the civil population on a daily basis and were not connected 
to the law enforcement activity of the authorities (military reprisals, border clashes, etc.).41 
To explain the occurrence of ‘everyday violence’, the theory of Georg Elwert 
provided an important methodological basis for the present work. He stresses that 
the weakening of the state creates a demand and thus a market for violence in society 
                                                 
39 But it seems that this evolution did not mean a decrease in violence, and so – from our point of view – an 
increase in the level of civilization. 
40 Soward, Austria’s policy, 76. Ottoman sources estimate 10,000 political murders in ten years. Ottoman 
Diplomatic Documents II, No. 1642. 05.06.1908. 
41 From another aspect we interpret everday violence a little bit more narrowly, as Anne Eva Frantz does, as we 
did not intend to deal with stealing of girls, forced marriages and other traditional forms of violence that were 
built into the culture and were characteristic prior to the turn of the century. 
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(Gewaltmärkte), which is operated by communities organized for trading in violence 
and coercive measures as commodities (Gewaltgemeinschaften). If these 
Gewaltgemeinschaften [vendors] are formed primarily for economic reasons (besides 
spreading political propaganda), they can be considered as enterprises for which the 
laws of economics are at least partially true. Even contemporary observers, like the 
Hungarian historian Thallóczy, wrote that for Mirdite Albanians of Lezhe banditry 
was some kind of ‘family enterprise’ (unlike Malisor Albanians, who were 
combative, but not robbers).42 Economic factors could be abundant on the demand 
side as well: economic rivalry between groups over scarce resources could appear 
under the disguise of ideological conflict and in the form of prejudice against ‘the 
other’ (manifesting in political conflicts often emphasizing ethno-religious 
differences). These groups, which gradually take control over the monopoly of using 
force from the state, have their own dynamics, including operating conditions and 
laws.43 
This phenomenon was examined primarily by sociologists and historians through 
case studies, concentrating on the reasons for violence and the formation of 
communities trading in violence. However, the internal cohesion and integrative 
power of these structures, as well as their regulative functions and social spheres of 
action, are considered to be underinvestigated. The uniqueness of this study is that it 
approaches the problem from economic aspects as well, stressing that special 
economic conditions triggered and accelerated the escalation, ethnicization and 
nationalization (organization) of violence in Macedonia. The authors would also like 
to draw attention to the practice (Gewaltpraxis) and the regularity in the recurrence 
(yearly cycle) of violence. Beyond the social life and social background of 
Gewaltgemeinschaften (perpetrators), the victims of violence are also examined at 
different levels from different aspects.44 
As for the responses to the violence (survival strategies), the authors would also 
like to show that everyday survival strategies also had an economic character, and 
their goal was adaptation to the changing economic circumstances. So, although 
                                                 
42 Thallóczy, Lajos. Utazás a Levantéban. A keleti kereskedelem története Magyarországon. Budapest: Pfeifer N. 1882. 
65. 
43 Elwert, ‘Gewaltmärkte’, 86–101. 
44 Speitkamp, Winfried. ‘Einführung.’ In Gewaltgemeinschaften. Von der Spätantike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, edited by 
Winfried Speitkamp. Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2013. 8–12. and Grandits, Hannes, Nathalie Clayer and Robert 
Pichler. ‘Introduction. Social (Dis)Integration and the National Turn in the Late- and Post-Ottoman Balkans: 
Towards an Analytical Framework.’ In Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire 
and Nation-Building, eds. Hannes Grandits et al. London: Tauris, 2011. 3–5.  
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loyalties may change quickly, there is a constant element behind them – the economic 
factor.45 
When investigating these problems, we utilized a special type of source: the 
observations of Austrian consuls of everyday violence as compared to contemporary 
Bulgarian consular reports. From a methodological point of view, a combination of 
Austrian and Bulgarian archival sources (a comparison of data obtained from 
independent observers and participants in events) supplemented by official Ottoman 
diplomatic documents (which represent a different level) can be promising in order 
to avoid partiality, since not only the terminology used in Austrian and Bulgarian 
documents is different,46 but so is the interpretation of events. As the case of the 
Slepče and Zrze monasteries proves (see later),47 Serbian and Bulgarian sources tell a 
different story of the same events, and thus a broadening of sources is inevitably 
needed to come to more balanced conclusions. The reinterpretation of some sources 
using a comparative approach would also be worthwhile. 
The authors also aimed to investigate whether statements in earlier scholarly 
works regarding the main fault lines or the nature and forms of violence can be 
considered realistic (whether these can be validated using a larger dataset and 
numerous concrete examples) or should be revised. To realize the aforementioned 
goals the study applies a statistical analysis of quantitative data regarding victims and 
perpetrators when tracing patterns, differences and general features. Analysis of 
selected individual case studies and the role of the economic background will be 
discussed further in Chapter V. As we were interested in the specific problems 
mentioned, general political questions (the history of Macedonian reform 
movements, Young Turk movements, parliamentary elections, etc.) and diplomatic 
affairs are not investigated. Neither do the limits of this study allow us to examine 
the origin of all fault lines and all interactions: the authors therefore focus on the 
tensions between Muslims and Christians and the antagonism between Patriarchists 
                                                 
45 Grandits – Clayer – Pichler. ‘Introduction,’ 5 –8.  
46 It is important to note that the word ‘Bulgarian’ is not equivalent to ‘Exarchist’ in Austrian documents. 
Österreichische Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv (hereinafter ÖStA HHStA PA), VII/Fasz.434, 
Rappaport to Pallavicini, March 21, 1907. No. 330, Beilage No.26, 5. See also the Kral consul’s map from 1903 
in Nachlass Szapáry, ÖStA HHStA. Cited also by Толева, Тeодора. Виянието на Австро-Унгария за 
създаването на албанска нация, 1896-1906. Sofia: Ciela, 2012. 540–544 (maps). By contrast, in the reports of the 
Bulgarian consul in Skopje, the term ‘Bulgarian’ is synonymous with Exarchist. The word ‘Bulgarian’ instead 
of ‘Exarchist’ often occurs even in Exarchist ecclesiastical documents. See: Централен Държавен Архив, 
(Sofia, hereafter ЦДА), ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 31. In Bitola, for example, ‘Bulgarian school’, and ‘Bulgarian 
church’ are used. There were even Patriarchist Bulgarian villages according to Bulgarian sources (some of 
them were converted as a result of Serbian propaganda, though some were not affected). Ottoman diplomatic 
documents also prefer the use of the word ‘Bulgarian’.  
47  See Volarić, Klara. ‘Between the Ottoman and Serbian State: Carigradski glasnik, an Istanbul-based Paper of 
Ottoman Serbs, 1895-1909.’ Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 3 (2014). 
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and Exarchists. The existing debates between Muslim communities of different origin 
and identity is only partly investigated – to prove that intra-community conflicts also 
existed beyond interconfessional and interethnic conflicts. 
 
 
General remarks 
 
However, prior to the discussion of the social conflicts, it is necessary to make some 
general remarks in order to place the subject of our investigation in its historical (and 
historiographical) context.  
First general remark. Internal problems I: the role and persistence of traditional patterns 
in determining the behavior of Muslim communities. As a consequence of the Tanzimat 
reforms, the differences between Muslims and Christians had been gradually 
diminishing, which deeply frustrated the Muslim community that was in the process 
of losing its privileges. On the other hand, economic inequality in this very region 
(unlike in other areas) did not decrease, as the landlords were mainly Muslims: this 
frustrated the Christians, who remained economically subjugated to the landlords 
(half of Macedonian lands were in large estates called čiftlik, mainly in Muslim 
hands,48 while one-third was waqf [Islamic land endowment], and only the remaining 
one-sixth was in the hand of freeholders in 1910).49 And since not all Muslims were 
rich, an abolition of their privileged position would eliminate the last factor that 
differentiated them from the Christian rayah. These (often rural) Muslim 
communities of the central Balkans formed one of the most conservative (and often 
intolerant) religious groups in the empire, refusing to live within the framework of a 
modern state and harbouring no desire to be treated equally to Christians. The state 
largely relied on them when it was unable to maintain full control or had to get rid of 
ideologies challenging central authority (like the bektaşi movement), but, as decades 
passed, they were more of an obstacle to modernization (both from the perspective of 
the hamidian rule urging for centralization and from the aspect of socio-economic 
modernization urged by external pressure – though there was also an antagonism 
between these two perspectives).50 The reforms satisfied neither Muslims nor 
                                                 
48 See: Memorandum des Syllogues Grecs de Constantinople. Jean D. Aristocles, 6 Avril, 1878. M.A.H. Layard, 
Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique á Constantinople. Correspondence respecting the Objections raised 
by Populations inhabiting Turkish Provinces against the Territorial Changes proposed in the Preliminary 
Treaty signed at San Stefano. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London: 
Harrison and sons, 1878, 61. 
49 Strauss, Adolf. Großbulgarien. Posen–Leipzig–Warshau–Budapest: Mitteleuropäischer Buch- und 
Lehrmittelverlag, 1917. 52-60. There were 15,000 čiftlik owners and only 10,000 freeholders in the region. 
50 Hamidian reforms were considered conservative and were to hinder external interference aimed at changing 
the existing structures. 
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Christians, nor did these reinforce trust towards each other or towards the viability 
of the state. The reforms generated confrontation between the Muslims and the 
central government, but the true victim of the Muslims’ anger and frustration was 
usually the local Christians, as this conservative rural Muslim layer thought that they 
were responsible for all unfavourable changes and suspected them of being ‘a fifth 
column’ of the Powers. (This card was also played out at an early stage by the central 
government, but as it usually resulted in external intervention, the practice was soon 
abandoned: the hamidian regime wanted to strengthen central power in order to 
decrease external interference.) Therefore this layer became burdensome for all 
actors, but from different reasons: for sultan Abdulhamid because their activity 
invoked external interference, for the Powers because they caused calamities, and for 
the local Christians because they meant a constant threat.51 Knowing all this, the 
paradox of why these classes could be convinced by the CUP to support their 
movement (including constitutionalism) is not a paradox any more – these echelons 
simply wanted to get rid of a government that challenged their privileges; they 
fought against the present situation and not for the new. (When they realized that the 
subsequent changes did not improve their position, they turned against the Young 
Turks also.) 
The reason for the negative attitude of these traditionalist Muslim groups against 
Christians (whom they identified with the Powers) should be found in historical 
events. After 1878 the situation deteriorated further when 40,000 Muslim refugees 
from Bosnia and the Sanjak of Niš arrived to Kosovo Vilayet (constituting one-third 
of the population in Priština, a quarter of the population in both Vučitrn and Gjilan 
and ten per cent of the population of Skopje).52 At the same time, neighbouring small 
states were established. These muhadjir families had lost everything they had during 
the war, and the Ottoman government declined to provide them with support. 
Fleeing from the Austro-Hungarian occupation or from the Serbian army, the 
absence of state support and the pressing need to provide for their families prompted 
these refugees to take desperate measures. They expelled thousands of the local 
Slavic peasant families, mainly from eastern Kosovo, who then fled to Serbia (Mala 
Seoba). These Muslim refugees, however, assimilated with the local society over the 
                                                 
51 To conclude, there was an antagonism in the Hamidian internal policy, as every step toward centralization in 
order to decrease external intervention and the role of rural destabilizing forces resulted in the activity of the 
latter targeted against the Christians, which increased the interference of power, despite the aims of the 
central government, resulting in a vicious circle. In this way an internal problem became externalized; this 
made the consolidation of central power almost impossible. Had the hatred of local Muslims been targeted 
only against the central government, it would have remained an internal conflict. 
52 Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul: T.C. Başbakanlik. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2007. 
BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 1/99. 332-34. 
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long term, and thus formed a social stratum in the province that could be best 
characterized by its constant restlessness.53 Their assimilation was not always full-
scale and not always generated new (nationalistic) loyalties, but rather was based on 
their privileged status and the disdain felt towards the Christian reaya. It seems that 
atrocities and massacres became inseparable from (or became an organic part of) the 
modernization process and executing state reforms in Macedonia54 – regardless of the 
type (as both traditional and new forms invoked violence) of loyalty and identity 
(self-determination). 
Second general remark. Internal problems II: the emergence of new identities and loyalties. 
By the final third of the nineteenth century, the social changes that had reached the 
Balkans had transformed or abolished the majority of the formerly existing identity 
patterns. This world was in transition in a religious, social and economic sense as 
well. The identity of the local, South Slavic-speaking Eastern Orthodox peasantry 
was also in crisis, though it was not the recognition of Christians as equal citizens 
that challenged this identity. This recognition took place too late, as it almost 
coincided with the birth of modern nationalistic ideas in the neighbouring small 
states—and (as mentioned earlier) equal citizenship did not represent a real 
alternative, since neither Muslims nor Christians were satisfied with the reforms.55 
The reception of liturgy in Slavic language from 1859, then the excommunication of 
the nascent Bulgarian Exarchate in 1872 for being “schismatic”, accused of 
“ethnophyletism”56 (the “love of a certain ethnicity” instead of promoting regional-
territorial identity) by the Greek Patriarchate, which wanted to preserve its 
’ecumenical-universal’ role with the Patriarch as the sole ’ethnarchos’, clearly 
                                                 
53 Clewing, Konrad. ‘Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo – ein geschichtlicher Überblick.’ In Der 
Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen-Akteure-Verlauf, edited by Konrad Clewing and Edvin Pezo. München: Bayerische 
Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, 2000. 46-47; Kaser, Karl. ‘Raum und Besiedlung.’ In Südosteuropa. 
Ein Handbuch, edited by Margaditsch Hatschikjan and Stefan Troebst. München: Beck, 1999. 53–72; and 
Schmitt, Oliver Jens. Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft. Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau, 
2008. 79-84, 153-56. 
54 Rodogno, Davide. Against Massacre. Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914. The Emergence 
of a European Concept and International Practice. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012. 9. 
55 In contrast to Bulgaria, where economic prosperity grew together with the replacement of Spahis (as layers 
that were not cost-effective) and resulted in the economic emergence of the Bulgarian smallholder in the 
1850s, in Macedonia the peasants remained economically deprived under Muslim landlords with no hope for 
prosperity after 1873–1878, when U.S. and Russian crops invaded Western markets, thereby lowering grain 
prices. It was the crop boom of the 1840s (thus an external factor) that prolonged the existence of the Ottoman 
Empire, not the reforms themselves. These reforms did not create economically favorable conditions (it was 
only a successful response to existing opportunities), but the contrary: the tax reforms of Midhat Pasha, 
providing a surplus for the central government, could be carried out due to the favorable economic situation. 
This was missing in the 1870s, when the Empire continued its reforms, and this contributed profoundly to the 
failure of social modernization. Demeter, Gábor. A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom I. Budapest: MTA BTK TTI, 
2014. 
56 Yosmaoğlu, Ipek. Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908. 
Cornell Univ., 2013.  53. 
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indicated this change (the ethnicization of identity). The appearance of new identity 
patterns using the old structures resulted in a transitional period, where state 
functions were also performed by the new Bulgarian Church (taxation, jurisdiction, 
social care, econimic enterprises, banking). The consequence was that Orthodoxy 
within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire ceased to be an united millet any more. 
The loss of income after the secession of Exarchist areas (and also of the Romanian 
Church) caused such a critical situation for the Constantinople Patriarchate that if it 
wanted to avoid the fate of the Ipek Patriarchate (its former rival),57 it had to accept 
the financial support of the Greek state (which was up to then not considered as an 
ally, because it created a national autocephalous Greek Church in the 1830s instead of 
accepting the supremacy of Constantinople, thus taking the first step towards the 
disintegration of Balkan Orthodoxy). This meant another heavy blow, as it invited a 
secularized institution to the fight, which brought its new ’tribal-nationalistic’ and 
not ’universal’ patterns of identity. Though the Greek state supported the activity of 
the Patriarchate with 1.5 yearly million drachmas by 1906, through its organizations 
like the Syllogos (from 1869, established to promote the Hellenic education of 
youngsters in Macedonia) or the Committees (1886), it also tried to exert pressure on 
the Patriarchate itself through these institutions – for example not to finance 
Patriarchist schools in which Slavic language is taught (1883). 
There were also some Greeks who expressed their pleasure over the schism more 
than their frustration, because (1) they thought that it would lead to the 
nationalization of the Patriarchate as well, and (2) they were convinced that the 
integration of the remainder patriarchist Slavs into Hellenism would have been 
easier had there had been millions of Slavic speakers. The same thought was shared 
by Paparrigopoulos, the leader of the state-supported Syllogos, while the 
Patriarchate – still considering itself ecumenical and not national – tried to move 
towards the abolition of the schism, which was not welcomed by Greece. Another 
Patriarch, Antimios VII, also went against the Greek government’s interests when he 
entered into a deal with the Serbs (in order to decrease the isolated situation and 
dependency of the Patriarchate and to hinder the advance of the Exarchate), which 
was refused by the Syllogos. 
So, the arrival of nationalism generated new fault lines within the population, 
such as religion had created earlier, but without erasing the old differences. The 
several types and layers of identities were overlapping one another, creating chaos in 
people’s minds, rivalry between the political ideologies (the loyal-liberal and the 
                                                 
57 It was incorporated in 1767 by Constantinople in return for consolidating the debts, thus establishing Greek 
dominance over the Christians of the peninsula for 100 years, though this was not enough to Hellenize the 
local Slavs. 
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nationalistic-revolutionary),58 unconsolidated identities and an upsurge of social 
change. Peasants’ hunger for land was also exploited by national movements. 
Furthermore, in our case,59 not only religious and nationalistic divisions tended to 
face one another at the same time,60 but in addition to the collision of competing 
internal ideologies an external threat also manifested itself as a transmitter of the 
nationalistic idea, offering a real alternative (a smallholder society with private 
property) for the oppressed.  
While in the Ottoman Empire the opportunity for an essentially sectarian identity 
to develop and transform into something new (the “Ottoman nation”) arose at a 
rather slow pace, the numerous and elaborated national ideologies suddenly seemed 
to “flood” the local population. And, soon enough, a violent rivalry broke out among 
the representatives of the different South Slav national creeds.61 These ideologies 
were no longer (or not only) promoted or propagated by the nationalized church 
subjected to/or allies of the Ottoman state, but by patriot foreigners from the nation 
states built on secular society or by the local intelligentsia, also resulting in a 
multiplication of agents and ideologies, which presented ordinary people with a 
difficult choice. Identities became fuzzy and multidimensional because of the 
persistence of multiple reference systems. National indifference, the abundance of 
multidimensional or complex identities, regional and hidden identities and involuntary-
forced identities were the additional results of this process of congestion of ideologies. 
Oliver Jens Schmitt set up a model for Kosovo, sketching the evolution of identity 
from traditional towards ethnicized identity patterns. In our opinion the Macedonian 
case (the ethnicization of South Slavs) was similar. In Schmitt’s model in the first phase 
the Orthodox millet undergoes a nationalization process, therefore first a new 
“Slavic” identity is created to oppose the Greek Church. Within the millet the so-
called ‘Konfessionsnationen’—confessional nations—are evolving.62 The problem is 
that the fragmentation of the Christian millet did not stop here, because not only one 
centre existed/was created: the ethnicization/nationalization of religious identity took 
                                                 
58 The third one, tradionalist, was rather a Muslim political behavior with anti-Christian sentiments, as explained 
above. 
59 The same had also taken place in France (1789–1815) and Central Europe (1848-49), leading to violence there as 
well. So the redefinition of national identity that stirs up sentiment is not a particularly Balkan phenomenon. 
60 In Europe religious opposition preceded the occurrence of the nationalistic by many centuries, but religious 
wars fought then were just as violent. 
61 Schmitt, Kosovo, 160–67. 
62 After the abolition of the Patriarchate in Ipek [Peć], the goal of the Greek Patriarchate to uniformize the 
population failed, with the exception of the Vlachs, mainly because this kind of assimilation was based on the 
presence of the urban Greek population, which simply did not exist in either Macedonia or Kosovo after the 
numerous Albanian raids in southern Macedonia in the 1820s that broke up the “Greek” Orthodox merchant 
communities. 
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place not simply in contrast to the Muslim or Greek community, but also within the 
Christian community.  
Prior to the mass establishment of state-financed schools for the illiterate masses 
and consulates (or trade agencies) to promote state interests, the Church was the only 
institution that could transmit national(istic) ideologies. Furthermore, it was the 
Church, which appointed local teachers, with the approval of local authorities. 
Therefore establishing control over the (parts of the) Church63 was extremely 
important for the small states, as shown by the Bogoslovie conflict in Prizren (which 
we turn to in detail later). If the Church had financial problems, then the state 
intervened, but – in return for financial support – it expected the transmission of its 
nationalistic propaganda. 
Due to its early territorial autonomy, Serbia had plenty of time to build up an 
institutional system of its own in parallel to the Church (The Serbian Church became 
independent from Constantinople only in 1879, but without the Macedonian 
territories, where the authority of the Greek Patriarchate prevailed until 1918, 
although Slavic language in ceremonies was allowed to be used from 1859 on, and in 
the 1890s there was agreement between Constantinople and Belgrade to harmonize 
their measures taken against the Bulgarian advance). The main measures were the 
foundation of the Serb cultural commission in Belgrade in 1868 in order to hinder the 
Islamization of the Eastern Orthodox population; then, state stipends in Serbia were 
established; this was followed by the establishment of Družstvo Svetog Save in 1886 
to coordinate cultural activities that could not be undertaken by the Church.64 
In the case of the Greeks we have already shown that the relationship between the 
universalist Church and the nationalistic state was not always harmonious, causing 
frictions with the Patriarchate over questions of authority and the curriculum of 
schools. In contrast, in Bulgaria the establishment of the National Church preceded 
that of the state; the former adopted state functions which it managed to keep even 
later in areas that were not incorporated into the nascent Bulgarian state (in 
Macedonia). 
Thus, while Serbian identity became nationalized-secularized (the establishment of 
the secularized institutional background went in parallel with the activity of the 
Church, which later became nationalized and integrated into this system), Bulgarian 
identity, according to Schmitt, remained national-religious (the members of the 
Exarchate were considered Bulgarian of ethnicity, and the Exarchate was the 
                                                 
63 This is called the ’nationalization of Church’, which split Orthodoxy apart. 
64 Schmitt, Kosovo, 160–65. 
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precursor of the state performing numerous state functions).65 While in the Greek 
case the authority over schools generated a debate between national and ecclesiastic 
interests for decades, in the Bulgarian case the interest of the state and the church 
more or less coincided; their activities rather reinforced one another, resulting in a 
synergy. But the nationalization of the Church was slow even here: the schism 
between the Exarchate and the Patriarchate deepened only gradually. Initially the 
leader of the Exarchate refused the peasants’ demand for native speaker teachers,66 
and a radical turn in this question was observable only after 1901, when the 
Exarchate went on the offensive in South Macedonia. 
In this second stage of nationalization, a local civilian-secularized nationalistic elite was 
formed (with the support of external interference) that questioned the leadership of 
the local priests, often overthrowing the influence of the latter. During the third stage 
the Small States overtly interfered in this process by “offering” teachers and priests 
to help influence the target groups.  
But as ethnic affiliations were not directly derived from religious differences – 
new fault lines fragmented society not only in parallel to the original religious 
differences, but also perpendicular to these (Muslim Slavs, Exarchist Serbs, 
Patriarchist Bulgarians, and even Patriarchist Bulgarian-speaking Greeks) – this did 
not result in the consolidation of new patterns. The old patterns also prevailed 
(villages claiming themselves ’Christian’ during the population census). Indirectly 
this also implied plenty of conflict between nationalist organizations (from guerrilla 
groups to consular agencies) and religious institutions. So, the cooperation between 
ecclesiastic and nationalist propaganda was not as free of conflict as we might think. 
As in rural regions traditional religious identity was better “embedded”, a broad 
transitional zone between “consolidated” ethnicized identities developed, which did 
not appear on the “flattened” maps, only in statistics, on which these maps were 
based. The Ottoman census of 1903 probably illustrates this confused situation the 
best, as (1) it mixed the old and newly introduced ethno-religious categories as well, 
and thus (2) generated an uncertainty as to whether self-declaration, or the 
classification favoured by ecclesiastic authorities or the categorization of imperial 
authorities should be taken into consideration (and what terms should be used).67  
                                                 
65 Bulgarian nationalists also include Patriarchist Slavs and Pomaks in the category of the Bulgarian nation. 
66 From 1895 onwards Bulgarian schools in Macedonia were subjected to the Exarchate – teachers were 
appointed by the Exarchate. On the other hand, teacher training colleges existed only in Bulgaria, and so, 
although 90% of the teachers teaching in the schools of the Exarchate were born in Macedonia, they were 
educated in Bulgaria.  
67 As there were ’silent’ – unconscious or intimidated – communities and ’loud’ ones, protesting with petitions 
against the classifications. 
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 As religious identity was only slowly dissolved into the newly evolving ethnic 
identity, ethnicized identity patterns – according to Schmitt – also remained 
unconsolidated among Orthodox South Slavs. First, the new type of ethnicization 
reached only 5% of the population: masses of the peasantry remained untouched or 
were characterized by old or fluid, amorphous identity patterns.68 As late as 1903 in 
the Sanjak of Prizren 17,000 Eastern Orthodox Exarchists and 22,000 Patriarchists 
lived together; thus half of the Slavs in Kosovo (a part of whom was described as 
Bulgarian as early as in 1861) were still not Serbianized.69 (Had Bulgaria started to 
build its nation or its Church 30 years earlier, the entire Slavic population in Kosovo 
could have been made Bulgarian).  
Second, even Serbian and Greek historians like Volarić,70 Terzić and Gounaris 
agreed that, beyond nationalist or religious sentiments, self-determination was also 
based on pragmatic personal or economic interests and decisions. Joining the 
Bulgarian Exarchate implied some financial benefits, e.g. newcomers escaped from 
some tax impositions made by the Patriarchal eparches; Bulgarian schools offered a 
stipend, while a student of Greek schools paid tuition fee,71 and many other reasons 
had to be taken into account, such as geographical position, intimidation of 
guerrillas, local clan divisions, etc. In other words, pragmatic as well as idealistic 
reasons determined church affiliation and nationhood.72 Branislav Nušić, in 1892 
vice-consul in Bitola, vividly described what Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian 
propaganda yielded among the local population of one entirely Slavic-speaking 
village: “The church is Greek, the school is Exarchist, the two priests are ‘Serbomans’ … In 
the house of the priest Serbian books are hidden in a basement, periodicals from Sofia are on 
the table, one son is a student in Belgrade, the second son is the teacher of the Exarchate in 
Skopje, the third son is a former student of the Austrian Catholic mission, and two children 
                                                 
68 In 1865, only 150 students studied Serbian in Peć: thus a narrow, but resolute and devoted national élite was 
formed. Schmitt, Kosovo, 159–72. While the nationalization of this elite seems to be obvious, Schmitt did not 
find any evidence that the same process took place among the peasantry by 1900. The behavior of these 
peasant masses were still determined by the representatives and teachings of the Church until the mass 
establishment of state-supported schools began (after 1900). 
69 Hahn (then in Serbian service) described the Orthodox population of Gjilan (in Kosovo) as Bulgarian during 
his famous travel. 
70 Volarić, Klara. 'Between the Ottoman and Serbian State: Carigradski glasnik, an Istanbul-based Paper of 
Ottoman Serbs, 1895–1909.’ Hungarian Historical Review 3 (2014): 3. 560–586. 
71 For example, in their secondary school in Salonica, Bulgarians received accommodation and a yearly grant of 
350 francs. It is not surprising that (1) the social composition of Bulgarian secondary schools differed from that 
of the Greek, targeting a different social class, and that (2) students became susceptible to the Bulgarian 
national cause. Most of the leaders of the Bulgarian national idea were trained in Salonica, and later managed 
to integrate social banditry into the national schemes (Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 71-72, 78.). While Bulgarian 
schools became a hotbed of state propaganda through state grants and focused on training an elite with an 
obligation to the nation, Greek schools focused more on transmissing universal erudition. 
72 Gounaris, Basil. ‘Social Cleavages and National ‘Awakening’ in Ottoman Macedonia.’ East European Quarterly 
29, (1995): 409-426. 
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are attending the  elementary school of the Exarchate.”73 In the second part of our 
investigation, which comprises government and local strategies, some new evidence 
of this phenomenon (fluidness of ethnicized identity and the role of pragmatic 
interests) is collected and analyzed through numerous case studies. The first part of 
the booklet analyzing the specific forms of violence (which is also considered as a 
symptom of declining state power)74 also stresses the role of personal motives 
beyond group consciousness (the latter often serving as a pretext to settle old, 
personal disputes).  
Third general remark. The external factor I: the Powers. The wave of violence in 
Macedonia reached Western readers at the turn of the century, and the publicity it 
obtained also urged politicians to intervene. The basis of intervention was the 23rd 
and 62nd articles of the Berlin Congress. The latter made the interference of the 
Powers in the internal affairs of the Empire possible, if the Porte refused to treat its 
subjects equally and according to the general European practices and expectations, 
while the former stipulated the introduction of reforms in Macedonia as a self-
governing province of Turkey (though its scale and method of execution was left to 
the Porte, and thus it excluded European interference). But as neither was autonomy 
realized nor security increased, the Powers were finally vindicated in their right to 
intervene in 1903 (the Porte wanted to hinder this step; that is why it decided to 
implement some reforms prior to this, which were considered inadequate by both the 
Powers and the political leaders of the IMRO). The interference of the Powers was 
based on the Armenian (1895) and Cretan (1897–99) experience, where the pretext of 
intervention was also the 62nd article. The intervention was considered as a 
’humanitarian’ one even by contemporary observers, because it targeted only the 
defence of a certain group, the Christians.75 The problems of local Muslims, who also 
suffered several types of abuse, mistreatment and violence, were irrelevant from the 
Powers’ point of view.76 But even the suffering of the Catholic and Orthodox 
population could only gain political significance because it involved two competing 
Powers (Russia and Austria-Hungary, protectors of their co-religionists), and the 
advance of any Power alone in the Balkans had to be hindered, as the balance of 
power between the two forming Power groups, the Entente and the Triple alliance, 
had to be maintained. Thus the interference of the Powers can better be called 
                                                 
73 Terzić, Slavenko. ‘Конзулат Кралјевине Србије у битолју (1889-1897).’ Историјски часопис 57, (2008): 338-39.  
74 The loss of the state monopoly on violence is a typical feature of frontier zones. 
75  Durham Burden of the Balkans, 4.  
76 Rodogno, Against Massacre, 9-10, 170, 229. 
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’humanitarian imperialism’ – meaning here the colonization efforts justified by the 
necessity of humanitarian intervention.77 
This joint intervention of the Powers proved to be a failure (not for the last time): 
the new gendarmerie led by the international board of officers was unable to secure 
peace. The common political pressure of the Powers after 1906 was also insufficient, 
unable as it was to enforce the implementation of new reforms. The Powers remained 
quite underinformed regarding the situation in the three vilayets – a lesson not 
learned even later – and committed several mistakes beyond applying an inadequate 
number of gendarme officers. Hiring more was hindered by the fact that the budget 
of the provinces showed a huge deficit even when tax reforms were implemented 
and tax arrears were collected.78 The opposing parties thought that the Powers’ 
proposal to rearrange the administrative borders would be carried out according to 
the ethnic composition,79 and the subsequent enactment of the (regular) Ottoman 
population census (1903-05) was thought to be a measure to prepare for this – 
especially because numerous new ethnolinguistic categories were introduced that 
way approaching the Ottoman concept to Western terminology.80 Thus, the two 
independent bureaucratic reforms acquired a political context.81 There was also a 
remarkable contradiction in arguing for the necessity of humanitarian intervention 
(which was regarded as legitimate by the press and public opinion) and at the same 
time considering local minorities as being able to defend themselves.82 As a result, 
compared to the earlier cases, it was not solely the Ottoman Empire that was blamed 
for the failure of the reforms, but the Macedonian paramilitary troops as well, which 
were not only no longer considered to be groups fighting for national goals and 
against oppression (as they were in 1903), but were also seen to be criminals.83 
Fourth general remark. Regional vs. national identity – the Macedonian factor. The clash 
of imperial and national thought over the Balkans and the growing rivalries between 
the competing groups had an important consequence. Debated or ill-defined 
territorial claims and geographical terms (Macedonia) appeared in mental maps, 
                                                 
77 The occupation of Bosnia was reasoned that way. See: Asbóth, János. Bosznia és Hercegovina. Budapest, 1887. 
(He had strong ties to Benjámin Kállay). See a similar evaluation of Kállay’s policy also from Gratz Gusztáv. 
’Bosznia Kállay halála korában.’ Huszadik Század 5, no. 1 (1904). 
78 Douglas Dakin. Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913. Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966,.150. 
79 This was first accepted by the Powers, causing upheavals and objections, then later dropped, also causing 
dissatisfaction. 
80 Yosmaoğlu, Blood ties, Chapter 4. 
81 The former population census was carried out ten years earlier, in 1893. 
82 “Massacres in the Macedonian provinces aroused a smaller amount of sympathy among the European public than had the 
massacres of Armenians. Whereas the Armenians were the archetype of defenseless victims, European newspapers 
portrayed the Macedonian people as brave insurgents able to defend themselves. The Macedonian Question could not be 
portrayed as a struggle of oppressor versus oppressed.” Rodogno, Against Massacre, 234. 
83 Rodogno, Against Massacre, 238-43. 
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which did not take into consideration local forms of identity: instead of overlapping 
and fitting existing reality, these instead created new cleavages and further 
complicated tensions. The evolving regional-geographical identity did not fit into the 
concepts of the neighbouring nation states (see the Bulgarians’ contemporary view of 
Misirkovism and of Chupovski),84 because it was bound primarily to territory, not to 
language or religion or commitment towards any of the new political centres. While 
the Bulgarians claimed that Macedonia should be Bulgarian (and not only because of 
the language, or because of the fabricated historical past, but because of the legal 
constructions they used in their argument – the constitution of Tarnovo was 
approved by the representatives of Macedonia as well, during the great national 
assembly in 1878, and the area was the part of the Exarchate, which de facto 
undertook state tasks), Chupovski, in his letter blaming the Bulgarians for the events 
of 1912-13, put the territorial integrity of Macedonia first and considered any 
partition harmful.85 
For this pro-Macedonian elite (like Pop-Arsov), the basis of mobilization was their 
belonging to Macedonia and not belonging to any state and nation (either Bulgarian 
or Serbian).86 Autonomy – promised in Berlin – and territorial unity were the 
foremost goals for them, whether realized within the boundaries of the Ottoman 
Empire or within Bulgaria, etc.87 But it is also true that autonomy was regarded only 
as a tactical element for many of the influential personalities in the IMRO (like Goce 
                                                 
84 June 25, 1910. Archimandrite Neophyte in Skopje to Bulgarian Exarch Joseph in Constantinople. Cited in: 
‘Diskusija – Misirkov i nacionalno-kulturniot razvoj na makedonskiot narod do Osloboduvanjeto.’ In Zbornik 
Misirkov, Simpozium, edited by S. Dimevski. Skopje: Institut za makedonski jazik, 1975, 338-39. 
85 What did Bulgaria represent for Macedonia? “…The role of Bulgaria as regards to Macedonia was from the very 
beginning criminal; it was first to violate…the article of the Berlin Treaty which bound Turkey to introduce reforms in 
Macedonia… strove to destroy in them any idea of an autonomous Macedonia… in 1888, the Bulgarian Government 
destroyed the ‘Macedonian Literary Society’ under the presidency of Georgi Pulevski….Two years later, in that same 
Sofia, the Bulgarian Government closed the evening schools, specially opened for the emigrant Macedonian craftsman…”  
Chupovski, Dimitrija. ‘Macedonia and the Macedonians,’ Makedonskij Golos, 1913, 130-33. 
86 “…We have been Macedonian fighters and we will fight to the end for the Macedonian people, but we do not fight for 
Bulgaria or Serbia, nor Greece; they are free and live freely … We are not against any nationality of either Bulgaria, 
Serbia, or Greece; we should recognize the merit of those who would help us. If there had been any Serbian, Bulgarian or 
Greek land here, they should not have waited for us to die in the mountains but should have liberated Macedonia with 
their armies; only then they could have demanded Serbia, Bulgarian or Greek land here…” A letter of a Macedonian 
warlord to another. Taken from ‘Blazhe Krusheski DA SSID – Fond Izvrshnog odbora Srpske narodne 
organizacije F-6 (1906)’. 
87 The IMRO officially considered Macedonia an indivisible territory and claimed all of its inhabitants to be 
"Macedonians", irrespective of their religion or ethnicity. In practice, most of their followers were Bulgarians. 
Officially it opposed foreign propaganda according to its statute of 1902 prior to Ilinden and after it in 1906. 
Chapter I. Art. 1. – The goal of the Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization is to unite any and all 
dissatisfied elements in Macedonia and the Adrianople Vilaet without regard to their nationality so that political 
autonomy can be achieved for these two regions. Art. 2. The Organization opposes any other country’s intentions to 
divide and conquer these two regions. … Chapter II. Art. 3. To achieve this goal, the Organization aims to abolish 
chauvinist propaganda and nationalistic disputes … Excerpt from the statute of IMARO, 1906 (in Bulgarian, 
amended at the general congress in 1906).  
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Delchev88 and Hristo Tatarchev): for them the desired outcome of the events was a 
unification with Bulgaria.89 On the other hand Jane Sandanski (who, having the 
greatest social conscience, urged socio-economic change) remained an autonomist. 
This division (revealed also in the amendments of the statute of the IMRO) decreased 
the success of the revolutionary organization.  
So, to apply Philipp Ther’s term, Macedonian vilayets became ‘lands caught in-
between’: intermediary spaces not only in geographical but also in cultural and 
ethnic terms. Beyond national thought infiltrating from ‘abroad’, the emerging ‘local 
patriotism’ originating from local dialects and traditions also became a basis of self-
identification.90 This concept considered Macedonia not as a periphery of an existing 
entity (as the neighbouring states considered it), but as a separate centre.91 
This internal Macedonian factor should not be ignored when discussing the roots 
and types of conflicts. In general, neither national nor regional ideas were strong 
enough to capture the minds of the overwhelming majority, and this made the 
population partly resistant, partly apathetic and hesitant, and it also contributed to 
the emergence violence.  
Fifth general remark. The external factor II. The aspirations of small states. Contrary to 
that explained above, the Christian nation states of the Balkans considered areas 
under Ottoman rule as a potential part of their countries. Citing religious issues 
(using the Exarchate as a Trojan horse) or the state’s interest (refugee questions, 
railways, etc.), they – competing with each other – continuously demanded 
interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state. The nation state building 
attempts of these small states can also be interpreted as some kind of colonization 
                                                 
88 The idea of autonomy was strictly political and did not imply a secession from Bulgarian ethnicity, as one of the 
founders, Hristo Tatarchev pointed out in his memoirs. Cindy C. Combs and Martin W. Slann, Encyclopedia of 
terrorism. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009. 135. Delchev wrote that the autonomy then was only a tactic, 
aiming at future unification with Bulgaria. “Firstly, the revolutionary organization began to work among the 
Bulgarian population, not even among the whole of it, but only among this part, which participated in the Bulgarian 
Exarchate. IMARO treated with suspicion the Bulgarians who were members of other churches, such as the Greek 
Patriarchate, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church. As to the revolutionary activity among the other 
nationalities, such as the Turks, Albanians, Greeks and Vlahs, such a question did not exist for the founders of the 
organization. For IMARO, these other nationalities were foreign people... Later, when the leaders of IMARO saw that the 
idea of the liberation of Macedonia could find followers among the Bulgarian non-Exarchists, as also among the other 
nationalities in Macedonia, and under the pressure from IMARO members with left, socialist or anarchist convictions, 
they changed the statute of IMARO in the sense that a member of IMARO can be any Macedonian, regardless of 
ethnicity or religious denomination.” Мемоари на Димитар Влахов. Скопје, 1970, p. 21. See also Борбите на 
македонския народ за освобождение. Библиотека Балканска Федерация, no. 1, Vienna, 1925. 11. Dimitar 
Vlahov became later the vice-president of Yugoslavia, formerly oscillating between pro-Macedonian and pro-
Bulgarian nationalism.  
89 Гоцев, Димитър. Идеята за автономия като тактика в програмите на национално-освободителното 
движение в Македония и Одринско 1893–1941. Sofia: Изд. на Българска Академия на Науките,  1983, 34. 
90 Ther Philipp. ‘Caught in Between. Border Regions in Modern Europe.’ In Shatterzone of Empires, 487-88, 496-97. 
91 They argued that in 1878 two Bulgarian autonomous principalities were originally planned by the Powers: an 
eastern and a western one, the latter including Macedonia, with Sofia as its centre. 
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effort (according to the socialist theorist Dimitrije Tucović, the behavior of small 
states during the Balkans Wars was very similar to that of the Powers in Africa).92 
Their struggle for Macedonia escalated into a ’cold war’, where the Serbian, 
Bulgarian and Greek interests collided and clashed indirectly with each other (and 
with the aspirations of the Powers) on foreign terrain at the cost of the local 
population. This ’cold war’ first erupted in an allied war against Turkey (the First 
Balkan War), then reached the next stage in the form of a direct showdown between 
the small states (the Second Balkan War) and finally it culminated in a war with the 
most interested power (Austria-Hungary) as a rival (WWI).93 
So, the speciality of Macedonia (as a geographical term) was that is was not only 
exposed to the colonization attitude of the Powers, but also to the aspirations of the 
small states94 – resulting in a multiplayer situation (which explains the diversity of 
ideas and political groups). Such an exacerbated state of affairs was more difficult to 
handle than a simple two-player system. 
 
 
Historical background (1903-1908) 
 
As the story we outline here is not a linear one, a brief summary of the events 
between 1903-1908 – beyond the discussion of the interpretative frameworks detailed 
in the previous chapter – is also necessary. 
In the aftermath of the 1878 Great Eastern Crisis, the remainder of the Balkan 
Peninsula had irreversibly become a frontier zone of the Ottoman Empire, a territory 
in which the collapsing central government was in direct contact with the rival Great 
Powers and the dynamically modernizing nation states nurturing expansive 
ambitions. This new situation sparked violence on the Ottoman side of the border, 
aggression that authorities either failed or did not even attempt to stop. By the end of 
the first decade of the twentieth century, Ottoman central power almost totally 
collapsed in the Kosovo Vilayet, leaving a vacuum for the propagandistic activity of 
Small States. This manifested itself in a competition for souls, schools and religious 
posts between Serbs and Bulgarians proclaiming nationalistic views and aspirations 
(a revival of ethnic mapping), and in the establishment of the revolutionary Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).  
                                                 
92 Tucović, Dimitrije. Srbija i Arbanija. Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije. Beograd–Zagreb: 
Kultura, 1946, 107–108. 
93 “It began as a war of liberation, it became rapidly a war of conquest and it has ended… in being a war of extermination.” 
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol. 56. p. 2293. Edward Grey, 12 August, 1913. Recent events 
proved that the problems of the region are still not resolved. 
94 Petrungaro, Balcani, 30-36. 
34 
 
IMRO was established in 1895 as a secret organization, but its cover was blown 
following a robbery of 800 Ottoman lira two years after its establishment. In 1896 an 
external branch was founded to help migrants/refugees and to promote cooperation 
with the Supreme Organization (the Verhovists), founded in the same year, with the 
purpose of fighting for liberation and the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria. 
The latter proposed a general uprising and the militarization of the organization 
(instead of conspiracy, network-building and training and influencing teachers as 
propagated by the internal organization), in order to provoke the intervention of the 
Powers. The IMRO wanted to avoid uprisings, considering them premature. But the 
following developments gradually made leaders change their minds: the failure of 
Verhovist Bulgarian officers in 1902 in the Gorna Dzhumaya uprising (due to the lack 
of local IMRO support); the subsequent intervention and reform plans of the 
Ottoman Empire and of the Powers (both considered unsatisfactory by the IMRO); 
the change in the support policy of the Danev government (a condition of the 
Russian loans was to decrease the support of Macedonian organizations), then after 
his failure the appointment of General Racho Petrov as prime minister (which 
brought Verhovists back into favourable positions); the bad publicity of the bomb 
attacks in Saloniki committed by the radical wing (which made the impression in the 
Western press that IMRO is a terrorist organization); and a series of revelations 
brought by the cooperation of Greeks and Ottoman authorities95 (the Patriarchist 
metropolite Germanos Karavangelos betrayed many activists). In order to prevent 
reforms considered unsatisfactory96 and to preserve its leading role as opposed to the 
Verhovists, IMRO stepped out from the shadows, and its activity culminated in an 
attempt to relieve the oppressed peasantry with the active contribution of 15,000 
guerrillas and the local population.97 But the Ilinden revolt (1903) soon took an anti-
Ottoman turn, though its leaders demanding autonomy for all inhabitants of 
Macedonia regardless of faith did not favour this outcome of events. Soon the 
participants began to march under Bulgarian flags, singing Bulgarian songs, which 
the leadership also wanted to avoid to preserve the general and indigenous local 
character of the uprising. 
                                                 
95 An example from Ottoman sources: Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. 345. 09.04.1902. See also: Ottoman 
Diplomatic Documents, II. No. 1190. 02.03. 1905. The Greek bands, explaining their own movement as organized 
as self-defence against Bulgarian aspirations, offered an alliance to the Ottomans. 
96 In the reform plan Huseyn Hilmi Pasha included the application of penal law to local authorities (instead of 
sharia), to which Christian representatives were also invited; he proposed a school for every settlement above 
50 households and the strengthening of the gendarmerie with Christian members (but still not proportional to 
their local representation). These reforms were not accepted by the Powers, who wanted Christian local militia 
for Christian areas and the joint administration of the three Macedonian vilayets. 
97 The second phase is the intervention of the Great Powers in 1903–1908; the third is the revival of violence after 
the failure of these Powers to settle the question. 
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With the Ilinden revolt (1903), the Macedonian question entered the next stage. 
The subsequent plundering of 200 villages, committed mainly by irregular Ottoman 
forces, producing 30,000 refugees and 70,000 homeless, resembled the era of 1875-
1876, triggering growing violence from each side as a consequence.98 Thus this new 
phase was characterized by the peace-keeping efforts of the Great Powers to restore 
order in the European Ottoman provinces and by the sharpening of national rivalry.  
 
Table 1. Atrocities in Macedonian vilayets during the Ilinden Uprising 
Vilayet House burnt Killed Raped Made homeless 
Monastir 8417 1752 2017 50211 
Edirne 2610 2565  12888 
Saloniki 1090 290  5772 
Skopje sanjak 94 60  577 
+ 30 000 displaced migrants 
HHStA, Liasse XL, Interna, 316kt. Kopien von Denkschriften / La Macédoine et le vilayet 
d’Adrianople, 1893-1903. 6. 
 
After this failure, IMRO found itself in a vacuum: Bulgaria came to an 
agreement with Serbia in which they proposed the dismemberment of Macedonia 
according to their spheres of interest. And though the Bulgarian-Ottoman 
agreement from the same year proposed an amnesty for all imprisoned IMRO 
members, the Bulgarian government refrained from the active support of IMRO, 
in favour of the Verhovists. Soon Greek bands alarmed by the uprising in 1903 
(they used Cretan volunteers, as they were Ottoman citizens, and thus could move 
around freely without strict controls) appeared, and the failure to secure 
autonomy by dint of their own strength, together with the above, resulted in a 
general shift to the right in IMRO. The pro-Bulgarian Garvanov and Boris Sarafov, 
who advertised terror as a necessary step, gained influence, pushing back the 
autonomist supporters of Sandanski and Gruev, who objected to violence. In 1905, 
during the Rila congress of the revolutionary organization, the Verhovists 
dominating the IMRO (while the left wing was engaged in fights against the 
Greeks around Seres) finally gave up their concept of sticking to violence and 
accepted the idea of promoting national propaganda through education – this 
naturally meant Bulgarian education. This strategy meant a return to the 
instruments applied during the Stambolovist regime a decade earlier.99 Without 
substantial opposition (Gruev was killed) Verhovists managed to position 
                                                 
98 During the two and half months of fighting in the Ilinden uprising, only 1000 activists were killed, but the 
civilian toll reached 4500 dead. Brailsford, H. N. Macedonia. Its Races and their Future. London: Methuen, 1906. 
166. 
99 Perry, Duncan, M. The Politics of Terror, 32-33. 
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themselves in the Prizren, Monastir and Skopje sanjaks. Feeling themselves 
tricked, the autonomists held their next congress separately in Dupnica in 1907, 
while the Verhovists held their meeting in Sofia (the venue obviously alludes to 
their connections).100  
The situation became more complicated by 1908. The Mürzsteg convention 
(regulating the intervention of the Powers) created more problems than it solved, 
as it contributed to the spread of violence instead of limiting it. Beside this, the 
shortage of financial sources also endangered Macedonian reforms, but the British 
opposed the increase of local tariffs from the low level of 8% to 11% because it 
would have been detrimental to their economic interest. Though they managed to 
put financial affairs under the auspices of all the Powers (which resulted in 
Austro-Hungarian objections, as it meant that the leading role was taken away 
from Russia and Austria-Hungary), the Ottomans refused any substantial changes 
unless their demand for the tariff increase be approved. When Sir Edward Grey 
demanded more reforms in 1908,101 the Porte refused it (this put an end to the 
cooperation between the Powers and the Ottomans), and tried to reach a separate 
agreement with Austria-Hungary (using the old principle of ’divide and rule’), 
offering the concession of the strategically important Uvac-Mitrovica railway (that 
would enable Austria-Hungary to reach Saloniki by rail) in return for their 
support. The cooperation between the Powers, and thus the reform movement, 
failed, though it did not put an end to the Powers’ plans regarding the Ottoman 
Empire. When rumours from the Reval meeting between Edward VII and the 
Russian Nicholas II on Macedonian autonomy spread across the land, this urged 
the Young Turks’ Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to intervene. This 
political group managed to unite local Muslim bands with different or no political 
goals at all.  Meanwhile Sarafov and Garvanov were murdered. Sandanski and the 
CUP entered into an armistice after the success of the CUP revolution, while 
Verhovists had to fight against Serbs supported by the CUP and against the 
Greeks as well. This meant that the possibilities for both the internal organization 
and the Verhovists became limited, and they became dependent on the financial, 
political and military support of their neighbours. 
 
 
                                                 
100 Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 39-45. 
101 According to these, the governing pasha of the 3 vilayets would have been responsible only to the Powers; 
reforms included an increase in the number of gendarmes, but a decrease in the numbers of official troops. 
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Map 1. Kaza-level religious and ethnic map of the Sanjak of Skopje. 
Cartography by Zsolt Bottlik. 
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Table 2. Ethnic composition of the kazas of the Sanjak of Skopje in 1903, based on Austrian 
consular reports102 
Nationality  
Kaza 
Total 
Skopje Kumanovo 
Kriva 
Palanka  
Kratovo Kočani 
Maleš 
Osmanie 
Radovište 
Štip 
(Ištib) 
Veles 
(Köprülü) 
Alba
nian 
Muslim 21,387 5,595 - - 7,800 - - - 1,500 36,282 (10%) 
Slav 
Exarchist 
(Bulgarian) 
25,921 23,710 22,141 17,391 16,524 16,536 7,622 19,472 29,394 
178,711 
(50%) 
Patriarchist 4,406 8,358 108 954 1,090 288 - - 4,130 
19,334 
(5,5%) 
Muslim 
(Pomak) 
5,600  - - - - 9,234  - - 5,242  
20,076 
(5,5%) 
Aromun 360 120 - 102 1,680  - - 900 3,162 (1%) 
Ottoman (Muslim) 9,949 6,765 1,929 3,815 11,600 425 10,464 25,764 12,512 83,223 (23%) 
Gypsies 2,404 1,008 336 336 712 485 390 378 664 6,713 (2%) 
Total 72,789 45,784 24,514 22,604 39,406 26,968 18,476 46,094 54 357 350,992 
Minorities such as Greeks and Jews, which comprise under one per cent of the population are omitted. 
 
                                                 
102 ÖStA, HHStA 19. Nachlässe, Nachlaß August Kral, Kt. 2, “Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und 
Religions-Verhältnisse im Vilajet Kossovo (1903)”. 
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II. The background to the tensions and the komitadji phenomenon 
 
 
Conflict types – general overview 
 
It was the ethnic and denominational-sectarian conflicts that claimed the most 
victims in Skopje Sanjak in the period from 1903 to 1908. But the question was too 
complicated to be reduced to Muslim-Christian opposition. In fact, these conflicts can 
be classified into three major groups – and this number is even doubled if we make a 
distinction as to the direction of the violence. Furthermore, not always religious or 
ethnic issues were in the background (as is evident in the case of numerous Muslim-
Muslim conflicts).  
The first type of religious conflict is represented by the rivalry between 
Patriarchists and Exarchists that began in the 1870s.103 Since the Skopje Sanjak was a 
collision zone of interests (referred to later as spornata zona or zone contestée) located 
between Serbia and Bulgaria, this type was quite frequent, although the proportion 
of Patriarchists did not exceed 10 per cent, compared to the 50 per cent of Exarchists. 
These tensions were not limited to this region—the same phenomena occurred in the 
Vilayet of Bitola (Monastir) and Saloniki (Selanik). This is demonstrated by the case 
of the Eastern Orthodox secondary grammar school in Prizren at the turn of the 
century. Atrocities over disputed symbolic places and institutions usually dominated 
in the first phases of these conflicts, followed by struggles against symbolic 
personalities and culminating in the fight against the local population. 
From the sectarian aspect, the second type, Muslim-Christian conflicts, proved to 
be the most serious among the peasantry in Kosovo Vilayet. A typical source of 
conflict was the Muslim raids on Christian churches, the perpetrators of which were 
hardly ever captured by Ottoman law enforcement forces. The latter often 
encouraged such attacks in order to punish četa groups, but it had greater impact on 
the civilian population than on paramilitary units.104 A good example of this type of 
attack is a Muslim Albanian raid of February 12, 1907, in which Eastern Orthodox 
churches in the villages of Zubovce, Požaranje and Galata near Gostivar were 
ransacked and burned down. These villages were maintained jointly by the Serbian 
and Bulgarian religious communities of Gostivar, where the denominational identity 
                                                 
103 The existence of the Exarchate evidently served nationalistic goals, as the liturgy mentioned the name of 
Bulgarian rulers instead of the Sultan or the Patriarch, thus challenging their legitimacy. This was the case 
with regard to the Varnava affair late in 1913, when Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria was mentioned in an exarchist 
village under Serbian occupation. Compared to this, the Greek Patriarchate was more popular in urbanized 
areas and among educated communities. 
104 Which tried to retaliate in response to these incursions, also against civilians, triggering a vicious circle. 
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was at the time still stronger than national differences. However, the delinquents 
were known to be Muslim Albanians originating from surrounding villages, and the 
authorities did nothing in spite of the fact that even foreign consuls were voicing 
protest to the Grand Vizier.105 We must also stress that this sectarian dividing line 
was not identical to dividing lines between nationalities: for example, in Shkodra 
Vilayet (today west Kosovo), the Muslim Albanians launched attacks on the shrines 
of the local Christian Albanians, as well.106 
The third type of religious conflict took place between Muslim communities 
(including numerous sub-types: Bektaşi-Sunni; rural-urban; citizen-official, Albanian 
blood feuds). Our statistical analysis will stress that conflicts of this type were not 
negligible in the Skopje Sanjak, either.  
The three types of conflict often appeared together in the same area: sometimes 
their motives can genuinely be traced back to sectarian differences, sometimes to 
customary law, though they can also be attributed to economic, social or personal 
antagonisms, and were often encouraged by foreign pressure. So, tensions and 
conflicts were not always monocausal and thus not exclusively of ethno-religious 
character – though even multicausal differences could manifest themselves in ethnic 
tensions (which are easy to perceive), generating simple, but often superficial 
explanations. The truth is that although ethnic differences often served as a pretext to 
trigger violence, but behind the surface other processes were also responsible for the 
outburst of tensions including economic problems (poverty, restricted accessibility to 
sources), or migration (during which people also became exposed of new ideologies 
beside exerting demographic pressure to a region), the distrust towards the central 
authorities (which was unable to find solutions for the existing socio-economic 
problems). The tensions between the landlords and peasants, capitalists and workers 
also had several layers – of which ethnic character was only one (Muslim landlord, 
Greek factory owner, etc.) 
The diversity of problems that could result in violence of (seemingly) ethnic 
character can be well observed even in small areas, as the remarks of Vasil Kanchov, 
the Bulgarian school inspector, have shown (Table 3). 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, February 12, 1907, No.14/pol. (Beilage No. 131.res 
Rappaport to Oppenheimer, 8). 
106 Ibid. For similar conflicts see: Clayer, Natalie. ‘The Dimension of Confessionalization in the Ottoman Balkans 
at the time of Nationalisms.’ In Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans, 89–109. 
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Table 3. Diversity of economic problems and ethnicity in a small region south of the 
Bulgarian border 
  
Bulgarian 
households 
Pomak 
households 
Turkish 
households 
Vlach 
households 
Bulgarian 
dwellers 
Pomak 
dwellers 
Ottoman 
dwellers Remarks of Kanchov, cca 1900 
Fotovishta 103 40     303 200   mineral water, bath 
Markovo 
čiftlik 46       200     no church, carpenters 
Obidish 220       1050     great poverty 
Krimen 214       1090     great poverty 
Musomishta 90   90   450   468   
Garmen 160             
No local revenue sources: 
dwellers travel to Bulgaria to earn 
their living, thus easily turned 
into Bulgarians 
Vyazem 115   120   553   608   
Eles 45   200   200   990 
Bulgarian-Turkish dispute: the 
Turks want to get the land and 
income sources of Bulgarians 
Zrnevo 380   55   1855   380 
Graecoman-Bulgarian-Turkish 
dispute, partly on an economic 
basis: fertile lands, but limited 
water accessibility 
Karaköy 294       1300     
divided: Sandanski's supporters 
are  “terrorizing” the others 
Gaytaninovo 200       1000     
the religious war began 70 years 
ago, with the establishment of the 
Church  (1839) 
Извори за българската етнография. Етнография на Македония [Sources of Bulgarian Ethnography. 
The Ethnography of Macedonia]. Sofia: Ak. Izd. Marin Drinov, 1998.77-87. 
 
The escalation of the conflicts 
 
The Skopska Crna Gora (Karadag) Mountains, located north of Skopje, represented 
one of the major hotspots of nationalistic tensions beginning in 1907 (as this was the 
zone in which Albanian, Serbian and Bulgarian interests collided and overlapped). 
(The same was true for the kazas of Kriva Palanka, Kočani and Radovište.) Serbian 
refugees from Stara Srbija had settled here in numerous villages between 1689 and 
1739, and these refugees were not obedient to the Bulgarian Exarchate. The conflict 
broke out following a number of unrelated murders. One of the killing sprees was 
provoked by Serbians led by Voivode Petko Ilić, when they attacked an Albanian 
village. Another incident took place in the village of Brodec: during a raid, Bulgarian 
attackers killed two Serbian men and kidnapped seven more, who were never found. 
(Kidnapping was a rewarding activity. The self-subsistence and the military potential 
of IMRO was established by 14,500 liras paid as ransom for a Miss Stone, which 
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facilitated the purchase of 5000 rifles with 200,000 rounds of ammunition).107 The 
motives remained unknown in both cases. In addition to the constant Bulgarian and 
Serbian propaganda and the activity of infiltrating irregular foreign troops, the 
situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the peasants of Skopska Crna Gora 
lived in traditional communities in which the unwritten customs of the family blood 
feud entailed obligations for family members. The two series of events mentioned 
infuriated the local communities, which wished to avenge the dead. A few months 
later everybody was fighting with one another. In this case, the local conflicts 
stemmed from the consequences of local customs over which state law had 
seemingly no authority whatsoever,108 while the presence of foreign influence 
complicated the situation even further. The authorities did nothing, although the 
local people had asked not only them, but the consulates of the Great Powers to 
intervene as well. The subsequent peace negotiations were led by an Archimandrite 
from a local monastery named Sava, who unsuccessfully tried to make a peace based 
on unwritten customs instead of official law. Although his efforts were thwarted by 
the local Albanians, who did not wish to give besa for the peace, his activity clearly 
illustrates that local people did not trust official Ottoman administrators as much as 
religious leaders with respect (charisma), and that local customs were much more 
authoritative than imperial law.109 
Problems occurred not only at the Ottoman-Serbian border. Just another example 
how complicated the situation could be if a third party, a state (with different 
preferences and pretensions) is involved into blood feud. In the spring of 1901 and 
Albanian from Gruda tribe shot a miller near Podgorica in Montenegro, because the 
miller was said to have shot one of his relatives years ago. However, the miller 
happened to be a relative of Nikola, prince of Montenegro, who asked for 
punishment from Ottoman authorities. As this delayed, Nikola sent a punishing 
expedition force of 25 men penetrating into Ottoman area. This force near the town 
Tuzi opened fire on an Albanian gathering, killing seven people as a revenge for the 
one miller. The Gruda tribe soon took revenge and killed 5 gendarmes along the 
Podgorica-Plavnica road. Violence escalated further, because the relatives of the 
                                                 
107 Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 32. But by 1907 ransom became of secondary importance. Hostages were taken to 
blackmail communities to leave the Exarchate and return under the authority of the Patriarchate according to 
the policy of Serbian bands. For details see Chapter III. Documents from: ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. 
108 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, July 27, 1907, No.55/pol, 17 and October 29, 1907, 
No.71/pol, 14. 
109 For information about the Lebenswelt of mountains and plains, including social norms corresponding to 
geographical attributes and constraints, see Frantz, ‘Zwischen Gewalt’, 63–79, and Frantz, Anne Eva, ‘Soziale 
Lebenswelten imspätosmanischen Kosovo, 1870–1913. Zur Bedeutung von Berg und Ebene, Ökologie und 
Klima.’ In Studime përnder të Rexhep Ismajlit me rastin e 65-vjetorit të lindjes, edited by Bardh Rugova. Prishtinë: 
KOHA, 2012. 261-73, esp. 262. 
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gendarmes also took revenge by killing some innocent fishermen on Lake Scutari. 
However these poor guys belonged to the Hoti tribe, thus the revenge was 
mistargeted. Thus the Hoti tribe was also involved into this chain of murders based 
on blood feud and a Hoti tribesman killed two Montenegrin in the next fair at 
Podgorica, but the local townsmen immediately killed him. Thus from then on even 
the citizens of the town became involved in the revenge-series. And so on...110 
By 1907 the situation became crucial along the Bulgarian frontier zone as well.111 
Here local traditions were exacerbated by the propaganda112 and paramilitary 
activity of small states. The equality of citizens meant nothing in these peripheries 
where local communities and identities were still stronger than the imperial identity 
that attempted to implement ‘unfamiliar’ civil rights. These traditional communities 
became more susceptible to nationalism if it occurred together with the defence of local 
interests and traditions. In a notebook, the Bulgarian consul in Skopje recorded more 
than 750 cases of violence committed by Serbs and Greek bands in 1906–1907. The list 
starts with the activity of Georgi Kapitan, who crossed the border with his Serbian 
četa and captured six hostages in two raids, then returned to Skopska Crna Gora, 
which served as his hinterland.113 It was a perfect base for operations: while 
promoting Serbian objectives, at the same time Kapitan could also avenge the 
previously cited atrocities committed against his host community. Local aspirations 
and state priorities intertwined, and those taken captive could never be sure whether 
they were being held for ransom to promote the Serbian cause or would be victims of 
blood feud.  
Even more interestingly, two more Serbian četas were reported from the region of 
Kratovo and Štip in January 1907 in spite of the bad weather conditions and the fact 
that the location was far away from the Skopska Gora borderland. The Serbian bands 
often operated far away from their hideouts and hinterlands in distant kazas to 
hinder the activity of authorities and to veil their communication lines. The 
organization of IMRO was a bit different – for each kaza or sanjak there was a 
voivode appointed who was responsible for the protection/control of the local 
population, and their troops did not cross the district boundaries unless it was 
necessary (cooperation in campaigns, or being chased). These Serbian attacks were of 
different character compared to the ‘usual’: in February, Ivan Stajkov kidnapped the 
                                                 
110 vadmezői Führer, Lajos. Néprajzi jegyzetek Montenegróból. Földrajzi Közlemények 41, 1913. 366. 
111 See details in Chapter III. 
112 Георгиев, Георги Н.  Българското националноосвободително движение в Македония (1893–1912). 
Идеология, политика, революция. Македонски преглед 40, no. 3 (2017): 7-20. and Georgiev, Georgi N. The 
Bulgarian national liberation movement in Macedonia (1893–1912) – Ideology, politics, revolution. Macedonian 
Review 40, no. 3 (2017): 21-34. 
113 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. 
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starešinas (chiefs, elders) of Stariprad village and forced the village to declare its 
loyalty to Serbia by taking on Serbian identity.114 These acts were definitely not 
connected to any vengeful act, and marked a new type of warfare: the prolongation 
of the ’season’ to winter (prior to St. George’s day), something quite unfamiliar in the 
previous decade. 
Changes in national consciousness were not permanent or irreversible: in many 
cases villages changed their identity quickly, if another četa appeared, in order to 
avoid violence. Even religious and national categories were often mixed within the 
same village. The intruders usually inquired about the nationality of residents (Serb, 
Bulgarian, Greek), though priests answered according to religious category 
(Exarchist, Patriarchist), which did not satisfy the intruders.115 The timing of these 
raids has more significance than the acts themselves: these events took place in 
winter, and cannot be explained by simple banditism, the goal of which was to 
collect food and other means of subsistence. Since the villagers stayed in their 
dwellings during winter, an attack on them was riskier during this period than in the 
summer, when potential victims were working in the fields. Therefore, the 
previously mentioned četa groups can be regarded as well-trained, organized and 
determined units in comparison to a simple band of robbers or mercenaries without 
deep-rooted nationalistic commitments.116 
 
Some temporal and spatial patterns of četa activity 
 
Map 2 from 1907 indicates that in Skopje Sanjak there were four larger četas (over 25 
persons) and six smaller Bulgarian ones, two smaller Muslim ones, and two larger 
and six smaller Serbian ones. Thus, the ethnic pattern of violence (the variety of 
potential aggressors) was diverse even in such a small area. On the other hand, there 
was also one kaza (administrative sub-unit in Skopje Sanjak) with (officially) no 
bands at all and one with only one (Muslim) group. The region of Monastir and 
Vodena showed similar pattern with their high density of bands, while the 
composition of četas was less diverse in the South, around Drama, Seres and Melnik 
(all in all 10 groups: seven Bulgarian and three Greek).  
                                                 
114 Ibid. This became a general strategy of Serbian bands. The Bulgarian consul was not alone in collecting data. 
By 1903 the lack of public security due to the significant decrease in Ottoman power prompted Austro-
Hungarian consuls to start keeping statistics on violent activities in their own districts as well. 
115 Livanios, D. Stavropoulo. ‘Conquering the Souls: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia 
1904–1908’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 23 (1999): 204 and 210–11. See also Balogh, Ádám. A 
nacionalizmus szerepe a görög politikai gondolkodásban. Szeged: SZTE, 2006.  
116 In winter food supply was scarce, which may have encouraged bands to undertake risky operations, though 
finding shelter and covering up tracks was also harder. Simple banditry was more abundant during the 
summer.  
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Regarding the duration of their activity in Skopje Sanjak only three of the 22 
bands mentioned were active before the 9th month of the year (and all were 
Serbomans). This means that most of them was connected to the yearly activity of the 
peasantry and thus with peasants themselves. Those bands that were already active 
early in May or June should be considered either to be “professionals” or 
“foreigners” or “urban terrorists” (social layers that were not dependent on 
cultivating the land), while the increase in number of bands that were active in 
autumn and winter refers to the increasing role of local peasants (who knew local 
circumstances well). For example, 10 out of the conscripted 26 Greek bands in 
Macedonia began their activity before the 9th month of the year, while this was 3/7 
among Muslim bands and 11/18 (more than 50%) among bands with Serbian 
affinities. In the case of Bulgarian groups this was “only” 12/50 (25%), beginning 
their activity especially early around Drama and Melnik in the close vicinity of the 
Bulgarian border (it is Sandanski’s homeland), referring to “professionals” 
independent from agrarian activity, or to “cross-border cooperations”. 
Another explanation for the different beginnings of četa activity could be the 
difference in the organization of the bands. The paramilitary troops in the western 
region (e.g. in Monastir Sanjak) began their activity well before September (17/43, or 
40%, a proportion markedly higher than that measured in Skopje Sanjak), usually 
after St. George’s Day (which is also the beginning of agrarian activity and the 
collection of tax). Since this region was not limitrophe with Bulgaria or Serbia, these 
troops stayed in their region for a longer time, and were engaged in consecutive 
operations with a larger radius of action, which also necessitated improved 
communication/cooperation with other bands. Due to the large distance from Serbia 
or Bulgaria, they had to organize themselves to secure supplies by maintaining good 
relations with the local population. Thus they were much more compelled to rely on 
local inhabitants than were the Serbian četas in Skopje, which were less dependant on 
local circumstances because of the proximity of the safe ’hinterland’. Therefore the 
latter applied crude force more often to enforce their demands on local communities. 
These četas operating in the eastern regions were mainly engaged in smaller 
operations (often not planned in advance, instead exploiting opportunities as they 
occurred) that lacked the campaign character of the western četas, after which they 
had the opportunity to retreat behind the border for reinforcements or supplies.  
The activity of bands were not randomly organized, but showed a systematic 
pattern. The bands that we consider ‘permanent’ (either located in the west or in the 
east) were organised by professionals (including civilian members of revolutionary 
organizations whose activity was discovered, and who were forced to go 
46 
 
underground), but local village militia also existed. These were  organized also by 
professionals, made up of local volunteers, characterized by a much smaller radius of 
action, and was considered some kind of reserve or auxiliary force (probably some of 
these appear on the maps as autumn četa). Special units also existed in urban centres, 
which were responsible for attacks against infrastructure and target persons; there 
were also professional executioners (hitmen) and a secret police. 
 
 
Map 2. Disposition and ethnic-political affiliation of cetas in areas falling under the Mürzsteg 
convention and the beginning and duration of their yearly activity 
 
It is also striking that the map lacks information on četa activity in the western 
fringes of the region, though banditism was not negligible even prior to 1903. The 
reason for this is that the map only indicates kazas involved in the Mürzsteg 
convention, while ’empty’ areas were not under the auspices of the Powers, and thus 
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bands operating there were not indicated. Such was the situation in the Prizren 
Sanjak, which we decided to use as a reference point (control) for the Skopje Sanjak 
governed by the Powers, in order to investigate any difference in the forms of 
violence and the operation of the bands. The distance from Bulgaria presumed 
differences in četa organization and activity, while the lack of humanitarian 
intervention and the abundance of Muslim Albanians promised conflicts of a 
different character. (Our hypothesis was that interethnic/interreligious conflicts – 
especially concerning Muslim-Christian relations – were more frequent in the 
western regions, where personal conflicts connected to blood feuds were also 
prevalent, unlike in the southern or eastern regions where ethnic and personal 
conflicts were accompanied by tensions of economic character – see Table 3 above). 
All this points to the fact that četas were (1) differentiated and (2) some of them 
were ’professionalized’, which allows us to typify them. Under professionalization 
we mean better organization, continuous activity, organized economic background 
(additional financial resources as well as expropriation), division of labour 
(differentiation within the group) and improved social networks (while previously 
isolation from civil society was dominant in the case of ’traditional banditry’).117 
These četas exceeded the level of bands living from robberies that might display some 
of the above elements, but not all. To claim that a band was professionalized, it was 
not necessary for it to have (though not necessarily stable) political commitment.  
Professionalized četas were very mobile, and they covered larger distances and 
areas, unlike bandits or rural militiamen. Professional četas were not confined to the 
seasonal rhythms of brigand life, as they had been when the frequency of raids followed 
a yearly cycle. During spring, the exhausted hard-core of the četas gained strength and 
supplies in the villages of their target/supply areas, and, by wandering from village 
to village (partly for security reasons, partly in order to gather men for their cause 
from the local militia, partly to intimidate internal opponents – many villages 
suffered from internal tensions), they increased their number to between 20 and 40 
men. Todor Alexandrov commanded a band of this type in Kratovo kaza in 1910.118 
The peak of their activity was the late summer, when villagers collected the harvest 
far from their relatively secure dwellings. Winter attacks were rare: local people 
referred to snow as the ‘white police,’ as it was more efficient than the Ottoman 
authorities or the international gendarmerie operated by the Great Powers between 
1903 and 1908.119 Increased winter activity can be regarded as a peculiarity of četas 
supported by small states, which were usually larger than other bands (the relatively larger 
                                                 
117 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 124-28. 
118 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, July 30, 1910., No.56/pol., 8. 
119 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, February 5, 1911., No.6/pol., 12. 
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number implies increased dependence on external sources). For example, the četa of 
Ivan Stajkov consisted of 30 men early in February,120 which means that it was more 
than merely the ‘hard-core’. (The ratio of big bands showing winter activity was 8/30 
or 26% in 1907, while it was 14/80 or 18% in case of small groups). 
 
 
Figure 1. Differences in the timing of Ottoman and Serbian attacks on Exarchist population based on 
the consular reports in Skopje (Skopje Sanjak, 1907, monthly distribution) 
ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. 
 
 
Četa types and their origins 
 
Beyond their size and the timing of their activity, other features also make it possible 
to typify guerrilla groups in Macedonia. In terms of their motives (which are often 
changing or intermingling), at least three different četa types can be discerned. Their 
aims could be social (revenge for local injustice), economic (from self-sustainment to 
weakening the economic basis of the enemy)121 or political (promoting national 
propaganda). But political results could also be achieved through the first two aims. The 
first group is identical to the ’social bandits’ of Hobsbawm, including some of the 
representatives of the Balkan celebi, the hajdut and the klepht. The second group 
comprised the real entrepreneurs of violence. They could be divided into two sub-
groups: the first only expropriated wealth produced by others, while the second 
organized the economy through its interference in the production structure (by 
promoting and controlling the production of better marketable goods, like opium or 
tobacco). As regards the third group, the ideologies behind the troops organized to 
                                                 
120 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. 
121 Sometimes bands with a nationalist commitment can be grouped here if they pursued such a tactic. 
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realize political goals were very diverse, while the organizational basis for the četas was 
extending in the second half of the 19th century.122  
Following the turn of the century two new general tendencies began to gain 
ground. The first was that denominational (sectarian) and national categories were 
mixed and combined in all conceivable ways in these groups – the goals and motifs 
mentioned above were various and often intermingling or changing. It is not a new 
phenomenon. Ethnically mixed bands existed even in 1881: during the revolt against 
the compulsory military service introduced by Austria-Hungary, two out of the four 
main groups were religiously heterogeneous.123 But even after 1904 we may find 
ethnically mixed (in other cases simply cooperating) Greek-Muslim četas in Southern-
Macedonia jointly fighting against Bulgarians.124 The difference between the two 
dates is that the first case can be labelled as social banditry – the group was formed to 
oppose the ’oppression’ of the state (though the different cooperating denominations 
might understand ‘oppression’ to mean different things), while after the turn of the 
century such motifs were of local or secondary importance. The 1904 case cannot be 
interpreted as social banditry – it represented guerrilla warfare in the ’cold war’ of 
small states. On the other hand, this ’supranational cooperation’ (mixed band) was 
still driven by political motives (for ethnically mixed bands with political 
commitments see also table 6),125 while in other cases the profit was the main 
motivating factor. In 1907 in Skopje Sanjak four Serbian attacks were commited by 
ethnically-religiously mixed groups and this constituted 10% of all raids led by 
Serbians.126 
And this was the second symptom. After the turn of the century a new social 
stratum emerged in Macedonia again, as was the case during the ’Kirdjali era’: being a 
četa member became a lifestyle. Its members were destitute and therefore radical men 
(regardless of their religion or nationality) who simply tried to profit from the chaos. 
The Greeks tried to organize their paramilitary units this way from 1904, hiring men 
(mercenaries in fact), often regardless of their nationality, who were not devoted to 
the Greek national movement, but had knowledge of local conditions, and therefore 
this offered a higher rate of success or effectiveness. (The group leaders were Greek 
officers with less knowledge of local circumstances, while Cretan volunteers, though 
                                                 
122 Troops fighting against Ottoman rule were the first to appear (up to the 1860s). These were followed by 
irregular armies organized on a sectarian basis: the Patriarchists and the Exarchists (1870s). These were later 
substituted by groups organized based on nationality. The Bulgarian bands split further after the 1890s, when 
war broke out between IMRO activists and Verhovists in Macedonia. After 1878 ‘nationalist’ Albanian 
paramilitary units also appeared in Kosovo Vilayet in addition to mercenary troops and bashibazouks. 
123 Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia. A Short History. London: Papermac, 1996. 139. 
124 Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 41. 
125 A mixed Serbian-Muslim band was formed in Kočani with the approval of the local Ottoman authorities. 
126 See: ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. A datailed analysis is given in Chapter III. 
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fierce and accustomed to warfare in the mountains, also lacked local connections).127 
Thus, besides the irregular troops arriving from abroad (which were fighting to 
realize national ambitions) and local revolutionary forces (like IMRO), these 
mercenary bands also created their own armed groups and under the banner of 
national goals they essentially lived off the terrorized population, as they could be 
hired by just about anyone to intimidate and kill the local population. These groups 
would often be balancing banditry, social resistance, freedom fighting, terrorism, but 
sometimes even functioned as the auxiliary forces of Ottoman authorities (when 
participating in the maintenance of public order or leading punitive operations).  
This behavior has a long tradition in Balkan countries – even among ethnically 
homogeneous groups. (Ethno-religious heterogeneity is a sign, but not an exclusive 
characteristic of these groups). The Hajdut and Klepht movements, which had been 
active in the Balkans for centuries, can be considered as precursors. Hajduts and 
klephts were not purely social bandits as Hobsbawm tried to depict them; they also 
lived from robbery and the exploitation of the local population. The line between 
lawlessness and legality was a thin one: if they were hired (and paid) by the central 
power to maintain order (or to attack another klepht band – the easiest way for the 
Ottomans to get rid of the problem, at least partially), the klephts turned into armatole 
(irregular forces) – still living from violence, but now in state service. Thus, contrary 
to Hobsbawm’s claim that banditism is organized against central oppression, in this 
case (and in many others – see the uskok robbers of Dalmatia) state support also 
contributed to the persistence of paramilitary activity. 
From the moral aspect, one might expect that state service meant some 
amelioration regarding their behavior and motivation, but often there was rarely any 
improvement. For many of them, what mattered was to get the payment, irrespective 
of who paid. They were merchants of violence and sold their services to whoever 
was willing to pay. (The pindari troops in India in the 19th century were similar.) 
This means that they were not always moving along the coordinates of nationalist 
sentiment, but it is also true that many armatole and klepht supported Greek 
independence in their hearts (others for money) and participated in the fight.128 
Their negation of traditional morals did not preclude some kind of codex of ethics 
– sometimes it even comprised religious elements (in a distorted form), some of 
which were still in force in the 20th century. For example, the 14th commandment of 
the ‘brigand code’ - analyzed by Koliopoulos - encouraged bandits to offer pious 
donations for the Church in order to forgive the sins they committed or were about 
                                                 
127 In 1905 87 out of the 255 known Greek Chetniks were Greek subjects, while another 21 arrived from Crete. 
128 See Balogh, A nacionalizmus, 16. 
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to commit.129 The Macedonian organizations had similar regulations. The main 
difference is that the Macedonian regulations were not so religion-centric and dealt 
instead with behavior and relations towards village society, the environs, on which 
there had not been much emphasis in the earlier ’codes’.  
The development of the discussed četnik type (and behavior) can be traced back to 
the era of Ali Tepedelenli, who organized the robbers of the time into policemen to 
maintain his regional power against the central authorities. Thus the roots of their 
resistance to central power (even going as far as separatism) might originate from 
here, as might their willingness to serve the authorities (Ali officially represented the 
Ottoman government). Thus an intermingling between gendarmerie and robbers was 
never overcome. Their social origin tied them to local communities, which forced the 
gendarmerie to apply illegal methods to expel them from a certain area. As each 
village provided at least one or two robbers (khersis), who had their relatives at home, 
their identity was well known, both to locals and the police. But local people often 
did not give them up to the authorities, instead paid them (the robbers, not the 
authorities) to defend the village from other robbers and to harass another 
community where they did not have relatives. (The betrayal of the robber by a 
villager might invoke the revenge of his ’peaceful’ local relatives.) This all was well 
known to the police, the zaptie, who were unable to break up these invisible ties and 
networks. Instead of direct confrontation or imprisoning relatives (which might 
induce revenge, but definitely not induce the restoration of peace), the zaptie chose 
another strategy: they often paid a mass visit to a village suspected to have 
connections with the robbers, and while they were staying there for weeks they ate 
up everything, thus also threatening the robbers’ supply base. Sooner or later it was 
the villagers who asked the robbers to move away from their hideout, or suspend 
their activity in order to get rid of the unpleasant ’visitors’. Such a solution implicitly 
meant that the policemen had indirect connections to the robbers (some of the zaptie 
were even their relatives or former bandmates or enemies), and that this strange 
game instead resulted in a stalemate: banditry was never obliterated, just moderated, 
or it shifted its base to a new location. The aforementioned robber type, the khersis, 
could be an archetype for the social outlaw, but also for the professional merchant of 
violence.130 
                                                 
129 Koliopoulos, Gioannis. S. Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912. Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1987. 260-69. 
130 St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Charles. Residence in Bulgaria. Twelve year study of the Eastern Question in Bulgaria. 
London: Chapman and Hall, 1877. 115–122. According to the romantic interpretation the Balkan çelibi (in 
contrast to the khersis) was the real (and rare) archetype of the social bandit. Nonetheless, this statement 
would be challenged by Hobsbawm and by Balkan national historiography, that consider reformed band 
leaders without deep intellectual knowledge, like Philip Totju and the apostles of freedom (Levski, Botev), but 
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So, the multi-ethnic or religiously mixed četas of the early 20th century – and 
there are several photographs of these religiously mixed bands in the military 
archives of the Great Powers (Photo 1) – can be characterized as group organized on 
an entrepreneurial basis: they were ’merchants of violence’, whose primary source of 
livelihood was fear. Nonetheless, these četa leaders could easily be convinced to 
change their allegiances. This is what happened to Ivan/Jovan Babunski, a former 
Bulgarian četa leader from the village of Martulica, who from 1907 onwards was 
considered to be a Serbian agent, trying to intimidate the dwellers of Kriva-Kruša 
(Veles) as described in a letter captured by the Bulgarian Lieutenant Colonel Nedkov 
in Skopje.131 
 
Photo 1. An example of hiring people of different ethnic backgrounds for the national cause: 
the ethnically and religiously mixed četa of the Serbian Lieutenant Gutriković in Kaza 
Kumanovo in 1908:  
 
     Source and copyright: Kriegsarchiv (Wien) AOK-Evidenzbureau, Kt. 3483.132 
                                                                                                                                                        
never Muslims, to be the archetype of the social outlaw. The çelibi is often depicted as a magnanimous high-
class personality (a gentleman of the woods) who became a socially declassed outlaw because of his conflict 
with the state authorities. An integral part of the image of the çelibi is that he helps the poor and desperate 
people, and fights against the representatives of central authorities (tax farmers, chorbadjis); in this way he 
buys the trust of the local people, preventing him being betrayed to the authorities. The çelibi is often a 
Muslim hero: he is a robber, like the merchant, but the latter is defended by the capitulations of the Powers, 
while the former is defended by the woodlands and the local inhabitants. Contrary to this ‘lawful lawless’, the 
khersis does not necessarily belong to the group of social bandits. He may randomly help his relatives or host 
community in great necessity, if this serves his interests too, but not necessarily. 
131 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 259. л. 109–110. 
132 Published by the permission of the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna. 
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But even bands originally organised to promote national ideas or characterised by 
real national commitment could be very heterogeneous in their composition and 
behavior. In a study, Dimitar Tasić analyzed the social base and social function of 
’Serbian’ bands operating during the Balkan Wars, and he came to the conclusion 
that irregular troops were characterized by completely different goals, methods and 
social-ethnic composition. The troops of Pavle Blažarić were composed of 
experienced četniks and border guards. Captain Tankosić (who maintained the četa 
training school in Prokuplje, was a trustee of the Black Hand, and had good personal 
contacts with Colonel ’Apis’) incorporated many Muslims from Bosnia, Metohija and 
Albanians from Kosovo into his troops. These persons were serving Serbian national 
goals not because of their commitment to the national cause, but because of personal 
interest: many were formerly expelled from their homeland, owing to previous 
conflicts, and they were eager to avenge earlier offences. Of course, this resulted in 
numerous outrages and atrocities.133 Another troop of 1300 soldiers led by major 
Vojin Popović was composed of Macedonian Slavs with anti-Muslim sentiments. 
Contrary to this, the units of Vukosavljević, aiming to occupy the Sanjak of 
Novipazar (he served here between 1905-1909 as a band leader and, as well as 
Tankosić, he was a member of Black Hand), were more disciplined, obedient to 
military leaders and tolerant towards the local population, regardless of racial and 
religious differences. It is not surprising that they were able to capture the town of 
Priboj without firing a single gun. Another Serbian četa leader, Trbić, settled in 
Macedonia, but originally was from Austria-Hungary.134 His troops were a mixture 
of Serbophile and Bulgarophile local Macedonian Slavs, in which the cohesive and 
driving force was the common hatred of Turks and Muslims. Not surprisingly this 
group also committed several atrocities, including killing six members of the 
Ottoman gendarmerie without any provocation and massacring 177 Albanians in a 
                                                 
133 As the member of the Black Hand Tankosić feared that the increasing pressure of the Great Powers on small 
states and on the Ottoman state would hinder the outbreak of hostilities.  Thus acting separately he launched 
an attack on Ottoman outposts in 15 October, 1912, prior to the official declaration of war to produce a fait 
accompli. After the failure of his attack, his troops were driven back as untrustworthy to the second line, but 
Tankosić was saved from further retorsions thanks to his good relations with Apis. Unfortunately, these 
troops found their way to influence the moral behaviour of the regular units: they were responsible for most 
of the arson and violence against local people and prisoners of war. Of course, these methods also meant that 
they were able to collect weapons from local inhabitants, securing the ’hinterland’. Tasić, Dimitar: Repeating 
phenomenon. Balkan Wars and Irregulars. In Les guerres balkaniques (1912-1913). Conflicts, enjeux, mémoires. 
Edited by Catherine Horel. Bruxelles et al: Peter Lang, 2014. 25-37. 
134 The relatively high proportion of Serbian band leaders originating from Hungary wass probably in 
connection with the dissolution of Military border in 1881. Many had to give up their original livelihood 
which determined the life and customs of generations, and the loss of their occupation did not mean the 
immediate disappearance of their traditions. Losing its original niche, the next generation tried to find new 
geographical spaces to practise their skills an traditions. 
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village, because they shot at the Serbian cavalry (killing one Serbian soldier), after 
they had previously invited the soldiers into their houses. Even Trbić recognised that 
these violent and unnecessary outrages were morally untenable and this lowered his 
troops to the moral level of the ’oppressors’ against whom they were fighting. As 
Trotsky, who was a witness of the war, wrote: “The četnici were worse than you could 
possibly imagine. Among them there were some intellectuals, men of ideas, nationalist zealots, 
but these were isolated individuals. The rest were just thugs, robbers, who had joined the 
army for the sake of loot.”135 Of course the Serbs could explain the methods of 
’pacification’ (soon to be called ‘Tankosić-methods’), as they claimed that the 
Ottoman army distributed 63,000 rifles among the Albanians, whose military force 
counted no more than 16,000 soldiers. The implication was that the remainder of the 
weapons were used by local inhabitants and bands, and so their impoundment 
justified the use of violence.136 
The professionalization of bands (either they followed national goals or were 
opportunists) is evidenced by their operation: functioning as ’catalysts’ these offered 
training for the local population (for self-defence) instead of being on a constant 
search for clashes with Ottoman authorities or inimical bands.137 The old methods of 
the Ottomans – to hire these bands for state service or to convince the leader of a 
band with a huge sum to ’retire’ – were not working after the turn of the century.138 
The original tactics of the bands resembling the old ‘brigandage’ was seriously 
criticized in novels: the ever-moving troops shifting their activity from village to 
village as the Ottoman troops appeared, thus avoiding direct clashes, inflicted huge 
burdens on the peasants without bringing any closer the day of freedom for the 
oppressed and bringing no harm to the Ottomans. From the other side, the over-
organized structure of the revolutionary movement was criticized sharply, claiming 
that regulations and constitution plans would not help the population, and that 
sticking to principles was even dangerous when pragmatism offered more 
progress.139 Theoretical and tactical elements were not unified, and this decreased 
effectiveness.  
                                                 
135 Trotsky, Leon. The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky. New York: Pathfinder, 1980. 
161-62. 
136 Bataković, Dušan, T. Serbia’s Kosovo Drama. A Historical Perspective. Belgrade: Čigoja, 2012. 76. The Serbian 
argument fails to mention that it was the Serbs themselves who also distributed weapons among the 
Albanians in the hope of an anti-Ottoman revolt, which broke out in the spring of 1912, serously undermining 
the stability of the state. As the Serbs knew who the main distributors were, it was quite easy for them to 
identify who received from the rifles and to retrieve the weapons. 
137 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 128. 
138 Apostol voivode, operating around Vodena-Edessa, was considered an old-fashioned hajduk-klepht rather 
than an ideologically trained leader, but even he decided not the accept the Ottoman offer. 
139 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 139. 
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The social background and functions of the revolutionary organizations 
 
As the ambiguous relation discussed above between the members of the villager-
khersis-zaptie triangle indicates, the social acceptance of the phenomenon (band 
activity) was not unequivocal. Balogh mentions that by the end of the eighteenth 
century, 10% of Christians (and a third of young men) had been involved in such a 
movement at least once in their lifetime.140 This proportion was even higher in 
Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century. A document listed 35,000 
supporters of IMRO in 1906 in the Skopje Sanjak alone, constituting more than 10% 
of the administrative unit’s population. Considering that IMRO was an organization 
that relied mostly on Exarchists (promoting Macedo-Bulgarian or Bulgarian 
interests),141 one cannot avoid the assumption that all Exarchist households were 
conscripted as sympathizers of IMRO (compare Table 2 and Table 4): only this could 
explain the high ratio of supporters of IMRO compared to Exarchist families142 (25 
per cent on average, or every head of a family). However, supporting IMRO was still 
a better choice than to fall victim to a hired band (one without genuine political 
commitment).  
Certain signs of mass appeal as reflected in other sources are evident. In 1896, the 
membership of the revolutionary organizations was hardly reaching 2000, while it 
increased to 20,000 by 1903.143 By 1913 even the number of četa members (fighters) 
had exceeded this, while thousands of civilians were also members of the 
organization (so-called legal members).144 The number of bands with Bulgarian 
sentiments exceeded that of the others (constituting 55% of all groups).145 In Skopje 
Sanjak this figure was 50% in 1904, in accordance with the proportion of Exarchists, 
and it was similar in Macedonia under the control of Powers (48% ‘Bulgarian’ vs. 
47% other). 
This all leads us to the conclusion that the numbers indicated in Table 4 refer 
primarily to the taxable population (on areas controlled by the IMRO so-called 
revolutionary tax was levied on the supporters) rather than to real fighters. 
According to a report from 1906, the 6,000 IMRO supporters in the Skopje kaza 
possessed only 250 rifles (including 190 old Berdans) with 17,000 cartridges and 85 
                                                 
140 See: Balogh, A nacionalizmus, 16. 
141 See the quotation fom Vlahov citing Goce Delchev’s memoirs in footnote 88. 
142 Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Vol. 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The 
Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 209. 
143 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II. No. 1202. Ottoman documents mention 10,000 četa members of all types and 
ethnicities in 1905. 
144 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 99. 
145 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II. 1617. 28.03.1908. 
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revolvers with 1,550 bullets (Table 2).146 Generally only one-tenth of the supporters 
had rifles, and the highest ratio was measured in Kočani and Štip (12–13 per cent). 
Here the ammunition-to-weapon ratio was also over 100 (explaining the escalation of 
violence in 1911–1912) and the ratio of older weapons was extremely high. We may 
assume that older weapons from the Crimean War were stored at home by peasants 
(or local militiamen) due to the deterioration in public security, while modern 
Mannlichers and revolvers had been distributed among active members through 
smuggling.147 
 
Table 4. The forces of IMRO and the ethnic distribution of the population in 1906 in Skopje 
Sanjak 
 
Skopje Kumanovo Egri Palanka Kratovo Kočani Štip Veles Total 
All members 6,000 3,448 5,280 5,536 4,640 5,028 5,200 35, 132 
In Towns 2,500 0 210 156 320 2,381 0 5,567 
IMRO 
Supporters as 
Percentage of 
Total 
Population 
8.3% 7.6% 22% 25% 12% 11% 10% 12% 
IMRO 
Supporters 
among 
Exarchists 
25% 15% 25% 32% 25% 25% 18% 24% 
Rifles 
(Mannlicher 
and Berdan, 
Gras) 
250 140 311 208 300 345 440 1,994 
Old Rifles from 
the Crimean 
War 
9 28 0 107 200 293 20 657 
Pistols 85 40 37 26 42 44 35 309 
Bullets 17,300 4,570 22,660 45,000 56,000 55, 000 48,650 249,180 
Bullets 1,550 313 1,710 800 1,700 1,760 1,050 8,883 
Bullet / Weapon 67 27 73 143 112 86 106 94 
Weapons  to 4.32 4.87 5.89 5.69 10.78 12.69 8.85 7.55 
                                                 
146 Биярски, Цочо – Ива Бурилкова, eds. Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация. (1893-
1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи, Vol. 1. Архивите говорят, 45. Sofia: Universitetsko 
Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2007. 608–609. No. 209. 
147 Although the number of weapons stored at home was large, this does not indicate a greater probability of 
everyday violence. The number of violent acts committed by non-četa members was very low in Kočani, 
though high in Štip.  
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Supporters as a 
Percentage 
Bombs, 
Dynamite 
122 15 60 125 58 36 0 416 
Bulgarian 
Villages 
no data 1 no data 63 56 50 50 over 220 
Serbian Villages 11 23 8 1 0 0 8 51 
Turkish 
Villages 
20 54 0 2 16 70 40 202 
Mixed S-4, T-9 0 S-3 T-5 
 
T-7 S-2 S-9, T-21 
Ethnic 
Character 
Bulgarian-
Muslim 
Turkish-
Serbian 
Bulgarian Bulgarian 
Bulgarian-
Turkish 
Turkish-
Bulgarian 
Bulgarian-
Muslim  
Dominant 
Character of 
Violence in 
1905 
Muslim 
against 
Christian 
Muslim 
against 
Christian 
Low Case 
Number 
Christian 
against 
Christian 
Unknown 
Muslim-
Christian 
Muslim 
against 
Muslim; 
Muslim 
against 
Christian 
 
Income 500 436 250 574 500 770 1,500 4,530 
Data calculated from: Биярски, Цочо and Ива Бурилкова, eds. Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна 
организация. (1893–1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи. Vol. 1. Архивите говорят, 45 (Sofia: 
Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2007), 608–609. Nr. 209. 
 
Thus it is worth analyzing both the willingness and forms of participation, as well 
as the social composition and revenue sources of the revolutionary organizations. 
The behavior of local people towards the organization cannot be unanimously 
judged, even when using contemporary official archival sources of non-interested 
parties. While McGregor, an English consul, reports on the cooperativeness of the 
local people, not only in paying the revolutionary tax, but in actively supporting the 
organizations, Biliotti, another English consul (a former dragoman with Patriarchist 
sentiments), wrote about abuses, coercive measures of četa members and bitter 
resentment of local people paying additional tax to the organization alongside state 
taxes and landlords’ share.148 
Historians like Duncan Perry write about a frightened and conservative society, 
while Hobsbawm argues for the susceptibility of educated but unemployed village 
youngsters attracted by the towns as key target groups. Artisans were also thought to 
support the organization partly for economic reasons, while pečalbari were also not 
only susceptible for the ideology, but could also be used as couriers. Keith Brown’s 
statistical analysis, based on 10% (375 cases) of the so-called Ilinden Dossier stored in 
Skopje, reveals that 66% of the organization members applying for a pension from 
                                                 
148 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 33-44. 
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the Yugoslav state were villagers, a little underrepresented relative to their total 
share of the population (75%). Among the 92 persons giving their former occupation, 
35% were farmers or landless agricultural wage-labourers (momci), and 25% were 
traders or merchants – either itinerant or shopkeepers.  
Participation in the activity of IMRO had several levels. The broadest layer was of 
supporters conscripted in Table 4: within their ranks one could find the civilian (legal) 
members (legalen člen) supporting the active četa members (komitadji) by fulfilling 
different tasks. Based on Brown’s calculations, approximately 1% of the membership 
was blagajnik or cashier, treasurer. It was a respected position – treasurers usually 
had some knowledge on future plans of the organization, and thus they were 
favourite targets for the Ottoman authorities, together with the secretaries. The 
organization had its own documentation and codes; even meetings and trials were 
documented. Many of the blagajniks were earlier desetars (leaders of a conspiring 
’cell’ including 10 persons) or vojvodas (military leaders). 
The logistics were mainly based on the activity of jataks, constituting 
approximately 2% of members, who were responsible for storing ammunition and 
providing food and shelter. Though it was originally a despised activity in society, 
with the claim that “whoever is not brave enough to steal, but only hides what is stolen, 
does not deserve to eat” and their role was evaluated as determined by material self-
interest rather than by real commitment,149 they soon became very important for the 
new outlaws. They were considered legal members and their conspiratorial activity 
soon consumed huge amounts of time: they baked bread and washed clothes (the 
organization had some kind of uniform) at night in order to prevent their activity 
being seen by curious neighbours or potential spies. Being a jatak was more 
dangerous than being a courier – the former permanently risked his house and his 
livelihood, while the latter received only temporary assignments and was more 
mobile. 
Pečalbari and students were excellent couriers: they carried letters in which the 
instructions for the cells of the organization were laid down, even including data on 
the next actions and targets, the names of traitors, the movements of Ottoman troops, 
etc. Organization members who were formerly wandering craftsmen were very 
useful in establishing networks with distant connections.150 Mitre Trajkovski could 
visit Austria-Hungary and Izmir in search of work as a charcoal worker, which later 
on intertwined with conspiratorial activity. He commuted at least six times between 
Capari, where he worked as a charcoal worker, and Katerini, where he sold the 
                                                 
149 Brown, Loyal unto Death,  132. 
150 Pechalba meant the same for artisans and was declassed as peregrination for the intelligentsia. 
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carried charcoal, before becoming appointed to a četa. He admitted that he smuggled 
Gras rifles to Macedonia underneath the charcoal.151 Ottoman authorities were aware 
of perspectives that pečalba could offer for the organization; therefore in 1898 they 
suspended this practice even for those who had official documents, because they 
feared that those who would leave for Bulgaria would return as četa members. This 
regulation also reveals the influence of neighbouring states on the minds of 
Macedonian population. 
As the numbers in the Skopje Sanjak warn us, there had to be many women among 
the legal members. Their involvement was rational: sometimes they married an 
organization member, in which case they automatically became helping hands, if 
their husband was wounded, imprisoned or simply came under observation.152 
Muslim officials, owing to cultural differences, refrained from molesting even 
suspicious women, who were exposed to less rough handling than men. Thus they 
made excellent couriers. Prior to 1903 authorities did not even dare suspect priests. 
As Trotsky wrote in his memoirs, when komitadjis in Old Serbia were armed by the 
Serbs through the Serbian consulate, the revolvers and cartridges were given to 
women and priests to distribute. Monasteries and schools functioned as storage and 
centres of the intelligence service.153 The behavior of Muslim regular soldiers was also 
discerned from that of the irregulars because of their politeness or naivety: women 
very often carried the clothing of četa members, supplies or ammunition belts under 
their original clothing, which remained untouched by regular Ottoman troops. 
Nonetheless, the irregular bashibozuks got to know these tricks as the high number of 
raped women testified in 1903 (Table 1). The line separating legal members from četa 
fighters was significant, but permeable: sooner or later many of the legal members had 
to give up their original life (including security, family, home and welfare) and to go 
underground because of their activity. 
The revolutionary committees also had their internal secret police, which was 
divided into two branches. The duty of the first branch, the investigative police, was 
not only to observe foreigners, non-četa members and government officials, but to 
examine the deeds and actions of četa members as well. The second branch was 
called the executive secret service, the task of which was not only to support the 
leaders in case of an internal crisis, but also to punish activities reported by 
observers.154 The revolvers mentioned in the document summarizing the resources of 
                                                 
151 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 55. 
152 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 136. 
153 Trotsky, The Balkan Wars, 127. 
154 ÖStA HHStA, PA, XXXVIII. Konsulate (1848–1918). Kt. 430. Üsküb (1900), No. 212. Pára an Goluchowski, 
handgeschrieben, Üsküb, September 17, 1900, Statut und Reglement der bulgaro-macedonischen Comités. 
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IMRO from 1906 (Table 4) were used by this branch of secret police (and by military 
leaders). The proportion of official ‘terrorists’ – as the executioners called themselves 
– was also around 1-2%. These assignments could be temporary or permanent, 
depending on the circumstances, the level of trust in each other, etc. 155 
The revolutionary organizations tried to build themselves up and behave as a 
state-within-a–state (the most evident sign of this is taxation), or as an authority 
satisfying social needs (undertaking social tasks as Muslim wakfs lands did). Beyond 
copying the religious rituals of priests (i.e. during the official oath of allegiance to the 
organization), the movement also tried to imitate state institutions (holding trials). 
Literacy (and thereby teachers) played an important role in this (in an illiterate 
society literacy was bestowed with some sacrality, too). When accepting a new 
member into the ranks of the organization, an oath was taken which was supervised 
by priests (representing the sacrality of the act) or by teachers. Thus highly esteemed 
members of local civil society, who also had a certain reputation in the eyes of the 
official authorities, were definitely involved in the movement. The fact that a gun 
played a key role among the symbols of the oath also had symbolic meaning. The 
gun represented the power, the right of violence, which was exclusively 
monopolyzed and practised by government authorities, and it implicitely referred to 
the demand on equal rights (from 1903 onwards, Christians were not allowed to own 
guns). The gun as a symbol was to challenge the authority of the Ottoman state.  
In a predominantly illiterate society, the role of the verbal oath is not negligible: 
when in June 1903 the elders of Rakitovo were kidnapped and three were murdered, 
the remaining five took an oath to recognize the authority of the Exarchate. The oath 
substituted for a contract – breaking the oath was similar to breaking the law (similar 
to the Albanian besa) – and in these cases the ’local penal code’ was applied, but only 
after a trial. No ‘unofficial’ forms of coercion and violence or self-jurisdiction were 
                                                 
155 Ibid. … Capitel VIII. Geheime Polizei 
“Art. 34. Jedes Comité besitzt eine geheime Polizei, die aus 2 Abtheilungen besteht: forschende und strafende. 
Der Director des Comités wählt unter den Arbeitern einen zum Leiter der Nachforschungscommission, dieser 
wählt sich dann 3 Hilfsarbeiter, die sich unter einander nicht kennen sollen. 
Art. 35. Die geheime Nachforschungspolizei wird beobachten: die Aufführung und die Handlungen der Comité-
Mitglieder 2/ die Stimmung und Thätigkeit der türkischen und christlichen Bevölkerung rücksichtlich der 
‘Arbeit’. 3/ Massnahmen die gegen ‘dieselbe’ die türkische Verwaltung ergreift 4/ beobachtet und forscht aus 
alle in der Stadt ankommenden Fremden ohne Unterschied der Nationalität. Alles Gehörte und Geschehene 
bringen sie durch ihren Leiter dem Comité-Director zur Kenntnisse.  [...] 
Art. 39. Jedes Mitglied der Strafpolizei muss immer mit einem Revolver und mit einem Dolche, im Zeitpunkte der 
Thätigkeit jedoch mit zwei Revolvern bewaffnet sein. 
Art. 40. Die Geheimpolizei muss ganz oder der ausgeloste Theil derselben im Inneren des Kreises auf Befehl des 
Directors, ausserhalb auf Befehl des Central-Comités den Nachbar-Comités zu Hilfe eilen.” 
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allowed by the organization. During the trials they held, educated teachers served as 
presidents.156 
In the case of murders – which could be incorporated under the term ’everyday 
violence’, but which had a political background – the revolutionary organization was 
clever enough (1) to share responsibility between executioners, thus pouring courage 
into them by decreasing their individual responsibility; (2) not to apply local people 
(their position would be untenable within the community; furthermore, it would 
target the revenge of Ottoman authorities not against the perpetrators, but against 
the whole community); (3) to fanaticize young people with no wife and children, 
bringing unconditional support while decreasing the potential for blackmail of these 
persons by the authorities through their family ties. Besides professional 
executioners, there were volunteers as well. The tactics of the organization were very 
often to link the new members to the organization through a murder (in their terms, 
the execution of a traitor), and this is why a gun was rarely used: the new members 
were not always given these “expensive” weapons, not to mention their lack of skill 
in using them (regular training was organized for new members and village 
militiamen). And though the revolutionary organization depended heavily on the 
activity of teachers and priests of the Exarchate (serving often as secretaries, 
supervisors of the oath or as judges in the trials), it did not refrain from punishing 
them. Therefore friction between the četas and the Exarchate (which had previously 
functioned as a state-within-a-state) was not rare. 
Not only Greek-Ottoman cooperation157 but also internal treason threatened the 
efficiency of the organization, which explains the need for internal police. A member 
of the committee, Marko Ivanov, promised the Ottomans to give information on 
weapon storage houses and smuggling routes for 500 pounds.158 Soon 94 
Mannlichers, 280kg of dynamite, 260 Lebel revolvers and 14,500 Mannlicher bullets 
were captured by the Ottoman authorities. At another site, 195kg of dynamite, 860 
Mannlichers, 150 Martini-Henrys, 180 Tüfenkchiev revolvers and 7200 Mannlicher 
bullets was found.159 Before the outbreak of the Ilinden revolt, many losses, including 
manpower, were accounted for due to treason. In Ichtepe a barricade fight took place 
between Bulgarian ‘bandits’ (as Ottoman sources call them), gendarmes and 
                                                 
156 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 75. 
157 In 1902 Greek authorities arrested 27 ’Bulgarians’ in Trikala for smuggling weapons from Greece; seven of 
them admitted they were members of the revolutionary organization. Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 
367. 08.06. 1902. Georgi Stefanov and his 28 followers were also captured by official Greek authorities. 
Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 748. 10.06. 1903. 
158 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 448/451.  03/09.12. 1902. 
159 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 578. 29.03. 1903.  
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Ottoman soldiers. 23 Bulgarians died, 10 were injured and captured.160 In Djumabala 
50 ’Bulgarian’ četa members were detected, most of them captured, and dum-dum 
bullets were found in their rifles.161 During the Smardesh incident, the Ottomans set 
fire to 200 houses, while they estimated the number of komitadji residing there at 600 
(in order to justify the scope of their coercive measures). 
There were also successful agents among foreign citizens (who could also become 
the targets of IMRO), like Monsieur Bondy.162 Despite the numerous arrests and the 
death of leaders163 the organization still possessed 25,000kg of dynamite and 2 
million bullets, as Mr. Bondy reported from the meeting of the komitadji leaders.  
So, what did a komitadji band look like? We may get information on this even 
from Ottoman sources. A band arrested after 1908 counted 1573 weapons, 14,500 
bullets, and 74 bombs. Among the six leaders were a teacher from Eğri Palanka, a 
teacher from Istib, a teacher from Kratovo, a teacher from Leskovica, an igumen from 
a monastery and the school inspector of Istib.164 
 
 
Financial sources 
 
Those who were conscripted with the aforementioned document (even if they 
remained passive towards the cause) had to pay the ‘revolutionary tax’. This—in 
addition to the official tithe that at that time was around 12–15 per cent (without the 
share of the tax farmer which could put it at 20%) —represented an additional (but 
not heavy) burden, paid willingly or under coercion.165 A teacher, Milan Chorbev, 
was cut into pieces by four very young četa members because he advised villagers 
                                                 
160 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 703. 07.05. 1903. 
161 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 738. 01.06. 1903.  
162 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 738. and No. 710. 12.05.1903.  
163 When the Ottoman authorities temporarily managed to behead the organization in 1901 and acquired most of 
the seals and codes, Ivan Garvanov, the sole possessor of such a seal, enjoyed full authenticity and power, 
contrary to the messages repeatedly sent to the villagers by Gjorche Petrov and Goce Delchev, other leaders of 
the organization. The seal gave enough bureaucratic power to Garvanov to control the timing of the Ilinden 
uprising, contrary to the will of Delchev. This again reveals the role of symbols (like the oath, pistols, etc.) 
164 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents II. No. 1415. 
165 ÖStA HHStA, PA, XXXVIII. Konsulate (1848–1918). Kt. 430. Üsküb (1900), No. 212. Pára an Goluchowski, 
handgeschrieben, Üsküb, September 17, 1900, Statut und Reglement der bulgaro-macedonischen Comités (ins 
Deutsche übersetzt) (3 + 14. Beilage, getippt): Cap. XI: Materielle Mittel der Comités “Auferlegte Hilfsbeiträge 
werden zur Einschüchterung oder mit Gewalt von Personen abverlangt, die wohl helfen können aber nicht wollen”.  
“Art. 47. Zur Deckung der nöthigen Comité-Auslagen, jedoch hauptsächlich zur Bewaffnung der Arbeiter 
erhalten die Comités die Mittel 1/ aus den monatlichen Beitragleistungen der Mitglieder, die ihnen im 
Verhältnisse zu ihrer materiellen Lage bemessen werden; 2/ aus Opfern, die entweder freiwillig oder auferlegt 
sind. Anmerkung: Freiwillig sind diejenigen Unterstützungen, die sowohl von den Mitgliedern als auch von 
Personen gegeben werden, die sich nicht entschlossen haben, Arbeiter zu werden, jedoch mit der ’Arbeit’ 
sympathisieren, dieselbe zu fördern wünschen und zu diesem Zwecke gewisse Summe geben…” 
63 
 
not to pay the revolutionary tax.166 The revolutionary tax increased to 1d by 1903. 
Though the organization offered a receipt for confiscations or taxes levied, its value 
did not always match the expropriated value; furthermore, there was no deadline on 
these receipts.167 But many locals accepted this, considering it as an ’investment into 
the future’; many others did so because they felt threatened.  
This financial source, though important, was not the sole income for IMRO. In 
addition to taxation, ransoms, smuggling, foreign support and regular economic activities 
(like the money sent home by the 35,000 Macedonian emigrants in the USA) were 
among the major sources of revenue. Finance was a continuous concern for the 
organizations, as indicated by the case of the kidnapped Miss Stone. Sometimes 
school-age supporters of the organization kidnapped themselves and demanded a 
high ransom from their wealthy fathers.  
Beyond pillaging and ‘requisition’, another source of income came from state 
subsidies: the Bulgarian consulate in Skopje warned the government that Serbian 
agents received 300,000 dinars for the Serbianization of the vicinity of Kratovo (this 
amount is equal to the annual salary of 350 teachers or 150 military lieutenants). 
These agents had bought weapons (one witness, a major of the international 
gendarmerie, mentions 200 rapid-fire guns) instead of creating schools, instead of 
creating schools, buying land or bribing local leaders, and only a small sum was 
spent on securing the loyalty of local people.168 
The significance (and uniqueness) of this act lies not in the overt169 state support 
(this was pretty common, albeit often in a hidden form), nor in its ’peculiar’ usage 
(the ransom paid for Miss Stone was also spent on weapons), but the way these two 
phenomena were connected: previously, state donations had not been spent on 
promoting destruction. This was something new. The small states with claims to this 
territory recognized that the destruction of existing (infra)structures was more cost-
effective and its effect more permanent than establishing churches or schools and buying land, 
indicating that there was a radical shift from soft methods to hard methods.170 After the 
withdrawal of the Powers, the third phase of the Macedonian question was 
characterized by nearly unlimited violence and coercion.  
                                                 
166 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 76. 
167 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 115. 
168 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. л. 5-7.  
169 This money did not go through religious or civilian organizations. 
170 By the end of 1908, Greek četa organizer Colonel Danglis acquired 10,000 guns, with one million rounds of 
ammunition, and more than 50 Greek military officers worked legally in Macedonia after relinquishing their 
ranks, while the Bulgarians had already distributed more than 30,000 weapons. See, Balogh, A nacionalizmus, 
88. 
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The income sent home by emigrants was also not negligible. Greek emigrants 
donated 45 million piasters in 1906 to fight against Bulgarian propaganda and to 
support armed counterstrikes.171 
Substantial income also came from organized economic activity. The agreements 
between Verhovists and IMRO activists, pointing out that peasants should be kept 
away from the violence and should not be considered as target groups, were driven 
not only by social sensitivity but also by economic interests. Through the use of its 
armed forces, IMRO compelled peasants to work the land and often prescribed what 
to grow in the fields. Surprisingly, this coercive agriculture was economically 
rational in a certain sense, as IMRO favoured crops with greater added value than 
that of the wheat traditionally grown in the region. One hectare of land sown with 
poppy-seed produced between 10 and 15 kilograms of opium (if the plantation was 
not set on fire by rivals) with an average price of 25 to 30 francs per kilogram, thus 
producing total revenue of between 300 and 450 francs per hectare. This significantly 
exceeded the revenue derived from other crops (one hectare of wheat produced 
about 130–150 francs – yields were slightly over one ton per hectare).172 By 
monopolizing trade in opium and tobacco, IMRO was able to create self-sustaining 
četas that were wedged between peasant and trader, expropriating the profits. This 
was a risky enterprise, as both adversaries and the government tried to hinder this 
activity, and the mobility of Četas decreased when they had to defend the harvest.  
Economic oppression and permanent migration generated by political tension led 
to the desertion of arable lands. By 1912, as a result of the growing violence, only 
400,000 hectares of land were under cultivation in Kosovo Vilayet out of a total of 3.2 
million acres.173 
 
Methods of rule 
 
This sub-chapter leads us to our second key chapter of investigation – violence 
exercised against local unarmed communities and persons. Kidnapping, ransom, 
mass theft of animals, blackmailing, threatening letters, bribery, as Ikonomov listed 
the methods in 1911 (see Figure 2 for the distribution of targets četa-civilian encounters, 
in Skopje Sanjak 1907), and the disinterest of Ottoman authorities forced many 
villages to convert (often temporarily) to a new identity.174 The village of Kanarevo 
                                                 
171 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents II., No. 1700. 14.09. 1908. 
172 The total opium harvest in Skopje Sanjak reached 100,000 kg, generating revenue of up to 2.5–3.0 million 
francs, which of course stemmed not entirely from fields controlled by bands. Strauss, Großbulgarien, 52–60. 
173 Strauss, Großbulgarien, 52–60.  
174 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
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(Kumanovo kaza) decided to become Serboman after the starešina was threatened 
and bribed.175 Bulgarian priests were arrested in Krastev Dol and in Radibuš by 
Ottoman authorities, and soon Serbian priests arrived to replace them.176 Ruginci, 
Orah and Podarži Kon became Serboman due to violence committed by Bulgarian 
četas.177 Ottomans accused IMRO activists of dressing in the clothes of Ottoman 
infantry and ulemas and pillaging Macedo-Slav villages in order to push them into 
the hands of the četas.178 In some cases the conversion of a village was not a sudden 
act—it took years, and the two parties often continued to live together: this kind of 
coexistence happened in the case of Stačna, Teovo, Oreše, etc. (Very often, social or 
economic tensions within the community were the explanation for the situation). 
Nonetheless, this phenomenon could also serve as a source of recurrent violence. In 
other cases, settlements changed sides many times: this happened with particular 
frequency after 1908, and the reestablishment of the constitution and the 
disarmament of četas: see the case of Oreše, Izvor, Rankovski, etc., which became 
Bulgarian settlements after Serbia temporarily lost Ottoman support, then changed 
sides again by 1910, when Serbian propaganda became revitalized again (Table 5).179 
The instruments cited above served not only to promote forced Serbianization or 
Bulgarization of the villages, but also provided food and income for the četa to 
sustain its activity, as these units were often operating far from their hinterland. (The 
identification of Serboman villages in kazas distant from the Serbian border may 
indicate areas of local support for Serbian četas – Table 6).  
 
Table 5. Settlements accepting the authority of Patriarchate between 1889 and 1908 
 
Never 
Exarchist 
Became Serboman in 
1889–1903  
Became Serboman in 1903–1908 
Became 
Bulgarian again 
after 1908 
Skopska 
Kaza 
Banjani*, 
Gornjani*, 
Čučer*, 
Brovec*, 
Kučevišta*,  
Kučkovo* 
Raženičino, Pakoshevo, 
Novo Selo, Gorno Orizari, 
Vizbegovo, Vučedol, 
Dolno Slivari 
Tavor (12), Pobože (15+60)  
Veleška Kaza 
 
Rudnik  (45+10**), Bašino 
selo (34+150), Bogomila, 
Orahovdol (32+58), 
Kapinovo (14), Mokreni 
Vladilovci (75+2), Smilovci (36), Oreše 
(73+29), Pomenovo (45), Starigrad 
(43), Novoselo (28+15), Izvor (44+16), 
Martinci (39), Stepanci (60), Nikoladin 
Oreše, Izvor, 
Nežilovo, 
Novoselo, 
Smilovci, 
                                                 
175 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 396. л. 5-7. 
176 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents II. No. 1438. 08.12.1906. 
179 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
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(64), Nežilovo (30+38), 
Teovo (50+60), Gabrovnik 
(12+19), Omorani (96+17), 
Lisiče (19+58) 
(46+83), Pomenovo, 
Vladilovci, 
Orahovdol 
Kratovska 
Kaza  
Šalkovica (13), Šopsko 
Rudari (20+75), Kratovo 
town (340+550 Muslim) 
?  
Kumanovska 
Kaza 
Staro 
Nagorično* 
(130 
households 
were never 
exarchist of 
the 145), 
Dumanovci (34+6), Četirci 
(62) 
Karlovci (15), Koinci (25), Vragoturci 
(42), Maložino (60), Ramno (67), 
Arbanaško (42), Dlbočina (40), 
Dejlovci (62), Žegnjane (50), Stepanci 
(45), Kokino (50), Bajlovci (114), Osiče 
(15), Ženovino (33), Alinci (48), Breško 
(12), Svilanci (24), Kanarevo (46), 
Drenak (82), Orah (85), Ruginci (65), 
Bukovljani (24), Čelopek (62+15), 
Dobrača (12+6), Strezovci (40+13), 
Janinci*, Pelinci*, Beljakovci (52+21), 
Kučkarevo (10) 
 
Palanečka 
Kaza  
Stačna (20+12) 
Carcorija (75), Dobrovnica (55), Lukje 
(140), Ogut (125), Podarži kon (116), 
Metirevo (55), Osiče (50), Baštevo (33), 
Gaber (102), Dlbočnica (69), Petrilica 
(305), Ljubinci (24), Radibuš (127), 
Stečna (32), Gulinci (45), Opošnica 
(90), Krivi kamen (27), Rankovci (135), 
Vražogranci (15), Ginovci (75), 
Milutinci (72) 
Ginovci, Radibuš, 
Milutinci, Osiče, 
Krastov dol, 
Lukje (100+40), 
Ogut, Baštevo***, 
Carcarija***, 
Dobrovnica***, 
Dlbočnica***, 
Gaber (14+88), 
Rankovci 
Tetovska 
Kaza  
Brezno, Rogačevo, Staro 
Selo, Vratnica 
? Dolna Lešnica 
Gostivarsko 
Kaza  
Zubovci (50+50), 
Balil dol (30+50 Muslim), Dobreše 
(40+110 Muslim), Vrutok (24+45), 
Pečkovo (17+15), Leunovo (79+38+16 
Muslim), Mavrovo (121+31), 
Nikiforovo (77), Železni Rečani 
 
Kočanska 
Kaza   
Nivičane (60+8), Gradče (32), Leški 
(21), Pašadžik (12), Pantalej (14+28) 
Nivičina, Gradče, 
Leški, Pašadžik 
* Never Exarchist; mostly refugees from Stara Srbija between 1689 and 1739 in the so-called Skopska Crnagora.  
**The first number in brackets represents Patriarchist households, the second Exarchist. Muslims are usually indicated. 
*** Patriarchist Bulgarian villages.                                       ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
 
Table 6. Location of Serbian četa leaders in 1907 (approximately 170 men) 
Skopska 
Černogoria Nikola Janković, Angelko Slavković +10 men 
Veles Ivan Martulčanec (Azot) + 10 men, Dušan (Orahovdol) + 10 men 
Egri Palanka Georgi Skopjanče(to) (Kozjak Mts.) + 10 men, Spas Garda (Petralica) 
Kumanovo Jovo Kapitan, Denko Genin, Pop Dičo vojvoda 
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Kočana 
Turkish-Serbian mixed četa led by a Serbian teacher from Kočani, with the approval of 
the Ottoman kaymakam 
Skopje Petko Kapitan (Staro Nagoričano) 
Porečie, 
Kičevo, Azot 
Grigor from Nebregovo with 30 men, Stefan with 10 men, Ivan Dolgač(ot) with 15 men, 
Pavle from Bač (Albania) with 7-8 men around Dibra 
Prilep Ivan/Jovan Babunski and 15 men, Boško vojvoda from Vir with 10 men 
Сайко Трифонов, Величко Георгиев, eds. История на българите в документи, Vol. I/2. 1878–1912 
(Sofia: Просвета, 1996), 290-91. 
 
 
Figure 2. Types of violence against Exarchist population committed by Serbian bands 
 (Skopje Sanjak, 1907), ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. 
 
 
III. Violence in Skopje Sanjak 
 
 
Everyday violence 
 
 
As we have already stated, by the term ’everyday violence’ we mean not only 
personal conflicts, conflicts with an economic background, or tensions triggered by 
the law of customs (blood feud), but also atrocities that might have a hidden political 
agenda. In the latter case the victims seem to be innocent civilians, and only a deeper 
investigation can reveal that they were indirectly involved in political struggles. 
Nonetheless, the sources are often unable to uncover these hidden motives, and this 
is another reason why we classify these acts as special forms of ’everyday violence’. 
This also means that the label ’political murder’ is retained for conflicts between 
armed persons or between armed persons and politicians. In this sense even the 
murder of a priest or a teacher can be considered as ’everyday violence’ whether or 
hostages for conversion
kidnapping for ransom
destruction of economic
infrastructure (granary, mills)
animals
destruction of houses
injury or deaths
fight against authorities
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not it involved any political motivation. Nonetheless, the thin line between the 
categories renders comparisons difficult. 
There are some symbolic examples for these difficult-to-classify cases cited by 
Keith Brown. The four murders listed here had different motivations, perpetrators 
and victims. In October, 1902 Sofia Trenchova and her mother was found dead, 
having been stabbed several times. This act could have been perceived as a general 
form of everyday violence, but the facts behind it and certain symbolic signs 
suggested it could be considered as a political murder as well: Sofia Trenchova was 
the mistress of the müdir. The fact that her tongue had been torn out had a clear 
message, namely that she was considered a spy by the murderers, Keith Brown 
claims.180 
The next one is more clear-cut, as it was not directly linked to the activity of the 
revolutionary organizations. In 1903 a pregnant woman was shot during the 
collection of a tax by a tax farmer. She delivered the baby, than both died. The father 
(who was seriously in debt and could not pay the tax), together with the embalmed 
child, went from one official institution to the next, seeking justice – to no avail. This 
second type of murder as listed by Brown symbolized the ignorance and abuses of 
official authorities, an ignorance which pushed victims into the hands of 
revolutionary organizations that undertook to avenge the murder, thus taking state 
functions into their own hands. The case became famous because it offered a 
splendid opportunity for the organization to advertise its justness and social 
sensitivity (so from a propaganda aspect it was also a beneficial investment), and 
thus it could be seen as political act - in spite of the fact that the participants were 
politically passive.181 
The break between the authorities, the reaya and the revolutionary organizations 
went so far that even when there was occasion for local Christians to enrol as 
policemen, they often hesitated, because those who decided to join the ranks of the 
gendarmerie were often punished by the revolutionary organizations by death. The 
same happened to the only volunteer from Lopaticza in January 1903: his throat was 
cut, and, to make it clear that he was not the victim of some robbery, an inscription 
was fastened to his coat with the words “the fate of those who serve the Turks”.182 
But even without this message (the revolutionary organization always left behind 
evidence to justify its acts), it is difficult to treat the murder as ’everyday violence’ 
because it was committed against the authorities. It seems that by this time the lack 
                                                 
180 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 1. 
181 IMRO also had its own narrative of events, emphasizing the heartless behavior of the powers that be and the 
vulnerability of the victim in order to mobilize the masses on the organization’s side. 
182 Brown, Loyal unto Death,  2. 
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of trust of IMRO in the solutions offered by the Ottoman authorities had grown so 
great that the revolutionary organisation refused any cooperation and considered 
any positive step of the Ottoman government as a threat challenging the movement’s 
authority. On the other hand the revolutionary organisations often built their 
members into the ranks of the gendarmerie to get better access to information 
through these double agents. 
The fourth murder did not represent a pure type, either, and deserves our 
attention on account of the participants: in July 1903, two Patriarchist, but Slavic 
cattle dealers were killed by a Muslim tax farmer (whose father had recently been 
killed by a band) and a gendarme. We might think of the economic disagreements or 
ethnic tensions behind this as well (and thus see it as a form of everyday violence), 
but what is interesting is the involvement of the official authorities in unofficial 
actions, such as revenge, which partly explains IMRO’s lack of faith in the 
gendarmerie. (In the second, case, the action was itself official, but the participating 
tax farmer was a private person, not a state official). 
As Keith Brown points out when comparing the differences in forms of violence 
between the pre-Ilinden stage of the movement and after it, the evolution of violence 
went through several stages.183 By 1903 the focus – which had previously been on 
human rights and justice, trust and solidarity in the communication of the 
revolutionary organization – began to shift. The bomb attacks in Saloniki in April 
1903 stood as a warning that from then on even innocent civilians and foreigners had 
become targets of this organization,184 beside the Ottoman authorities, thus crossing 
the demarcation line between freedom fight and terrorism. IMRO, which was 
formerly organized based on trust, shifted to terror. The earlier constraints on the 
usage of deadly force had vanished: originally the movement refrained from 
attacking civilians not involved in conspiracies, espionage and counterespionage. 
From 1903 on this had changed: extending the threat to anyone who belonged to the 
opposing ethno-religious group, regardless of their involvement in revolutionary 
organizations, meant that the era of justified violence185 was over, and the time for a 
broader interpretation had come. 
The response to this was escalated Ottoman, Albanian and Greek 
counterinsurgencies and official Ottoman counterstrikes (the destruction of 
                                                 
183 The typization is ours, using the examples given by Brown. 
184 There is an evident connection between the Armenian bomb attack against the Ottoman Imperial Bank in 
1896 and the Macedonian case (both regarding methods and consequences). This was also a turning point in 
the history of Armenian resistence (the domination of h’nchaks was substituted by that of the dashnaks). 
185 Meaning attacks on authorities and moderate revenge attacks on civilians (including conflicts stemming from 
blood feuds). 
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Smardesh village in April 1903 is a good example of the latter).186 The Greeks’ 
response – propagating the replacement of ’justified violence’ with ’unlimited violence’ 
– was brutal, but corresponds to the logic of terror. The Greeks promised to kill two 
Bulgarians (regardless of whether they belonged to the movement or not) for each 
Patriarchist killed in the countryside.187 They applied this so consistently – as the 
raids in SouthMacedonia in 1905-1906 proved – that IMRO was also enforced to 
apply the same tactics. 
But the situation soon became untenable. The next stage began when spontaneous 
massacres occurred with the involvement of civilians,188 but without the 
encouragement of the authorities. After the explosion of the secret IMRO cartridge 
factory in Monastir, angered local Muslims replied to a Christian insult ending in 
nine being killed on St. George’s Day (also known as the beginning of četa-season)189. 
This very first case, the model for Istip and Kochani (where the bomb attacks against 
sacred places also ended in massacres) symbolized the mass implementation of 
violence.190 The story of the embalmed new-born child had another moral beyond that 
expressed earlier – it was one of the first times that a woman was shot by a Muslim 
civilian,191 and this cultural breakdown also marked the boundary of an era. By this 
time events had become uncontrollable – characterized by Balfour as the “balance of 
criminality”.192 In a large region around the second-largest city of Macedonia, 
Monastir, in a six-month period from April to October 1902 (prior to the reforms), 43 
people were killed, one every four days.193 In June 1903 this rose to one every two 
days. It is understandable why Damian Gruev stated in an assembly of revolutionary 
organizations, when they decided to launch the Ilinden uprising, that it was “better 
an end with horrors, than horrors without end”.194 
                                                 
186 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 177. Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 748. 10.06. 1903. Hussein Hilmi Pasha, the 
new vali, after the beginning of the reform movement also promised to sanction the atrocities committed by 
the Ottomans. He managed to capture the perpetrators of the Smardesh incident. Ottoman Diplomatic 
Documents I. No. 775. 17.07.1903. 
187 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 181-82. When Patriarchist Slav priest Stoyan and his wife were murdered in Brod, 
eight Greeks immediately killed a Bulgarian teacher. They also used the tactics of ’sharing the sin and 
responsibility’ as it was applied by IMRO. The Greek organization in Thessaloniki was also based on cells of 
10 persons, stressing secrecy, obedience and sacrality – emphasizing the same principles and applying the 
same organizational methods that were used by IMRO. 
188 The Greeks killing civilians were četa members, komitadjis, while the Muslims killing Christian civilians were 
civilians themselves. 
189 Our statistics for Skopje Sanjak in 1907 deny the significance of this date (see Chapter III). 
190 The difference between unlimited and mass violence is that in the first case the target groups were broadened, 
while in the latter the circle of perpetrators became extended         
191 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 180. 
192 Ibid., 3. 
193 Ibid., 1. 
194 Brailsford, Macedonia, 116. 
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While Brown was lucky enough to carry out a statistical analysis combined with 
prosopographic research for the period 1897-1903 (that functioned as an introduction 
to our investigations by providing data for comparison), our sources offer only the 
execution of a quantitative analysis (withouth prosopographic studies) for the next 
period 1903-1908, characterized by an escalation of violence. In this chapter – beyond 
trying to grasp this escalation through the number and variety of conflicts – we focus 
on the role of geography (the differences between peripheral and central zones) and 
the interethnic character of the conflicts based on Austro-Hungarian consular 
reports. 
The macro-level data of the Ottoman authorities reveals that violence did not 
decrease during the reforms (1903-1908). Violent crimes flooded the courts. The 
extraordinary court in Saloniki finished 300 criminal trials, involving 1026 persons, 
during January 1907. In Monastir, until 2 February 1907, 403 persons were arrested 
and 127 cases were taken to trial, while in Kosovo up to the middle of February there 
were 37 trials with 163 defendants. The high number of persons for one case refers to 
the fact that they were in connection with crimes committed by groups (supposedly 
of komitadji activity). While there were only 356 imprisoned in Monastir in 1900 
because of attacks against persons or institutions, by 1907 this increased to 1200. This 
was 631 and 1954 in Saloniki and 446 and 1265 in Kosovo Vilayet, respectively. The 
number of those deported was 7372, and 3830 of them were Muslims (over 50%), 
overrepresenting their proportion of the population. This means that authorities 
were more focussed on Muslims – probably as a result of the international 
intervention, rather than because of their violent character.195  In order to decrease the 
burden of the central authorities, the government tried to establish local peace 
tribunals for cases of lower value. (Participants in these were getting paid). 
Even after the interference of the Great Powers, the provinces were still crying for 
relief,196 as testified to by the Bulgarian Shopov’s compilation. Between May 1904 and 
May 1905, 111 violent cases committed by četas were reported within the boundaries of 
Macedonia, including those that were targeted against the authorities. (These are not 
covered by the term ‘everyday violence’, but can be compared to this category). 
These atrocities claimed an average of seven victims and perpetrators all together 
(including not only those killed, but also those wounded and captured alive).197 This 
high average number of ’participants’ reveals (1) that these incidents and conflicts 
                                                 
195 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents II. No. 1517. 13.09. 1907. One may argue, of course, that it is not that violence 
became more widespread, but that the authorities became more efficient at detecting it. But as other sources 
reveal, 50% of the perpetrators often remained unknown even after the intervention of the Powers. 
196 Frantz, ‘Zwischen Gewalt,’ 134–60. 
197 ЦДА, ф. 332k. oп. 1. a.e. 17. л. 544-555. 
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were not accidental or of personal character, but were planned in advance as a part 
of a campaign of intimidation and revenge – symbolizing a special type of warfare. 
(2) The general numbers also reveal that tensions did not decrease compared to the 
1902 data in Monastir. Though these numbers refer to a greater area and only 
political attacks are involved, the 509 murders mean a daily average of 1.4, while the 
more than 2000 arrested reached 6 daily on average. On the other hand, this general 
summary does not reveal whether the proximity to borders or distance from central 
administration had an effect on the escalation of violence, nor does it provide an 
account of the interethnic character of conflict, contrary to the Austro-Hungarian 
consular reports.  
These statistics cited in the report of Shopov help point out some preferences of 
groups with different ethnic origins or political commitments and also show their 
over- or underrepresentation among the dead and those injured, convicted and 
released. Most of those arrested in Macedonia were Bulgarians (80 per cent, a result 
of either the enhanced activity of the Bulgarians or the prejudice of the authorities, 
because their proportion of the population did not exceed 50-60%), though almost 
two-thirds of them were not imprisoned. Among those who were convicted, 
Bulgarians were not overrepresented: 20 per cent of arrested Bulgarians were 
sentenced to several years in prison, representing 79 per cent of all imprisoned, while 
Bulgarians constituted 80 per cent of those arrested. The proportion of imprisoned 
Serbs was also around 20 per cent of all Serbs arrested. Among the acquitted, Serbs 
were overrepresented (80 per cent of arrested Serbs were freed), while the 
investigation process was the longest in the case of Greeks, due to the fact that they 
were often not Ottoman but Greek citizens,198 unlike Bulgar(ian)s, who were mainly 
recruited from the territory of Macedonia and not from Bulgaria. 
According to the data collected by Shopov, Greek četas preferred to capture 
people alive and hold them for ransom, which means that the tactics of Greeks in the 
struggle for Macedonia reflected old tendencies and were not yet ’upgraded’ to the 
new stage of unlimited violence: 70 per cent of those captured were held by Greeks, 
while the proportion of atrocities committed by Greek forces was only 27 per cent. 
This practice was quite rare in the case of Serb and Bulgar offenders, who usually 
killed their victims (over 80% of known cases). Compared to this, murders 
constituted only 33 per cent of Greek violence. Altogether 66 per cent of those who 
died were killed by Bulgarian četas, although the latter were involved in ‘only’ 50 per 
cent of encounters. The proportion of the victims of Ottoman authorities constituted 
                                                 
198 In 1905, 87 out of the 255 known Greek četniks were Greek subjects, which is 33% – quite high compared to 
Bulgarians, for example – while another 21 arrived from Crete (8%). In the case of ’Bulgarian’ teachers in 
Macedonia, the proportion of indigenous teachers was over 90%. 
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‘only’ 17 to 20 per cent of all victims and those who died were underrepresented 
among them (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Distribution of violent acts between ethnic groups in 1905 throughout Macedonia, 
according to Shopov 
Arrested Convicted Acquitted 
Still under 
Investigation 
Ethnic Group 
1,607 (80%) 313 (20%) 993 (62%) 301 (18%) Bulgarian 
349 (17%) 79 (22%) 99 (28%) 171 (50%) Greek 
52 (3%) 4 (8%) 41 (80%) 7 (13%) Serb 
2,008 (100%) 396 (20%) 
1,133 
(55%) 
479 (25%) Total 
 
Confrontations Wounded Killed 
Captured 
Alive 
Adversary, 
opponent 
68 (61%) 6 320 (81%) 65 (16%) 
Bulgarian četas 
 (total cases: 391) 
30 (27%) 12 93 (33%) 165 (61%) 
Greek četas 
(total cases: 270) 
13 (12%) 2 96 (86%) 13 (11%) 
Serbian četas 
 (total cases: 111) 
111 
 (average of seven people per 
confrontation) 
20 509 (66%) 243 (31%) Total: 772 
? 122 86 - 
Committed by 
Turkish Authorities 
ЦДА, ф. 332k. oп. 1. a.e. 17. л. 544-555. 
 
Another set of statistics, limited to the British zone of the reforms and collected by 
the British consul in Saloniki, provides even more detailed information on theinter- 
and intraethnic character of the violence. This data is from the year 1907 (when the 
Greek-Bulgarian clash in South Macedonia culminated) and is limited to murders (the 
previous source had a broader base that included casualties), but also including cases 
committed by četa members against civilians (which the previous source did not). 
According to these statistics, the Serbs killed almost 70 persons during the period 
investigated, but only 10 were četa members (15%), the others could be supporters of 
inimical units, like peasants, legal members of the IMRO or other activists of nation-
building, like teachers or priests.199 (The numbers given in Table 8 do not represent 
the total year, as we have data that Greeks killed 334 persons all in all that year, 
while the table mentions ’only’ 230). In another zone, the Italian one (the Sanjak of 
                                                 
199 Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 312. 
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Monastir and Serfidje, the Kaza of Kastorija), 100 Turks (including soldiers), 511 
Bulgarians, 137 Greeks, 17 Serbs, 28 Vlachs, that is, a total of 954 persons were 
murdered that year. This was in line with their ethnic proportion, and the numbers 
(comparing them to the aforementioned 1902 data from Monastir) indicate that the 
situation had not improved. 
 
Table 8. The distribution of victims and perpetrators according to a British consular report from 1907 
VICTIMS 
PERPETRATORS 
Bulgarian 
Greek -
patriarchist Serbian Vlach Muslims 
Turkish 
troops Total 
Bulgarians 120 184 49 11 86 71 521 
Greeks 320 17  0 21 12 22 392 
Serbs 68 0 1  0 2 25 96 
Vlachs 0 23  0  0 1 8 32 
Muslims 172 1 16 3 1  0 193 
Unclassified 75 5 1 3 26 9 119 
Total 755 230 67 38 128 135 1353 
  
% Bulgarian Greek patr. Serbian Vlach Muslims 
Turkish 
troops Total 
Bulgarians 15.9 80.0 73.1 28.9 67.2 52.6 38.5 
Greeks 42.4 7.4 0.0 55.3 9.4 16.3 29.0 
Serbs 9.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.6 18.5 7.1 
Vlachs 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 5.9 2.4 
Muslims 22.8 0.4 23.9 7.9 0.8 0.0 14.3 
Unclassified 9.9 2.2 1.5 7.9 20.3 6.7 8.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   
% Bulgarian Greek patr. Serbian Vlach Muslims 
Turkish 
troops Total 
Bulgarians 23.0 35.3 9.4 2.1 16.5 13.6 100.0 
Greeks 81.6 4.3 0.0 5.4 3.1 5.6 100.0 
Serbs 70.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.1 26.0 100.0 
Vlachs 0.0 71.9 0.0 0.0 3.1 25.0 100.0 
Muslims 89.1 0.5 8.3 1.6 0.5 0.0 100.0 
Unclassified 63.0 4.2 0.8 2.5 21.8 7.6 100.0 
Total 55.8 17.0 5.0 2.8 9.5 10.0 100.0 
Dakin, D.: The Greek Struggle in Macedonia. 312. 
 
As the data shows, most of the murders (55%) were committed by Bulgarians in 
Southern Macedonia, well over their ethnic proportion (Table 8). However, as this 55% 
did not exceed that of the proportion of exarchists in the whole of Macedonia, we 
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cannot accuse Bulgarians generally of any ‘race-specific inclination’ towards 
violence. 40% of their victims were Greek, Muslim victims constituted only 22% of 
the total killed by Bulgarians, while 16% of their victims were in fact their fellow 
countrymen. This is a high figure: in the case of the Greeks, such an intraethnic 
political showdown constituted only 7.5% of the total, and in the case of the Vlachs, 
Serbs and Muslims, it was negligible.   
We may draw two conclusions: intragroup rivalry was the greatest among Bulgarians 
(as they were the greatest community, the chances of intragroup fault lines were 
probably the greatest here), while Serbs and Greeks were more unified and tended to 
articulate violence against other ethnic groups. Furthermore, in the case of political 
murders, the proportion of intraethnic showdowns seems to be smaller than in the case of 
everyday violence (see later), as the latter was ethnically and ideologically less targeted. (This 
also means that our theory, namely that other factors like blood feuds and economic 
disagreements were behind this phenomenon, is confirmed by the different nature of 
political murders). 
Greek violence was targeted at Bulgarians – 80% of victims of Greek political 
murders were Exarchist or Patriarchist Slav (but none was Serb!). Vlachs directed 
their violent activities against Greeks and Bulgarians, while Muslims also had 
problems mainly with Bulgarians: the figure of Bulgarian victims (67%) is higher 
than the general proportion of Bulgarians in Macedonia (around 40-50%). The 
violence applied by the Ottoman army in Southern Macedonia shows a more 
‘balanced’ picture, as the distribution of victims is similar to their ethnic proportions. 
The army did not discriminate in favour of any ethnic group.  
From the other side – that of the victims – most of the Bulgarians were killed by 
Greeks (35% of the 521), and Muslims were only 3rd in the rankings with their 16.5%, 
as the proportion of exarchists killed by their own comrades reached 23%. Beside 
being divided between groups with different ideological commitments, Bulgarians 
had to fight on many fronts at the same time, and this limited their chances for 
success. In the case of Muslims, Greeks or Serbs the situation is much more clear-cut: 
70–80% of the victims were killed by Bulgarians, while most of the Vlachs were killed 
by Greeks. 
These numbers are shocking. But the most convincing evidence of the failure of 
the Ottoman authorities and of international intervention to maintain public order, 
and of the increasing anarchy that ensued after the turn of the century, is presented 
by the detailed statistics compiled by Austro-Hungarian consuls, listing the victims 
of the social conflicts (which we analyze on the following pages, comparing them 
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with those mentioned above).200 Contrary to those discussed above, this source 
contains conflicts that cannot be tied unambiguously to the activity of authorities or četas, 
thus falling under the category of ‘everyday violence’. For example, the list of violent 
activities in Radovište kaza records five political murders among the 20 cases (25%),201 
and only one victim was a committee member (Table 9).201  
 
Table 9. List of violent activities in Radovište kaza (cited in the original language)202 
11. Mai Fatima und Tochter Zarifa aus 
Treskavec 
Getötet, Täter unbekannt 
27. Mai Koce aus Podoreš Vermißt 
16. Juni Demendezi aus Jargerica getötet, Täter angeblich Comité-Rache 
17. Juni Stojan aus Jargerica getötet, Täter angeblich Comité-Rache 
19. Juni Avram Jane dessen Frau und 
Tochter aus Rozbunar 
verwundet, Täter 3 unbekannte 
Mohammedaner 
20. Juni Risto Konstantin aus Radovište verwundet, dtto 
20. Juni Traman Dimitrija aus Delina schwer verwundet, Täter angeblich 
Türken 
28. Juni Kristo Ile aus Vratica der Tatverdächtig der Mohammedaner 
Damjan [sic!] 
12. Juli Jovan Velko aus Šipkovica Vermißt 
16. Juli Angelko Trajan, Jordan Postol, 
Mike Lazar, Mike, Petre Stojan, 
Tase Gjorgje: Hirten aus Radovište 
von einer mohammedanischen Bande 
gefesselt und durch Messerstiche getötet 
17. Juli Stojan Niko u. Gam: dtto dtto. 
19. Juli Trajce Zafir aus Kance getötet, Täter Rara Ahmed 
12. August Dane Jane und Sohn David, Koce Ilia 
aus Vrahovica 
getötet, Täter mohammed. Comités 
18. August Tašo Georgiev aus Radovište getötet, Täter unbekannte Comités 
21. August Ilija und Arif aus Vrahovica  getötet, Täter 3 Mohammedaner 
25. August 1 unbekanntes Comité-Mitglied bei 
Gmerdeš 
Getötet 
3. September File Risto aus Jargaica getötet, Täter unbekannt 
3. September Todor Spasov aus Kanče getötet, Täter Türken aus Promet 
3. September  Panče Ilo aus Skoruša getötet, Täter Türken aus Promet 
Im Kaza Radovište: Getötet 23, Verwundet 4, vermißt 2, 
 
                                                 
200 A typical example from the consular reports is a document written in Skopje in 1905, recording all acts of 
everyday violence that occurred in the sanjak between May 11 and September 13 of that year. 
201 It is interesting on the other hand that some settlements occurred repeatedly on the list (Jargarica 3 times, 
Vrahovica twice, Radoviste 3 times), referring to murder-series. 
201 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Calice, September 16, 1905., No.86/pol., 12. Sicherheits-verhältnisse im 
Amtsbezirke in der Zeit von 11. Mai bis 13. September (mit Beilag).  
202 Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, beyond being different, this source also has its limits. Compared to 
the shorter list (Table 10) provided by consul McGregor in April 1903, published by 
Keith Brown, which offered possibilities to reconstruct the causal relationship 
between events, this linear enumeration of events lacks any data that would provide 
internal cohesion. Even the short list of atrocities given by McGregor indicates the 
ongoing changes in the nature of violence (before Ilinden): the logical links between 
the murders became much complicated (beyond the level of simple revenge), but still 
traceable. Behind the published series of murders, three actors and two triggering 
pretexts could be identified. (1) Among the actors we can find Muslims carrying out 
individual blood feuds, which resulted in ’multiple’ vengeance for the death of their 
relative, who was involved in the tobacco business. (As tobacco was also important 
for the revolutionary organization as a revenue source, we may assume some conflict 
of interest). (2) The revolutionary organization exerting pressure on both Christian 
and Muslim inhabitants. (3) Local villagers (of Potmol) threatened both by IMRO 
activists and by vengeful Muslims. Villagers also participated in the killing of 
Muslims, probably after being won over by the organization. The first pretext of 
summoning violence (a) is the murder of Rassim, probably with an economic 
background. The second (b) could be an older offense or insult (to be avenged) as the 
last link in the chain indicates. It is also possible that the četa wanted to enforce the 
loyalty of villagers by making them accessories to atrocities. We have numerous 
example for the latter. Inhabitants of recently converted villages were oftern 
recruited by Serbian bands to contribute in attacks against Exarchists, and it is 
doubtful whether they acted willingly.203 
 
Table 10. Some subsequent cases of murder in 1903 
9 April, 
1903 Potmol 
A Bulgarian and his son were killed by Sugarev's band for refusing to supply them 
with rifles. 
16 April near Krushevo Bulgarians killed a Turk named Rassim bey Halil. 
18 April Krushoyani Rassim's relatives killed a Bulgarian. 
20 April Vyrbyani Turks from Pressila killed another Bulgarian as revenge for Rassim's death. 
22 April Potmol 
A Turkish watchman was killed by Bulgarian villagers who also killed one of the 
attackers and wounded another some months before. 
 
Dated 1905, two years later, our list of 285 victims from a period of four months 
and from a different region (which is larger than the one in the report by MacGregor, 
                                                 
203 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 82, 26 October 1907. 
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but smaller than the area in Shopov’s summary) looks to be more detailed compared 
to the report from the same year that contains 772 victims for the whole of Macedonia. 
Cases were reported for each kaza, giving the name and religion of perpetrators and 
victims (see Table 9), which makes the list more valuable and informative than 
Shopov’s report. Note that the cases mentioned here took place after the intervention 
of the Great Powers, and so it also demonstrates the powerlessness of the recently 
organized international gendarmerie. Though it lacks cohesion, and thus the 
connection between individual events remains unclear, the list still makes it possible 
to trace certain phenomena and to observe certain tendencies (the spatial pattern of 
violence, the role of border areas, the correlation between the ethnicity and religion 
of perpetrators and victims, etc.), though the cause of conflicts still remain obscure. 
Although the names of the victims and the perpetrators do not provide 
unquestionable evidence of their nationality, the sectarian composition can be more 
or less precisely reconstructed, thereby permitting an investigation into religious or 
ethnic tensions.204 
But this did not represent the peak of the violence by any means. After the failure 
of international intervention, the number of people killed increased quickly: in 1908 a 
total of 1080 “political murders”205 were committed throughout Macedonia (while 
there were 1350 dead listed for a smaller area, including the victims of band attacks on the 
local population, a year earlier), claiming among its victims 649 Bulgarians, 185 Greeks, 
130 Muslims, 39 Serbs, 36 Vlachs and 40 soldiers, according to the report of 
Englishman Harry Lamb.206 Compared to their proportion of the entire population, 
Muslim victims seem to be underrepresented and Bulgarian victims a bit 
overrepresented. These statistics also reveal that the reinstatement of the constitution 
in 1908 proved to be more effective than any other previous measure: over the last 
five months of that same year, only 71 political murders took place, constituting 7% 
of all murders, while the figure for the first four months of the year was almost 50 
per cent.207 One cannot avoid the assumption that the ceasefire among the bands in 
1908–1909, a consequence of the Young Turks’ rise to power, contributed to the 
stabilization of the situation to a greater degree than did the constitution or the 
parliamentary elections. 
                                                 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents II. No. 1642. 05.06.1908. There were 1133 murders within 10 months and 10,000 
over the previous ten years, according to Ottoman sources. 
206 Balogh, A nacionalizmus, 87. This work cites British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. Vol. 5. The 
near East: The Macedonian problem and the annexation of Bosnia 1903–9, edited by George Peabody Gooch and 
Harold Temperley. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926. 246, 289 and 293. 
207 Balogh, A nacionalizmus,  87. 
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Comparing the Bulgarian (Shopov’s) and the British sources, one may arrive at 
the following conclusions: (1) that violent acts committed by četas became more 
frequent in a short period between 1905 and 1908 in Macedonia (772 killed and 
injured compared to 1,080 killed); (2) that Austro-Hungarian documents are more 
detailed and therefore more suitable for conducting further analysis (as they include 
categories of victims of everyday violence not mentioned in the former sources); and 
(3) that everyday violence (or acts “not reported as political murders”) was apparently as 
frequent as political violence. Just to compare the two types of violence: during the first 
four months of 1908, 450 ‘political murders’ were carried out by četas throughout the 
whole of Macedonia, while in the first four months of 1905 197 people were killed in 
everyday violence within the much smaller area of the sanjak under inspection. 
In some parts of the Sanjak of Skopje in 1905, the average number of victims per 
attack exceeded four or five (likewise in Shopov’s Bulgarian statistics reporting četa 
involvement, where seven victims per attack were counted), which makes it evident 
that in these cases the source of the violence was not simply personal antagonisms or 
economic conflicts but rather ideological or intergroup tensions. The names and 
occupations in Table 6 reveal that many of the victims (especially the four women) 
can hardly be identified as members of paramilitary units (their activity may have 
been confined to providing information or supplying troops as legal members, or to 
espionage) and that in many cases they were victims of blood feuds motivated by 
rivalry between communities, or were victims of punitive actions or intimidation on 
the part of četas.208 
The fearless early use of coercion and violence against civilians and activists is 
clearly confirmed by a document entitled ‘Reglement für die Bulgarisch-Adrianopeler 
Revolutionären Comités’,209 dating from the year 1900. In addition to the spies and 
Ottoman bureaucrats who impeded the activity of the revolutionaries, both četa 
members and non-četa members were kept under surveillance by the secret police. 
Any retorsion against the non-četa members could be interpreted and labelled as 
’everyday violence’,210 even the punishment of spies - if the signs pointing to the 
revolutionary organizations were not recorded or were neglected. What made the 
situation more complicated was that not only activists, but even members of the civil 
                                                 
208 Austrian consular documents clearly indicated if the victim was a četa member, though of course could not 
accurately detail the background of all victims. Furthermore, četa activities can be avenged on the peaceful 
population as well, and thus the classification of these acts as ‘everyday violence’ is not unequivocal. In many 
cases the low clearance rate hindered the objective judgment of the situation.  
209 ÖStA HHStA, PA, XXXVIII. Konsulate (1848–1918). Kt. 430. Üsküb (1900), No. 212. Pára an Goluchowski, 
handgeschrieben, Üsküb, September 17, 1900, Statut und Reglement der bulgaro-macedonischen Comités. 
210 As legal members were often not known to the diplomats, they did not consider these murders to be political 
in nature. 
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population were allowed to be killed, if they threatened the goals of the committees 
and disregarded first warnings and fines. The punishment was extended to 
Bulgarians, whether living in Bulgaria or abroad, if they engaged in activities serving 
to exacerbate discontent among revolutionaries. Even those were sanctioned who 
had acted under pressure, or who were forced to commit violence or who were 
tortured by enemies of the committee. Mentioning the name of a committee member 
to the authorities or in public for the second time also entailed a death sentence.211 
These punitive measures could also have been behind the escalation of everyday 
violence, as very often the community did not dare inform the authorities about 
murder(er)s, while members of the internal police were allowed to kill ‘civilians’, not 
only komitadjis (as pointed out in the regulations). 
Very often, when Ottoman authorities did not have direct evidence of 
membership or supporting activities, they simply beat the suspected member up 
heavily in order to get him to break his silence. In most cases the suspect remained 
silent even during the beatings, for fear of breaking the oath and bringing the 
revenge of the organization. This meant that Ottoman authorities were unable to 
distinguish between people who remained silent because they were innocent and lacked any 
knowledge of illegal activities from those who were involved in the activity of the 
organization. The silence of band members had two consequences: the Ottomans 
changed tactics and simply beat up everyone - whether innocent or not - who 
remained silent in order to limit their activity for a few months. This put double 
                                                 
211 Ibid. Capitel IX. Strafen 
“Art. 41. Mitglieder und Arbeiter, die sich in etwas vergangen haben, begegnen folgenden Strafen:  
1/ Wenn die Übertretung leicht ist, z.B. Schwäche bei irgend einem Gespräche, Unregelmässigkeit in der Zahlung 
der Beiträge etc., macht dem Betreffenden der Leiter eine Ausstellung, falls sich dieselbe Übertretung 
wiederholt, wird sie mit einer Geldstrafe in Gemässheit der Vermögensverhältnisse bestraft, falls sich der 
Schuldige auch dann nicht bessert und gefährlich für die „Arbeit” wird, ist die Strafe der Tod. 
2/ ist das Vergehen der ‘Arbeit’ verderblich, namentlich falls der Übertreter zu Grunde zu gehen riskiert und die 
‘Arbeit’ in Gefahr bringt, wird er mit dem Tode auch dann bestraft, wenn die Übertretung eine unfreiwillige ist  
3/ falls jemand die Ausführung einer vom Vorgesetzten erhaltenen Befehles verweigert, erhält er für das erste Mal 
eine Rüge, falls sich dasselbe wiederholt, wird er mit dem Tode bestraft  
4/ falls jemand vorsätzlich ein Geheimnis verräth oder falls er durch eine nicht gewissenhafte Ausführung einer 
ihm übertragenen Aufgabe die ‘Arbeit’ der Gefahr aussetzt, wird er mit dem Tode bestraft. 
Art. 42. Gegen diejenigen, die die ‘Arbeit’ schädigen und nicht Comité-Mitglieder sind, werden folgende Strafen 
vorgesehen:  
1/ falls jemand die Existenz der Comités bespricht und dieselbe ruchbar macht, die Namen der revolutionären 
Arbeiten bekannt macht, dem wird vorerst nahegelegt, dass ein solches Benehmen nichtpatriotisch und mit 
Gefahrverbunden ist, falls er nicht begreift, wird er mit dem Tode bestraft  
2/ Wer absichtlich gegen die ‘Arbeit’ Drohungen ausstosst, mag er Bulgare sein oder nicht, wird mit dem Tode 
bestraft. 
Art 43. Der Todesstrafe verfallen ferner noch: Spione und jene Regierungsbeamte, die sich in der Verfolgung 
gegen die ‘Arbeit’ au....chnet [unlesbar: wahrscheinlich ‘ausgezeichnet’] haben, jene Bulgaren, mögen sie 
inländisch oder ausländisch sein, die es versuchen Uneinigkeit und Spaltung in die Comités zu säen, die den 
Vollzug der Befehle der Vorgesetzten verweigern und jene Comité-Mitglieder, die .... [ein Wort fehlt] bei 
Proclamierung des Aufstandes sich weidern, zu den Waffen zu greifen.” 
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pressure on the local population: even if they did not know anything they were 
beaten up, so neutrality remained an inadequate response for civilians in this case. If 
everyone is beaten up, not only band members, why not join them and at least be 
defended from one side?212 The abandonment of neutrality as a strategy only further 
increased tendencies towards escalation. 
Neither is it surprising that communist activists and ideologists visiting the 
Balkans during the ’struggle of Macedonia’, like Trotsky, implemented these 
methods effectively in organizing the secret police in their homeland. Even the terms 
used, such as ‘Arbeit’ (the Cause, the Work), reappear in these Soviet documents.  
An examination of data (correlation) shows that neither the high concentration of 
IMRO weapons, nor the ethnic heterogeneity of districts always resulted in an 
escalation of violent activities. The activity of IMRO cannot alone explain all forms of 
‘everyday violence’: in Kočani, which was well supplied with ammunition, everyday 
violence was rare until 1910, although here Albanians and Muslims also lived 
together with Bulgarians. The extent of violence was also relatively low in Veles, 
even though IMRO had plenty of bullets and weapons and half of the district was 
Turkish. In Kriva Palanka and in Kratovo, the high number of victims measured 
against the total population (Table 11) at first glance seems to be due to the fact that 
an extremely high 22 per cent of the population supported IMRO (Table 4). However, 
the percentage of sympathizers supplied with weapons was quite low here (only five 
per cent). Furthermore, both territories were mainly Exarchist in character, and 
therefore neither interreligious tensions nor clashes with the Turkish authorities can 
explain the spread of violence here (the latter conflict type was anyway excluded 
from the term ‘everyday violence’).213 
 
Table 11. Types of violent activity and the territorial and religious distribution of victims in Skopje 
Sanjak between May 11 and September 13, 1905214 
Kaza Attacks Killed Injured Missing 
Christian 
victims 
Muslim 
victims 
Unknown Total 
Victims 
per 1,000 
Inhabitants 
 
Skopje* 
8 
(average 
41 8 2 30 (2 f) 
19 (4 f, 1 
c) 
3 (1 f) 
52 (7 f, 
1 c) 
0.71 
                                                 
212 After his recovery the suspected person often became a komitadji. 
213 The high number of weapons can be explained by the infiltration of Serbian irregulars into these borderland 
districts from neighbouring Serbia. Since the clearance rate was quite low in borderland areas, perpetrators 
could be foreigners serving in irregular units. The clearance rate was lowest in peripheral areas, where the 
violence seemed to be the worst (Kriva Palanka, Kratovo). Thus in these two kazas the violence can be 
explained by interethnic tensions fuelled by external factors. 
214 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz. 434, Pára to Calice, September 16, 1905., No.86/pol., 12.  
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of 5 
killed) 
Kumanovo* 
9 
(average 
of 4 
killed) 
36 9 4 21 (1 f) 12 16 49 (1 f) 1.07 
Kriva 
Palanka 
24 24 9 5 15 (4 f) - 24 38 1.55 
Kratovo 13 13 5 4 9 3 10 22 0.97 
Kočani 3 3 1 1 4 1 - 5 0.13 
Maleš 3 3 5 2 3 2 5 10 0.37 
Radovište 23 23 4 2 25 (2 f) 3 (2 f) 1 29 1.57 
Štip* 
11 
(average 
of 4 
killed) 
42 11 10 44 13 (1 f) 6 63 1.37 
Veles 12 12 1 5 8 5 5 18 0.33 
Total 106 197 53 35 159 (9 f) 
58 (7 f, 1 
c) 
70 (1 f) 
287 (17 
f, 1 c) 
0.82 
f = females; c = children, *Extremely high casualty/attack refer to political background. 
 
Table 12. The religious and territorial distribution of perpetrators committing murders between May 
11 and September 13, 1905 (only known perpetrators included)215 
Kaza 
Christians 
Christians 
Altogether 
Muslims 
Muslims 
Altogether 
Unknown 
Cases 
Total Against 
Christians 
Against 
Muslims 
Against 
Christians 
Against 
Muslims 
Skopje 5 3 8 8 3 11 26 45 
Kumanovo 3 2 5 10 3 13 12 30 
Kriva 
Palanka 
2 - 2 1 - 1 7 10 
Kratovo 4 - 4 - - 1 9 + 1216 14 
Radovište 2 1 3 9 1 10 6 19 
Štip 6 1 7 13 1 14 29 50 
Veles 2 1 3 2 3 5 3 11 
Total 27 (14%) 7 (4%) 34 43 (22%) 11 (6%) 55 101 (53%) 189 
 
As we pointed out earlier, Austrian consular sources offer possibilities for deeper 
investigation into the ethno-religious and geographical characteristics of violence (cases 
committed by soldiers or police are not included). Most of the victims (including 
deaths, injuries and missing) were Christians (55 per cent) (Table 11–12). The 
                                                 
215 Ibid. 
216 Muslim attackers and one unknown victim. 
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proportion of Muslims was 20 per cent, while 25 per cent remained unknown. 
Compared to their proportion of the entire population of the sanjak (40 per cent), 
Muslim victims were somewhat underrepresented (Table 2).  
With regard to the perpetrators, these ratios are not more than estimates, because 
more than 50 per cent of cases remained unresolved. This also demonstrates the low 
effectiveness of the imperial and international authorities. Based on known cases, 
Muslims mainly attacked Christians (22 per cent of the total, and four times more 
frequent than Muslim attacks on Muslims). This was the largest share of all types of 
intercommunal conflicts and supports the general thesis to be found in the literature. 
On the other hand the proportion of Christian perpetrators committing violent 
crimes against Muslims was only 4 per cent of the total (Table 12). Attacks within the 
Muslim community ranged up to 6 per cent of the total, while violence between 
Christians constituted more than 14 per cent of the total in Skopje Sanjak – similar to 
the value in the report of Lamb on South Macedonia (this was a greater percentage 
value than that for Christian crimes against Muslims!). One may arrive at the 
conclusion that the Exarchist-Patriarchist rivalry or internal showdowns were more 
important here (especially considering the relatively small proportion of Patriarchists 
in the territory) than the hostility of Christians towards Muslims, and that violence within 
the Muslim community was more frequent than Christian violence toward Muslim 
communities.  
The spatial pattern of violence can be investigated too: in Štip kaza Christians 
primarily attacked Christians, while Muslims in Štip, Kumanovo and in Radovište 
mainly attacked Christians. These phenomena were not connected to ethnic 
predominance: in Kumanovo, Muslims composed only 30 per cent of the population, 
while in Štip they constituted the majority. In the vicinity of Kriva Palanka and 
Kratovo,217 all known Christian attacks were targeted at other Christian communities. 
This may be explained by the fact that though these kazas were ethnically 
homogenous, the national conflict between Bulgars and Serboman troops was fierce 
(one should not forget that 50 per cent of cases were unresolved, and therefore the 
numbers have limited statistical relevance).  
The spatial distribution of victims and perpetrators (Table 13–14) shows that the 
largest absolute numbers of victims were observable in Skopje, Štip and Kumanovo 
kazas. Nevertheless, these absolute numbers are not representative, as these kazas had 
larger populations. The proportion of victims measured against the total population is 
more representative. With this in mind, victims of violent activities were 
                                                 
217 The majority of the population in Kriva Palanka and Kratovo was Christian (81.6–90.7 per cent), although 
these kazas were small in terms of their total population.  
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overrepresented in Kumanovo, Kriva Palanka, Kratovo, and especially in Radovište 
and Štip kazas. These territorial units were located in the mountainous periphery, far 
away from the administrative centre and the Vardar axis (which served as the main 
line of communication with adjacent areas). 
 
Table 13. The proportion of perpetrators and victims compared to the population in the sanjak (taken 
to be 100 per cent) in 1905 (in order to examine underrepresentation and overrepresentation)218 
 
Skopje Kumanovo 
Kriva 
Palanka  
Kratovo Radovište 
Štip Veles 
(Istib) (Köprülü) 
Population (%) 21 13 7 6 5 13 15 
Victims (%) 18 17 13 8 10 22 6 
Perpetrators (%) 24 16 5 7 10 26 6 
Kočani and Maleš were omitted due to a small number of cases. 
 
Table 14. Spatial and religious differences in violence in 1905, based on a comparison of victims and 
perpetrators. A coloured background indicates overrepresentation (>1) 
Kaza 
Christian 
Victims/ 
Christian 
Population 
Muslim 
Victims/ 
Muslim 
Population 
Christian 
Perpetrators/ 
Christian 
Population 
Muslim 
Perpetrators/ 
Muslim 
Population 
Distance 
from 
Centre219 
Distance 
from 
State 
Border 
Skopje 1.35 0.69 0.41 0.46 1 2 
Kumanovo 0.61 0.89 0.24 1.58 2 2 
Radovište 2.09 0.18 0.38 0.93 4 3 
Štip 1.65 0.37 0.33 0.50 3 4 
Veles 0.70 0.78 0.43 1.28 2 5 
*Kriva Palanka and Kratovo were omitted due to the large proportion of unknown delinquents; 
Kočani and Maleš were omitted due to small case numbers. 
 
The same conclusions can be made on the bases of the data on perpetrators. 
Measured against the entire population, perpetrators were overrepresented in 
Skopje, Radovište and Štip, nearly the same kazas in which the ratio of victims 
compared to the population was the largest. In the latter two kazas, the proportion of 
perpetrators and victims was twice as high as the proportion of the population of the 
kaza compared to the total population of Skopje Sanjak (Table 13). This is not 
surprising, as the conscription of 1903 tells us that the proportion of Muslims was 
quite high in these places (see the map of Kančov or the map published in the 
                                                 
218 Based on ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Calice, September 16, 1905., No.86/pol., 12.  
219 Distance from the centre or from the border was measured using graph theory and based on the number of 
nodes (local centres) that had to be passed in order to reach the territory in question. 
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Carnegie Report).220 Based on the absolute numbers of perpetrators and victims, these 
attacks were the bloodiest, reaching an average of between four and five deaths per 
attack. Christian victims measured against the Christian population were 
overrepresented in Skopje, Radovište and Štip kazas, but this does not mean that 
Christian victims221 were killed solely by Muslims (see Table 12 and 14); meanwhile, 
Muslim perpetrators compared to Muslim population were overrepresented in 
Kumanovo, Radovište and Veles. Muslim victims and Christian perpetrators were 
not overrepresented anywhere. 
 
Table 15. Correlation table between variables related to violence in 1905 (only those who are known to 
have committed crimes are included) 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of 
Christian Victims* 
-0.75 
Proportion of Muslim Perpetrators vs. 
Distance from Administrative Centre 
-0.47 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of 
Christian Perpetrators* 
0.41 
Percentage of Unknown Cases vs. 
Distance from Administrative Centre 
0.36 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Muslim 
Victims* 
-0.42 
Percentage of Unknown Cases vs. 
Distance from Border 
-0.55 
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Muslim 
Criminals* 
-0.31 
 Proportion of Muslim Criminals vs. 
Distance from Borders 
0.55 
Percentage of Christian Victims vs. Percentage of 
Christians Perpetrators 
-0.78 
Proportion of Muslim Victims vs. 
Distance from Borders 
0.40 
Proportion of Muslim Victims vs. Proportion of 
Muslim Perpetrators 
0.33 
Percentage of Muslim Victims vs. 
Distance from Centre 
-0.76 
Percentage of Christian Victims vs Proportion of 
Muslim Perpetrators 
0.29 
Percentage of Muslim Perpetrators vs. 
Percentage of Christian Perpetrators 
0.19 
*Substituting Christians with Muslims, the strength of correlation does not change. Significant 
relationships are marked in bold letters. 
 
Contrary to some well-distinguished territorial patterns, violence in the sanjak (as 
a total) was characterized mainly by weak correlations, and thus general features were 
overshadowed by local patterns (strengthening the thesis of Petrungaro and Reclus on 
geographical circumstances influencing social structure). Although a significant but 
reverse correlation was measured between the proportion of Christian victims and 
the proportion of Christian perpetrators (k= -0.78),222 other relations did not show 
                                                 
220 Among the interior kazas, Skopje, Radovište and Štip had Muslim majorities (52.8–56.6 per cent), while in 
Kumanovo and Veles Christians constituted the majority (63.4–70.3 per cent). 
221 Most of the victims here were also Christians.  
222 Meaning that where the proportion of Christian perpertators is great, the proportion of Christian victims is 
low, and where the proportion of Christian victims is great, the proportion of Christian perpetrators is low. 
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such a strong correlation due to the previously mentioned ethnic heterogeneity and 
due to the diversity of conflict types mentioned earlier (Table 15).223 
Since perpetrators were mainly Muslims, both in kazas with a Muslim majority 
(Štip) and with a Muslim minority (Veles), while victims were dominantly Christians 
in both cases, the pattern of violence at the kaza level was not determined solely by the 
religious character of the population, but also by other factors (distance from borders, violence 
among those of the same religion). Violence in central territories was relatively224 rare 
(despite the higher population density), while it was more frequent in peripheral 
kazas along the Bulgarian and Serbian borders. We may assume that Christian 
perpetrators were overrepresented along the Bulgarian border and in Slavic-
speaking territories, while Muslim perpetrators were more frequent in the 
Kumanovo, Veles and Radovište kazas along the Muslim-dominated Vardar axis. 
This is confirmed by the correlation table: as the distance measured from the centres 
grew, the proportion of Muslim perpetrators decreased (r= -0.8). The clearance rate 
also draws attention: a general tendency was observable for police to be the most 
inefficient along the easily penetrable Bulgarian border. Unresolved cases ranged 
from 60 per cent (Maleš) up to 100 per cent (Kočani!) in the peripheries.225  
Spatial differences in violence and the driving factors of it were collected to 
summarize our analysis in Table 16.  
 
 
Figure 3. Spatial distribution of Serbian attacks on exarchist population in 1907, Sanjak of Skopje 
ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. 
                                                 
223 The correlation coefficient between the Christian population (percentage) and Christian perpetrators is also 
high, though it remained under 0.5. Clashes between Christians elevated this number, while Christian-
Muslim clashes tended to decrease it. The value of the coefficient demonstrates that conflict of both types was 
abundant in the area. There is no close relation between the proportion of Muslim victims and Christian 
perpetrators or between Muslim victims and Muslim perpetrators at a sanjak level as a result of the same 
factors, since conflicts may occur in Muslim-Muslim relations as well as in Muslim-Christian relations.  
224 Measured relative to the population. 
225 While in the case of Kumanovo, Radovište and Veles this was only between 27.2–40.1 per cent.  
Kumanovo
Kratovo
Palanka
Skopje
Veles
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Table 16. Summary table: characteristics of wave of violence in 1905, Sanjak of Skopje (May 11–
September 13, 1905) 
 
Skopje Kumanovo 
Kriva 
Palanka 
Kratovo Kočani 
Maleš 
(Osmanie) 
Radovište Štip Veles 
Distant from Centre (x),  
Near Borders (y)  
y xy xy xy xy x x 
 
Proportion of Unresolved Cases 
is Significant 
x 
 
x x x x 
 
x 
 
Proportion of Muslim 
Population is Significant 
xx 
   
xx x xx xx x 
Proportion of Victims 
Compared to Population is 
Significant 
 
x x 
   
x x 
 
Proportion of Perpetrators 
Compared to Population is 
Significant 
x 
     
x x 
 
Muslim-Christian Conflict x x 
    
x x 
 
Christian-Christian Conflict x x x x 
   
x 
 
Muslim-Muslim Conflict x x 
      
x 
Majority of Known Perpetrators 
is Muslim  
x 
    
x x x 
Majority of Known Perpetrators 
is Christian    
x 
     
Christian Victims are 
Overrepresented 
x 
     
x x 
 
Muslim Victims are 
Overrepresented  
x 
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Map 3. Kaza-level map of the religious distribution of victims and perpetrators in the Sanjak of 
Skopje; cartography by Zsolt Bottlik. 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
 
Map 4. An ethnically mixed area around Skopje and Kumanovo in 1912.  Map by Hasluck and 
Schulze-Jena in 1927. No indication is given for settlement size. Map from the work of Wilkinson, H. 
R. Maps and Politics. A review of the ethnographic cartography of Macedonia. Liverpool Univ. Press, 1951. 
251. Cartography by Zsolt Bottlik. 
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Map 5. Macedonian areas involved and omitted from the reforms 
 
The practice of destabilization226 – other forms of violence  
 
The main goal of this chapter is to highlight the differences in the character of 
’everyday violence’ and violence driven by political goals. Another aim is to verify 
(or challenge) some specific features of četa activity mentioned earlier, and the third 
aim is to trace ethnic or cultural differences and patterns in attacks not labelled as 
cases of ’everyday violence’. In order to analyze these the reports of the Bulgarian 
                                                 
226 We try to avoid the usage of word terror, because the extension or projection of the recent meaning of this 
term into the past is ahistoric. The word terror was used limitedly by IMRO activists retaining this term for 
the activity of the internal police that punished ’deviant’ revolutioners and the enemies of the ’revolution’ 
(like in the French revolution of 1789). The term ’terror(ism)’ did not even occur regarding the Serbian attacks 
on Exarchist civilians, though nowadays we would classify these as terrorist events. 
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consulate from 1907 – a year before the withdrawal of Powers from the reform 
movement – were selected and these underwent both a prosopographic and 
statistical analyis.  The first method was used to identify general and specific features 
through numerous case studies – in order to make our conclusions comparable with 
the research on the Prizren Sanjak, where problems were analyzed in the same 
manner. The second method (quantitative analysis) was chosen to compare the 
features (frequency, geographical scope, etc.) of violence with the ’everyday 
violence’.  
In short, the formerly mentioned hypotheses, assumptions or logical 
constructions, as well as the relevance of statements derived from other works are 
tested here in this chapter.  
 
Encounters between armed groups and civilians  
 
As this source was collected by one of the concerning parties, the Bulgarians, it 
cannot be considered impartial: Bulgarian actions against other people were not 
conscripted, therefore a numeric analysis on proportions could not be conducted. 
However, it still provided substantial material for other purposes (measuring četa 
activity, timing, participants, targets, etc.). The simple description of the cases would 
assume that many of these conflicts could be grouped into ’everday violence’ as well, 
but the number of perpetrators/case and the timing (often night) refers to the fact that 
these were thoroughly planned mass-actions, thus cannot be considered as ’everyday 
violence’, but rather as politically motivated actions. 
One of the first reports reveals the changes in tactical elements of Serbian bands: a 
congress of Serbian committees227 agreed that beside maintaining former practices 
threatening letters should be delivered to all reluctant communities. Together with 
these letters the villagers were to receive a pre-written arzahan, a testimony, in which 
the villagers pointed out their deliberate willingness to leave the Exarchate for the 
Patriarchate. These letters had to be delivered to the Ottoman authorities to 
announce the change officially and to prove the deliberateness of their decision.228 In 
the earlier practice, threatening letters usually demanded money or food. This 
change implies a substantial shift in četa goals and tools and also implied that the 
supply of četa was secured somehow by other means. As the same booklet of reports 
also mentions the 300 000 dinars as „credit” from the Serbian state and 200 
                                                 
227 Like the Bulgarians, the Serbs also usually held meetings to define what tactics to follow that year. 
228 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 71 (old page – new page 8), 26 March 1907. 
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quickfiring guns deposited in a village near the borders from the same year, it means 
that these subsistence problems had been overcome by that time.229  
Such a threatening letter was written to the community of Kriva Krusha in Veles, 
which immediately forwarded it to the Bulgarian metropolite in Veles to inform the 
Bulgarian side. The document threatened with burning up the houses and killing the 
inhabitants.230 One of the četas specified for these acts was led by Ceno Markov, who 
was formerly with the Bulgarians, but then became a Serbian vojvoda.231 In a 
threatening letter to the former friends and protegees, he warns that 50 Mannlichers 
would open fire on the villagers unless the settlement turns to be Serbian, and it is 
futile to trust in the Ottoman army to hinder this.232 This was not an unique case. 
Other documents also mentions the mass-practice of forced arzahan.233 
The same Markov was also one of those, who also applied new strategies in četa 
survival. Wandering from village to village in Subotsko in winter, he finally reached 
Banjane in Skopsko, where his troops were fed by the local monastery.234 The activity 
of Serbian paramilitary troops in winter increased in parallel to the abundance of 
threatening letters: on 20 December 1906 three Bulgarians were kidnapped, on 24 
December further four were kidnapped by the četa of Georgi Kapitan, on 25 another 
one was taken as hostage, but this time the victim was not a village starešina, but a 
person accused simply of pro-Bulgarian sentiments. In January a Serbian četa in 
Mlado Nagorichano burnt up a house,235 another village, Kanarevo (Kumanovo) soon 
declared itself Serbian.  
The frequent raids continued in spring as well. On 1 March a Serbian četa 
including 4-6 soldiers went from Vranja to Subotsko terrorizing Muslims as well.236 
20 or more Ottomans were insulted around Kratovo.237 On 10 March a Serbian četa of 
25 men led by Ivan Martulčanec entered into Veles kaza and kidnapped 3 persons. 
The hostages were usualy held in Serboman villages (Orahov dol, Kanarevo),238 and 
this confirms the cooperation between civilians and paramilitary units. On 20 March 
an armed mass attacked a Bulgarian village in Skopsko. The Bulgarians suspected 
that the attackers came from a Serboman village and were encouraged by a well-
known Serboman priest to take revenge for an insult on the Serboman Rudnik 
                                                 
229 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 66-67, report No. 500. 
230 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 72, 27 March 1907. 
231 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 72, 22 March 1907. 
232 Ibid. 
233 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 66-67, report No. 500. 
234 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 71, 26 March 1907. 
235 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 66. report No. 186 and No. 78. 
236 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 68. No. 637. 
237 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 66-67. report No. 500. 
238 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 69. 
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settlement. The attack resulted 1 Bulgarian dead and 1 wounded. Among the lines of 
attackers Turks were also discovered,239 which confirms the assumption, that mutual 
hatred against a third group or personal differences could also be motivating factors. 
On the first day of April a Serbian četa set 2 houses on fire in the Bulgarian village 
Izvor (Veles), while kidnapping 16 persons. Later they were set free when they 
signed the arzohan, in which they denied being Exarchists any more, and delivered 
the letter to the Ottoman authorities.240 Two days later a Serbian četa attacked 
Vladilovci village kidnapping the teacher forcing him to announce the return of the 
village to the Patriarchate. The 5 more captured hostages were not released until the 
arzahan had been signed.241 
At the end of May a Serbian četa ranging to 20 men led by the formerly Bulgarian 
vojvoda, Andrey, attacked 2 Bulgarian villages in Veleshko. But incidentally, in one of 
the villages Dacho, a Bulgarian četa leader happened to stay with his 4 men (we do 
not know whether he was the original target of the Serbs or not), who repelled the 
attack and even sent reinforcements to the other village. The clash resulted in 1 dead 
and 2 wounded from the lines of the paramilitary troops.242 On 31 May the same 
happened. A Bulgarian village was attacked by a Serbian četa unit, but a strong 
Bulgarian force was deployed there. The encounter resulted in 6 deaths. Despite the 
Bulgarian presence, the Serbs set fire to 2 houses and kidnapped 2 starešinas and 
threatened them to be killed unless they would refrain from supporting Bulgarian 
četas and deny the authority of the Exarchate.243 On 14 May another Serbian četa 
attaked a Bulgarian village in Skopsko. The peculiarity of the situation was that 3 četa 
members came from the neighboring Serboman village,244 which highlights the 
civilian participation in these raids – which was probably triggered by personal 
tensions or economic interests or was simply driven by a revenge for an earlier insult 
or atrocity. 
The summer was also characterized by violent band activity. On 6 June, 1907 a 
Serbian paramilitary unit attacked a village in Veleshko and forced it to accept the 
Patriarchate. The mukhtar had to stamp the official letter and send it to the Serbian 
school director in Veles, who was one of the coordinator and organizer of band 
activity then.245 On 1 June, a Serbian četa of 20 and some 50-60 local Serboman 
Patriarchists joining them attacked Poddarzhi Kon, a village claiming itself Bulgarian 
                                                 
239 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 71 (8), 26 March 1907. 
240 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 73, 6 April 1907. 
241 Ibid. 
242 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 74, 27 May 1907, report No. 1414. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 76, 14 June 1907. 
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and forced the village leaders to accept the authority of the Patriarchate and declare 
themselves Serbian. The attackers took a youngster as a hostage.246 Also in June, a 
Serbian četa including 3 Turkish members attacked 2 villages forcing them to convert 
to the Patriarchate.247 On 15 June, in the evening, a četa composed of 6 Serbomans 
from the neighboring village and 3 unknown attacked a priest, his brother, sons and 
their workers working on the fields in Skopsko. The priest managed to escape on a 
horse.248 On 14 June again in the evening a Serbian četa of 30 attacked a Bulgarian 
village in Kratovsko and shot on the local teacher, Simeon Stefanov, who was 
injured, but managed to escape. During the clash the četa killed a girl and another 
was wounded. It was neither the askeri, nor the gendarmerie, but a Bulgarian četa 
(more likely the local militiamen organized by the IMRO warriors) arriving from the 
neighboring village that reacted quickly, but was unable to capture the Serbs.249 On 
26 June a Serbian četa arriving to Skopska Crna Gora reached village Kaplan. When 
the Serbs fell asleep a Turkish band member stole some weapons from them and 
fled.250 On 27 June a Serbian četa attacked a Bulgarian village in Palanechko, 
kidnapping 4 starešinas and prvenci and forcing them to declare the village Serbian or 
else they would be killed and the village burnt down. In order to defend themselves 
and the village leaders from further harassment the villagers went to the town and 
gave an arzahan to the kaymakam, that they would accept the authority of the 
Patriarchate.251 An even larger četa of 60 men – composed of četniks and local 
Patriarchists – reached the Giljan kaza on their way to shift their activity to Tetovsko 
and Gostivarsko. There they met a local četa and an askeri detachment and the battle 
resulted in 6 dead četniks and 6 dead Serboman villagers.252 As we have already seen, 
inter-četa clashes were rarely mentioned, četas usually carried out raids on local 
population instead of engaging into battle with another četa. Clashes between the 
official army and četas were not rare (as testified by the casualty lists), but in this 
booklet this was the sole case, when the Ottoman official forces intervened – partly 
because the band activity exceeded the local level and began to grow into regional 
level. (The authorities of the neighboring kazas tried to hinder the movement of četas 
between kazas). In other words, the source contains selected cases, where the attacks 
on local population are overrepresented, thus it is not reliable enough to carry out a 
thorough statistical analysis. It is also worth mentioning that the bands had enough 
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248 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 76, 18 June 1907. 
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weapons allocated in the villages to arm 30-60 villagers as supporters. The formerly 
mentioned Serbian četa had arrived from Serbia, led by a captain and 2 other army 
officers and a sergeant. Their supposed route was indicated on an official Austrian 
military map found at the battlefield, where the Serboman settlements to visit were 
also indicated.253 On 9 August, 1907 a Serbian četa of 12 persons arrived to Tetovsko 
and gave 10 days to a village to surrender and return to the Patriachate.254 5 days 
earlier another Serbian četa from Staro Nagorichano (Kumanovo) led by Petko 
vojvoda took 2 hostages from a village in Skopsko to force the villagers to return to 
the Patriarchate. They were given 1 day to think it over.255 This was another – not rare 
– case when a Serbian četa crossed the administrative boundary of a kaza. On 13 
August, the same Petko vojvoda repeated the act against another village.256 Even more 
serious incident took place on 19 August, when a Serbian četa kidnapped 9 villagers 
from a village in Kratovsko and further 8 inhabitants of Kratovo town, who were on 
their way or were working on the fields. One of them was killed because he resisted. 
Among their lines was a rich urban dweller for whom ransom was asked.257 (Ransom 
was getting rarer and rarer – the mentioned 9 hostages were kidnapped to force the 
settlement to return to the Patriarchate and become Serboman). 
On 25 August a Serbian četa attacked a han (called Chifte Hanove) near the karakol 
(the police station!) wounding 10 Bulgarians and kidnapping many. And the 
attackers were able to disappear after they had engaged in fight with the police!258 
This reveals that the extent of „neutral” territories were shrinking indeed and that 
the authorities were unable to chase the bandits who were getting more and more 
fearless and audacious.  
The end of summer did not mean a decrease in band activity. On 9 September 
1907 in the Bulgarian Mlado Nagorichano a peasant, Trajko Stefanov and his wife 
was killed by a Serbian četa.259 A day earlier a family in Kumanovo kaza was 
threatened and forced to become Serboman after a family member had been killed.260 
On 6 September the victim was a Bulgarian village in Skopsko.261 In October a 
Serbian četa of 15 men burnt 3 watermills around Veles and sacked 150 goats. In this 
case the warfare showed evident signs of its economic character. This was especially 
frequent after harvest. The destruction of mills forced the villagers to transport their 
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wheat to larger distances, and this made them more vulnerable. Supplying the četa, 
while destroying the enemies’ economic infrastructure (the loss of mills was also 
harmful for IMRO activists as these also processed their food) was another sign of 
’total warfare’ similarly to the involvement of local people to connive at a crime and 
targetting civilians. The attackers shot on the 2 shepherd, who managed to escape. 
Though there was a military unit deployed around Solje settlement, the army 
pursuited the attackers only the following day.262 On 23 October, village Gradec in 
Palanechko received a threatening letter written by vojvoda Kochanski, a former 
Bulgarian četnik to return to the Patriarchate.263 On 4 October the 9 Bulgarian 
kidnapped from Kratovo and further 5 from „Chifte Hanove” were found dead near 
the Serbian border (this evidenced the direction of communitcation lines and way of 
retreat of Serbian četas, as Kratovo kaza was not limitrophe with Serbia). Further 2 
Bulgarians from Skopje kaza were also found to be dead.264 On 26 October a Serbian 
četa of 100 men (remember what we told about extreme četa size in autumn and 
winter!) attacked again the mentioned Gradec in Palanechko. 11 houses and the 
granaries were burnt265 in order to weaken the economic position of the settlement 
for the winter. The tactics to famish the villages and thus forcing them to convert was 
not rare. Though many shots were fired, no one died. The attacking force contained a 
contingent of 20-25 villagers from the recently Serbianized villages and 2 Albanians 
and a Gypsy was also among their lines. (The Serbian tactics probably included the 
principle of generating and exacerbating antagonistic tensions between settlements, 
making their future return to Exarchism more difficult. It is also possible that the 
neighboring villages wanted to take revenge for older insults. What seems to be 
impossible is the probability that they participated in the attack because of deep 
nationalistic commitment). The word ’zaloveni’ in connection with them makes the 
impression (at least through Bulgarian glasses) that they did not participate in the 
attack deliberately, but acted under pressure. Some participants later stressed (the 
Gypsy and the Albanians) that they received an order (from whom it remained 
unknown as the report used passive voice) to set fire to Bulgarian villages.266 Actions 
against private property (like houses) also became more violent as winter was closing 
in. This must have been another tactical element. Economic benefits were motivating 
factors for villagers to participate in the raids. (In the first week of January in 1907 50 
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Serbs, including Serboman villagers attacked Kanarevo and stole many sheep.)267 On 
27, October a Serbian četa in Kratovsko burnt down 15 houses and killed 7-8 persons 
in Stracin. According to the survivers, the number of attackers reached 500, mostly 
from the neighboring Serbianized villages. A part of this group was attacking the 
telegraph station and the karakol in order to prevent the gendarmerie to bring help. 
Finally the cavalry from Kumanovo (another kaza!) had to intervene.268 This case not 
only englightens that violence escalated so much that local forces were not any more 
able to control the situation (not even if they really wanted to do so), but also draws 
the attention to the fact that these autunm raids showed the character of a well-
planned attack rather than a simple plundering. The harmonization of parallel 
attacks, the detachment of small forces with separate goals also implies that among 
the četa members active of former professional soldiers had to be found. On 11 
October 8 Bulgarians from the town Skopje were attacked by Serbians during on 
their way home (2 hours walk form the town). In the middle of November a Serbian 
četa burnt the granary of the local leader in Palanechko. Three of his relatives were 
injured in the attack.269 On 24 November the poor village of Gradec in Palanechko 
was once again attacked at night. 
So, this is 43 incidents within a year, with at least 160 known victims (including 
more than 50 deaths, many injuries, missing and hostages), which reveals the failure 
of the international gendarmerie and the ’humanitarian intervention’ of the powers. 
This is averagely 4 persons per attack, still high to be labelled simply as ’everyday 
conflicts’.270 Even if we extrapolate this average value to cases where numbers were 
not given, the number of victims would equal to 250 for the whole sanjak, while the 
Austrian consular report mentioned more than this as victims of ’everyday violence’ 
for a shorter period of 6 months. Even if we add the supposed number of 
intranational showdowns and Ottoman punitive actions (cca. 130 victims) both 
committed by the army and by paramilitary units, the number of victims and cases 
would still not exceed the number victims of everyday violence for the whole year! In 
other words: everyday violence was as serious as political violence, if not more! This 
confirms our assumption on the existence of „Gewaltmarkt” and 
„Gewaltgemeinschaften”. 
From among the 43 attacks 41 targeted Exarchists, and only two against Muslims. 
The number of the raids against Muslims might be larger, but the Bulgarian 
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consulate did not feel these important enough to count. (We are prior to the Young 
Turk revolution, thus a supposed cooperation between Ottomans and Serbs could 
not explain the low number of attacks against Muslims). Though the reports are not 
consistent in giving all details, in 16 cases (33%) we have knowledge on the number 
of attackers, which is rated averagely to 40 persons. In 5 cases the number of raiders 
was under 20, in other words, two-thirds of the attacks were committed by large groups! 
Comparing these numbers to those given in Table 6, one may come to the conclusion 
that the četa sizes given there (10-15 prs) refer only to the bare core of the Serbian 
četas.  
As for the seasonal distribution of attacks we have knowledge on 20 Serbian 
attacks in the winter-autumn period, which is almost 50% of recorded cases. In three 
cases the attackers numbered more than 50 in winter and autumn (in 16 cases their 
number remained unknown). So not any of the seasons seems to be overrepresented 
regarding band size and case occurences. This means that winter was not 
underrepresented in our dataset. What is more interesting is that also 20 Muslim 
attacks on Exarchists were recorded in winter, while this number was smaller in 
other periods. This is probably because in winter the mountain passes were usually 
not easily trespassable, so Muslims did not have to fear of repressions, because band 
members could not cross the border to punish Ottoman raids, while during the 
summer the continuous Serbian and Bulgarian reinforcements made Ottoman 
enterprises more risky.  
Among the perpetrators Serboman local inhabitants were mentioned 6 times 
(15%). 4 times Turks and Albanians were mentioned as contributors (10%). At least 5 
of the attacks (10%) were commited by former Bulgarian vojvodas, who changed 
sides. (Two of the 5 mentioned leaders were formerly Bulgarian agents). Night 
attacks were mentioned at least 8 times (this is the only timing mentioned in the 
texts: ’vecher(ya)ta’, beside ’sutrinta’, in the morning). Kidnapping was mentioned 15 
times (33%), murders, injuries were mentioned 13 times (30% including those cases 
when not villagers, but četa members were the victims). 76 persons were taken as 
hostages out of the mentioned 160 mentioned in the casualty list (appr. 50%), but 
ransom was mentioned only in 2 cases. More than 50 were killed (33%) among whom 
at least 15 (33%) were četa members or local četa supporters. The destruction of 
economic infrastructure and the requisition of animals was mentioned 5 times (all 
during the autumn and the winter),271 houses burnt were mentioned in 5 cases. Raids 
                                                 
271 It does not mean that this was confined only to these seasons, rather that it was important to note there, 
because due to the decreased accessibility to food its importance was growing.  
In Albania a similar attitude was practised by Essad Pasha Toptani, who wanted to monopolize information and 
supplier routes, therefore he usually attacked economic infrastructure and telegraph stations that were not 
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against property altogether made up to 25% (in 10 cases harms remained unknown). 
The violence targetted leaders 8 times, (20%), forcing secession from the Exarchate 
was mentioned in 14 cases (or 33%). The other goals, ransom (2), smuggling, ruining 
economic infrastructure (5) were underrepresented compared to this (and in 21 cases 
the reasons were not specified).272 The territorial distribution of attacks was diverse, 
but quite even: Kumanovo kaza was mentioned 10 times (25%), Palanka and Skopje 
kaza was mentioned 6 times (13-13%), Stip only twice, Kratovo 4 times, Veles 7 times 
(15%). The distant Tetovo and Gilan was mentioned altogether 3 times, the state 
border twice. 
Reading these cases the impression of the authors is that many of the former 
assumptions and statements based on different source types can be statistically 
verified. 
1. Attacks often took place at night, thus were planned, intentional conflicts. 
2. Mixed četas vere not unique, which also means that attacks were not only 
ethnically driven, or that common hatred against a third communitiy could 
temporarily unify the competing inimical parties. 
3. Very often local people accompanied the attacking party, which implies 
coercion or strong interest (like personal or economic conflict) in participation 
beyond ethnic hatred. 
4. Priests and teachers were not only targets but main organizers of not only 
’revolutionary’, but military activity, with direct links to the četas. 
5. Many of the četa leaders changed sides, this also implies that beyond the 
struggle for national liberation other personal motives have to be taken into 
consideration. 
6. The reason for kidnapping well-known persons of a community was not 
always driven by financial purposes. Hostages were rarely held for ransom 
after 1907. Taking hostages was to enforce changes in the national 
commitment of local communities. 
7. Sometimes the attackers were pursued by militiamen. This means that the 
organization of self-defence through local militia and armed četniks was 
progressing by that time. This also refers to the escalation of violence and the 
impotence of central power to react immediately and restore order by 
punishing the perpetrators. These clashes between četas rarely took place in 
                                                                                                                                                        
under his control. In the Macedonian case we cannot state that this (monopolization of information) was 
behind the acts, but it can also be a possible explanation beyond ruining the enemies’ communication lines or 
deceiving the authorities by deterring its attention. 
272 Of course the number of these could be higher, but it were not mentioned if their realization did not invoke 
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the woods or in open fields and these were usually unintentional. Clashes 
between četas mainly took place in villages and for the villages, and the 
original intention was usually to enforce a četa-civilian encounter, which 
concidentally failed due to the circumstances.   
8. The army was usually in 1-2 days delay considering its reaction time. The 
clashes between the army and paramilitary troops were outnumbered by 
encounters of different type. The hesitation, bureaucratism, the lack of own 
initiatives and the lack of will was another factor that promoted the escalation 
of violence and urged for self-defense.  
9. Officials were also reluctant to investigate cases or pursuit perpetrators, 
sometimes they even cooperated with one of the parties.273 
10. Ruining the economic infrastructure was also part of the plan. This was 
usually targeted agains rich and inluential village leaders to convince them 
that resistance is futile. This stem usually preceded kidnapping. 
11. Destructive actions to supply a četa with food were also not rare. 
 
This Bulgarian dossier also contains the abuses of Turks committed against 
Exarchists/Bulgarians, including the unofficial repressive maneouvres of the askeri 
and the paramilitary activity of redif bashibozuks wearing uniform and also of the 
local bands. Beyond the acts of reprisals and repressions the results of the official 
jurisdiction (either just or unjust) were also recorded in the booklet. 
In 30 December 1906 the Ottoman authorities imprisoned 11 persons accused of 
being yataks in Kumanovo kaza.274 In January an Ottoman patrol searching for 
weapons and bombs harassed local people.275 On 8 January 24 people were arrested 
and 6 were condemned to 5-15 years.276 In February torbesh bashibozuks attacked a 
village in Skopsko together with some soldiers, but the action was not considered as 
official military operation, rather as an abuse.277 A month later soldiers burnt down 
18 Bulgarian houses.278 That month 13 Bulgarians from Skopsko were arrested and 11 
more from other places.279 In early March a Turkish patrol wanted to capture a 
shepherd, who managed to escape. The same event was repeated 3 days later.280 A 
clash in April resulted in 7 dead and 2 injured, the attackers wore Ottoman uniforms, 
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but the circumstances did not refer to official Ottoman action.281 After a discussion 
the representatives of the Powers agreed to arrest 5 of these soldiers of whom 4 was 
soon captured, but neither showed regret for their illegal acts. The documents also 
described that from the 24 Bulgarians mentioned earlier 11 were condemned to 3-4 
years imprisonment and 11 was released, but by August further 37 Bulgarians were 
under trial.282 In October an Ottoman četa of 30 men led by Kara Mustafa plundered 
the villages around Istib (which was an ethnically mixed region) twice and from 
October to December we have further 20 cases of Muslim attacks on Christians, 
highly outnumbering the violent acts committed by Serbs (12). It seems that winter 
tours were rather characteristic for Muslims in this region. 
The number of Muslim attacks were also over 40 a year. Thus repressions - that 
are not classified into the group of ’everyday violence’ - targeting Exarchist 
population were almost evenly divided between Serbs-Serbomans and Muslims. If 
we suppose a similar number of attacks initiated by IMRO and vrhovists, this means 
more than 150 violent acts in a year! However, from the number of Muslim 
repressions one has to subtract the number of trials and other juridical cases ranging 
to 5. Five more case were committed by perpetrators wearing uniforms, but some of 
these were official Ottoman patrols or measures punishing former attacks. At least 7 
attacks were committed by Ottoman četas, 8 by Albanian bands and torbesh 
bashibozuks (all in winter - 20% of all encounters). Beside the more than 80 captured, 
arrested or imprisoned Bulgarian persons mentioned in the reports at least 38 
Exarchist victims were exposed to violence. This is altogether similar to the value 
committed by Serbian četas, but the distribution between different categories is not 
the same. The number of victims of violent acts is smaller, than in the case of Serbian 
attacks. The Muslim activity was definitely greater in winter compared to the 
Serbian. The Bulgarian authorities were successful in identifying the perpetrators’ 
community: only 5 unknown cases were recorded (5%), which is a definitely greater 
clearance rate, than in the Austrian consular reports in case of ’everyday violence’. 
 
Table 17. The target groups of violent activities in Skopje sanjak in 1907 based on 43 identified cases 
Target groups 
cases 
(43) % 
hostages for conversion 15 35 
kidnapping for ransom 2 5 
destruction of economic infrastructure 
(granary, mills) 3 7 
animals 2 5 
                                                 
281 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. 27 April 1907. 
282 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. л. 136, 4 and 24 August 1907. 
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destruction of houses 6 14 
attacks resulting in injury or deaths 12 28 
fight against authorities 4 9 
attacks against local leaders 8 20 
involvement of Bulgarian četa 3 7 
involvement of Ottoman forces 4 9 
more than one group involved  11 26 
 
Encounters between armed groups and regular military forces in Skopje Sanjak 
 
The previous cases highlighted the features of četa civilian encounters. But a report 
from the head of the Macedonian provinces, Hilmi Pasha also reveals the heavy 
losses in clashes between četas and Ottoman forces. Nevertheless, the Ottoman 
statistics should be handled with care as this table depicts a picture that suggests 
Ottoman authorities were successful, because the number of killed četniks highly 
exceeded tha of the losses of the army. One thing is for sure: most of the encounters  
in 1906 (56%, similar to the ethnic proportion of Exarchists) took place between 
Ottoman forces and Bulgarian bands, and these encounters usually resulted in a 
fierce fight as losses/clashes testify it. Within the next 3 months in 1907 18 clashes 
took place in Macedonia regarding Ottoman Bulgarian relation, while it was only 2 
in the case of Serbian-Ottoman relation. Bulgarian and Serbian losses seem to be 
realistic, if we consider that encounters between četas and civilians showed similar 
averages. But Ottoman losses seems to be underestimated (Table 18). 
Table 18. The results of Ottoman military confrontation with Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek 
paramilitary units 
 from 1 March 1906 to 1 
March 1907 Killed Wounded Other Clashes Losses/clash 
Clash with Bulgarian forces           
četniks 240 13 21 56 5 
soldiers 48 56     2 
Clash with Greek forces           
četniks 181 18 64 34 7,7 
soldiers 19 28 
 
 1,5 
Clash with Serbian forces           
četniks 39 3   11 4 
soldiers 7 13     2 
  
from 1 March 1906 to 1 
July 1907 Killed Wounded Other Clashes Losses/clash 
Bulgarian četniks 291 13 24 74 4.5 
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Askeri 28 39       
Serbian četniks 47 3 6 13 4.3 
Askeri 8 14       
ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1 a.e. 396. 
 
 
Parts from a letter of intimidation  
 
 
IV. Conflict types in Prizren Sanjak 
 
 
General tendencies 
 
As we mentioned earlier, we selected another area with a peripheral location to use 
as a control for our results in order to investigate whether these could be extended or 
not. As the administrative boundaries drawn by the government after the vilayet 
reforms of 1864 and 1878 were to incorporate heterogeneous areas, instead of 
creating homogeneous districts that could serve as hotbeds of future separatism, it is 
not surprising that both the original features and ultimately the results displayed 
great differences compared to those observed in Skopje Sanjak.  
Our methodology was also different here. While the previous chapter applied a 
statistical approach with comparative regional analysis, here we used case studies to 
illustrate the different conflict types and the roles of actors. In this chapter we first 
outline the general evolution of tendencies in Kosovo, and then we focus on the 
different conflicts. 
Unlike in Macedonia violence was quite unilateral in Kosovo. Most of the 
perpetrators were Muslims. It did not mean that Orthodox Serbs remained passive, 
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but they developed other tools and strategies, like cultural offensive, cooperation 
with the authorities, etc. The lack of multiplayer-character of the conflict and the 
evident preferences of the Ottoman government, which did not support Serbian 
armed bands unlike in Macedonia (this compelled local Serbs pay huge sums for 
their security as an alternative strategy), limited četa-policy and thus certain forms of 
violence. But on the other hand, the direct influence of Powers was of greater 
significance, causing more calamities than in Macedonia. 
Though the presence of an overwhelming majority of Albanians around Prizren 
(Table 19) simplified the ethnic pattern of violence, but not the frequency of violence 
itself. Furthermore, despite the more transparent situation, violence was not so 
ethnicized as Serbian historiography claimed. It is true that the customary law of 
Albanians and their reservations about urban dwellers and central authorities, 
together with the Christians in minority, all made them prone to excessive violence 
(which was integral part of their culture), but this often showed old, traditional 
patterns beyond the evident Muslim-Christian tensions. And even cases grouped in 
the latter type can often be interpreted as a manifestation of traditional (economic) 
conflicts, not events driven purely by ethnic tensions, as it is shown later. 
As for the frequency of violence, the 136 and 281 attacks in Kosovo against 
Serbian population in 1904 and 1905 respectively seems to be low compared to the 
106 cases of ’everyday violence’ within half a year and the 80 četa-civilian encounters 
in Skopje Sanjak. But the situation was somewhat different, if we consider 
proportions: the overall frequency of violence per 1000 person was between 0.33-1.33 
(averagely 0.85), while this was 0.25 and 0.50 in Kosovo. 
Furthermore, one should also not forget that the former absolute numbers neither 
contained Serbian attacks against Muslims (Serbian sources are silent regarding these 
cases), nor the clashes between local Muslims and Ottoman authorities, which were 
not rare here – unlike in Skopje. These would increase absolute numbers and rates 
too. On the other hand the number of violent cases should be reduced in Skopje, if 
we want a real comparison, because the latter included almost all type of incidents.  
So, after narrowing our sources to attacks committed against Slavic population in 
both areas, the 136 and 281 attacks (if we accept the reliability of Serbian data) do not 
seem to be low any more, as the 207 000 Slavs constituted only 33% of the 
population. It is 0.65 and 1.35 cases per 1000 Slavs. In Skopje Sanjak the 40 Ottoman 
and 43 Serbian assaults on 173 000 Exarchists gave averagely 0.5 cheta attacks per 
1000 person, plus the 43 identified Muslim attacks in connection with ’everiday 
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violence’283 puts it altogether 0.75 cases per 1000 persons in 1907. Thus, the value in 
Kosovo was not smaller at all if proportions are considered. 
 
Table 19. The ethnic composition of the population in Prizren Sanjak 
sanjak and kaza 
Albanian Slav 
Aromun Ottoman  
emigrants 
from BiH, 
Serbia and 
Bulgaria Gypsies Total Muslim Catholic 
Exarchist 
(Bulgarian) patriarchist Muslim 
Prizren 
Kalkandelen 37,602   17,232 8922 1932 30 16170   780 82,668 
Prizren 71,118 1340   13,628   650   4500 3000 94,236 
Ljuma 17,700                 17,700 
Total 126,420 1340 17,232 22,550   680 16,170   3780 194,604 
Prizren 
Kalkandelen 45.5 0.0 20.8 10.8 2.3 0.0 19.6 0.0 0.9 100.0 
Prizren 75.5 1.4 0.0 14.5 0.0 0.7 0.0 4.8 3.2 100.0 
Ljuma 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 100.0 
Total 65.0 0.7 8.9 11.6 0.0 0.3 8.3 0.0 1.9 100.0 
ÖStA HHStA, PA, Liasse XXV, 272. 1896-1902. 
 
 
Map 6. The mixed ethnic structure around Dečani in 1840.  
(Redrawn by Zsolt Bottlik, after Müller) 
 
Traditional (not interethnic) conflicts had their own characteristics. Though the 
use of violence as coercive power became more and more common during the 
century, armed conflicts did not always go hand in hand with bloodshed and 
massacre, even in areas with an Albanian majority (which, owing to prevailing 
                                                 
283 Other forms are excluded just to obtain comparable data for the two regions. 
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stereotypes, were often accused of excessive violence). Baron Nopcsa listed 4 cases at 
the turn of 1906 where he witnessed more than 10 shots but no deaths occurred. In 
contrast, when the action took place at night or the victim was encircled, the results 
were more serious. This also limited the target groups: the head of the family or 
children were the main victims. The behaviour patterns differed from the continent, 
as on the peninsula not even sacral spaces were free of violence: in the Christian 
church of Dusmana an altercation at Easter resulted in ten people being killed and 
two wounded (but one may think of the bomb attack against the mosque in Istip in 
1911), even though hospitality to guests (proxenia) was usually considered seriously. 
Even a murderer under a blood feud could get accommodation at the victim’s 
relatives without being harmed. Women and the unarmed were never targeted (of 
course they could be accidental victims of violence). Therefore it is not surprising 
that many put the armed mortality rate of Albanian males at 30-50% (like Barbarich), 
though Nopcsa estimated it even in ’barbarian North Albania’ to at only 20% (it was 
21% in Oroshi but 40% in Toplana).284 
Even extreme nationalists like Bataković accepted that the conflict in Kosovo was 
not merely ethnic but was also rooted in economic affairs and the difference in legal 
status. The Albanians infiltrating into the region after the Serbian seoba were not just 
Muslims of religion, but also earned their living from husbandry, while the peasants 
cultivating arable land were predominantly Orthodox. As the newcomers had 
numerous privileges – among them the right to possess weapons285– it is evident that 
in the growing conflict concerning land use the Muslims had better positions both in 
the fields and in the courts. Observers often told of the distortion of old customs 
relating to livelihood: while prior to the turn of the century only 4-5 Albanians 
accompanied 1000 sheep on their way to the pastures, by 1902 this grew to 40-50 
(partly the result of weaker public security and partly a reason for it). They were not 
just shepherds any more, but rather a band allied for the plundering and sacking of 
the local population under the pretext of guarding sheep. Another problem stemmed 
from the existence of čiftlik-system and the lack of control over landlords. In 1910-11 
Serbian authorities recorded 55 agrarian abuses (taxes increased unilaterally, lands 
confiscated, etc.) against Orthodox population and against the written laws.286 
On the other hand, these traditional patterns determining the early conflicts also 
began to change and become ethnicized. The nationalized conflicts first appeared 
                                                 
284 See the local proverb: ’In Toplana men are killed as swine are in other places.’ See details in: Nopcsa, Ferenc. 
A legsötétebb Európa. Budapest, 1911. 
285 Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 49-50. 
286 Милић Ф. Петровић (ed.). Документи о Рашкој области (1900-1912). Београд: Архив Србије, 1995. No.246-
247. 
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within a traditional guise, but in a changing framework, like in the form of an 
extension of the blood feud against the Slavs. Margaret Hasluck claims that if a Slav 
killed an Albanian, any Albanian was allowed to punish him regardless of faith and 
tribal origin. And though Ghegs disliked Tosks, they immediately punished the Slavs 
if a Tosk was killed. (Naturally, the revenge should be meted out on the victim’s 
close family, and, unlike the Ghegs, the Tosks themselves did not exceed this level). 
Christian and Muslim Albanians began to work together – not because of hatred of 
the Slavs (sometimes they fought against each other with the same vehemence), but 
in order to defend their privileged positions. Thus here a class struggle became 
amalgamated with racial tensions. 
The change was in connection with the loss of old privileges like the exclusive 
right to possess weapons or serve as gendarmes (before the Mürzsteg reforms of 
1903, 50% of the gendarmes in Salonika vilayet were Tosk Albanians, 25% were 
Muslims of non-Albanian origin, and 25% were Gheg-Albanian highlanders),287 
which also meant that the unpunished pillaging and extortion of Christians for 
ransom was over.288 (In 1902, while mentioning the abuses of the gendarmerie, 
Biliotti wrote that, Gheg colonels on the pretext of defending villagers from Greek 
paramilitary troops forced villagers to hire Gheg policemen who were fierce enough 
to impose a threat on the local population instead of on the expelled Greeks. This was 
a survival strategy typical of mountain tribes). On the one hand, these changes forced 
Albanians to find new sources of income, leading to the growing participation of 
these Muslim groups in the smuggling of weapons, which was an inadequate 
response to this challenge, further decreasing their power over the Christian 
minority. On the other hand, the changes also triggered nationalization. 
Before 1878, Slavs had only palette of social strategies with which to tackle the 
new problem: complete subjection to the new landlords (as reaya), expatriation or 
Islamization (from superficial mimicry to complete assimilation). There were 
examples of each. The local landlords, the Djinolli (Djinić), succeeded in making their 
land inheritable and transferable, and thus here the timar system was substituted by 
the čiftlik, which resulted in stronger control of landlords over their subjects.289 The 
situation for the Slavs was further worsened by the conflicts between the local elite 
and the central government, and the disputes between lowland Albanians and 
Catholic Albanian highlanders. Orthodox groups opting for Islamisation kept many 
                                                 
287 Brown, Loyal unto Death, 161. 
288 The Bulgarians did not usually object to paying tax to one Albanian patron for their safety, but refused to do 
so when a second and a third ’protector’ appeared, also seeking a ‘business opportunity’. And this became 
very frequent after the traditional forms of coexistence were replaced by unleashed, unfettered violence. 
289 Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 53-54. 
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of their former customs, like celebrating the slava and Easter and kept their family 
names (Dokić, Stepanović, Stojković, Ljukić). Often only physically mobile groups 
(males) converted to Islam; their wives remained Christians and practised their 
religion at home.  
All in all, these changes resulted in the transformation of the ethno-religious 
structure.290 Though there were 318 thousand Slavic speakers in the Sanjak of Novi 
Pazar and 161 thousand Albanians, as 70 thousand of the Slavs were Muslim, the 
number of Orthodox was only 250 thousand, while the total number of Muslims was 
240 thousand. Unlike in the Skopje Sanjak, migration and problems related to it 
remained acute in Kosovo Polje. While around Prokuplje there were 2031 Orthodox 
and 3054 Muslim-Albanian households in 1877, after 1878 64 villages were 
abandoned by their inhabitants, creating a strong pull factor for those Orthodox, who 
were prone to leave Kosovo for Serbia. Between 1870 and 1890, at least 50 thousand 
Muslims arrived in Kosovo from Serbia and Bosnia291 (while 15,000 Orthodox left the 
Ipek and further 25,000 left the Priština region in 1879), and so the ethno-religious 
proportions (60:40 in 1830 or 114 thousand Muslims vs. 84 thousand Orthodox) 
changed to 70:30 (in the 1890s there were 246 thousand Muslims and 95 thousand 
Orthodox, while Serbian was spoken by 152 thousand).292 The muhadjirs, losing their 
home became one of the most fanatic groups, and this exacerbated tensions. In 1899 
Dionisije Petrović, archbishop of Prizren, put the number of Orthodox households in 
Raška and Kosovo at only 11,300, while estimated the number of those who left over 
50,000. Even official Russian sources (diplomats) wrote of 250 families expatriated 
from Kosovo every year, which is over 20% of the population for the ten-year period 
as a whole.293 The situation was not better in Novibazar under Austro-Hungarian 
occupation at the turn of the century,294 which foreshadowed the failure of foreign 
intervention. In Novi Varosh more than 50 Orthodox houses became empty within 2 
years. Another document from the same year (1900) mentiones 240 repatriated 
persons within 5 months. A year later further 33 Serbian refugees were recorded by 
Serbian authorities.295 As Ottoman authorities tried to hinder this process which was 
                                                 
290 According to Hilferding, in 1858 in Ipek there were 4000 Muslim taxpayers and only 800 Christians, in 1844 in 
Priština there were 1200 Muslim males and 300 Christians, in Prizren there were 3000 Muslims and 1000 
Christians, and in Vučitrn 400 Muslim households and 200 Christian households were listed. Bataković, 
Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 57. 
291 Jagodić, Miloš. ’The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions 1877/1878.’ Balkanologie 2, no. 2 
(1998).  
292 See Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. London: Macmillan, 1998  
293 This data can be challenged, as the Ottoman authorities – referring to the insecure situation – did not provide 
an escort for the diplomats, and thus they were unable to collect reliable data.  
294 Serbs even mention abuses in Novi Pazar Sanjak (Plevlje) committed by Austro-Hungarian authorities. 
Документи о Рашкој области, No.98. 18.08.1906. 
295 Документи о Рашкој области, No.1. 16/29.04. 1900; No.2. 2/15.05. 1900; No.4. 04.18.1901. 
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harmful from economic aspects (Orthodox were both paying taxes to the state and 
cultivating lands for Muslim landlords), while searching for the refugees 296 clashes 
between Serbian graničari and Ottonam askeri became unavoidable. The loss of 
workforce forced begs to increase pressure on peasants, which induced a vicious 
circle, a positive (unstabilizing) feedback. 
The Slavs of the Ljuma region first became Islamized, then lost their language as 
they married Muslim Albanian girls. By 1900 the whole region was considered 
Albanian. Albanization was also observed in Opolje and Orahovac by the Sebian 
consul, Branislav Nusić.297 The refugees from Bosnia also increased the number of 
Muslims; in some districts the proportion of muhadjirs reached 25% of the total 
population (Gjilan).298 Ten years after their arrival many began to speak Albanian. 
The assimilation also progressed among vlachs (the Serbianized vlachs were called 
mijaks, while the Albanized vlachs in Ljuma were called kula-builders); in 1907 the 
Serb metropolite closed down the Greek school at Lipljan as only 9 vlach families 
were living there. 
Thus, although the conflict in Kosovo did not start ab ovo as an ethnic conflict, 
later it turned into one, owing (1) to the simplifying approach of modern 
nationalisms and (2) to the reinterpretation and nationalization of old customs. 
Contemporary diplomats acknowledged that Muslims claimed themselves to be 
superior and oppressed Christian Slavs (so this is not just a construction of modern 
Serbian historiography),299 but on the other hand this was the consequence of existing 
social structures, as Orthodox were reaya – subjected and inferior before 1856. As the 
fault line between oppressor and oppressed here coincided with the religious and 
linguistic fractures (like in Bosnia, which was not so evident elsewhere), it was easy 
to transfer the socio-economic tensions to the level of ethnicity and religion.300 
And of course the old elite was susceptible to violence if it felt its power and 
privileges challenged, especially if this happened due to external interference. (The 
similar attempts of the central authorities were also not tolerated). Such was the case 
after the establishment of the Serbian consulate in Priština in 1889, culminating in a 
wave of violence and the fleeing of 700 Serbs.301 As the year of its opening was 
symbolic, because it coincided the 500th anniversary of the battle at Kosovo Polje, 
Muslims - having felt their legitimacy over Kosovo offended – reacted with anger. 
And though the original terrain for Serbian aspirations was Bosnia, until its Austro-
                                                 
296 Документи о Рашкој области, No.5. 18.04. 1901. 
297 We do not deny the possibility of this phenomena, but the Serbian numbers seem to be exaggerated. 
298 Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde, 332-34. 
299 Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 65. 
300 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji, 1852-1912. Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1987, 247-48. 
301 Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 66. 
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Hungarian occupation in 1878, by 1889 Serbian propaganda made remarkable 
progress in Kosovo Polje. The map of Gopčević from the same year – that indicated 
Serbs everywhere in Kosovo and Macedonia, even in Muslim regions – revealed that 
Serbian pretensions went beyond the demand of peaceful development of Orthodox 
communities. 
Beyond firm ideology,302 two basic conditions had to be fulfilled to achieve 
success in the fight for supremacy: (1) a strong middle class of craftsmen and 
merchants ready to assist (even financially) the new ideology (in this Bulgaria was 
stronger than Serbia), and (2) the institutionalization of ideology through the 
contribution of the state (in this Serbia showed better performance, thanks to an early 
start). The first Serbian school was established in Prizren in 1836, in order to 
challenge Greek cultural domination. The establishment of schools generated 
enormous disputes with the Patriarchate. Teachers arriving from Serbia were 
mistreated and repelled: Nikola Musulin was excommunicated in 1859, because the 
patriarchate feared the decrease of its own influence. Garašanin soon sent two new 
teachers in 1866 and by 1873 the number of Serb schools in Ottoman territory 
increased to 61.303 Apart from schools and churches that were considered solid 
outposts of the state, able to control the ‘Raum und Boden’, (but which were at the 
same time most exposed to physical intimidation), a network of background 
institutions responsible for securing optimal conditions for national propaganda also 
had to be created. This included the establishment of the Serb cultural commission in 
Belgrade in 1868, and the foundation of Družstvo Svetog Save in 1886 to coordinate 
cultural activities. The foundation of a seminary for priests in Prizren in 1871 was 
also a part of this campaign. Thus the Serbian state gradually took take over tasks 
from the Church.  After the death of the Greek metropolite of Prizren, there was a 
change in Church policy too: the Serbian Nićifor (1901-11) promoted the 
establishment of Serbian schools, while the Ottomans responded by forbidding the 
establishment of another Serbian consulate in Prizren. 
The new consulate in Priština was to crown the efforts of the last 30 years: its 
main goal was to spread national propaganda; another aim was to disseminate 
unfavourable stereotypes of Albanians in order to inhibit rapprochement between 
                                                 
302 Although Serbian scholars and politicians (Karadžić, Garašanin, Ristić) had already written their idealistic 
and ideological works and disseminated them both locally and in the West by the time Bulgaria became 
independent, these works focused mainly on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus the redirection of aims and 
instruments toward Macedonia required time and a Great Power to support this. (Gopčević’s famous work, in 
which he Serbianized the Macedonian Slavic population, was published in 1889, in the very year when the 
Austro-Hungarian-Serbian alliance – allowing the reorientation of Serbian foreign policy on Macedonia – was 
renewed). 
303 Malcom, Kosovo, 188. 
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local Slav and Albanian communities.304 It is not surprising that anti-Serb tensions 
culminated in murder of Serbian consul Luka Marinković (who symbolized Serbia’s 
increasing involvement in the province’s affairs) – a case the Ottoman authorities 
were unable to solve.305 The Russian consul Lisevich wrote that the goal of the local 
Muslims in Kosovo was to get rid of all Christians, and from the 1870s onwards they 
could rely on the tacit support of the Ottoman government, which decided to create a 
Muslim zone separating Serbia from Montenegro.306 (This is why the muhadjirs from 
Bosnia were settled in Kosovo Polje). This plan was approved (but not elaborated) by 
Austria-Hungary, which also wanted a stable basis that separated Montenegro from 
Serbia, thus preventing their unification once and for all.  
As the above outlined prove, the direct influence of Powers was of great 
significance causing more calamities than in Macedonia. While Power policy in 
Macedonia targeted the central government and was aimed at gaining influence over 
peace-keeping units, thus the direction of their intervention was more or less in 
parallel to the authorities’ goals; in Kosovo the influence of Powers targeted local 
communities, which caused more problem for the Ottoman government which had 
to fight alone to restore order. 
As it would be very unwise and partial to draw up the history of the region 
without taking an outlook to the Serbian concept, we try to compare the different 
interpretations of events. While the local Muslims considered the struggle as ’class 
fight’ between the ruler class and the deprived rayah (supported by foreigners), the 
Serbs emphasized the ethnic character of the conflict.307 But even contemporaries 
denied the ethnic character of the violence. "Those of Debar kill to rob, those of 
Djakovica kill from shear fanaticism, those of Prizren kill for their evil instincts, and 
                                                 
304 The involvement of the state in these affairs progressed through several stages, as Schmitt demonstrates using 
the example of Serbian activity in Kosovo Vilayet. Schmitt, Kosovo, 160–65.  
305 Gawrych, George. The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913. London: Tauris, 
2006. 124. 
306 The government was aware that the traditional fault lines began to fade and new began to evolve. The 
intensifying relations between the Catholic Albanians and the Serbs culminated in the Malissors’ refusal to 
take up arms against the Montenegrins in 1862. As a consequence of the vilayet reforms, the state began to 
organize regions of differing ethno-religious character into one administrative unit to prevent the further 
nationalization of the area. On the other hand such alliances as mentioned above, were still not considered 
solid: the Serbian consuls regularly complained about the aggressive behaviour of Catholic fandi against local 
Orthodox people. Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 66. Any strict reaction from the side of the authorities 
against the traditional privileges of local Albanians might have two outcomes: attack against Orthodox or 
cooperation with them. This factor of uncertainty made the situation much complicated as decades ago, when 
the central authorities usually supported the local Muslims. And this was largely the result of the change in 
state policy towards the Christians, which can be traced back to the Powers’ pressure. 
307 Even nowadays: the translation of Bataković’s work (The Kosovo Chronicles) never fails to use the epitheton 
ornans ’ethnic Albanians’, when mentioning Albanians. 
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those of Tetovo kill to try out their carbines.”308 Albanians were accused of 
participating in the first Armenian massacre and their behavior towards Serbs was 
often compared to the Kurd-Armenian relation.309 The Serbs in Kosovo were 
unsatisfied with their situation. Their discontent grew when Kosovo was omitted 
from the reform movement and when četa tactics, which worked in Macedonia failed 
in Kosovo. Being outnumbered by Muslims and Albanians, their opponents, who 
were at the same time still more useful for the Ottoman government, than the 
Bulgarians in Macedonia (as perceived even by western observers), therefore the 
chances for punitive actions against them were limited, the local Serbs were divided 
regarding tactics.  
But not even Serbs of Serbia were unified in this question then. Before 1903 
Serbian rulers supported the policy of Austria-Hungary, which partly relied on the 
protection of the interest of Catholic Albanians. The so-called fandi,310 settling on the 
lands abandoned by Serb peasants after the austrian occupation of Novipazar 
became the main bearers of Austro-Hungarian propaganda among their compatriots 
of Muslim faith. Scientific researchers, like Theodor Ippen tried to underline the 
common roots of Muslims in Bosnia and Novi Bazar.311 A group of tribal and feudal 
leaders, headed by Haxhi Mulla Zeka, and Riza Bey Kryeziu of Djakovica, openly 
recommended closer relations with the Dual Monarchy. The idea of Albanian 
penetration elaborated by Ludwig von Thallóczy was based on sending the most 
talented consuls to the region, like Rappaport. According to a Russian paper Novoe 
Vremja, the Dual Monarchy spent yearly 5-6 million francs on Albanian schools, 
propaganda and the payment of Albanian leaders. The list of confidentials of 
Austria-Hungary contained numerous well-know persons, like (friar Palić, consul 
Prohaska, Prenk Bib Doda, Ismail Kemali, Vrioni, Osman Nuri and even Jovan 
                                                 
308 Gaulis, Georges. La ruine d'une Empire, Abdul-Hamid ses amis et ses peuples, Paris, 1913. details 325-56; Though 
the quotation was cited by Bataković, this does not sound so’ethnicized’. 
309 A large number of Albanians, especially those from Djakovica, took part in the Armenian massacre; see V. 
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Cvijić).312 The creation of the League of Peje was also supported by Austria-Hungary 
as a counterweight to Serbian propaganda. 
As most of the Serbian governments were pro-Austrian (together with King 
Milan), it is not suprising that Stojan Novaković’s proposal to supply Serbs in 
Kosovo with guns to defend themselves against harassment in 1896 was not 
approved. Thus he asked for diplomatic intervention and proposed to form a mixed 
Turkish-Serbian investigating committee.1 The investigation committee led by the 
sultan's adjutant, General Saadedin Pasha at the beginning of August 1897 found 
nothing serious. The attempt to request the intermediation of the Powers’ 
ambassadors in Constantinople was thwarted by Count Goluchowski, stating that 
Russia would hinder any action favourable for Serbia because of the pro-Austrian 
sentiments of King Milan. 
When in 1896, pressured by the Great Powers, the Sultan announced a program 
of reforms, proposing equality for Muslims and Christians under the law, and the 
introduction of Christians to administrative bodies, this was challeged by local 
warlords, who felt their privileged positions and supremacy challenged again. Haxi 
Mula Zeka of Peć requested for the reforms not to be implemented in Old Serbia, 
referring to the external, Serbian threat manifesting their propaganda.313 Their 
strength is evidenced by the fact that the Sultan finally refrained from executing the 
reforms. The question was not even raised in Hague during the Peace Conference in 
1899, though the Serbs published a book on Albanian atrocities (Prepiska o Arbanaskim 
nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji 1898-1899). In this – according to Stojan Novaković –, more 
than 400 atrocities were recorded within six months in 1898, which is similar to our 
aggregated data for Skopje Sanjak in 1905/1907.314 
Though the joint support from both Austria-Hungary and the central government 
encouraged the local Albanians, but from the side of the Ottoman government 
certain tendecies of reservation towards the Austrian benevolence also began to gain 
space. 315 The vali of Kosovo, Hafiz Pasha, attributed all Albanian unrest in Metohia 
(especially in Prizren 1899, subsequently in Skopje), to operations carried out by 
                                                 
312 ÖStA HHStA PA I Allgemeines, 9 Personalia, Kt. 766. Without deeper examination one can not make 
conclusions regarding the character of their tasks. 
313 They were partly right as the proposition of Novaković proved. 
314 Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima u staroj srbiji, 1898-1899. / Documents diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les 
actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans le Vieille Serbie (Vilayet de Kosovo). 1898-1899. Beograd: 
Ministére des Affaires Etrangéres, 1899. 145.  
315 Austria-Hungary often gave fake information in order to influence the relation between the parties. 
Regarding the conference of the Serbian and Bulgarian rulers at Niš, Austro-Hungarian agents spread the 
rumour that it was secretly being held at Priština. Among the Albanians a widespread conviction existed that 
a joint military intervention of the two countries was being prepared. The besa was hastily given and a 
conference on joint defense began. Bataković, Dušan, T. The Kosovo Chronicles.  
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Austro-Hungarian intelligence services. Their purpose, he believed, was to cause 
widespread unrest to provide Austria-Hungary with a pretext to occupy the Kosovo 
vilayet.  
On the other hand according to the reports of the Serbian consul in Priština, the 
Ottoman government even gave tacit support to atrocities committed against Serbs316 
(similarly to the situation in East Macedonia). By 1900 anarchy reached such 
dimensions that the Porte was compelled to send new military contingents. Brigadier 
General Shemsi Pasha was sent to Kosovo to consolidate government authority and 
collect arms. Being impartial (he defended local Serbs also) he almost reached 
success, but the consequences of an old story ruined everything and also led to the 
increasing involvement of Powers, which complicated the situation further. 
The case was the following. After the failure of the diplomatic mission with the 
Porte to protect Serbian inhabitants, the government of Vladan Djordjević began, in 
1899, the secret delivery of guns to Serbs inhabiting the northern regions of the 
Kosovo vilayet – as adviced by Novaković earlier. As Austria-Hungary supported 
local Albanians soon a conflict evolved in the summer of 1901 in Ibarski Kolašin, 
which was then the target area of Serbian weapon-supplies.317 Under the leadership 
of Isa Boletini, Albanians and Turks searched the villages and forced the people to 
surrender their arms. From January to August alone, around 600 persons fled to 
Serbia – wrote Bataković. Finally Russia intervened and the requisition campaign 
was over. But the interference of a new Power into their internal policy angered not 
only local Albanians, but Austria-Hungary as well. Thus when Adem Zaimi killed 
Haxi Mula Zeka in Peć for tribal dissentions, at the beginning of 1902, Austro-
Hungarian consuls suspected that it was in fact a Serbian conspiracy.318 
When King Aleksandar Obrenović took a Russophil course in foreign policy, to 
calm tempers in the country, a new Serbian diplomatic offensive aimed at settling the 
debated question both through official and unofficial steps was initiated. In order to 
stop violence a group of Albanian notables from Djakovica was invited to Belgrade, 
among whom was the new leader in Peć, Mehmed Zaimi. They were given money 
                                                 
316 During the Kolašin-affair discussed below an Albanian band of 600 men, with the support of 50 Ottoman 
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and arms, if they helped bring an end to violence. This story is very important from 
our perspective, because one of our case study - the visit of Adem Zaimi in Belgrade - 
had similar character, with the minor difference, that Zaimi was tricked by a Serbian 
officer who played the role of the king.  
The Serbian government officially raised the issue of protecting Serbs in 1902, and 
in August the following demands were delivered to the Porte: regular and for all 
equal application of law and an end to the policy of encouraging Albanians. 
Propositions along this line were for either disarmament of the ethnic Albanians or 
allowance for the Serbs to carry guns; for reinforcement of Turkish garrisons 
wherever there were Serbian-Albanian inhabitants admixed; removal of corrupt 
Turkish officials; implementation of administrative and judicial reforms with larger 
Serbian participation in the administration and judiciary; implementation of agrarian 
reform. Russia supported Serbia since none of the bases were touched regarding the 
status quo established with Austria-Hungary in 1897.319 
These demands were very similar to those of implemented in Macedonia after the 
Mürzsteg agreement! To hinder the intervention of the Great Powers, especially 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, which had the right to protect Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire under article 23 of the Berlin Congress, the sultan announced 
reforms in November 1902. The reform action of Turkey, headed by Hussein Hilmi 
Pasha as general inspector, anticipated a more rigorous application of the law, 
regulation of agrarian duties, dismission of corrupt officials and the enlisting of Serbs 
in the Turkish gendarme. Military authorities undertook to capture the most wanted 
criminals. 
But this process was thwarted by the murder of the Russian consul and later by 
the Ilinden uprising in Macedonia (1903) and the course of events failed the to secure 
the Sebian interests in Kosovo.  
Following the Kolašin affair, Russia opened a consulate in Mitrovica partly to 
check Austria-Hungary's actions.320 Though Isa Boletini was removed by authorites 
under the pretext of paying a visit to Constantinople, the admission of Orthodox into 
the lines of gendarmerie, which was formerly monopolized by fandi and Muslims, 
angered local warlords. At the beginning of 1903, a large assembly of tribal chiefs 
was held near Djakovica. Albanians blamed the Serbs for all the reforms (another fact 
that underlines their ’traditional view’) and they decided to execute 
countermeasures. In the Peć nahije ten people were killed within a few weeks. 
Following another meeting in Drenica, Albanians revolted against the reforms and 
                                                 
319 Ћоровић, Владимир. Историја српског народа. VI/1. Београд: Ars Libri, 1997. 323-24.  
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first turned against the ’weakest’, the Serbs. Rebels raided Vučitrn on March 29, 
disarmed the Serbs in the gendarmerie and set off to Mitrovica to remove Consul G. 
S. Shtcherbin from the town.8 Though official Ottoman forces supported by artillery 
fire routed the 2000 Albanians, the next day a Turkish corporal, an Albanian, shot the 
Russian consul, while the latter was visiting the outskirts of town. 
As a result, the Prizren Sanjak was not put under the auspices of the Great 
Powers in 1903. The statement that the omission of Kosovo from the Mürzsteg 
reforms was purely the result of Austrian machinations is partly flawed, because it 
was Isa Boletini’s man, who then killed the Russian consul. And we know that he 
was also given financial support from Serbia. And it is also true that his opposition 
came from his thinking in tribal and traditional class categories and not from 
nationalism: though Albanians did not like Russians, who were protectors of 
Orthodox subjects, Boletini himself did not hate Christians, but simply wanted to 
preserve his privileges. During the revolt of 1899 it was he who defended the 
Christians of Mitrovitsa – living in the area he ruled – from atrocities, while in 1901 
he led the punishing actions in Ibarski Kolašin to collect the weapons distributed to 
Christians. Furthermore, because of the Dečani problem (discussed in detail later), 
not even the Serbs did sympathize with the Russians then, and so the murder was 
not against their interests. Local interests could overwrite government or power politics.  
Anyway, the Dečani question offered a good example (1) of the unconsolidated 
self-consciousness of local people, (2) of violence treated as a marketable product, 
and (3) of the diversity of fault lines within society (which cannot simply be 
described in ethno-religious terms).  Similarly to the case of Mavrovo, the Orthodox 
monastery of Dečani was defended by volunteer or paid Albanians living in the 
surroundings, until it was attacked by highlander tribes several times before 1902. 
The Serbs then decided to call in Russian monks, thinking that no one would dare 
offend a subject of a Great Power. But soon the local population began to claim they 
were Russian, resulting in the disapproval both of the Serbian state (and church) and 
of the Ottoman Empire. The former feared the de-Serbianization of the recently 
Serbianized Orthodox peasants, while the latter accused the monks of espionage.321 
The arrival of the Russian consul was a culmination point:322 Austria-Hungary, a part 
of the Serbians, the Ottoman central power and local Albanians all disapproved his 
presence. The instigator could be anyone. 
                                                 
321 Malcolm, Kosovo, 235. 
322 And is was just on of the numerous steps of the Russian diplomatic offensive in 1902-1904, which included a 
treaty with Bulgaria in case of a Romanian attack (1902) and an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria (1903-
1904). 
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Expecting war in the Far East, Russia did not intervene and was satisfied with the 
maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. Therefore it accepted the principles laid 
down in Mürzsteg and withdrew from Kosovo. Austria’s positions were again 
strengthened.323 But after the Serbian political turn in 1903, Austria-Hungary’s 
position were again endangered, thus enforced the exclusion of the Northwest parts 
of the Kosovo vilayet (Kosovo and Metohia) from the reform action.324 
As the Prizren Sanjak was omitted from the Mürzsteg reforms, these events all 
forced official Serbian policy to reconsider its goals and (r)enumerate the 
possibilities. When recounting the tactics of local and Serbian nationalists, vice-
consul Rakić in 1905 wrote that local Serbs tended to exaggerate their losses in order 
to get as much money and weapons from Serbia as possible. While newspapers 
wrote about violence day after day, Rakić had knowledge of 25 cases within the 
space of five months. So the 400 cases mentioned in 1899, cited by the recently 
deceased leading Serbian historian Bataković seems to be an exaggeration. (This 
highlights the fact that even contemporary sources had to be treated with certain 
reservations). Rakić himself approved the decision of the Serbian government (!) that 
in order to secure Serbian villages from harassment Albanian troops has to be hired 
and paid (in Dečani, for example).325 This was indoctrinated by appealing to the 
following hopes: each outcome of the events would only weaken the Albanian 
element and not the Orthodox one. Those settlements which made this crucial step – 
which implied huge costs, and was risky, because it did not always work, as the 
examples of Jolovce and Dečani proved – later showed reluctance to support the 
central government when it tried to re-establish its power. This phenomenon was 
indirectly advantageous for the Serbian state as well, because this strategy slowly 
eroded faith in the credibility of the central government and in its ability to represent 
its interests. Mavrovo village (Tetovo kaza, 140 houses, mixed Patriarchist-Exarchist), 
for example, paid seven Albanians (beyond regular taxes) to maintain order; that it is 
to say, the village took over state tasks and functions by outsourcing it. This was a step 
towards self-governance, though not a cheap one, which decreased the asymmetric 
dependency of villages on the central power. The salary of the guards was 6-20 
Turkish liras (14,000 piastres in total). The expenses stemming from different abuses 
practised by the landlords were also a burden on society for which neither the state 
nor the guards could offer a solution, and this enhanced the resentment of rural 
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population towards the urban administrative centres where both the government 
authorities and the landlord seated (the urban-rural dichotomy was a real problem, 
as our analysis below proves).326 
But this survival strategy did not work at all in some localities. Albanian chiefs 
forbade their compatriots to protect the Serbs around Peć and this resulted in 38 
murdered and five wounded in 1905. Turkish authorities forbade the Serbs and 
Albanians to visit consul Spalajković and talk to him.327 Jolovce village paid 1500 
piastres to a band to avoid harassment,328 but this did not mean that they defended 
the village from other bands which would soon sack the village. 
During 1904, from Kosovo 108 persons fled to Serbia (small number compared to 
the 600 mentioned during the Kolašin-affair). In 1904, of 136 different crimes noted, 
46 ended with murder, in 1905, 281 cases of oppression were recorded in Kosovo and 
Metohija, and 65 Serbs were killed.329 Thus Serbian cultural propaganda in Prizren, 
offensive by any standard, was substituted by military means and measures. Under 
the private initiative of several wealthy citizens of Belgrade who organized the first 
company, comprised of patriot volunteers and refugees from Old Serbia and 
Macedonia, to fight Bulgarian komitadjis in Macedonia in 1902, 330 četnik action came 
under the wing of the state gained further swing in 1904 – wrote Bataković. But what 
was relatively successful in Macedonia did not work in Kosovo, where Albanians 
had greater proportion and were better organized. While in Macedonia Serbian četas 
were tolerated by the Ottoman authorities in their fight against Bulgarians, in Kosovo 
this multiplayer situation was missing and Ottomans did not tolerate attacks against 
Muslims. Not even quarrelling Albanian groups could be divided and played off 
against each other. When the question of Serbian armament arose the feuding 
Albanian tribes immediately expressed solidarity with each other. When a četnik 
detachment was passing through Metohia on its way to Macedonia, in 1905, it was 
discovered and killed in the village Velika Hoca, the home-town of its leader Lazar 
Kujundžić. At the demand of Albanian tribes, the houses assisting the komitadjis were 
burned in retribution.331 In summer 1907, another Serbian company passed through 
                                                 
326 Георгиев, Величко,  Стайко, Трифонов (eds.). История на българите в документи. Toм 1. 1878-1912. Част 
втора. I/2. 82. and ЦДА, ф. 321, oп. 1. a.e. 1616. л. 2-13. 
327 Peruničić, Branko. Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913. Beograd: Naučna knj, 1988. 227-228.  
328 Frantz, Anne Eva. Gewalt und Koexistenz. Muslime und Christen im spatosmanischen Kosovo (1870-1913). 
München: De Gruyter-Oldenbourg, 2016. 75. 
329 Peruničić, Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, 227-228. But in Skopje Sanjak more than 100 cases were mentioned 
as ’everyday violence’ with more than 200 deaths within 6 months in 1905, not to mention the četa-civilian 
encounters (Chapter III). 
330 Vucinich, Wayne. Serbia between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908. Stanford Univ. Press, 1954. 131-32. 
331 Ракић, Милан. Конзулска писма, 1905-1911. Бeоград: Просвета, 1985. 41-46, 304-13. 
119 
 
Kosovo and was received by the locals of the Pasjane village. It was soon discovered, 
and was destroyed.  
Milan Rakić vice-consul soon recognized that četa tactics and recruiting members 
from Serbia (offered by radical consul Spalajković) had no positive effect; in 1907, he 
adviced to return to placing Albanian guards over Serbian villages.332 Most of the 
local Serbs were of the opinion, in Kosovo Polje such a policy had no real chances 
(the Muslim villagers constituting the majority of population were armed unlike the 
masses Macedonian Exarchists). This also reveals that not only different policies had 
to be adopted in different localities, but even local communities were divided in the 
question which tactics should be followed. 
The policy of supporting schools also continued, but now it led to Bulgarian-
Serbian antagonism in Macedonia and to rivalry between local Serbs of Kosovo and 
Orthodox students from elsewhere (not to mention the persisting conflicts between 
the Serbian state and the Church regarding predominance). Despite the existence of 
the organizational background, the Serbian presence was relatively insignificant in 
Macedonia prior to 1903 (unlike in Kosovo). But the dynamic increase of Serbian 
schools between 1896 and 1901 there alarmed the Bulgarians, and the number of 
teachers in Bulgarian schools also doubled between 1901 and 1910 (Table 20), which 
also reflects changes in their support policy. 
The Serbian tactics regarding schools were different from the Bulgarian ones: the 
Bulgarian state refrained from directly imposing its own agents on the Macedonian 
Bulgars.333 The Serbs could not do this, because the low number of Kosovar Serbs 
made it difficult to reproduce their own intelligentsia. Therefore, they used teachers 
trained in Serbia, which was another factor that could trigger tensions in local 
communities. Another method was to supplant non-indigeneous Ortodox students 
from religious schools, the so-called ‘Bogoslovie’, in order to secure the training and 
reproduction of local elite. The Serbian methods are probably best illustrated with 
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the case of the Eastern Orthodox secondary grammar school in Prizren at the turn of 
the century (discussed later). In other places (Visoki Dečani) conflicts even resulted 
in the cancellation of several school years as the result of constant fighting between 
pro-Bulgarian and pro-Serbian factions and during which the reciprocal intimidation 
of Serboman and Bulgarian Orthodox priests continued until the arrival of a ‘neutral’ 
clergyman (Joakinije Marković, also see later) sympathizing with Austria-Hungary.334 
 
Table 20. The result of “peaceful” propaganda: schools in Macedonia in 1896 / 1901 / 1910 
  Schools Schools Schools Teachers Teachers Teachers Students Students Students 
Bulgarian 
843 785 1359 1306 1220 2203 43,432 40,000 78,519 
Serbian 77 178   118 321 2873 7200     
Greek   924     1400   
 
 57,500   
Schurman, Jacob Gould. The Balkan Wars: 1912–1913 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1914) see: 
www.gutenberg.org/etext/11676 1914. and Misheff, Dimitar. The truth about Macedonia (Berne: Pochon-
Jent, 1917), http://www.promacedonia.org/en/pdf/mischeff_the_truth_about_macedonia_1917.pdf 
 
Violence ceased intermittently in 1907 when Austria-Hungary aimed to expand 
the reform action to the Preševo and Gnjilane districts due to its interest in the Sanjak 
Railway question. But the rumours of the Austro-Hungarian army arriving in 
Kosovo brought several thousand ethnic Albanians together in Ferizović 
simultaneous to the breaking out of the Young Turk Revolution.  
During the constitutional regime, the political attitude of the Serbs in Kosovo 
differed somewhat from that of their Macedonian compatriots, which also highlights 
the regionally diverse, multi-faceted political practices.335 The Young Turk movement was 
not welcomed in Kosovo, neither by the Serbs nor by their opponents, the 
traditionalist (or liberal)336 Albanians (unlike in Macedonia, where the Serb parties 
agreed to cooperate with the CUP). For Kosovar Serbs, not even a reformed and well 
organized Ottoman Empire could offer a viable perspective; indeed, it merely 
threatened to destroy previous achievements. (Unlike in Macedonia, in Kosovo Polje 
the Serbian influence was already dominant among the Orthodox.) On the other 
hand, representations of traditional power were respected by local Serbs: it was the 
same Rakić who organized a feast to celebrate the arrival of the Sultan to Kosovo 
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Polje in 1911, in which the Serbian community participated also.337 This was a 
politically sensitive question because of the participants and the site itself (no sultans 
paid an official visit to Kosovo Polje after the decisive battle of 1389 that ruined 
Serbian statehood). In short, the Serbs in Kosovo tried to exacerbate the tensions between 
the traditionalists and the CUP, turning conservative rural Albanians (their enemies!) 
against the central government (even supplying them with weapons), while at the 
same time showing loyalty and respect towards the sultan (who was also the 
opponent of the CUP in power). This was classic ‘divide et impera’ policy. 
But did not work. Beside the traditional and ethnicized conflicts, new conflict 
types - tensions with political background – occurred complicating the situation 
further. Neither the visit of the new Sultan Mahmud V could bring appeasement, but 
rather exarbated tensions despite the general amnesty, because his visit had symbolic 
meaning in the eyes of the local Albanian and Serbian community from different 
perspectives. Soon another wave of violence began against the Serbs, instead of 
stabilizing the situation. (This refers to the persistence of ’old reflexes’ among the 
Muslims). Since July to November 1911 more than 400 incidents including 128 
robberies, 35 arsons, 41 banditries, 53 abductions, 30 blackmails, 19 examples of 
frightening, 35 murders, 37 attempts to murder, 58 armed assaults upon property, 27 
examples of fights and armed abuse, 13 attempts of forced conversions and 18 
examples of serious injuries were recorded in Old Serbia. These absolute numbers 
were even higher than those measured in Macedonia in 1907 including both ’everday 
violence’ and paramilitary attacks on civil population. (On the other hand by this 
time the Macedonian violence wave had even exceeded this stage: here the number 
of victims of one single case could exceed hundreds. In 1911 Stip after a bomb attack 
of the IMRO against a mosque - a new element in the tactics, up to then attacking 
sacred spaces was Muslim speciality - hundreds were injured by the Muslim 
revenge. A similar case occured in Kočani in 1912. There were more than 500 political 
murders in Macedonia in the first 6 months of 1912).338 The culmination of problems 
was also observable in the number of selected-published documents: while there 
were 78 documents dealing with abuses and problems in Raška between 1902 and 
1906 (5 years), there were 67 cases for 1910-1911.339 
After this short introduction to the complicated situation and the key factors and 
features (the involvement of the Great Powers, the political impact of neighbouring 
states, the multifaceted background of local conflicts, dynamic fault lines, temporary 
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correspondence in the interests of different groups, different tools to reach the same 
goals, etc.), we sketch some of the most typical conflict types through case studies 
and illustrate the reactions to handle these problems.  
 
 
Traditional banditry – weakening central power 
 
As we have stressed, the old unethnicized forms of violence, such as banditry, also 
prevailed in Prizren alongside ethnicized conflicts. The possession of firearms is 
usually considered as a sign of the weakness of the executive power of the state, 
especially if this appears among population groups that are not entitled to their own 
weapons. In Kosovo not only the Catholic Albanians serving as local militiamen (the 
so-called fandi) but even Orthodox inhabitants managed to acquire firearms, albeit 
illegally, and therefore they kept them at home (they refrained from appearing with 
weapons in public spaces, because it would trigger Muslim outrages against them). 
Possessing weapons implied the possibility of self-jurisdiction. Though it is hard to 
establish whether this phenomenon was the reason for or the consequence of the 
weakness of the central power, it definitely meant that the execution of the already 
slow legal process, characterized as it was by abuses and corruption, was passed on 
to the local population.  
Albanian privileges (they argued that weapons are needed to hinder harassment 
from the Montenegrin side, but it is rather the consequence of their traditions which 
considered weaponless adult males to be ’women’ and not equal members of the 
community) became a problem even prior to the unifying and centralizing attempts 
of the Tanzimat. The practices of the blood feud and of transhumance husbandry 
also rationalized the possession of weapons. (Economic migration itself enhanced the 
possibility of a conflict between different social groups). Sometimes it was civilian 
migrants without clear political commitments (besides those who were members of 
nationalist organizations) who smuggled weapons because of the increasing 
demand. Most of the smugglers were not Albanian of origin, but torbesh or goran, so 
Slavs from Dibra or Gorna Reka, who became Islamized, were thus allowed to 
possess weapons. Their dual or fluid identity also explains why they sold weapons 
without clear preference, i.e. without favouring any of the competing ethno-religious 
groups, while their language allowed them to communicate with inhabitants of 
distant lands.340 This is how the robbers of Drenica (approximately 200 men) were 
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equipped. They activated themselves during spring (when the peasants began their 
yearly work in the fields) or in autumn (when peasants travelled to urban markets to 
sell their products), and specialized in small groups of weaponless peasants (who 
were usually Orthodox Slavs), because they were the least protected social group 
(foreign travellers or vlach merchants could usually pay for their personal security). 
And even when the Orthodox peasants took arms with themselves illegally, this 
merely served as a good pretext to punish them without fear of government 
reprisals. 
Thus, though the target group could be well defined in ethnic and religious terms, 
these attacks did not in fact have any real ethnic character. This group of bandits was 
politically inactive in an ethno-religious sense: they supported the traditionalist line 
because they wanted to preserve their privileged situation. When after the 1870s they 
positioned themselves at odds with the Ottoman government, they did so because 
the government wanted to strengthen the state’s authority over Drenica. Banditry as 
a phenomenon is not bound to ethnicity: the Serbs in Peje were also robbers 
(Orthodox communities possessing land and with tax exemptions also existed), as 
were the Albanians in Drenica. 
 
Banditism vs. the state authorities 
 
The following outrages did not belong to the group of everyday violence, but were 
still typical. Muslim rebel bands attacked not only local peasantry, but also launched 
attacks against the gendarmerie led by international officers,341 whom they simply 
considered intruders. This special form of violence was not targeted at the officers 
themselves (because this might have diplomatic consequences or might bring 
security measures that would render impossible the further ’economic’ activity of the 
četa), but against local Christians serving as privates in the gendarmerie, in order to 
discourage them from participation in peace-keeping forces.342 
While the aforementioned conflicts can be considered as acts with a political 
background, the following one cannot. It rather illustrates the limits of coercive 
measures against banditism (many dozens of soldiers were mobilized to capture a 
single evil-doer), while the subsequent case represents possibilities for peaceful 
solutions. 
Prior to 1908, most of the problems were caused by the tribes living in the 
mountains, where the existence of blood feuds generated numerous secondary 
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conflicts. Before Ilinden a typical conflict was the blood feud of Ipek. On 1 March, the 
son of the local strongman, Mustafa Aziz bey, was murdered in the bazaar. The killer 
came from the Albanian Rugova tribe, and was hired by another Rugovan, Ibrahim 
Mehmet Redj, famous for his violent personality. The killer, pursued by the army 
and the gendarmerie, managed to escape to the kula of Ibrahim. The soldiers warned 
the host to surrender the murderer (according to imperial law), which he refused to 
do (referring to the customary law of hospitality, the kanun). The soldiers then 
warned him that they would not refrain from the use of violence (negotiation was 
useless, if the perpetrators decided to follow the kanun). The leader of the town, 
Suleyman pasha, decided to capture Redj, who was accused of many other violent 
abuses. Redj was given four hours to surrender, after which the kula would be 
besieged by cannons (!). Redj’s men immediately opened fire on the gendarmerie, 
killing four men and wounding a further three – he decided to break through the 
blockade before the cannons arrived. Then Suleyman pasha ordered the cavalry to 
control the roads leading to the Rugovan area, but soon they were attacked by seven 
Rugovans from the woods, who tried to give support to their compatriots (not 
because they respected Redj, but because they considered the insult to be an offense 
against the whole tribe) by infiltrating into the town, which had been left defenceless. 
(Breaking through the cordon around the kula would have meant evident support for 
Redj, rendering them accessories to the crime). But the cavalry repelled the attack. 
Meanwhile the soldiers ruined the kula, using the cannons, then set it on fire. But the 
defenders still continued firing, killing more people. Only after the 19th cannon shot 
did Redj surrender, by which time his compatriots, the murderer, a 3-year old boy 
and another male from the Rugova tribe, were already dead. But after such events 
not even the soldiers kept to the law: Redj was shot by a soldier, and his body then 
mutilated by the others – thereby invoking the blood feud of the Rugova tribe on 
their heads. Therefore Suleyman bey, fearing the revenge of the Rugovans, asked 
military headquarters to send more troops to the region.343 
 
 
The state treatment of banditism – a successful solution? 
 
On the eve of the turn of the century, the authorities in Prizren and Ipek were unable 
to stop the rebel bands in the towns, and the numerous blood feuds resulting from 
their activity, which generated a vicious circle. These bands were organised from ad 
hoc groups assembling to protest against the officials representing the central 
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government (who either violated some customary law in order to enforce imperial 
law, or were simply corrupt and rapacious). Thus the government was also 
responsible for their formation – but only indirectly. The authorities, unable to put 
down the revolts, decided to legitimize them by appointing their leaders (Hadji Zeka 
in Ipek, Halil pasha and Zeynel bey) to be officers of the gendarmerie. In effect this 
meant that they received a salary, in return for which they had only one task – to 
tame their men. It was evident to all that this was some kind of bribery, showing the 
weakness of the central powers344 – in fact it was a regular subsidy paid by the state 
(and taxpayers) to paramilitary troops for the maintenance of public order, of which 
the central powers were then incapable. It was another example of the outsourcing of 
state tasks, but here it was a central initiative, unlike in the case of Mavrovo (Tetovo 
kaza), where it was a private initiative, or in the case of Dečani, where it was the 
church, a non-government organization, which paid for peace to be maintained. 
But by 1900 all these proved to be inefficient, and thus the new mutesharif of 
Prizren proposed a new solution: he convinced the leaders of the Albanian 
community to organize an advisory board that would undertake to decrease the 
number of blood feuds. The Albanian leaders gave a traditional oath (besa) to the 
Ottoman leader to fulfil their task.345 Soon this new semi-official organization settled 
15 blood feuds by intermediating between the rival groups. What is more interesting 
is the application of old customary law – which was accepted by the authorities! In 
the case of murder it was this committee that visited the site with the local police and 
settled the problem (identifying the perpetrator and negotiating recompensation 
instead of continuing the blood feud), neglecting official law. The activity of the 
commission was so successful that it was extended to the whole territory of the 
Sanjak.346 
But soon the central government ordered Djemal bey to suspend the activity of this 
organization, even though it had by then successfully concluded 700 cases within a 
year. The rumours quickly spread and murders began again. The Albanian leaders 
neglected their former oaths given to the commission, while the commission 
completely lost its former authority and respect. (It is very interesting that though 
state authorities had lost their executive power by then in practice, their authority 
did not vanish completely, as they were still able to legitimize the activity of locally 
organized commissions. In other words, governing Albanians was possible by 
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inserting a hierarchical level between the local and governmental levels, in which 
executing power was practised by locals, based on local customary law, but bearing 
the authorization of central power.) 
Furthermore, the central government ordered the mutesharif to avoid violence, 
but, if necessary, to use the first-order nizam troops (instead of the gendarmerie). 
Djemal immediately sent a telegram to the Porte, stating that both conditions would 
just weaken the power of the civil government in the eyes of the local Albanians, but 
received the answer that it was the sultan’s personal decision to avoid the 
establishment of such committees that could challenge the sultan’s authority, and 
forbade everyone to organize authorities based on besa (oath).347 
Due to these circumstances, Djemal bey resigned at the end of 1900 and soon 
mountain robber tribes swept across the villages of the plains – something 
completely unusual in winter, as acknowledged even by contemporary witnesses. 
The army had to be deployed to hinder the sorties. As urban policemen did not get 
their salaries for months, they also accompanied the robbers, leaving the town of 
Ipek completely defenceless, while offering a good opportunity for the Rugova and 
Šala tribes to settle their conflicts violently, using the town as their ’arena’.348 
The local gendarmerie was omitted from the maintenance of order as being 
untrustworthy and inefficient, only to be substituted by army units that lacked 
training and knowledge of local customs, society and the surrounding terrain. This 
meant, first, that the idea of maintaining order by involving both parties using 
customary law slow vanished once and for all, and, second, that those who earned 
their living from banditism were forced to obtain better firearms in order to execute 
successful raids. And as these were more expensive, their acquisition invoked more 
violence or illegal activities: raids became targeted at military stockhouses to acquire 
weapons, and smuggling became more intensive. As a result of this policy, while at 
the turn of the century it had been enough to send a battalion of nizams to maintain 
order, ten years later whole divisions were needed to disarm the population.349 
In addition to the rivalry of the small states, the closeness of Austria-Hungary and 
the strong influence of Russia (as official protector of the Orthodox population) also 
contributed to the spread of violence. In the forthcoming paragraphs we publish 
some unknown conflicts that were generated indirectly or directly by the opposition 
of these two Great Powers.  
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Violence as an alternative source of income for Ottoman state officials 
 
As Austria-Hungary was the official protector of the Catholics of the Ottoman 
Empire, Ottoman officials usually did not interfere in cases in which Catholics were 
concerned, leaving jurisdiction to the Great Power.350 This ignorance of the central 
authorities (which were nearer and still better informed, than burdened Austro-
Hungarian officials reacting slower) did not enhance public security. In 1901, Adem 
Zaimi, a Muslim Albanian officer of the gendarmerie unsatisfied with his salary, 
wanted to exploit this situation by kidnapping Lol Kuka, a well-known Albanian 
Catholic merchant from Shkodra. Then he blackmailed not his family or the Ottoman 
authorities, but rather Austria-Hungary, supposing that if the latter refused the deal, 
the authority of the dual state would be ruined forever. (The case is very edifying for 
modern times…). What is more interesting, he did not ask for ransom, but - in return 
for handing Lol Kuka over - he asked the Austro-Hungarian consulate to 
intermediate at the local Ottoman authorities to promote him to the higher ranks.351 
This case is all the more interesting because it reveals that Austria-Hungary was 
considered more powerful and efficient (even within the boundaries of the Empire) 
by local actors than the imperial authorities.352 Furthermore, it highlights the lack of 
trustworthiness of state authorities like the gendarmerie. The later detailed 
curriculum of Zaimi will also highlight that enlistment to the ranks of the 
gendarmerie was not based on moral principles or personal aptitude, but indicates 
the custom that the officers’ posts functioned as ’fiefdoms’ (‘state sinecures’)353 
donated to restless or politically trustworthy Muslim lords (to make them obligated 
or to control their activity). The great Albanian landlords, the beys, even needed and 
demanded this kind of money in order to pay their personal troops, thus maintaining 
law and order (including the stability of social relations and structures). Insufficient 
financing meant losing their authority over their men and this implied losing control 
over violence. 
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Conflicts indirectly generated by the competition between the Powers 
 
Though the previous case could also have been classified in this group, the case of 
the Orthodox priest, Joakinije Marković fits here better, and is even more interesting, 
because he turned to the Austro-Hungarian authorities as being the Orthodox 
archimandrite of Visoki Dečani monastery! Joakinije was born in Perjašica, Croatia, 
in 1845 and served in Niš until 1880, where he had conflicts with his superiors (he 
was claimed to be the opponent of radicals and liberals). After he had been 
pensioned, he secretly offered his services to the embassy of Austria-Hungary in 
Belgrade. In return he asked for an ecclesiastic position. He served in Bosnia in the 
1890s, but soon was dismissed. He appeared in 1898 in Sveta Trojica, then served as 
igumen in Visoki Dečani.354 This monastery was one of the main propaganda centres 
of Serbia, but it was located at the western fringe of the Kosovo Vilayet, surrounded 
by Muslim Albanian villages. Marković asked for support at the local Austro-
Hungarian consulate, as the Serbian government was reluctant to give financial aid 
because the press accused him of being an agent of Austria-Hungary and of not 
promoting the idea of Greater Serbia wholeheartedly. Though he refuted the 
accusations, these left him with no other choice other than really to turn to Austria-
Hungary in 1899.355 This was a great chance for Austria-Hungary to have a secret 
agent within the walls of a Serbian propaganda centre. 
But the real reason for his decision was to be found not in these accusations, but 
rather in the fact that the existence of this Serbian outpost angered local Muslims, 
who often tried to attack the monastery, from which the Muslim landlords, as the 
patrons of all (even Christian) local sanctuaries, tried to save the monks (regardless 
of whether they promoted the Serbian cause or not) if they paid enough money. (This 
also enlightens us that the problem was more than an ethnic conflict between the 
Serbs and Albanians, or a conflict between the triangle of the local authorities, 
Ottoman state power and the Serbian state, or a rivalry between landlords (beys) and 
their subjected ’vassals’ for income and authority). 
In the 1890s, these attacks became more frequent, and thus diverting them would 
also cost more money. The monks were unable to finance these costs from their own 
income any more, and asked for a loan from the local Albanian landlords at 12-15% 
yearly interest. The dues grown so high by 1899 that they were unable to finance the 
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debt any more; Belgrade refused to help Marković, arguing that his propagandistic 
activity was unsatisfactory, and that Serbia did not want to “finance Muslim 
landlords” – their potential enemies. (This did not bother the monks, when they paid 
for their safety.) Finally the Austro-Hungarian consul intervened and “asked” 
Marković to send regular reports which would be paid for according to their 
information content. The situation was paradox: the money received from the 
espionage was spent on the maintenance of the monastery, thus Marković spied for 
Austria partly to promote Serbian goals, while Austria-Hungary financed Albanian 
warlords through the dues of a Serbian propaganda centre.356 
The story became even stranger after the turn of the century, and revealed other 
reasons for internal debates among the monks. On St. George’s Day, 1904, the 
Muslims of the Rugova tribe opened fire on the Visoki Dečani monastery, and 
though nobody was harmed, the soldiers garrisoned in the surrounding buildings 
were unable to catch anyone. The Ottoman authorities soon sent a report to the 
Austrian consulate stating that it was the radical Serbs of Ipek who hired the 
Albanians to attack the Russian monks of Dečani (!), as the Serbs (who originally 
invited the Orthodox Russians) were fed up with their activity.357 
Russia paid huge sums for the maintenance of Orthodox monasteries and 
sanctuaries and in return Russian monks appeared in those places as treasurers 
responsible for financial affairs. The Serbs tolerated them at first, because they 
needed the financial resources and thought that the presence of Russian subjects 
would defend them from Ottoman harassment. But the activity of the Russians 
divided the Serbs. In Ipek the tension between the pro-Serbian minority calling itself 
Gušteri (including igumen Miron, the local teacher, and some merchants) and the 
pro-Russian majority named Kurdjoni, began to grow as the Russians of Visoki 
Dečani started to build up their network and to put trustworthy informers in 
important places (like Jovan Gerić in Prizren and Luka Garikolović in Mitrovitsa). 
The pro-Serbian party revolted against this practice in 1904 and hired Albanians to 
attack Visoki Dečani. Serbians and official Serbia tried to do everything to get rid of 
Kiril igumen and Arsenije in Dečani.358 They refused Russian patronage, claiming that 
the presence of Russians did not make life more tolerable. Knowing all this, the 
successful murder of the Russian consul in Mitrovitsa just on the eve of international 
intervention is worth reconsidering – was there an instigator behind this act? (Isa 
Boletini – whose men were accused of committing the murder - regularly received 
money as subsidy from Serbia up to the 1910s). The murder had far-reaching political 
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consequences, because the Kosovo vilayet was omitted from the Mürzsteg reform, 
partly due to this act. The Austrians did not want to include the vilayet in the process 
from the beginning, because international oversight could only ruin their positions, 
while the Russians felt themselves insulted because of the murder – and their 
withdrawal left plenty of space for the Serbian agents to fill.359 
 
 
The case of the Bogoslovie in Prizren (1899-1900) 
 
The above testifies that not only armed bands but also the propaganda and 
ideologies of neighbouring states battled with one another, sometimes turning local 
rivalries into a diplomatic question, sometimes overwriting original fault lines 
making temporary allies of former enemies.360 As Eastern Orthodox priests and 
village teachers had the greatest influence on shaping the identity of illiterate 
villagers and were able to disseminate this message most efficiently,361 and therefore 
the village usually followed the national identity pattern(s) that priests and teachers 
represented or were forced to represent,362 it is not surprising that these symbolic 
personalities not only became propagators of national ideology but also became 
targets. 
Conflicts within the Orthodox Church(es) were not limited to the monasteries: 
schools were also the targets of national propaganda, thus becoming scenes of 
everyday violence even without the contribution of paramilitary troops. Schools 
maintained by the Church, the so-called bogoslovies (‘God’s word’), were by this time 
to serve the process of nation-building rather than religious piety. As village priests 
played an important role in determining the self-identification of their community, if 
the national propaganda became able to gain influence over these religious schools, it 
could successfully influence the minds of hundreds of future priests, and through 
them thousands of villagers. (When the village teacher, educated in a neighbouring 
state, and the village priest followed or advertised a different national propaganda – 
or simply pursued different tactics – it generated conflict and divided the 
community, sometimes ending in internal showdowns).  
By 1900 the Bogoslovie in Prizren fell into the hands of priests supporting Serbian 
propaganda, who took care not to let any priests, teachers or students advertising 
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Bulgarian national ideas enter the walls of the institution. As there were hardly any 
possibilities for young Orthodox people to train themselves within the boundaries of 
the Kosovo vilayet, the distribution of the few existing grants was a permanent 
source of conflict: the applicants usually accused each other of serving foreign 
propaganda (whether or not this was true). A larger conflict evolved at the end of 
1899, when the school began to focus on local Macedonian applicants in order to 
promote the Serbianization of the region, while the traditional schooling district of 
the institution included Montenegro and Eastern Bosnia as well. In Montenegro only 
the relatives of the vladika and the tribal leaders had a chance to study within the 
country, while those who did not originate from influential circles had to train 
themselves abroad. And although Orthodox students from Bosnia had the 
opportunity to educate themselves in Bosnia under the aegis of Austria-Hungary, 
many refused to do so because of their political convictions. It is not surprising that 
the changing tactics of the Prizren school, which threatened to deprive them of their 
traditional place of education, angered these groups, which officially protested at the 
Serbian consulate in Skopje.363 
Those who had already been enrolled supported the demands of their compatriot 
applicants. As a reprisal, leader of the school wanted to dismiss twelve of the 
protesting students, and the metropolite of Prizren, Dionysie Petrović, confirmed this 
as the leader of the organization responsible for the maintenance of the school. The 
response of the students was broadened resistance – the number of protesting 
students suddenly increased to 90. When they were also threatened with exclusion 
by igumen Makaria, they attacked the priest with knife and firearms. The metropolite 
asked for the participation of the gendarmerie, thus involving state authorities in the 
settlement of the question. Education was suspended, but the students again warned 
Makaria to secure the same rights for the applicants. The igumen then left the school 
and asked for instructions from the metropolite.364 
Finally, at the end of November 1899, he warned the students to give up the strike 
and continue their studies or else they would be dismissed as the former 12 students 
had been. 80 of the protesting students left the college and immediately turned to 
local Russian and Serbian institutions and to the bishop of Üsküp, Firmilian, to ask 
for their opinion of the case.365 
As only 90 students remained within the walls of the school, on 6 December 1899 
metropolite Dionysie Petrović ordered the remainder of the students to be shared 
between the monasteries of Sveti Petar, Sveta Trojica, Sveti Marko, Sveta Bogorodica 
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and Visoki Dečani until the “teacher question [!] is settled”. The temporary closure of 
the school created unrest among the local Serbian population, which tried to restrict 
it by force. The closure was later explained by a delay of four months in the subsidy 
given by Russia, because of which a loan of 150,000 piasters had to be requested.366 
Finally, at least based on Austro-Hungarian consular reports, only seven students 
were dismissed (the ones who attacked their teachers with weapons) – though even 
they were offered new fellowships in Bosnia.367 
As the withheld Russian support arrived, the teaching began again in January 
1900. Students were called back from the neighbouring monasteries. The metropolite 
dismissed most of the old teachers, and only two of them remained at the school: 
Apostol Filipović from Gjilan and Trifun Dimitriević from Djakova. Both received 
their degree in Belgrade. Stefan M. Dimitrijevič became the new director, while Milan 
Šiljak, Sava Rabranović, Mitar Trifkovič and Damiani Isailović arrived as new 
teachers. Most of them were from Kosovo Vilayet and finished their studies in 
Belgrade and Moscow. This common experience bound them together, and, in 
addition, all were trustworthy agents of Serbian nation-building.368 Thus the 
transformation of the school into an outpost of Serbian national propaganda was 
finally carried out through a change of tactics, using new teachers devoted to the 
Serbian national cause (instead of the selection of students). The new director also 
allowed three Bosnian Serbs, Ilia Marcetić, Radomir Blažić and Christo Bjelatić, to 
attend the school in order to keep up appearances (the number of total students was 
around 140).369 
 
 
Protests against the opening of new consulates and trade agencies 
 
Some of the violent acts were in fact targeted to decrease the interference of small 
states as manifested in the establishment of schools, diplomatic agencies and trading 
posts, but the tactics of blaming local Christians for this, and turning against them, 
resulted in just the opposite: the enhancement of the small state’s activity. The 
mentioned activities were considered to be an offense by local Muslims. Those who 
built new buildings or were likely to hand over existing infrastructure for such 
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369 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 23. Dezember 1900, No. 164. 
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purposes were threatened with death.370 Similarly to the case in 1889 in Prizren, in 
1900 the Serbian consul Jovan Mihajlović, his wife and his secretary (Dragačevič) 
hosted two Serbian scientists (the famous Jovan Cvijić and Svetozar Tomič), who 
were supposed to promote the nationalist goals of Serbia through their work. On 27 
September hundreds of Albanians gathered to expel the aliens from the town, who 
finally left only when escorted by the authorities.371 It might be surprising that one 
may find even Cvijić on the special beneficiary list372 of Austria-Hungary. This could 
happen not because he was spying for the Dual State, but because with a Serbian 
passport he could not have survived an Albanian trip.  
 
 
Actions against sacred places during Christian festivals 
 
Some of the incidents in the Prizren and Prishtina Sanjak were evidently anti-
Christian in character, especially those that were targeted at churches when these 
were visited by large numbers of people (during feasts). Though these outrages 
regularly started as simple mass demonstrations against central state reforms in the 
countryside, after the end of the demonstrations the armed (Muslim) mass did not 
disband, and instead penetrated into the towns (the seats of the central authorities), 
attacking Orthodox churches or other sacred, holy spaces.373 The reason was that the 
government policy on equal citizenship and centralization threatened the privileges 
of certain rural Muslim communities, and they were convinced that the changing 
situation was the Christians’ fault.  
In 1904 the Muslim Albanians of Sjenica and Mitrovica chose St. George’s Day 
(very important not only for tax collectors, but also as the beginning of the četa and 
agricultural season) to attack Christians. On the very day the members of the Rugova 
fis also attacked the church of the patriarchate in Ipek, shooting at Christian 
soldiers/gendarmes (this was after Mürzsteg, and thus the intimidation of Christian 
soldiers – who were a new and uncommon phenomenon – could also be a motivating 
factor), then retreated to the hills without being punished or pursued.374 
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Another example: the Albanians of Drenica and Lauša organized a protest 
meeting near the Klina stream (25km south of Mitrovitsa) to march on the town of 
Vučitrn, thus protesting against Mürzsteg reforms. Until 3pm everything was 
peaceful, but then they spotted a funeral ceremony in a nearby Orthodox church, and 
soon the rumour spread that ammunition and weapons were hidden in the church. 
Haydar aga and Ibrahim Madjur from Ipek with 200 armed men penetrated this 
sacred place, frightening the participants of the funeral ceremony. The Albanians 
began to open the coffin to search for weapons, while the priest, Hadji Dapche 
Furtunich and his son Zhivko tried to deflect them. Then the Albanians beat up 
Zhivko, and though Haydar aga ordered them to spare his life, his men sacked the 
parsonage, where they found Zhivko’s Martini rifle, jewels and some money. Zhivko 
was kidnapped (on the pretext that he had an illegal weapon), but soon released. The 
authorities refused to investigate the case.375 
 
The Albanian village vs. the town 
 
The opposition of traditional and modern cultural patterns and the distrust towards 
the attempts of the central authorities to transform the customs of the countryside 
manifested itself not only in the form of a traditional (not yet ethnicized) Muslim-
Christian conflict, but also as a rural-urban opposition. In rural Kosovo, religion 
remained the basis of identification. Though Muslim Albanians had knowledge of 
the nation-building efforts of Montenegro and Serbia, and had even heard about 
Albanian nation-building attempts, for them these were of secondary importance. 
This introverted traditional society still considered the Orthodox reaya, and later (as 
the central power gradually alienated them through its reform plans) urban dwellers, 
as an inferior race. They usually practised the collection of protection money, which 
was a good source of secondary income and also a common practice to mitigate the 
presence of uncontrolled violence, but rarely an effective one.  
The local population refused centralization and stuck to their traditions 
(including removing - or even killing - Ottoman officials, as happened in 1875 and in 
1904, as well as the possession of firearms, the preference for customary law against 
official law, etc.). They refused to participate in the official censuses (fearing taxation) 
and in recruitment. (Many claimed then that they were indeed Christians and 
exempt from military service. The fandi - Catholic Albanian militiamen - refused 
military service and served as a bashibozuk free corps in wars led by their own 
officers). The fact that Ottoman officials were very often forced to leave their 
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positions reflected the lack of prestige of the state, just as did the failures of punitive 
actions. (The campaign led by Hasan pasha in 1880 was unable to identify and catch 
the murderers of the kaimakam in 1875). The possession of weapons, formerly supported by 
government authorities when state power was too weak to maintain order in the frontier zone, 
by the turn of the century became a factor hindering consolidation.  
These rural dwellers were unable overcome their traditional views on identity 
defined by purely religious thinking, while other groups of the population had 
already classified themselves according to a different system of reference. For them 
the ’true believers’ were the rural Muslims - including those who spoke a Slavic 
dialect.376 So these conflicts took place not between ethnicities, and neither can they 
be interpreted as an opposition within a paradigm – these were conflicts between 
cultures, paradigms and reference systems. The phenomenon of religion still being 
able to overwrite linguistic differences was recognized by Austro-Hungarian 
diplomacy and even appeared in the practice of Austrian ethnic mapping.377 These 
rural inhabitants were alienated by the Ottoman administration, but they always 
revolted as ‘true Muslims’, loyal to the Sultan, insisting on their traditional privileges 
and not as a class or a nation or as peripherized population with a regional identity. 
It is also interesting that urban areas usually functioned as the spaces for their protest 
– probably because protests indirectly targeted Ottoman central power. It is also 
possible that the limitations on market days were to limit the number of possible 
conflicts (with the exception of Ferizaj with a railway connection, there was only one 
market day a week in each of the larger settlements). On the other hand this meant 
that merchants were forced to wander to cover all the area and on every weekday to 
earn enough – and this was not without risk. 
Villagers marching into the towns took violence with them in their rucksacks. 
This violence – whether it managed to reach central authorities or it was diverted by 
raffish bureaucrats – usually reached the Orthodox (and their symbolic spaces) at 
some stage despite the original (not ethnically-driven) motives and goals of the 
protest. If the demonstration lasted for days, the protesting Muslim Albanians 
occupied Orthodox houses and accommodated themselves there without paying. 
Very often they sacked the town, stole the tax collected from them earlier, or 
kidnapped the representatives of local elite (and held them for ransom). If the family 
refused to pay, the kidnappee was moved from the town to the periphery, and was 
sometimes mutilated.378 The same happened to the merchant Vasil Šiotič.379 This was 
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the most frequent form of urban terror prior to the bomb attacks of the ’judgment 
days’ in 1911-12. By 1905 these rural marches became widespread, exerting political 
pressure on the government; more and more often political demands were also 
formulated.380 So did the frequency of violent acts grow – the authorities had no 
chance of handling this after the prohibition of Djemal’s method.381 
Here is an example of this phenomenon. On 4 September 1901 a young Muslim 
Albanian from Djakova, Bajram Zup, murdered the Serbian Andrija in Üsküp. After 
a feast celebrating the sultan, Bajram went to a coffee house located in front of the 
Serbian school. There he heard Andrija celebrate Serbia and the Serbian ruler (“źiliva 
Srbija, źivio srpski kralj”). Then Bajram (who must have known some Serbian) insisted 
on celebrating the Sultan too, for which Andrija replied by shouting “źivio krst” 
(’hurrah for the cross’). The Albanian then went out for a moment, returning with a 
gun (where did he get it so quickly, as it is evident that he did not take it into the 
coffee house?) and shot Andrija – as testified to by 10 (!) Serbian witnesses (the 
Albanian must have been a daredevil). Then he left the place unharmed. The Serbian 
Sava from Ferizaj was also wounded when he tried to intervene.382 
Another typical phenomenon was the harassment of the Orthodox population by 
Catholic Albanian policemen. To take revenge for this, Orthodox men of the 
reformed gendarmerie began to harass Catholic Albanians in those places where the 
traditionally Catholic police (fandi) had been removed as a consequence of the 
reforms. The Catholic priests soon objected to the Ottoman authorities and to the 
Austrian consulates, and asked for the return of Catholic Albanian policemen.383 The 
Powers recognised that reforms could only work if the policemen of a certain religion 
only patrolled in districts where the religious composition of the population was the 
same. Ethnically mixed patrols proved ineffective. 
 
Conflicts stemming from border positions 
 
The social role of firearms in traditionalist peripheries made conflicts stemming from 
border positions one of the prevailing types of problem in the Prizren sanjak, though 
not in its classical sense: despite the growing ethno-religious tensions culminating in 
raids and border clashes, there were also examples of deep-rooted cross-border 
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cooperations driven by economic interests. The peculiarity of the situation here 
(unlike in the Skopje Sanjak) was that economic interests were able to prevail over 
ethno-religious tensions – which in the long run proved to be detrimental to one of 
the cooperating parties. 
The role of weapons has already been analyzed with regard to conflict types 
classified as banditry. Based on Nopcsa’s account we also estimated its role in 
traditional societies. But weapons also played a central role for the different 
revolutionary groups with separatist tendencies: 270 out of the 375 of IMRO activists 
analyzed by Brown mention guns, ammunitions or bombs (70%).384 After 1903 the 
Ottoman authorities made great efforts to collect weapons possessed by Christians 
(sometimes reallocating these to Muslims or Greeks), combined with a tactical 
amnesty for those who willingly handed them in (they were listed and later kept 
under observation as potential četa members). But in 1903 only 1886 rifles, 227 
revolvers (the military leaders and the IMRO internal police used them, as well as 
teachers and agitators) and some 54,000 cartridges were collected, alongside 369kg of 
dynamite and 183 hand grenades (these were developed together with Armenian 
dashnyaks and soon became part of the weaponry of the regular infantry), or, in other 
words, only 5% of stocks estimated by McGregor at 40,000 guns in October 1903.385 
The diversity of weapons collected reveals the (various) channels of IMRO to 
acquire them: 1400 of the weapons collected were (obsolete) Russian Krinka used in 
Bulgaria, 120 were Gras used in Greece, 92 were Martinis used by the imperial army 
and 41 were Mannlichers, also from Bulgaria. The latter were considered modern, 
and probably reached Macedonia through Boris Sarafov, who was military officer in 
Bulgaria. One of the persons investigated by Brown, Iljo Lokardev from the village of 
Setino, alone transferred 350 rifles from Bulgaria to Macedonia – as ordered by 
Sarafov.386 25% of the persons analyzed (originating from South Macedonia) were 
involved in smuggling weapons (Gras), hidden in charcoal, from Katerini to Capari, 
where the weapons were handed over to the local teacher Simon Trajkov.387 
However, the Gras rifles were old and no match for the official Ottoman weaponry. 
The Turk authorities had some knowledge of this activity:388 after the attentat in 
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Salonika in 1903, Ottoman troops besieged Capari village, immediately killing 13 
men who were trying to hide the weapons. But this did not mean the end of this 
trade route: in February 1907 Greek paramilitary troops killed fifteen charcoal 
burners in Katerini, perhaps to cut off the supply line of non-Greek bands. In 1902 
the Bulgarians wanted to smuggle 600 rifles of the Carnica system to the bands.389 
Official Bulgarian authorities were generally lenient towards smuggling and 
recruitment.390 
Though the Albanians were considered enemies by the revolutionary 
organizations – not because they were Muslims, but rather because they were 
monopolizing the zaptie and gendarmerie positions, and under the pretext of 
pursuiting illegal practices they became involved in numerous outrages and abuses – 
they were also involved in supplying IMRO. Among the 594 political prisoners 
granted an amnesty in March 1903, there were also 18 Muslims arrested for selling 
firearms to the Christians.391 They were able to acquire better weapons than those 
provided by the Bulgarians or Greeks (which were heavier and less accurate then the 
Martinis used by Ottoman forces). Even soldiers were involved in smuggling. This 
was a widespread phenomenon: even Ludwig von Thallóczy, a leading diplomat and 
historian of Austria-Hungary, mentions such purchases en masse. The unpaid Muslim 
soldiers of Plevlje sold more than 25 thousand weapons to the Montenegrins (non-
believers and their future enemies) just before the outbreak of hostilities in 1912.392 
The Macedonian Dimitar Boyadzhiev from Monastir persuaded an Ottoman soldier 
to bring him army rifles and promised 600 piastres for each (a Greek rifle was about 
400 piastres, while old Werndl rifles could be bought for less than 50 piastres). 
Weapons from the Martini replica factory in Tetovo could be obtained for as little as 
150 piastres from reservists, Brown writes.393 (The USA sold tens of thousands of 
Martinis to the Ottoman state in the 1870s, but at the turn of the century these were 
just exchanged for German Mausers. Martinis then became the weapon of the 
reservists, the redifs.) A good Martini, not a replica – a mark of authority and power – 
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cost 1500 piastres if sold illegally, equivalent to the gross six-month wage of a 
charcoal-burner or village farmer, or to the price of 4-6 cattle.  
What was the benefit for Albanians or foot soldiers in this risky transaction? 
Cash. Ottoman authorities lacked money, and even military salaries were regularly 
delayed by several months (see the quotation from Thallóczy).  
Beside the numerous individual initiatives, the organized selling and smuggling 
of weapons also became part of the strategy of small states. The Montenegrin 
authorities permanently fuelled banditism along the border through selling weapons 
illegally, thus sharpening local tensions in order to tie down as many of the regular 
Ottoman forces as possible with local calamities like chasing bandits. Smuggling 
weapons to the Orthodox population could only be successful because the Albanian 
tribes of the border mountains had a vested interest in this business, as they also 
obtained their share from the ammunition and weapons. The consequences of this 
were (1) the increasing number of available weapons in civilian hands, which did not 
increase public security, and (2) the formation of a supranational smuggling network 
directed from Belgrade and Cetinje. It was these actions that made it possible for 
Bajram Curri and Isa Boletini to increase their local power to authority on a regional 
scale – as reported by Austrian consuls.394 In contrast, the Greeks pursued a different 
strategy, with Greek authorities trying to cooperate with the Ottomans in order to 
hinder the smuggling of Greek weapons to Macedo-Bulgarian bands. In 1902 they 
arrested 27 ’Bulgarians’ in Trikala and seven of them admitted that they were 
members of the revolutionary organization.395 
The cooperation of Albanian leaders and the Montenegrin authorities was so 
fruitful, Albanian beys were even hosted by Serbian or Montenegrin authorities after 
their temporary failures - without having to fear extradition to the Empire.396 
Through arming and financing Muslim groups (and not only Slavs), the South Slav 
states were gradually able to divert the Albanians’ attention from fighting against 
local Christian dwellers towards rebellion against the Ottoman authorities. This 
could happen due to the previously mentioned traditionalism of the rural masses, 
which manifested itself in opposing those governmental attempts that were targeted 
to deprive these communities of their old, local privileges. During the Young Turks’ 
rule in 1911, even bands composed of Serbs fighting for their co-religionists and 
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conservative Albanians fighting against the constitutional regime (which was 
preparing for the abolition of traditional Albanian privileges and customary law, 
even though the CUP had previously managed to mobilize these masses on its side 
by promising to preserve these traditional customs) crossed the borders of the 
Empire to fight jointly! Though their aims were radically different, their enemies 
were – temporarily – common. This phenomenon was also reported by official 
diplomats.397 
The weapon supply became regular by 1911  - Isa Boletini not only smuggled but 
also received a huge amount of weapons398 - which pushed the peripheries into the 
stage of permanent revolt, fitting the Serbian concept which focused on the immense 
destabilization of the Empire at any cost – even by supporting their enemies, the 
Albanian landlords (who later turned against them and fired on Serbian troops with 
Serbian weapons). The organizer of these transports arriving from Serbia was 
probably Petar Kostić, the secretary of the metropolite of Prizren. Thus the 
involvement of the Church became also evident; this was even recognized by the 
Ottoman authorities.399 Among the ’local agents’ of Kostić were many priests, who 
served as mediators between the Albanian bajraktars and the secretary. These 
clergymen even participated in the transportation of weapons (in Dibra for example), 
arriving from Serbian military depots in Vranje and Kragujevac. Weapons given to 
Albanian rebels were stored in the monasteries.400 As Kostić constantly informed the 
Serbian authorities about his activity, it was easy to trace the route of that weapons; 
this is why the repossession of these in 1912, during the Balkan Wars, was so 
successful (nonetheless, the aggressive behavior of Serbian troops participating in the 
’pacification’ of occupied areas could be also convincing).401 On the other hand, the 
joint participation of the inhabitants of Dibra in the smuggling of weapons explains 
the ameliorating relationship and the willingness to cooperate between Albanian and 
Slavic leaders (see the Albanian-Macedonian revolt in the autumn of 1913 against the 
Serbs). 402 
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Yet we can trace the origin of weapons even further back. In 1902 the Austrians 
proposed to sell 20,000 old Werndl rifles to the Serbs – asking only 6 francs for each 
(Werndl rifles were at the time in the system only in Austria, and thus the place of 
origin seems to be evident).403 Based on their price these must have been completely 
obsolete, thus unsuitable for any regular army, and so it was evident that the 
weapons would be handed over to irregular bands, like the Bulgarian band of 
Stanchev.404 Another Ottoman diplomatic report warns that smugglers with Austro-
Hungarian citizenship tried to send ammunition to IMRO through legally operating 
economic enterprises.405 Even the Albanophile diplomat Thallóczy admitted – 
through his agent, the Albanian Zurani – that weapons were smuggled into Albania 
from Austria-Hungary with the knowledge of Austrian authorities in 1912-13.406 
Thus it is not surprising that by the beginning of 1912 public security collapsed. 
The war with Italy and the internal debates within the CUP ruined the 
communication between local müdirs, beys and bajraktars on the one side (more 
embedded in the host society) and high-ranking kajmakams on the other (who were 
usually considered by local people as a ’corpus separatum’ or outsiders representing 
the government). Thanks to its numerous modern (repeater) guns, the Drenica region 
became fully autonomous: their Albanian inhabitants sacked the Priština Sanjak, 
usually targeting Orthodox (Serb) villagers, collecting the harvest, animals, and 
clothes. The complaints were either ignored or the central government lacked the 
power to intervene. Not only beys but even smaller bandits became untouchable. The 
central power retreated to the towns, but even here the population began to arm 
itself for the sake of its own safety. Roads between the towns were controlled by 
Albanian bands turning into permanently active paramilitary troops, who even 
clashed with other bands if those entered their territory. This meant that the supplies 
sent to towns began to decrease – private trade declined, and only those supplies 
managed to make it that were escorted by the army, the activity of which soon 
became limited to this task instead of the reinstatement of order – so wrote the 
Austrian ambassador, Pallavicini.407 The rural region became emptied, while 
besieged towns were not able to provide food and shelter for immigrants, who acted 
as further destabilizing factors in urban areas. Society had to find alternative ways to 
survive without the help of the state. 
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V. Local strategies of coexistence and survival, the politics of neighbouring states and 
the attempts of the Ottoman government and Great Powers to restore peace 
 
 
As the present study does not aim to analyse all the social fault lines within the 
nationalities of the Sanjak of Skopje, in the following we will discuss the behaviour of 
only four communities. The first is the activity of the Young Turks in power, the 
second is the strategy of Serb communities as minorities in the sanjak, the third is the 
support policy of Bulgaria toward Macedonia (and against Serbia) and the fourth is 
the response of local (mainly exarchist) communities to the socio-economic 
developments in Macedonia.408 In doing this we apply the technique of zooming 
gradually from the macroeconomic situation, macrosocial strategies and 
government-level responses towards microsocial strategies at a community and 
individual level. 
 
Scratching the surface: exit strategies – symptoms of economic breakdown or of 
collapsing public security? 
 
Emigration as a social strategy, as a response to the deteriorating circumstances was 
partly driven by the wave of violence and partly by the shortage of incomes. 
According to the selected sources of Austro-Hungarian archival documents, the 
political situation in Kosovo vilayet, despite the escalation of violence, was only 
secondary as a driving force: the economic situation had a greater effect on migration 
processes. The latent economic problems were also key factors in the timing of the 
Ilinden uprising earlier in 1903 (see below). Economic and political problems were 
inseparable, as we pointed out, but the Ottoman state tried to find solutions only for the 
latter, which might explain its ultimate failure. 
The USA became a target destination for inhabitants of Kosovo vilayet only after 
1906; prior to this most of the early migrants traditionally moved to other regions of 
the Ottoman Empire as seasonal workers or to neighbouring states (pečalbari), where 
they were often infected by or fell victim to nationalist agitation (see later).409 The 
                                                 
408 On Young Turk–Macedonian relations between 1908 and 1912 see Hacısalihoğlu, Mehmet. Die Jungtürken und 
die Mazedonische Frage (1890-1918). München: Oldenbourg, 2003, 184-187, 214-224, 240-245, 309-317, 366-372. 
409 On the former, see the articles of Stoytcheva, Stanislava. On the pečalbari see Calic, or the numerous 
complaints of the Bulgarian consul concerning the (often forcible) Serbianization of Macedo-Bulgarian 
employees working in Serbia. Stoytcheva Stanislava. ‘Season Work Migration as a Factor in the Development 
of the Bulgarian Population in Prespa and Bitola in the Early Twentieth Century’, Macedonian Review 30, no. 4 
(2007): 47-76. (in Bulgarian); Stoytcheva, Stanislava. ‘The Bulgarian Family in Macedonia Between Two 
Centuries: Aspects of the Crisis (1897-1902).’ In: Proceedings of the Bulgarian Historical Society. IHS-BAS, Vol. 41, 
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emergence of the USA as a new, overseas destination for the inhabitants of a landlocked 
country clearly indicates the desperate situation of inhabitants.410 Most of the 
emigrants were Catholic or Orthodox men from the uneducated lower classes. 
Hardly any of them had a qualification (e.g. as a tailor or stonemason). Most of them 
were agricultural labourers working for daily wages and in almost constant motion 
for years. As employment possibilities shrank, many decided to settle overseas to 
earn their ‘two dollars a day’,411 which was quite a lot compared to their earnings 
(around two francs a day) in the Ottoman Empire. Another tendency was that 
expatriates came mainly from administrative centres where agencies for emigration 
also operated (Skopje, Tetovo, Lipljan), or from settlements along railway lines. On 
the one hand these areas also suffered from relative overpopulation (population 
density was not the highest, but still high compared to the sustainable capacity of the 
region). On the other hand these were often contact zones of nationalities, where 
violence was more frequent. Thus the different motives for emigration are often 
inseparable: both circumstances contributed to the phenomenon. Economic decline – 
the high proportion of uncultivated land – can be interpreted either as cause, or as a 
consequence. But the tendency that it was mainly men who left their place of living 
clearly tells us their emigration should be considered temporary, not permanent, and 
was mainly inspired by employment. From Kosovo vilayet, emigrants left Europe 
from Fiume (Rijeka) and Hamburg (which is why Austrian sources provide 
information on this topic). The procedure cost around 500 francs (equal almost to the 
yearly wage of an untrained industrial worker or a day labourer in agriculture).412 
This social strategy – including forced and unforced migration – had long-term 
economic and ethnic consequences. The shortage of manpower resulted in the 
escalation of violence, as no one was able to defend the households left without adult 
men. The originally cheap Macedonian labour wages (in Bulgaria it was more than 
two francs a day in agriculture) were also increasing, which endangered the 
profitability of large, market-oriented čiftlik estates. These were partly based on the 
cheap labour force and partly on the high retail price of wheat prior to 1873/78. But 
after Argentina, Russia and the USA appeared in Western markets as wheat 
exporters, prices began to fall. The landlords tried to exert pressure on the producers 
to earn a profit, but on the one hand this generated četa activity and on the other it 
led to the mass migration described above. Finally, many landowners were forced to 
                                                                                                                                                        
in print; Calic, Marie-Janine. Sozialgeschichte Serbiens. München: Oldenbourg, 1994. 180-182; ЦДА, ф. 315k. 
oп.2. a.e.10. л. 7. 
410 For Greeks it had been an obvious destination for decades. 
411 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02. 1909., No.19/pol, 8. 
412 Ibid.  
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sell the land to the peasants, but these often lacked real purchasing power, and 
needed credit to purchase land. This amount of money could be provided by private 
persons (this often meant usury, and thus indebtedness) or could be obtained from 
the agents of small states using money as an instrument for nationalistic propaganda. 
As the case of Pusta Bresnica shows (as discussed later),413 tenants tended to buy the 
landowners’ land using foreign loans, and in turn they offered their loyalty to the 
small states allocating credit also for this purpose (beyond creating schools and 
building churches). 
In order to halt the aforementioned unfavourable phenomena, the officials and 
landlords of Kriva Palanka made several efforts to bring Muslim Albanian settlers 
from the western part of the vilayet to replace the emigrants. This also explains the 
presence of Muslim Albanians in Kočani. Unfortunately, this decision weakened 
public security even further by imposing new cultural patterns (the abundance of 
customary law with new types of conflict) on an ’accommodated’ society. The 
Bulgarian state officially objected to the settling of muhadjirs on territory inhabited by 
Slavs,414 while according to Bulgarian sources the number of those Slavs leaving 
Macedonia for Bulgaria increased to 20-30,000.415 Their property was often 
distributed among the newcomers. Emphasizing the misery of refugees was a good 
technique either to draw the attention of the Great Powers in order to enforce 
intervention or to justify Bulgarian interference in the course of events. It is not 
surprising that in 1895 the Bulgarian Nachovich claimed that there happened to be 
65,000 Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria in addition to those who had acquired 
citizenship.416  
It is also important to emphasize that in the process of discouraging peasants who 
finally decided to emigrate, not only economic processes played a decisive role, but 
also the frequent harassment of agitators and bands, who pillaged this region, and 
intimidated landlords, as well.417 Their activity was focussed on recruiting from 
among the peasants and destroying the harvest, thus weakening the economic basis 
of the Ottoman ruling class.418 Nevertheless, these raids also ruined the economic 
basis of peasantry as on čiftlik estates, because the crop was usually shared 50-50% 
between the tenant and landlord. 
 
                                                 
413 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 8-10. 
414 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II No. 1808. 23.06.1910. 
415 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II No. 1829. 04.09. 1910.  
416 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, I. No. 161. 10.07. 1895.  
417 Diplomatische Aktenstücke, 166-174. No. 160. 29. 04. 1906. 
418 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Styreca, 31.05.1905., No.55/pol, 7. and Rappaport to Calice, 27.06.1906., 
No.61/pol., 12.  
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The macroeconomic situation before 1903 and attempts at reform  
 
It became evident by the turn of the century that Macedonia was unable to supply 
more people at the given technological level without dramatic (positive) changes in 
its internal (socio-economic) structure. The obsolete economic structure of the region 
is marked by the fact that in the Kosovo vilayet 50% of the central income still came 
from the tithe, while in the more industrialized Saloniki vilayet and Monastir this 
was 25-30%.419 Similar values were typical in Bulgaria – but prior to 1878! Grain 
exports were stagnating, while crop imports grew from zero to 30 thousand tons 
yearly between 1895 and 1905.420 While in the 1850s 20-25% of the crop per household 
was exported, this figure fell back to 5% in 1900. Compared to the significance of 
land revenues, that were increasing, crop production was stagnating, and the price 
index was also decreasing (Table 21). As the number of agricultural workers was 
decreasing, too (at this time Macedonia was in a phase of reindustrialisation, and silk 
exports were increasing compared to crops), these unfavourable conditions for the 
budget could only be balanced by the increase of per capita tithe revenues. This 70% 
increase in the per capita tax burden within 10 years was the main reason for the 
increase in central revenues (and not prices or yield), but this overtaxation also 
contributed to the outbreak of the Ilinden uprising.421 The per capita tithe was similar 
to that in North Bulgaria prior to 1878 (including a tax rate of over 12%), but the 
circumstances were different: the peasants of Macedonia were living mostly in 
čiftliks and had to face other obligations toward the landlord, while North Bulgaria 
was dominated by free estates in a period of a crop boom. 
 
Table 21. Central income from tithe in Macedonia between 1890 and 1903 
Year 
Tax 
income 
in 
million 
piastres 
Rural 
population 
in million 
Tithe 
per 
capita 
in 
piastres 
Crop 
price 
index 
Tax 
burden 
index  
Crop 
production 
in million 
tons 
Crop 
production 
per rural 
person in 
tons 
Index 
of tax 
burden 
per 
capita 
1888-
1890 
41.5  2.04  20 100 100 1.1 0.5 100 
1901- 58.3  1.7  34 85 200 1 0.6 170 
                                                 
419 Diplomatische Aktenstücke, calculated based on 166-174. No. 160. 29.04.1906.  
420 Akarli, Ahmet. ‘Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880-1910.’ In: The Mediterranean Response 
to Globalisation before 1950, edited by Şevket Pamuk – Jeffrey G. Williamson. London: Routledge, 2000. 121. 
421 The Ilinden uprising was considered a ’Bulgarian’ uprising by Austrian diplomats. Austrian diplomats wrote 
about Bulgarian agitation and provocation, blaming it for the failure of the reform plans handed in prior to the 
uprising, as a response to the Ottoman initiative at the end of 1902. The 1903 plans to reform Macedonia 
(together with the unrealized Ottoman initiative) urged IMRO and the Bulgarians (as they considered the 
reform plans insufficient) to intervene prematurely. Diplomatische Aktenstücke, 14. No. 12. 01.09. 1903. 
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1903 
Akarli, A.: ‘Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880-1910.’ In: The Mediterranean 
Response to Globalisation before 1950, edited by Pamuk, Sevket - Williamson, J.G. London: Routledge, 
2000. 121.  
 
To have a better understanding of the economic conditions dominating the region 
after 1908 (and thus of their consequences for society), we have to go back in time to 
analyze the attempts at the reorganization of Macedonia after the Ilinden uprising. 
Beyond the restoration of public order (which was quite unsuccessful, as shown in 
previous sections), other efforts of the international mission in 1903-1907 are also 
worth an analysis, as it originally planned more than a simple reorganisation of the 
gendarmerie. The official stance of Austria-Hungary and Russia as supervising 
Powers was that their mission was to promote self-governance, to establish modern 
administration, and to implement a new taxation system, in order to restore the 
economic viability of the European provinces – based on the Cretan experience (1867-
1897). The introduction of a modern taxation system was openly targeted to relieve 
the population of a heavy tax burden (over 15-20% of incomes,422 while this was 
under 10% in the neighbouring Bulgaria, representing another pull factor). 
The problem with this was that, despite the higher tax rate in Macedonia, central 
incomes were not higher than in Bulgaria. Per capita taxes in Macedonia did not 
exceed the Bulgarian levels of thirty years earlier (in 1866 it was 27 piasters per 
person, and in 1867 it was 34 piastres) – not even during the era of increasing tax 
pressure (1880-1903). The basic problem was that (1) the Bulgarian figure was 
calculated during the grain prosperity characterized by high wheat prices, thus - 
supposing the same yields/ha in the two regions - the tax in Bulgaria was also 
proportionally lower relative to income (while peasant incomes were higher). (2) 
Furthermore, the Bulgarian tax rate decreased after 1878, while it increased in 
Macedonia. It is not surprising that the social structure of Bulgaria was so attractive 
to Macedonian Slavs. (3) As the population of the two regions was nearly the same (2 
million) the Ottoman central income from Macedonia in the 1900s did not even 
exceed the Bulgarian values of the 1870s! This not only suggests the lack of progress, 
but – as yields/ha were the same, while in Macedonia grain prices decreased – it 
meant that in order to produce this same amount of state revenue a higher tithe rate 
had to be adopted. And when the need for higher central income met with the goal of 
the Powers to decrease burdens and stop pauperization (and to stop increased 
migration also serving as a source of urban banditism), this generated antagonism. 
                                                 
422 Diplomatische Aktenstücke,  119-120. 27.09.1905. 
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Furthermore, the activity of the Powers also implied huge costs. According to the 
Powers the spread of violence was partly the result of the abundance of Albanian 
paramilitary troops that participated in sanctioning the Ilinden uprising.423 These 
četas persisted and later also acted as auxiliary troops for the Ottoman authorities 
when the latter were unable or unwilling to intervene in the course of events. 
Therefore the Powers insisted that the proportion of Christians in the gendarmerie 
should be set in line with their proportion of the population, instead of the general 
20% prescribed by the original Ottoman plans. Considering that in Edirne vilayet 
only 10% of the gendarmerie was Christian at the end of the 1890s, this step was to 
enhance the security of local people.424 
The involvement of local people in gardes champetres (militia) was a new and 
welcomed element, but one that failed, for several reasons. The successful application 
of ethnically mixed troops was hindered by the low number of international 
supervising officers. The increase in their numbers was challenged by the Ottoman 
authorities, claiming a lack of financial sources, which was true. The critical situation 
is best illustrated by the fact that the governor of the provinces, Huseyn Hilmi pasha, 
often asked the Allatinis, the owners of the greatest milling company in Salonica, to 
continue providing bread supplies to the army without getting paid for months 
because of the financial situation. The government even asked for new loans from the 
Allatinis to settle earlier debts.425 
After the first failures in using ethnically mixed gendarme troops, the Powers 
decided to organize ethno-religiously homogeneous troops. But it seemed to be a 
mistake to apply the principle of nationality: this generated discontent among the 
local population, who – together with the small states – expected that the next step 
would be the reorganization of reformed vilayets according to the principle of 
nationality, which implicitly meant dismemberment rather than autonomy. This 
assumption enhanced četa activity: both the Ottoman Turks (besides the existing but 
least ethnicized Albanian bands) and Greeks formed their own paramilitary troops to 
represent their interests.426 These regarded international officers and Christian 
gendarmes as foreign intruders who were working for the destabilization of the 
Empire rather than re-establishing law and order. These bands with different aims 
were successfully unified by the CUP, which learned much from the tactics of 
                                                 
423 Diplomatische Aktenstücke, 9.  No. 5. 04.02.1903. Calice to Goluchowski. 
424 История на българите в документи I/2. 35. és 38 
425 See: Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties… 
426 Autonomy was refused by both groups – the Greeks were propagating the dismemberment with a favourable 
outcome for the Hellenes, while local Muslims were sticking to the present administrative borders which were 
unfavourable to national groups. 
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IMRO.427 On the other hand, the IMRO groups’ stance was that no matter whether 
these troops were preparing for dismemberment or strengthening central power, 
both were detrimental to the interests of local people. The gendarmerie had no real 
legitimacy and social support, which is not surprising, knowing that persons like 
Adem Zaimi (who kidnapped merchants) were among their ranks as officers (he was 
appointed after committing a political murder!).  
Unfortunately, not only would the reform of the gendarmerie fail, but so too 
would the introduction of a new taxation system, for a number of reasons. The 
numbers of the gendarmerie never exceeded 80% of those proposed (Table 22), just as 
the amount of taxes collected never exceeded 75-80% of the original plans,428 and the 
number of policemen was not higher than in territories with a traditional 
gendarmerie. Even diplomats were short-sighted or ill-informed. Contrary to the 
consular statistics analyzed in Chapter III, official reports in 1905 wrote of successes. 
The then military attaché of Austria-Hungary, Giesl, reported to Calice, ambassador 
at Constantinople, that Bulgarian bands had calmed down, including IMRO and the 
Tsonchevists. Although he mentioned a clash between Serbian and Bulgarian bands 
(Petralica in Egri Palanka, 13 June, and Belan in Kumanovo, 17 June), this was put 
down by official Ottoman forces. The Bulgarian border was silent, he wrote (no 
trespassing of foreign agitators or troops was observed). Giesl had seemingly no 
knowledge either of other Austrian statistics on everyday violence or of the 
conscription of IMRO weapons from 1906. These are good examples of the limited 
interaction between the different organizations of Austria-Hungary. Since military 
attachés were subordinated to Conrad von Hötzendorf, they relied on different 
information sources and thus were not aware of all events.429 
 
Table 22. Theoretical and real numbers of the gendarmerie in reformed and intact areas 
Reformed 
gendarmerie 
Theoretical numbers Real numbers 
sanjak officer 1st class 
2nd class 
(local) 
mounted total officer 1st class 
2nd class 
(local) 
mounted total 
Saloniki 46 1121 186 195 1502 40 781 141 173 1095 
Seres 14 374 34 79 487 15 292 33 70 395 
                                                 
427 Hacisalihoğlu, Die Jungtürken 
428 Diplomatische Aktenstücke,  152-154. 28.02.1906. No. 153.  
429 It is also possible that these optimistic reports were to calm down public opinion and the diplomatic corps 
(the British wanted to intervene in Macedonia from 1906, claiming that the activity of the Powers was a 
complete failure). Both Benjámin Kállay, Joint Minister of Finances and Gustav von Kalnoky, Joint Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, mentioned previously: “… the only problem with our diplomats in the Balkans is that they always 
report what I want to hear”; “Austrian agents are not driven by ideologies or the wholehearted support of the empire; 
most of them are driven by the desire to live a safe, calm life and be promoted as soon as possible.” See Kállay, Béni. A 
szerb felkelés története, 1807-1810. Vol. 2. Edited by Thallóczy Lajos. Budapest, MTA, 1909. (Appendix: Kállay 
Béni utazásai Szerbiában és Boszniában), 258. 
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Drama 10 154 65 42 261 9 123 49 45 217 
Monastir-
Kastoria 
31 811 73 147 1031 27 612 84 138 834 
Skopje 32 800 157 87 1044 24 540 153 77 770 
Total 133 260 515 550 4235 115 2348 460 503 3311 
 
 Traditional 
gendarmerie 
 
Theoretical numbers Real numbers 
 kaza officer infantry mounted total officer infantry mounted total 
Gürid 11 242 64 306 10 230 58 288 
Elbassan 8 201 32 233 10 197 32 229 
Dibra 11 247 28 275 15 227 27 251 
Serfidje 23 475 98 573 23 441 93 534 
Pristina 23 509 73 582 23 488 73 561 
Sjenica 11 231 73 304 10 226 72 298 
Ipek 14 309 44 353 10 284 43 327 
Prizren 17 354 54 408 15 337 51 388 
Total 118 2568 466 3034 116 2427 449 2876 
 
As the part of the reforms, the new tax system was based on fixed amounts, 
replacing the iltizam system. 1 dönüm of land in Skopje sanjak (750-900m2) was 
charged 1.5-8 piastres yearly for 5 years.430 According to this newly introduced 
system, the average tithe in Monastir kaza fell from 3.4 million piastres in 1899-1904 
to 2.4 million piastres (collected with 87% effectiveness); in Skopje and Saloniki kazas 
it remained 1.3 million piastres in each, collected with 75% efficiency. Contrary to 
these efforts, in 1905-1906 more than 2500 men left Monastir kaza, while in the 
previous year only 1000 had done so: these numbers indicated persistent instability. 
One may come to the conclusion that the burdens of the peasantry were 
decreasing from 34 piastres per capita to 13-21 piastres. But the vilayet budgets made 
it clear that the situation was not becoming easier: together with the arrears collected, 
the tithe reached 20-28 piastres per capita. This means that per capita tax revenues were 
still not lower than in Bulgaria (which was overtaxed under favourable external 
circumstances with peaking grain prices, while in Macedonia 30 years later prices 
were declining). Macedonia remained overburdened (Table 23). Furthermore, while 
the yearly total income in the three vilayets of Macedonia was as high as 190 million 
piastres in 1905/1906, expenditure was even greater, rated between 253 and 267 
million, resulting in huge deificits.431 While earlier the centre was able to finance its needs 
from the incomes of the periphery (that was the main cause of protests in Bulgaria prior 
                                                 
430 Diplomatische Aktenstücke, 119-120. 27.09. 1905.  
431 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II. No. 1193. 03.03. 1905. 
150 
 
to 1878 – 60% of provincial income was not spent within the boundaries of the 
provinces),432after the turn of the century it was the periphery sucking money from the 
central government. The deficit was due to high military expenses, which constituted 
50% of the spending,433 while the share of civil expenditures reached only 31%.  
 
Table 23. Tithe and total income in millions of piastres in Macedonia 
 
Income 
from tithe 
in 1903/4  
Income 
from tithe 
in 1906 
Income from tithe 
 per person, per 
family 
Income from 
arrears 
(1903) 
Income from 
arrears 
(1905) 
Monastir 12.3 11.1 13 and 78 piastres 7 4.3 
Kosovo 23.4 22.3 
21 and 120 
piastres 
5.3 4.3 
Saloniki 21 20.3 
21 and 120 
piastres 
3 2.9 
 
Expenses, 1905/1906,  
 millions of piastres 
Civil 
expenses 
Military 
expenses 
Affectation Total 
Saloniki 33.3 50.2 26 109.5 
Kosovo 27.1 55.6 1,6 84.3 
Monastir 24 42 7.8 74 
Total 84.5 148 35.4 268 
Total for previous year 74.5 143 36 254 
     
Income, 1905/1906  
millions of piastres 
Tax 
Tax arrears 
collected 
Total 
Population and tax 
per capita and per 
family (6 persons) 
Saloniki 70 7.8 77.9 
1.1 million: 63 
piastres, 350 piastres 
Kosovo 49 7.9 56.9 
1 million: 50 
piastres, 300 piastres 
Monastir 42 8.4 50.8 
0.95 million: 44 
piastres, 250 piastres 
Total 161.4 24.2 185.6 
50 piastres, 300 
piastres 
Collected and calculated from: Diplomatische Aktenstücke, 166-174. Nr. 160. 29.04.1906. 
 
 
Prevailing agrarian (social) problems after 1903 
 
Economic conditions did not seem to improve after 1903. As the account of Boris 
Nedkov in 1904 reveals, although the tithe remained 12%, in Macedonia other 
                                                 
432 On the other hand, this meant social care and education were financed by the Church, which managed to give 
cohesion to society. 
433 In another frontier region, Deir-es-Zor, 1500 piastres per capita was calculated for a soldier and 4000 piastres 
for a gerdarme. The latter value is much higher than that measured in the consolidated Bulgaria in 1859. The 
gendarmerie incurred higher costs in frontier zones. 
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contributions had to be paid by peasants over and above those that were customary 
in Bulgaria:434 while the military exemption tax was 37 grosh (piastres) per family in 
1896, it increased to 60-110 grosh by 1910 and school tax increased from 1.5% to 6%.435 
Furthermore, most of the peasants were tenants on čiftlik, and so any crop produced 
was halved (after paying the tithe and subtracting the seeds) between producer and 
landowner. Christians remained in a minority in the local governments. The 
existence of tax farming was another shock for local tenants: in Küçük Sejmen 
(Silivri) the right of collecting the state tithe was sold for 50 thousand piastres in 1910 
(the extent of the land was 5000 kile sown crops equalling 500 hectares), but the tax 
farmer collected 70 thousand (+40%), which gives a tax rate nearing 18-20% instead 
of 12%!436 Of course this would not have been a problem at all if production had 
increased. But it did not. As Table 24 confirms, in most cases the production rate 
measured relative to seeds sown did not exceed 6:1, referring to 1.2 tons of wheat/ha, 
which was not higher than in the 1870s (Table 24). Together with the low wheat prices 
compared to other products, the output per hectare remained around 200 francs, 
which is why IMRO and thousands of peasants themselves turned to more profitable 
cultures like poppy (opium) and tobacco. The latter produced an income exceeding 
1000 francs/ha (Table 25). Even smallholders could make profit from this activity, 
though it was labour-intensive and the lack of public security had a deteriorating 
effect on yields. 
 
Table 24. Incomes, peasant productivity and tithe revenues in the village of Küçük Sejmen in Thrace 
(Silivri okolie), 1912 
Total 
land 
in 
sown 
kile* 
Fallow 
land or 
pasture 
Peasant 
 Sown 
wheat in 
kile 
Price 
of 
sown 
crop in 
grosh 
harvest 
in kile 
Production 
rate 
Value of 
crop 
harvest 
in grosh, 
output 
per ha 
(francs) 
Tithe 
in 
kile 
Tithe 
in 
grosh 
Tax as % 
of crop 
Unit 
price of 
1 kile 
(20-25 
kg)  
30 4 
Stavri Nikolov 
and 7 children 
11 330 100 1:9 
2600 
(350) 
19 488 18 26 
120 15+45 
Ivan 
Trendafilov 
28 952 150 1:5.5 
4500 
(225) 
19 562 12.5 30 
30 4 
Todor 
Dimitrov 
14 476 75 1:5 (1 t/ha) 
2325  
(230) 
10 290 12.5 31 
40 18 
Petko Tanev 
(kmet, 
18 648 120 1:7 
3120 
(250) 
15 390 12.,5 26 
                                                 
434 Like road construction tax was 16 piastres or 4 days corvéé yearly. 
435 История на българите в документи, I/2. 94. ЦДА, ф. 321, oп. 1. a.e. 1984. л. 150–168. 
436 Разбойников, А. ‘Чифтлици и чифтлигари в Тракия преди и след 1878г.’ In Известия на Института за 
История 9 (1960): 176–177.  This equals at least 500 tons of wheat, multiplied by 150 francs/ton unit price, 
equalling 75 thousand francs in total. Thus the 70 thousand piastres equalling 14 thousand francs make for a 
tax rate 20% on this as cultivated by tenants. 
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mukhtar) 
Based on Разбойников, А. ‘Чифтлици и чифтлигари в Тракия преди и след 1878г.’ In Известия на 
Института за История 9 (1960): 175-176.  
*assuming 1 kile sown crop (25 kg) for 1.5 dönüm (1400-1500 m2), a land of 30 kile sown crops equals nearly 4.5 
hectares. 
 
Table 25. Income from tobacco around 1910. 
Region Settlements 
Peasants 
(1000) 
Land in 
1000 
dönüm 
Yield in 
1000 tons 
Value in 
1000 
francs 
Land  
(dönüm) 
per 
peasant 
Yield / 
peasant  
in tons 
Income per 
peasant (franc) 
Kavala-Nevrokop 
region 
425 36.7 128.45 15 19909 3.5 0.40 542.5* 
Xanthi-Deridere 
region 
492 28.6 134.42 6,8 10350 4.7 0.23 361.9 
1 dönüm is about 0,1 ha. *Data calculated from Strauss, Großbulgarien, 64-66. 
 
The data of Bulgarian school inspector Vasil Kanchov highlights that the average 
income of a family (though using various resources, this reflected a strategy adapted 
to the local social and geographical circumstances) without animals or grapes varied 
between 1000 and 3000 grosh/family, and displayed a regional diversity (Table 26). By 
comparison, in the čiftlik of Küçük Seymen 2500–3000 piastres were calculated for 
units of 4–6 ha in 1910. 
 
Table 26. The regional distribution of the value and composition of rural incomes  
in Macedonia, 1890s 
1890 
Sown 
grains 
in 
uvrat,  
Grain 
output in 
oke 
Sown 
tobacco, 
poppy, 
cotton in 
uvrat,  
Tobacco, 
poppy, 
cotton 
output 
Population 
Grain 
output 
(oke/uvrat) 
Other 
output 
Grain  
oke / 
prs. 
Other 
product 
oke/ prs. 
Income 
/ family 
in 
piastres 
Seres kaza + 
Nigrita  
325,600 33,000,000 30,000 1,200,000 88,000 101 40 375 13.6 2796 
Zikhna kaza 55,000 7,100,000 470,000 1,650,000 32,600 129 3.5 218 50.6 2991 
Demirhisar 
kaza 
100,000 8,400,000 12,000   50,000 84   168 0 1028 
Petrich kaza 116,000 12,000,000 11,000 606,000 39,000 103 55 307 15.5 2043 
Melnik kaza 52,000 6,300,000 3000 86,000 26,000 121 28 242 3.3 1965 
G. Dzhumaja 
kaza 
80,000 8,200,000 18,000 550,000 29,000 102 30 282 19 1983 
Nevrokop 
kaza 
200,000 23,000,000 7000 550,000 76,300 115 78 301 7.2 1723 
Based on Kanchov, Vasil. Makedonija. Patopisi. Sofia, 2000. 
1890 
Horse, 
oxen 
Sheep, 
goat, pig 
Animal 
/ capita 
Animal 
/ capita 
Wool 
in oke 
Vineyards 
in uvrat 
Grape in 
oke 
Grape 
(oke/dönüm) 
Grape / 
capita 
(oke) 
Seres kaza + 
Nigrita  
180,000 380,000 2.05 4.32 180,000 25,000 12,500, 000 500 142 
Zikhna kaza 12,000 153,000 0.37 4.69   6880 4,000,000 581 123 
Demirhisar 
kaza 
14,000 194,000 0.28 3.88   6500 3,000, 000 462 60 
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Petrich kaza 25,000 116,800 0.64 3.00   1200 480,000 400 12 
Melnik kaza 8700 81,000 0.33 3.12 30,000 13,600 5,440,000 400 209 
G. Dzhumaja 
kaza 
30,000 123,000 1.03 4.24         0 
Nevrokop 
kaza 
3800 186,000 0.05 2.44         0 
1 kg grape is 0.1 franc or 0.5 grosh.1 oke of tobacco  = 6–10 grosh.  1 uvrat here =1000 m2= 1 dönüm. 
 
Beyond these legal practices, illegal burdens also overloaded the peasantry in 
Macedonia. In Mavrovo (Tetovo kaza), when landlords collected the 12% tithe on hay 
in cash, they calculated using a price of 20 paras/oke instead of the real market price 
(6-7 paras).437 This way the 12% tithe was in fact 30%. In Novo Selo (Štip), the 10 
households had only 30 hectares of cultivated land, while the landlord had 40 
hectares. Both the state and the landlord taxed the population (the so-called 
gospodarlik), and the tax per household was 700 piastres. Assuming three hectares of 
sown land per household (supposing no fallow land), this gives three tons of wheat 
yearly with a total of 450 francs of income (2250 piastres). This means that the tax rate 
was over 25% here as well.438 
Another abuse was the use of coercion against the smallholders to sell their land 
if they were unable to pay interest on loans (usually usury). Though the market price 
of one hectare was 10 Liras, Spas Iliev was forced to sell his four hectares in Mlado 
Nagoričano (Kumanovo) because of his debt of 6 Liras; Trayko Stoyanov also had to 
sell his land of 5 hectares because of a 12-Lira debit. The land was bought by 
Muslims, but the difference between the debt and the income from selling the land 
was not paid. With the exception of 1878, land was never sold so cheaply! Since the 
peasants did not want to pay the illegally increased beglik tax (animal tithe), a 
landlord, Jusuf bey, hired out the whole pasture used by the Christian community 
for muhadjir refugees. In the village of Kumaničevo, according to official Muslim 
records, not a single čiftlik had existed, but a bey from Nevrokop played the role of 
the local landlord, collecting 25% of the harvest, and the local peasantry had no idea 
that this duty on them was charged illegally.439 
These economic problems remained unsolved during this period, and contributed 
to the decline of general trust. This misery encouraged migration for work, known as 
gurbetčijstvo, pečalbarstvo. With his family of 10, Apostol Georgiev paid 300 grosh of 
tithe on his 1.5 hectares of land (a tax equal to 20-25% of the land revenue),440 plus 60 
grosh harač (military poll tax); his brother paid the same amount, plus 60 grosh vergi 
                                                 
437 История на българите в документи, I/2. 80–81. and ЦДА, ф. 321, oп. 1. a.e. 1616. л. 2–13. 
438 Ibid. 
439 История на българите в документи, I/2.  I/2. 88. 
440 1.5 ha = 1500-2000 kg wheat = 1350 piastres (300 francs). 
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(income or property tax) and 65 grosh beglik on the 10 goats, which brings the tax rate 
to 35%. Certainly the remainder of the crop was not enough to feed ten persons. The 
yearly wheat consumption of a person ranged between 200 and 250kg, and so for 10 
persons at least 2.5 tons of crop was needed, while a maximum of two tons were 
produced on such a small parcel, worth 300-400 francs. This wheat income equalled 
the yearly 70-100 silver Lira surplus that Macedonian emigrants sent home from 
America. 
So, beyond the religious and ethnic diversity of the area, the economic situation 
was another reason why the Macedonian question could not be solved by peaceful 
propaganda transmitted by religion or education: the population was looking for 
alternatives which would solve their everyday social and economic problems, and 
was ready to exploit its fluid and amorphous national consciousness in order to 
secure its material interests. On the other hand, the illiterate rural population did not 
have time to contemplate nationhood; only coercion or pragmatic interests yielded 
results from them. 
 
The response to the challenge I: The central government and local society 
 
 
Tactical elements of četa origin in the activity of the CUP 
 
After the failure of the Powers (1903-1908), the Young Turk (CUP, Committee of 
Union and Progress) revolution tried to resolve the problems. The Ottomans also 
adopted the methods of revolutionary organizations: in 1908 military officers 
committed to the CUP decided to organize ‘Ottoman national bands’ on the model of 
the Greek, Bulgarian and Serb bands, with similar rhetoric and agenda, partly to gain 
popularity among the villagers and partly to cope with the problem that most of the 
levied soldiers would not agree to their ultimate goal (constitutionalism).441 When the 
revolution began, adjutant-Major Niyazi Bey, who commanded a battalion in his 
native town, Resen, could only count on nine of his soldiers: it is not surprising, then, 
that he started preparations to form a guerrilla band. When the rebel group began its 
march to the hills, it was composed mainly of civilians or agents of the CUP: many of 
the 160 volunteers thought that they were chasing a Bulgarian band (deception and 
bluff was also one of their favourite tactics) and did not know anything about the 
                                                 
441 Young Turk officers did not trust their own troops enough to involve them in the insurrection. The average 
soldier was loyal to the Sultan. Enver Bey, for example, travelled in disguise and tried to avoid contact with 
troops or gendarmes. He did not take any troops with him and raised a volunteer force in the Turkish-
speaking villages of the Tikvesh region.  
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real goals. At first sight these events refer to a spontaneous act as Ramsaur believed, 
but other circumstances confirmed that the CUP in fact implemented the 
conspiratorial experience of IMRO.442 Niyazi’s decision to move to the mountains 
instead of engaging in urban guerrilla warfare was encouraged by the fact that he 
was an Albanian of origin and a member of a landowner family, and so had good 
connections with the neighbouring Albanian villages. The rural support might be 
surprising, because the CUP comprised about 2,000 members in all of Rumelia at the 
time, nearly all of them urban, and, according to Enver (the other leader of the 
insurrection), the CUP had no foothold in the villages. On the other hand, few of the 
large landowners who lived in the town and were CUP members, remained very 
influential in ‘their’ villages, and their traditional influence mobilized the villagers. 
So, the revolution seems to be a movement organized from above, relying on 
classes that only partly shared the leaders’ aims. The CUP leaders were modernists 
and constitutionalists, while their supporters were traditionalists. How could these 
officers mobilize the support of the villagers? Abstract rhetoric on constitutionalism 
would not have worked. Instead they appealed to villagers’ discontent at a 
government that imposed heavy tax rates, but did not deliver either services (i.e. 
roads, schools; they were using IMRO’s rhetoric)443 or protection from the armed 
bands. Niyazi managed to get the approval of the head of the Topulli clan, claiming 
that his revolutionary troops were ’patriotic Ottoman groups’. The rebels constantly 
emphasized that the country was in danger and that foreign (Christian) control 
would mean the end for the Muslim ‘majority’ in Macedonia and that the 
government would do nothing to hinder this. 
The religious aspect was as important as the ethnic one: when Niyazi sent his first 
soldiers into the villages, he ordered them to recite prayers. Later the rebel officers 
tried to reassure the Macedo-Bulgarian population that the movement was not aimed 
against them, and called upon Bulgarian bands to join them, but his initial success 
was partly due to the supposed action against the ’infidel’ bands.  
So, the tactics and behavior of the CUP really resembles IMRO, with some 
exceptions (like the composition of the leadership, dominated by the urban elite and 
its success). The interlocking of imperial and illegal networks (or, from other aspect, 
the different survival strategies of members of the same family) was also observable: 
                                                 
442 Ramsaur stated that the Young Turk uprising developed spontaneously in several places at the same time 
and that the central committee of the CUP in Salonica had not masterminded it. But Hanioğlu pointed out that 
as early as mid-June instructions had been sent to CUP branches to prepare for insurrection and that officers 
were given permission to form bands (çete). Enver Bey in his memoirs wrote that he was provided with 
instructions, money, and texts for proclamations. See: Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy. 
443 As this appeared in the rhetoric of both parties, this confirms that this was a real problem for all inhabitants of 
the region. 
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the CUP leader Enver pasha’s brother-in-law, Nazim bey, was the leader of the 
authorities investigating into the CUP (he was even wounded in 1908, prior to the 
revolution).444 The CUP also had its own executioners and was able to react quickly 
to avoid the emergence of other movements with different aims that could threaten 
its success: Atıf [Kamçıl] eliminated a very dangerous opponent of the Young Turks, 
Şemsi Pasha, who could have mobilized Albanians against them.445 His successor 
(Tatar Osman Pasha) was kidnapped by another troop led by Adjutant-Major Eyüp 
Sabri, supported by Albanians. The CUP had a broad and well-organized network by 
that time: agents even worked successfully among the ranks of the reservists sent 
from Aydin to Macedonia as reinforcement to put down the revolt.  
It is also interesting how the independent movement of the Albanians, beginning 
on 5 July (two days after Niyazi had escaped to the hills) and working for completely 
different aims, was treated and misled. The gathering at Firzovik, as Zürcher writes, 
was a spontaneous affair, triggered by rumours that the Austrian army was coming 
to the South. As some railway engineers did appear in the settlement to mark a 
proposed Austrian railway line, their presence gave credence to the rumours.Soon 
the number of those gathered increased from 3000 to 20,000, led by Nexip Draga and 
Bajram Curri. Ottoman officers led by Galip Bey were sent by the government to 
persuade the demonstrators to disband and return home, but as Galip Bey was an 
active member of the CUP, he managed to convince the gathering to take an oath 
(besa) to the constitution, arguing that only a constitutional regime could avert the 
danger of foreign intervention. In his rhetoric he promised the implementation of 
sharia, the abolition of compulsory recruitment, the reinstallation of the right to bear 
arms, in short, a return to the era before Hamidian centralization.446 Niyazi also 
managed to force local clans to declare a truce in their blood feuds in order to unite 
their forces – so they usually relied on old traditions while promoting the 
establishment of a new system. 
                                                 
444 Ramsaur, Aksin or Feroz Ahmad attribute the revolutionaries’ decision to start an open rebellion in June 1908 
primarily to the fact that the Porte was getting very close to discovering the CUP underground network 
(similar to the reasons for the Ilinden uprising in 1903!). The news from the Reval meeting was of secondary 
importance. The activity of the imperial spy network was increasing and they managed to infiltrate the 
Macedonian army through the system of regimental chaplains (alay müftüsü). Ahmed Bedevi Kuran sees the 
increased activities of the Bulgarian, Serb and Greek bands as the main factor that made the CUP (and illegal 
activity) attractive to officers of the Third Army. He says that it was the Reval meeting that forced them to 
increase their activities. More recent authors, Aykut Kansu, Şükrü Haniog ̆lu and Gawrych, all seem to agree 
that the rebellion was originally scheduled for a later date. Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy. 
445 The volunteer officers (executioners) were organized as a separate unit and continued to do dirty work after 
the revolution. During the Balkan War, they were charged with setting up an independent Muslim republic in 
Western Thrace.  
446 Malcolm, Kosovo, 238. 
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One of the remarkable changes of these times was that the pre-existing national 
character of the movements had after 1908 become by far the most dominant source of 
conflict (alongside economic and social problems). Though the denominational identity 
in some cases still manifested itself in both the Christian and the Muslim 
communities (e.g. after an attack on a shrine, or following the funeral of a prominent 
leader of the irregular troops),447 it was more common that the consular reports 
discussed the received information from an ethnic approach (Bulgarian, Serbian, 
Albanian).448 The national character of movements increased in the Kosovo vilayet, 
too, where previously traditional forms of ethno-religious conflicts had dominated. 
The CUP functioned as a Trojan horse for traditionalist communities, transforming 
them while promising a return to old times. As the bulk of Albanians were still 
conservative in their views (regardless of the growing ethnicization among their 
ranks), they could be mobilized only for goals, that were carefully designated and 
planned by the Young Turks. Such were the obscure demands of the constitution 
(under which most Albanians still understood merely the assurance of their 
privileges, rather than legal equality or civil rights) or the protest against the 
penetration of the Powers – as these were recognized by the representatives of 
Austria-Hungary. The by-product of the instrumentalization of these Albanian mass 
gatherings was usually violence, where the gathered groups of different origins tried 
to settle old scores as well.449 
 
CUP policy towards national minorities 
 
In the light of the above, is not surprising that Albanians were overrepresented in the 
new Parliament (almost half of the deputies from the Balkans were Albanians), but it 
is also worth mentioning that parliamentary deputies after the elections of 1908 were 
predominantly independent and liberals, and not CUP members. (Hamidian 
conservatives had only one mandate – as most of the Albanians refused the 
centralization efforts of Abdülhamid, this is not surprising). If we accept that 
parliamentary elections more or less reflected the real political balance of power 
(which often had nothing to do with real ethnic proportions) then we have to point 
out that the Young Turks’ power in the Balkans remained fragile and 
unconsolidated: only 22% of the deputies were members of the CUP and they could 
                                                 
447 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 27.11.1909, No.83/pol, 6 and Heimroth to Eduard 
Otto, 14.10.1910, No.73/pol, 8. 
448 On Ottoman reform movements and violent responses see: Frantz, ‘Zwischen Gewalt,’ 350-369. 
449 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Pallavicini, Mitrovica, 20. Juli, 1908, No. 45.  
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achieve a majority only together with the Liberals (33%).450 Any split between these 
factions could result in the collapse of this unstable situation. On the other hand, 16-
16% of deputies were Greeks and Turks, revealing the ethnic preferences of the CUP 
leadership, while Bulgarians had only 10%, clearly indicating both the low rate of 
acceptance of the CUP among Exarchists and the distrust of the CUP towards 
Macedo-Bulgarians. This warns that the ceasefire concluded between IMRO and 
other groups in 1908 was more a freezing of the conflict rather than a final settlement 
of disputes (Table 25). 60% of Young Turk deputies were ethnic Turks, while liberals 
and independents were dominated by ethnic Albanians (56-56% respectively). 
Albanians and Greeks were equally divided between liberals and independents, 
while Turkish deputies were CUP members (75%) or liberals (25%) (Table 27). 
Beyond the evident ethnic pattern the support of CUP showed regional 
characteristics as well. The CUP had strong positions only in the Saloniki Vilayet, 
where six of the 13 deputies were CUP members, i.e. six of the ten Macedonian CUP 
deputies was elected in the southern (most developed) region. Among the 15 
deputies of Monastir Vilayet, only two were CUP members, compared to the five 
liberals and seven independents, while in Kosovo Vilayet the CUP won only one 
mandate out of 17. The regional distribution of the liberals was more balanced: four 
mandates from Saloniki, five from Bitola, and seven from Kosovo. 
 
Table 27. The ethnic background of the political palette in Macedonia after the elections of 1908 – the 
capacity of the national groups to assert their individual political interests  
MP* Turk Greek Bulgarian Jew Vlach Albanian Serbian Total % 
Young Turk 6   1 1   2   10 22 
Liberal 2 4       9 1 16 33 
Socialist     2         2 5 
Independent   3 1   1 9 2 16 33 
Total 8 7 4 1 1 21 3 45 100 
% 16 16 10 2 2 48 7 100  
+1 conservative Albanian.  
 
MP* Turk Greek Bulgarian Jew Vlach Albanian Serbian Total 
Young Turk xxxxxb   a x   ab   10 
Liberal xx  xxaa       aaabbbbbb b 16 
Socialist     xx         2 
Conservative           a   1 
Independent   xaa b   a aaabbbbbb ab 16 
Total 8 7 4 1 1 21 3 45 
a: Monastir vilayet; b: Kosovo vilayet; x: Saloniki vilayet 
Based on: Hacısalioğlu, Die Jungtürken, 253–56. 
                                                 
450 Data from: Hacısalioğlu, Die Jungtürken, 253–56. 
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As a consequence of the revolution, the leadership in charge of the vilayets was 
transformed. While old and experienced bureaucrats were (re)placed in distant parts 
of the Empire, in the first few months following the 1908 Young Turk revolution this 
south-eastern part of Kosovo vilayet remained relatively calm. What made this 
possible was not so much the talent and aptitude of the new Young Turk officials as 
the merits of Pasha Hadi, the energetic new governor.451 In the Skopje sanjak he 
maintained peace by creating his own local intelligence network. He aimed to collect 
compromising information on all potential members of the opposition (clerics, clerks, 
teachers, journalists, četa leaders, national clubs, etc.). When minor incidents 
occurred, he used this information to arrest those people and thus to prevent major 
demonstrations (either against the state or against another community).452 However, 
as he made no attempt to solve real problems, like reducing social tensions and 
discussing neglected but relevant political and economic issues, he had no chance of 
preventing the eventual collapse of state power in the region.  
This policy was not very constructive. The CUP also tried to create a 
supranational organization of its supporters, and, when this failed, it was keen to 
reach an alliance with some of the nationalist groups. As this also proved futile in the 
long run, the CUP returned to the old practice of ’divide and rule’. 
After the victory of the CUP, in 1909 four national clubs were allowed to operate 
in Skopje: the Serb, the Bulgarian, the Young Turk and the Albanian.453 The first two 
represented the radical nationalism of the neighbouring states; the latter two were 
closely related, due to personal connections and overlaps. During the autumn of 
1909, the leadership of the vilayet attempted to create a civil supranational ’Ottoman 
Club’ that would incorporate anybody willing to cooperate with the CUP regardless 
of their ethno-religious ties, and thus the club could serve as a means of 
communication between the CUP and radical national associations. The goal was to 
demonstrate and promote the possibilities of rapprochement between the 
nationalities and central authorities; furthermore, it could serve as a means of 
hindering propaganda against the government.454 Although among Macedo-
Bulgarians IMRO and the Verhovists had an overwhelming majority in the 
countryside,455 many of the urbanised Bulgarians in Skopje tended to cooperate with 
                                                 
451 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 05.10.1908, No.69/pol, 24. 
452 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.5.1909, No.44/pol, 8 and Adamkiewicz to 
Pallavicini, 14.01.1910, No.3/pol, 6. 
453 For the history of clubs and their relations with one another, see Hacısalihoğlu, Die Jungtürken, 213-47. 
454 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz. 434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 09.07.1909., No.49/pol., 8 (Beilag, 5). 
455 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol., 12. 
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the central power.456 Beyond this plan was the idea that the key element to restoring 
security and tolerance in the region was an appeasement with the most radical 
organisations (Serbs, Bulgarians), while the aspirations of peaceful minorities could 
be neglected,457 since only the organisations of these two radical nationalities were 
able to exert pressure both on irregular troops and on peaceful organisations.458 The 
legal framework for creating an Ottoman Club was the so-called ’Ottoman Law’ that 
pointed out that the empire was constituted only of the Ottoman nation (in which 
every subject or citizen of the state was incorporated), and therefore only Ottoman 
associations and clubs could be regarded as legal. Clubs organised on a national 
basis were soon considered illegal and prohibited.459 
But the efforts to organise a supranational Ottoman club remained futile. 
Christian national clubs neither wanted to appease with each other, nor agreed to be 
organised in a supranational organisation. Negotiations were delayed by the lack of 
real local respect for the CUP. The lack of trust increased further from 1909, when the 
central government was – unlike during the period of supervision by the Powers – 
unable to pay its officials and the gendarmerie in the countryside in time. This 
resulted in the loss not only of efficiency, but also of influence. Central power nearly 
drifted on the brink of collapse in local centres.460 The CUP had to change its tactics to 
gain success in stabilizing public order. 
In order to keep conflicts within certain boundaries, the CUP tried to persuade 
local Serbs and tolerant urban Bulgarian associations to cooperate with each other 
against IMRO and the Verhovists.461 But this also failed. Then it tried to focus only on 
Serbs, to sharpen antagonism between Serbs and Bulgarians (detailed in another 
chapter, told from the Serbian point of view). This was successful, but not enough.  
Then, in the late spring of 1909, the radicals of the Young Turk leadership shifted 
their focus of interest to Muslim policy, inasmuch as they became more open 
towards fanatical religious urban groups. They initiated secret negotiations with the 
local denominational leaders in secluded mosques. The Young Turks’ idea was to 
create a secret Muslim organization modelled on IMRO, with its own regulations, 
which could organize trustworthy and able Muslim men into combat teams after the 
Christian fashion. They planned to store the necessary weapons in the mosques. With 
                                                 
456 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Calice (from Üsküb), 04.28.1906., No.36/pol., 10. és 1906.6.27., 
No.61/pol., 12; Ibid. Ranzi to Calice (from Monastir), 28.06. 1906., No.28., 5. 
457 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909., No.33. pol.,  8.  
458 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol., 12. 
459 Krause, Albert Gottfried: Das Problem der albanischen Unabhängigkeit in den Jahren 1908–14. Wien, 1970, 60–61. 
460 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909, No.19/pol, 8. 
461 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909, No.40/pol, 12. and ibid. Adamkiewicz 
to Eduard Otto, 05.30.1909, No. 44/pol, 8. 
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this step the Young Turks wished to win the allegiance of the fanatical Muslim 
communities, to suppress the moderates within the party, and to prepare for an open 
armed conflict in the vilayet, which, for many members, now seemed unavoidable.462 
The demands of rural Muslim landowners also needed to be tackled, however. 
Restlessness was primarily on the increase in the Serbian and Bulgarian border kazas, 
as these areas were virtually ruled by irregular Verhovist troops or by IMRO, where 
the tension between Muslims and Christians escalated the most.463 The leaders of 
Skopje sanjak understood that the peripheral kazas had slipped out of their control, 
and from the spring of 1909 they started to distribute weapons to the Muslims from 
army warehouses. This happened after the Ottoman beys of the countryside had 
threatened the military leaders that unless they armed the Muslims, the beys would 
call up the Albanians and hire them to break into and rob the warehouses.464 The 
distribution of weapons from military storage did not remain a secret – the Bulgarian 
government officially repeatedly objected to these attempts, which the Turks refused 
to admit.465 
The opening towards fanatical Muslims and the arming of Muslims along the 
border is interesting, since, in 1908, thanks to the provisory armistice between the 
CUP government and IMRO, the safety of Muslims seemed to be less under threat 
than in earlier periods. Even the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have a 
decisive impact on the security of Macedonian Muslims. Muslims were convinced 
(such as some autonomist Macedo-Slavs were) that an Austrian annexation was still 
a better solution than a Serbian one. Muslims in Skopje even hoped that the 
annexation would create a wave of emigration among Bosnian Muslims, and new 
settlers in the Sanjak of Skopje could change the religious proportions in favour of 
the Muslims.466 Beyond their lack of training, these hopes can also explain the 
hesitation and passivity of regular soldiers to hinder the outrages and pogroms in 
Štip in 1911. 
The CUP did not elaborate a new policy towards the Albanians in the Sanjak of 
Skopje: Albanian national clubs were considered merely as attachments or branches 
of the Young Turkish clubs. The CUP continued its policy of assimilation based on 
common religion by refusing Albanian cultural demands like the Latinized alphabet 
in 1908.467 But, unlike in Prizren Sanjak, serious conflicts between Albanians and 
                                                 
462 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909, No. 44/pol, 8. 
463 Ibid. and Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910, No.15/pol, 5. 
464 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909, No.33. pol, 8; Heimroth to Pallavicini, 
04.11.1910, No. 80/pol, 3. 
465 ЦДА, ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 351. л. 2-3. 
466 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8. and 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 8. 
467 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12. 
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Young Turks did not emerge in Skopje Sanjak.468 And, unlike in Tetovo, Gostivar, 
Prizren and other regions where a violent religious (Catholic/Orthodox vs. Muslim) 
conflict evolved even among Albanians (alongside conflicts with nationalities) that 
had to be tackled, in the Skopje Sanjak no major fault lines emerged within Albanian 
society.469 
 
CUP policy towards the Orthodox Church 
 
The CUP administration of the sanjak was totally powerless470 in the debate over the 
school question. Between 1903 and 1908 many settlements decided to join the 
Exarchate in Southern Macedonia. How did this shift from the jurisdiction of the 
Patriarchate to that of the Exarchate take place? Very often local teachers decided to 
teach Slavic without the knowledge of the metropolites of the Patriarchate – simply 
because Greek grammar based on katharevusa was unfamiliar for them (many Greeks 
spoke dimotiki dialect), not to mention the illiterate masses. Patriarchist communities 
sometimes demanded Slavic-speaking teachers – they did not consider this as 
separatism (they were still thinking in ethnoreligious categories), but the Greek 
extremists did think it so. Local Slavs often refused the inauguration of teachers 
appointed by the Patriarchate because of threats from ’Bulgarian’ bands. In this case 
the metropolite’s threat of involving the local Ottoman authorities only escalated the 
conflict: local people immediately turned to the authorities too, which were unable to 
decide. The whole process resulted in a mutual decline of trust, respect and 
authority, while villagers would ultimately turn to the Bulgarian bands because of 
the impotence of the state and ecclesiastical authorities, who were unable to defend 
them from the outrages of the četas. The Exarchy also changed its policy, and from 
1901 on it promised native speaker language teachers for settlements seceding from 
the Patriarchate. 
As the owner of the buildings (new schools and churches were not allowed to be 
opened, owing to a former agreement on the status quo), the Patriarchate responded 
by closing down schools and churches and inviting Greek bands to the contested 
zones. In addition to these conversions, which violated the status quo, abuses were 
also numerous. Exarchist priests around Prizren reported that, on 31 October 1909 in 
Kraklinno (Bitolska), the Greek vladika Vasilios closed down the Bulgarian church, 
even though it had been consecrated by the exarchist Gennadiy in 1878, and the 
                                                 
468 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910., No.15/pol, 5. and 05.05. 1909., 
No.40/pol, 12. 
469 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 09.07.1909., No.49/pol, 8.  
470 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8. 
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founding firman had given the church to the local exarchist community (in 1910 the 
village had 53-57 exarchist households and 7 Greek households, see Table 28). The 
village seceded from the Patriarchate in 1904, but the church was used by 
patriarchists until the intervention of Havzi pasha. Although the church was given to 
exarchists in 1908, one year later villagers complained once more of patriarchists 
using the church and expelling exarchists.  
 
Table 28. The religious (ethnic) composition of some villages where atrocities (mentioned in the text) 
took place 
Bitola kaza 
Exarchist 
households 
Patriarchist 
households 
Exarchist 
nufuz 
Patriarchist 
nufuz 
Kraklinno 53 7 354 61 
Dihovo 54 15 394 111 
Kopadurishta 44 20 336 235 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 29. 
 
In Dihovo four exarchists were killed by an andartis četa in 1909 because the six 
Greek households demanded the right to use the local church. Despite considerable 
Hellenic pressure, the number of Grecophile households rose only to 15 by 1910 
(when conscription took place), while there were still over 50 exarchist households.471 
Dihovo was not just a simple village, but a significant rural industrial centre and an 
excellent example of ethnic conflicts induced by economic activity.472 Deconcentration of 
the textile industry was very characteristic of Macedonia at the time, and the village 
of Dihovo sold 340 000 metres of aba cloth to the Ottoman army as early as in 1883. 
120-250 local and commuting women and children worked for the factory of Bogo 
Anesti, resident in Monastir, who wanted to penetrate the Bulgarian and Serbian 
markets. The engines came from Samokov, while the capital was from Saloniki and 
Skopje merchants, which meant the involvement of circles with different political 
backgrounds. By 1910 four factories operated in the village, each with 250 workers473 
(most of them not local residents). Both the method of capital concentration, the form 
of ownership and the ethno-religious composition of the workers would foreshadow 
future conflicts. 
 
                                                 
471 Ibid.  
472 Compare this to the situation in Kosovo in the first half of the 19th century, which was more of a land use and 
social conflict that was later ethnicized. Even extreme nationalists accepted that the conflict in Kosovo was not 
merely ethnic. Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 49-50. Economic interests were also capable of diminishing 
ethnic differences, as the cooperation in the smuggling of firearms proved. 
473 See: Gounaris, Basil K. Steam over Macedonia 1870-1912: Socio-economic Change and the Railway Factor. New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993. 
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Table 29. The situation of exarchist households in Southern Macedonia before the reforms (1909) 
 
Jenidje-Vardar 
kaza 
(households) Exarchists Patriarchists 
Patriarchist 
Slav Turk Gypsy Vlach   
čiftlik Apostol 50 30         
church and school 
in Greek hands, 
Exarchists study at 
home 
čiftlik Alariya 12 4         
twice burnt by 
Greeks, church 
closed 
  Karich-Kariotina 14   12 12 9   
Greek church and 
school 
  Kadiyno-Suyutil 55             
čiftlik Sveti Georgi 20           
Exarchist from 1903 
on 
partly čiftlik  Sarbegovo 32     27     church closed 
čiftlik Mandalevo 15         17 church closed 
  Babyan 26         20 
church closed, 
school just opened 
čiftlik Sarikad-Vadrishta 90     10     
2 churches closed, 1 
school open one 
closed 
čiftlik 
Vehtipazar-
Eskidje 30           
church closed, 
school just opened 
čiftlik 
Krushare-
Armutich 55           
seceded in 1903-
ban, church closed, 
school opens now 
  Kornishor 90           
seceded in 1903-
ban, church closed, 
school opens now 
  Radomir 48           first school opens 
mainly čiftlik Pilurik 31           church closed 
  Damjan 16           
school opened 2 
years ago 
čiftlik Litovoja 30           school closed 
čiftlik 
Livadishta-
Suyabakadji 26           joint use of church 
čiftlik Konikovo 13           
seceded 20 years 
ago 
  Grubevci 40 1         
seceded 20 years 
ago 
čiftlik Girakarci             
seceded 14 years 
ago 
čiftlik Livanovon 20         6 church open 
partly čiftlik Toshilovo 40           
exarchist teacher is 
the same as earlier 
during Patriarchist 
rule 
partly čiftlik Tumba 85           
seceded 18 years 
ago, school 
established then 
Bulgarians in 
čiftliks 
Babakovo-
Babaköy 50     20     
seceded 15 years 
ago 
  Orizari 50 10 12         
čiftlik Valgat 24           
seceded 10 years 
ago school, church 
Извори за българската етнография, 77-87. 
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Despite the numerous conversions and reversions between the Patriarchate and 
the Exarchate, official Ottoman policy after 1903 was to refuse to acknowledge any 
change474 – in order to mitigate the pressure of guerrilla groups on church officials. 
But this did not work, as the above examples prove – sometimes bands were hired 
even by the Church to carry out their decisions, as state authorities were reluctant to 
accept the changes. In numerous cases, secessions from the Patriarchate were 
punished by closing down the church (new churches were not allowed to be built 
without state consent), and this gave space for the spread of exarchist schools. In 
many villages in South Macedonia with no active church, these new schools became 
the only flag-bearers of national ideology in the first decade of the century (Table 29). 
Though closing down churches made funerals and baptisms difficult, it was not able 
to discourage people in all cases. 
Since the religious issues were intertwined with conflicts between nationalities, 
the Ottoman administration gave up its former stance, and tried to regulate disputes 
over schools and churches through the law on religion, as issued on 15 June 1910.475 
The law regulated the redistribution of patriarchist and exarchist ecclesiastic 
property and schools based on the number of local supporters and proselytes. With 
this step, the government hoped to increase public security and trust in the 
government and also to diminish the rivalry and atrocities caused by the fact that 
since the beginning of the 20th century many villages had converted to the Exarchate 
but ecclesiastic property remained in the hands of the patriarchist clergy.476 
According to the 3rd article of the new law, the local church belonged to the 
community that built it, provided its proportion of the population did not fall below 
33%. If the proportion decreased below 33% the church and the school had to be 
handed over the community in the majority, the other community had the right to 
erect a new sanctuary. According to the 4th article, in settlements with more than one 
church, churches had to be divided between communities, unless the proportion of 
the smaller one decreased below 33%. If any community converted to a new religion 
after the enforcement of this law, they had the right to erect a new building for 
religious worship, but at their own cost.477 
                                                 
474 Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties,  
475 Similar problems occurred in royal Yugoslavia. See: Bíró László. A jugoszláv állam 1918-1939. Budapest: MTA 
TTI, 2010. 71-84. 
476 ЦДА, ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 22-26. л. 76. 
477 See the intentions of the Bulgarian population of Čair mahala in Skopje and their problem below. ЦДА, ф. 
335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 16., 10.06.1911., and also a.e. 354. on the establishment of the church under the 
patronage of tv. Constantine and St. Helen in 1907. 
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The content of this law draws our attention on two points. First of all, with the 
ratios mentioned in the text, it is possible to describe ethnic/denominational 
proportions in the Macedonian countryside within villages and thus to compare 
these with the settlement-level ethnic map of the Bitola vilayet from 1899/1901 – 
before enforcing the law, a committee visited the settlements and registered the 
households based on religion (Table 30).478 
Secondly, thanks to this new consciption, investigations could be carried out 
regarding former (and forthcoming) abuses, which had usually been ignored by the 
central government of the sanjak. Religious communities in a minority often 
complained about reprisals coming from the majority. In a Macedo-Bulgarian letter 
written to Ali Riza, President of the Parliament, it turns out that, prior to these 
reforms, in the last six-seven years priests assigned to other religious communities 
had refused to baptize the children of ’infidels’ or ’secessionists’ or to bury their 
dead. The behavior of these priests challenged “the most sacred right of human beings – 
pleading for and praising God according to our own customs”.479 
Unfortunately, scrupulous situations also recurred after the initiation of reforms, 
especially in territories where Exarchists remained in the minority. Very often, 
Exarchist communities were unable to get rid of Grecophile priests (in Southern 
Macedonia),480 or the majority did not acquire the right to operate the school, despite 
the law (Armenohori). In some cases Greeks would rather close these institutions 
than hand them over to Exarchist communities (Gorničevo, Krushare-Armutich, 
Kornishor, Pilurik, Sarbegovo and Mandalevo) (see Tables 30-33).481 In Southern 
Macedonia some čiftliks were burnt twice by Greeks (Alariya). Now the law made it 
possible to open an Exarchist school based on the ethno-religious proportions. This 
sometimes resulted in strange outcomes: in the Exarchist Toshilovo the same teacher 
was appointed as under the Patriarchists (this could be explained either by the 
scarcity of teachers who undertook to teach in conflict zones, or more likely he was a 
widely-accepted teacher who had previously taught in a Slavic language). 
As positive measures were unable to resolve the school problem, the government 
finally applied strict regulations and forbade foreigners from being schoolteachers in 
order to decrease foreign propaganda. This was primarily unfavourable for Serbs, 
because of their smaller proportions in Macedonia,482 while 90% of the teachers 
teaching in Exarchist schools were of local origin. 
                                                 
478 Conscriptions for contested southern Macedonian areas: ЦДА, ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 23. 28-31. 
479 ЦДА, ф. 312k. oп. 2. a.e. 10. л. 31. 07.11.1909.  
480 ЦДА, ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 30. 
481 Ibid. л. 31.  
482 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II. No. 1840. 21.10.1910.  
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Table 30. Religious (ethnic) distribution of population in the villages of Kostursko that seceded from 
the Patriarchate after 1903, prior to the redistribution of ecclesiastic property in 1910.  
Situation in 
15.05.1910 
Exarchist 
household
s 
Patriarchist 
households 
Muslim 
household
s 
Total 
population 
Year of 
secession 
from 
patriarchat
e 
Number 
of 
churches 
Number of 
schools 
Nestine 32 18 20 420 1910 3 
1 
(Bulgarian
) 
Gorjanci 161 170 175 2645 1909 2 2 
Gusilovo 44 8 0 295 1909 1 1 
Kumaničevo 86 24 42 755 1908 3 1 
Starigiani 38 20 0 455 1903 2 1 
Sničani 58 23 0 420 1903 2 1 
Mogila 15 7 0 115 1903 2 no school 
G. Nestram 79 91 0 970 1908 3 1 
D. Nestram 70 150   1320   2 2 
Seligošte 24 14 120 831 1909 1 1 
Rabigošte 12 5 0 97 1909 1 1 exarchist 
Kalebušta 2 58 0 402 1910 2 
1 not 
Bulgarian 
Čuka 3 22 166 1909   1 
1 not 
Bulgarian 
Breznica 110 10 655     1 1 
Želevo 110 110 ?  1406   
2 (1 
exarchist
) 2 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 74-75 and л. 35-38. (bold letters indicate settlements with details of 
situation after the enforcement of new law, see below) 
 
Table 31. Disputed churches in Kay(a)larsko 
Paleor 
(Paleohori?) 90 Christians 50 Muslims 
Exarchist majority with divided 
school 
Embore 
200 Exarchist houses,  
20 Patriarchist 
40 Muslim 
households 
4 churches, 2 larger, and the one 
outside the village is Patriarchist 
Lipinci 
(Hassanköj) 
65 Exarchist households, 6 Patriarchist, everybody visits the same church, the 
priest is Greek, village seceded from the Patriarchate 2 years ago, the 
government hinders the establishment of a school due to the fear of violence 
and propaganda 
Dorutovo 
40-50 houses, all Exarchists except the priest, who remains in charge after the 
reforms 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 30. 
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Table 32. Distribution of ecclesiastic and educational properties in Kostursko after the implementation 
of the new law in 1910  
Disputed settlements in Kostursko 
Gorjeni 
the bigger church outside the village becomes Bulgarian483 
property, the Grecoman majority possesses the main church in the 
centre of the settlement and the small one outside the village  
Dolno Kumaničevo 
problem remains unresolved: there is a bigger church in the 
village and a smaller outside the village, but there are only 3 
Greek households  
Gorno Kumaničevo 
the church becomes exarchist property; there are no Greek 
households 
Olissa 15 Greek households; one church becomes exarchist  
Konomladi 
the great church of the village becomes Bulgarian property; the 4 
households with 6 Greek nufuz use the chapel in the cemetery 
Pozdiviša 
the village church becomes Bulgarian property; the 2 Grecoman 
households uses the chapel in the cemetery   
Breznica 
the old church belongs to the Bulgarians; the 11 Greek households 
with 74 nufuz may erect a new building 
Želevo the newer church belongs to the Bulgarians and one school also 
Staričani 
Bulgarians, constituting the majority, get the larger church, while 
Greeks get the smaller one outside the village  
Ezerec 
the church is given to the Bulgarians; the Greeks have to build a new 
one  
Sničani 
the large church belongs to the Bulgarians; the Greeks are allowed 
to build a new church 
Čuka 
the Greek majority gets the church, the 2 exarchist household may 
build a new one  
G. Nestram 
the large church is given to the Bulgarians, the Greek possess the 
small one outside the village 
D. Nestram the church remains Greek; Bulgarians may establish a new one  
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. l. 28. 
 
Table 33. The religious distribution of the population in Lerinsko, and the distribution of ecclesiastic 
property after the reforms of 1910 
 
Exarchist Patriarchist households 
Lerin town 180 555 
the church and the school are Greek; the Bulgarians may 
erect a new one 
Nered 248 93 
 Armenohori 54 40 school and church remains Greek 
Gorničevo 174 9 
small church is given to the Bulgarians, and the larger 
one is Greek; the school is closed down  
Sorovič 57 62 school and chapel in the cemetery are Greek; the 
                                                 
483 Bulgarian documents use the terms ‘exarchist’ and ‘Bulgarian’ as synonyms, while Austro-Hungarian 
documents did not always do the same.  
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Bulgarians may establish a new one  
Bač 40 16 the school and the church are given to the Greeks 
Srebreno 45 55 the school and the church are Greek 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 31. Contrary to its exarchist character, Bač in Albania was the 
homeland of the Serboman četa leader Pavle (Table 6). 
 
The fight was fierce not only between Patriarchists and Exarchists, but even 
within Exarchist circles: as the metropolite was elected by the Eparchial Council, 
consisting of the town’s elders, even the urban population (artisans) could raise their 
voices on ecclesiastic questions, and many supported the return of the separatist 
(autonomist) Theodosios, former Metropolitan of Skopje, a comrade of the 
autonomist Pop-Arsov. 
The government also had moderate success in decreasing Christian-Muslim 
tensions in Prizren. Though the Ljuma region became completely Islamized, 
conversion to Islam as a strategy was rare from the second half of the 19th century. It 
threatened mainly the Orthodox, and functioned as a social strategy to avoid 
harassment from local (Albanian) Muslims. Better-organized Catholics, often living 
in clans or in tribes and supported by Austria, had a better chance of resisting 
Islamization in situ, while Orthodox people usually fled to Serbia or Montenegro.484 
Conversion was sometimes chosen because it meant escape from the authorities 
(those who abandoned their original roots were exposed to heavy punishment from 
their original community): a young Serbian male decided to convert to Islam because 
he had killed an Orthodox person called Sava from the village of Istok, and this way 
he hoped to avoid the punishment. In another example (1905), an Orthodox Serbian 
woman from Ipek left his husband and three children to marry an Albanian man.485 
 
 
The četa problem reloaded 
 
 
The dethronement of the sultan shocked the traditionalist Albanians and they turned 
away from the CUP. Young Turks had no understanding for their special rights and 
autonomist desires, while they usually exploited the discontent among Albanian 
factions, when the interests of the central government were threatened – for example 
against the introduction of Latin Alphabet during the congress of Dibra.486 Referring 
                                                 
484 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Winter to Calice, Prizren, 8. November 1896, No. 171. 
485 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Calice, Mitroviza, 1. Mai 1905, No. 10. 
486 At the anniversary of the Revolution in 1909 (July), the ethnic Albanians held a congress in Debar, where the 
demand for introducing military obligation was rejected, and the issue of creating a separate autonomous 
region encircling all territories on which ethnic Albanians lived was brought up. 
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to external threats - the introduction of Latin Alphabet would increase the influence 
of Austria-Hungary and Italy, and was considered as an inimical step against the 
’Ottoman thought’ - was always a good tool to evade the opposing factions. But the 
other Albanian demands expressed in Dibra, like the abolition of recruitment and the 
administrative unification of Albanian areas were refused and neither sharia was 
implemented. 
The first conflicts in Metohia arose in 1909 when the Turkish authorities 
attempted to execute a list of the population for conscription and the collection of 
taxes. The followers of the exiled Kryeziu and Isa Boletini (formerly the leader of the 
sultan’s Albanian guardsmen) revolted against the central government. Četas – now 
Muslims – were soon marching against district centres. 
The government sent Djavid pasha against them, who, having formerly been 
defeated by Albanian troops, considered his punitive operation an act of personal 
revenge. In 1909, commanding 5000 men, he collected the tax arrears for the last two 
years from everyone, destroyed 60 fortified kula, but he was unable to pacify Kosovo 
and soon was forced to retreat as in 1910 another revolt against levied taxes began.487 
Gjilan was occupied by Idris Seferi, Mitrovitsa by Isa Boletini, even the Albanians of 
the Skopska Crna Gora revolted, but, despite their cooperation with the Kosovars, 
they were twice defeated by Torghut Shefket pasha and his 16,000 troops.  
In order to maintain peace, the authorities had also taken steps against the 
broadening activity of irregular troops. At the end of 1909 the parliament in Istanbul 
passed a general law to abolish all irregular troops within the boundaries of the 
Empire. According to the law it was forbidden to set up irregular troops or to keep 
weapons at home. If caught, četa leaders were to be executed, and četa members to be 
imprisoned. The law also declared the right for the authorities to arrest the wives and 
the children of četa members.488 (These instructions were also implemented by the 
Serbs in 1913 after they occupied Northern Macedonia). 
This measure also meant that the ceasefire between the government (that had lost 
its social basis in North Macedonia) and the Bulgarophile četas was over. The central 
government had no other choice in 1910 than to “solve” the problems and to collect 
the weapons with the help of the Imperial Army. There were many reasons for this: 
contrary to the military reforms of the CUP that encouraged Christians to serve in the 
military forces, the army still remained predominantly Muslim in character. 
Therefore the army was considered loyal, while the gendarmerie – much of it 
                                                 
487 Malcolm, Kosovo, 241. 
488 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909, No.33.pol, 8. 
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Christian – was not.489 The army was ordered to use force if necessary in order to 
disarm the civil population. The government also expected the imperial troops to 
collect the levied taxes of that year once again, to abolish all the (illegally operating) 
national clubs and societies in the three Macedonian vilayets (by arresting people, 
destroying buildings, burning printed products) and to temper the extremely high 
rate of social violence in the countryside. The second target of the military operation 
was to prevent a new general Albanian revolt, among other things by recruiting 
soldiers from the Muslim population.490 
The Imperial army of Torghut Pasha, more than 50,000 men with heavy artillery, 
obeyed the order with the greatest possible violence as it marched from the occupied 
Prizren to Shkodra.491 Besides collecting the weapons, the pasha wanted to terrorise 
the local Christian villagers. The method of the army was simple: the military troops 
surrounded a village, opened fire with the cannons, brutally beat up the terrified 
inhabitants and carried off the handcuffed men. After these outrages, the frightened 
villagers handed over their weapons without resistance. The military forces intended 
to carry out the operation in those months when the activity of četas was low, and so 
these would be unable either to encourage or to intimidate the population to resist or 
to flee, and Ottoman military forces did not have to confront paramilitary troops.492 
Carrying out this military plan proved harder in the border kazas, because the 
news of the disarmament reached this region faster than it reached the regular 
troops. Those living along the border managed to hide their weapons, or they 
escaped to Bulgaria, smuggling their weapons with them.493 The Christian 
inhabitants of the central kazas and church dignitaries protested to the authorities 
and the foreign consulates about the disarmament plan. They appealed to the fact 
that without their weapons they would be at the mercy of the Muslims and would 
not be able to defend their villages against irregular Muslim or Christian troops. 
Their need for weapons – as they argued, because of the incapacity of the central 
government to defend the countryside from intruders or from restless local elements 
– was all disputable, as very often these weapons were used not to resist, but to 
promote the activity of rebels. Whatever the truth about weapons kept at home was, 
this situation posed a threat to the central government, and therefore the authorities 
                                                 
489 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II. No. 1650. 13.06.1908. The strengthening of the local militia was not an 
option, as it would only have strengthened banditry, according to the official Ottoman stance.  
490 Nika, Nevila. Përmbledhje dokumentesh mbi kryengritjet shqiptare (1910–1912). Prishtinë 2003; Bartl, Peter. 
Albanien. Regensburg: Pustet, 1995, 125. 
491 The action was repeated in 1911. The fear of another action was one reason for the revolt of Hasan Prishtina in 
1912. On the revolt in 1911, see Gjermëni, Sokol. Kryengritja shqiptare e vitit 1911. Tiranë: TOENA, 2011. 
492 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910., No.56/pol, 8. 
493 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 14.10.1910, No.73/pol, 8. 
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ignored the complaints. What is more, purely on account of their complaining, most 
of the complainants risked the revenge either of the authorities or of the paramilitary 
troops. The Bulgarian Pop Vane Zafirov from Orašje (kaza Kumanovo) was brutally 
executed by Hristo Lazarev, a četa leader from Bulgaria on 9 July 1910 for exactly this 
reason. A Bulgarian peasant from Živina (kaza Skopje), Stojce Čaparanski, had more 
luck: though he was sentenced to death by the müdir of Konjari, he managed to flee 
abroad.494 
The success of the disarmament plan seemed doubtful, however, even to 
contemporary witnesses. Official statistics on collected weapons were created only at 
vilayet level. Approximately 150,000 pieces were collected in Kosovo vilayet by 
September 1910 and a further 50 thousand were planned to be collected, but sabres 
are also included in these numbers. Half of the collected weapons came from 
Albanians, half from Slavs. On the one hand, according to the Austro-Hungarian 
consul of Skopje, a remarkable proportion of the weapons collected was useless and 
old. On the other hand, the inhabitants were able to rearm themselves again at any 
time by smuggling weapons, since the borderland has already slipped out of control 
of the Ottoman authorities.495 The former enemy of the Albanians, Montenegro, came 
into sharp focus: the Montenegrins rearmed the Albanians, but at the same time tried 
to sharpen the tensions between them.  
The Bulgarian state considered this disarmament of the local population to be the 
armament of Muslims.496 Rumours floated that the collected weapons were 
distributed among Muslim population. Mahmud Şevket Pasha refuted these 
statements and responded to the intervention of the Bulgarian state, stating that 
those to whom the weapons were allotted were indeed soldiers of the reserve class 
(redif), who were enrolled against the četas. But the Bulgarian government had 
information from many localities that the distributed weapons – no matter whether 
they came from military storage or were collected from local people – remained in 
the hands of the Muslim village leaders (mukhtar), and that weapons were not 
handed into military storage after the operation was over.497 
 
Community-level response to the changes II: the strategy of the Serbs in 
Macedonia 
 
                                                 
494 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910, No.56/pol, 8. 
495 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 15.08.1910, No.57/pol, 4. 
496 Related to the Bulgarian policy on Macedonia see: Bozeva-Abazi, The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National 
Identities, 90. 
497 ЦДА, ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 351. л. 2-3. 
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It is noteworthy that the only minority in the Skopje sanjak that did not object to the 
disarmament was the Serb one. According to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Skopje, 
the Serbs had two reasons for doing this: they wanted to enjoy advantages on 
religious and educational issues in return for their cooperation, and the government 
in Belgrade did not want to create unnecessary conflicts with the Ottoman Empire. 
Secondly, it is also noteworthy that – via band leaders arriving from Serbia (like 
Skopjance) – Belgrade pointed out that Serbia was ready to supply new weapons 
whenever the loyal population needed it.498 Belgrade refrained from a wholehearted 
support of the Albanian uprising, as a cooperation of Albanian tribes was against its 
interests. The Serbian government was rather interested in exacerbating tensions 
among them. Belgrade after the Young Turk revolution turned to the Ottomans – as 
instructions sent to Macedonian schoolmasters and the meeting between the leaders 
of the Narodna Odbrana and the Young Turks testify.499 (Meetings also took place 
between the officers of the Serbian Foreign Ministry and the Bulgarians as well. In 
those years full of calamities, every party tried to position itself.) 
The Serbian Democratic League led by Bogdan Radenković and the new paper of 
the Serbians, the Vardar, urged for the decrees of the constitution to be applied upon 
ethnic Albanians as well, who recognized the new regime, but displayed no 
readiness to support the law and continued their raids on local Serbs in Kosovo. 
Albanians spoke in a threatening voice that they would never allow the infidels to 
enjoy the same rights as the Muslims, but a certain repprochement after the 
annexation of Bosnia also took place, when Bajram Curri felt his positions weakened 
by the Austrian penetration.500 The promises made to the Albanians for their support 
of the coup d’etat of the CUP (so that they could keep their privileges) and 
constitutionalism promised to the Serbs was contradictory and left the Young Turks 
in a dangerous, unstable and unresolved situation.  
In order to articulate common goals and harmonize the existing particular 
regional policies of different Serbian communities a large assembly of Ottoman Serbs 
was held in Skopje on the Visitation of the Virgin in 1909 with 78 delegates present 
(44 from Old Serbia and 34 from Macedonia). As the Serbs were represented only by 
Sava Stojanović (Priština), Aleksandar Parlić (Skopje) and Dr. Janicije Dimitrijević 
(Bitola) in the Ottoman Parliament an organization to represent Serbian interests 
became essential. Thus the Organization of the Serbian People in the Ottoman Empire was 
established. However, this did not mean that local (often contradictory) policies 
                                                 
498 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910., No.56/pol, 8. 
499 Malcolm, Kosovo, 243. 
500 Some years before he also offered his services to the Serbian government, but it refused than. 
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ceased to exist, because the circumstances for the Serbs were quite different in 
Kosovo and Skopje. 
The local policy of the Serbian community in the Sanjak of Skopje was basically 
determined by three conditions.501 1. Within the boundaries of the sanjak, the 
Serbians belonged to the smaller nationalities (they made up only 5.5% of the entire 
population, and 9.6% of the Christian inhabitants).502 2. The most significant 
opponent of Serbian national propaganda was the Bulgarian national movement. 3. 
Considering the fact that the greatest problems for both the Young Turks and the 
Serbs were generated by the Bulgarians, the Serbian politicians and the CUP 
government became natural allies and had to come to an understanding. The early 
initiatives to form Bulgarian and Serbian bands fighting jointly has vanished by 
then.503 The front lines between the bands with nationalistic affiliation were not rigid: 
after the refusal of Serbia to cooperate, the Bulgarian četa leaders wanted to reach an 
agreement with the Greeks in order to avoid further isolation.504 
The greatest challenge for the new Young Turk leadership in the sanjak of Skopje 
was undoubtedly how to handle the Bulgarian and Serbian conflict. Based on the 
political aspirations that the two nations nurtured against the Empire, to moderate 
the hostility between them or to make compromises that could be acceptable for all 
parties were simply not realistic options.505 
In the beginning the policy of the CUP was based on the rule of law, without any 
distinct preference of the competing parties. (It began to change – of necessity – only 
after the Albanian rebellion). But good will was not enough when competing parties 
both referred to laws and historical traditions – as the following events testify. In 
their letter from November 1909, Bulgarian monks in the neighbourhood of Prilep 
complained about the violent expropriation of two monasteries (in Slepče and Zrze) 
by Serbian villagers in 1906. After the coup d’etat of the CUP, the state gave the two 
monasteries back to the Exarchate. But since the Serbs expropriated the property and 
land of these monasteries, and the surrounding villages (Dabnica and Nebregovo) 
                                                 
501 On the question of the ethnic and identity policies of the Balkan states, see Clewing, Konrad. ‘Nationalstaaten 
im multiethnischen Raum: Ethno- und Identitätspolitik.’ In Geschichte Südosteuropas. Vom Mittelalter bis zur 
Gegenwart, edited by Konrad Clewing - Oliver Jens Schmitt. Regensburg, 2011. 538-42. 
502 ÖStA HHStA 19. Nachlässe, Nachlaß August Kral, Kt.2, ‘Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-
Verhältnisse im Vilajet Kossovo (1903)’. On the Macedonian activity of Serbian consuls, see: Frantz, ‘Zwischen 
Gewalt’, 366-367. 
503 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, I. No. 315. 24.02.1902. Prior to the Gorna Dzhumaya uprising, Boris Sarafov 
met Svetozar Simić, a leader of the department of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for 
propaganda.  
504 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II. No.  1821. 18.09.1910.  The Bulgarians promised to support Greek bands 
against Vlach četas, if the Greeks supported Bulgarian četas against Serb bands. 
505 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909, No.44/pol, 8. 
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were opposed to becoming Exarchist and to supporting the monasteries with food,506 
the clergy had to ask for help from the Bulgarian state (for 100 Turkish lira = 2000 
francs). The money was used to hire Albanians to collect the harvest from lands that 
once belonged to the monasteries, then under cultivation by Serbian peasants. As a 
response, the Serbs also asked for armed assistance and resisted. The authorities of 
the sanjak and vilayet were unwilling to interfere in the debate.507 
The case of the two monasteries is interesting because the contemporary Serbian 
interpretation of events is completely different, and this highlights the danger of 
using a narrow base of sources. Based on the articles published in Carigradski 
Glasnik, Volarić wrote that “in February 1909 Ottoman Serbs from Prilep defended two 
Serbian monasteries from Bulgarian bands, and on this occasion sent a letter to Ottoman 
authorities, including the Parliament, in which they demanded the defense of their rights.”508 
The Serbian interpretation of events is given in the following quotation. 
 
“The Ottoman Serbs from Prilep and its surroundings gathered today at the national assembly to 
protest that the Bulgarian attacks on Serbian property not be tolerated. They protest because Ottoman 
authorities protect Bulgarians and therefore cause damage to the Serbian nation and its property. They 
express their dissatisfaction that the Ottoman authorities allowed the Bulgarians entrance into 
distinctly Serbian monasteries: Zrze and Slepče; and not only that they allowed it, but that the 
gendarmerie offered it for the sake of the peace and order. Zrze and Slepče are villages inhabited by 
Ottoman Serbs and their monasteries are financed by entirely Serbian villages, which also provided 
them with estates… There are no Bulgarian villages nearby these monasteries; therefore Bulgarians 
have no legitimate right to claim them… Ottoman authorities treat Serbdom unjustly … For example, 
while Greeks and Bulgarians have bells on the churches, to Serbs this is strictly forbidden, and the 
police even comes to take the bells down, as was the case here in Prilep.”509 
 
                                                 
506 The Serboman Grigor’s band came from Nebregovo, mentioned  earlier, Table 6.  
507 ЦДА, ф. 313k. oп.2. a.e. 10. л. 31. 
508 See Volarić, ‘Between the Ottoman and Serbian State’, 571. 
509 “Срби Османлије из Прилепа и околине, скупљени данас на народном збору, протестују што се 
дозвољава, да Бугари насрћу на њихову имовину. Протестирају што се од стране власти Бугари 
протежирају на штету српског народа и његове имовине. Изјављују своје негодовање што су државне 
власти допустиле да Бугари уђу у чисто српске манастире Зрзе и Слепче, па не само што су их пустиле, 
већ су им и жандарме, ради веће сигурности, дале. Зрзе и Слепче села су насељена Србима 
Османлијама и манастири њихови издржавани су од села чисто српских, која су им и непокретна 
имања поклањала, те Бугари никаква права на њих немају, нити ће моћи имати, пошто је у нашој 
отаџбини завладао ред и поредак. Бугарских села нема у околини оних манастира и толико је од њих 
далеко, те никаквог законског ослонца не могу имати, да својину манастира себи протежавају, пошто ту 
немају свога елемента… Српски народ налази се ожалошћен, кад и му у времену слободе и једнакости 
власти неправду чине и од других га народности одвајају, као на пр. Док Бугари и Грци по црквама 
могу слободно звона подизати, дотле се Србима и њиховим црквама забрањује да им силом чак 
полиција скида звона, као што је случај овде у Прилепу био.” ‘Насртај на српске манастире’ (The attack 
on Serbian monasteries), Carigradski Glasnik, no.  7, 1909, 1. Quoted by Volarić, ‘Between the Ottoman and 
Serbian State’, 571. 
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The Serbs were convinced that Ottoman authorities generally supported 
Bulgarian claims, while the Bulgarians claimed that their use of coercion was the 
result of negligence on the part of the Ottoman authorities and the Serbian resistance, 
who refused to accept the official decision. Both were unsatisfied with the behavior 
of official authorities – something even worse from the aspect of central government 
than satisfying one or other of the parties. The Bulgarian sources wrote about the 
expropriation of church property, while the Serbs argued that villagers offered to 
supply the monastery because it was Patriarchist, and retained the right to withdraw 
these benefits if circumstances changed. The Serbian story focused on the present 
situation, using ethnic arguments, while the Bulgarian party went back to 1906 
(when Serboman villagers expelled the exarchist priest) in listing injustices and 
appealing to the law. 
The situation was similar in another case. 
 
The Ottoman Serbs from Prizren and its surroundings legitimately demand the return of the 
monastery in Treskavac, because it is situated in the middle of the Serbian population, which has also 
maintained and financed it. Bulgarians violently took the monastery – with the help of their bandit 
troops – and now it is illegitimately in their possession.510 
 
These decisions – giving a monastery to a community which was scarcely 
represented in the neighbourhood, thus restituting the original situation according to 
law – were only likely to increase tensions, while neglecting the law would have 
raised objections from the other party. 
Tighter cooperation between local Serbs and Young Turks began during the 
elections of 1908.511 The Ottoman leadership of the sanjak employed a peaceful tone 
with local Serbs, although this tolerance did not mean the acceptance of Serbian 
demands – sometimes Serbian leaders were also arrested, as everyone else was, if the 
situation made it necessary.512 Very often the central power remained neutral in 
Serbo-Bulgarian conflicts, or tended to support Serb claims on religious or 
educational issues even contrary to the spirit of laws. 
Beyond their tacit support Turkish authorities often collaborated with Serbian 
četas (as they presented less danger to the Ottoman state), and never initiated attacks 
on Serbian paramilitary troops – pointed out the Bulgarian consul Ikonomov in his 
                                                 
510 “Срби Османлије из Призрена и околине с правом траже, да им се преда манастир Трескавац, јер се 
налази у средини српског живља који је тај манастир за толико стотина година чувао и издржавао. 
Бугари насилним путем 'помоћу њихових разбојничких чета овај су манастир отели и данас га 
незаконито пригежавају.” ‘Насртај на српске манастире’ (The attack on Serbian monasteries), Carigradski 
Glasnik, no.  7, 1909, 1. Quoted by Volarić, ‘Between the Ottoman and Serbian State’, 572. 
511 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 05.10.1908., No.69/pol, 24. 
512 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909. No.44/pol, 8. 
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account. Major Janusewski, an Austro-Hungarian officer in Skopje – and probably 
rather more impartial – also admitted to the Bulgarians that Turks seemed to favour 
Serbs over Bulgars. It was also Ikonomov who reasoned this when he gave a detailed 
account of Mahmud Şefket pasha’s opinion, expressed in February 1908. According 
to the pasha, only the Bulgarians (here the pasha meant the official Bulgaria) were 
responsible for the worsening of the situation in Macedonia: Bulgarians think that 
the case of Macedonia is similar to that of Eastern Rumelia, but they are wrong, as 
the Macedonian question is an European diplomatic question.513 The opinion 
expressed Turkish fears that, after the withdrawal of the Powers from the provinces, 
a similar and quick process would take place in Macedonia as happened in Eastern 
Rumelia. 
In return for their ignorance or negligence, Young Turks expected Serbian 
solidarity concerning the anti-Bulgarian measures initiated by the state.514 This was 
characteristic of the whole Kosovo vilayet, not only of the Sanjak of Skopje.515 A 
Young Turk–Serbian cooperation also existed on restricting Albanian cultural 
demands, especially in the western and northern regions of the vilayet, where the 
proportion of Albanian population was greater.516 
In the Sanjak of Skopje, two parties were responsible for the local representation 
of Serbian interests: the Serbian National Club and the Constitutional Party (Club).517 
The differences between the views of the two organisations were not significant (the 
latter was more open towards the Ottoman government); the rivalry between them 
was based on the competition for financial sources. The debate on the distribution of 
financial support arriving from Serbia also resulted in the division and opposition of 
villages. The two parties in Skopje and Kumanovo established local organizations 
and a skupština, the common body of the Serbs in this sanjak. Based on Austro-
Hungarian archival sources, it seems that, contrary to their internal debates, the 
Serbian political organizations represented the Serb interests unanimously and 
unambiguously.518 
The leaders of the local Serbian communities did not increase their aspirations; 
their aim was to secure the results already gained through a peaceful coexistence 
with the CUP. Young Turks did not hinder the work of the skupština in the 
                                                 
513 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 205. л. 112-125. 
514 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12. 
515 “Gegenwärtig sind sie [die Jungtürken] jedoch bestrebt, speziell die Serben im Vilajet von Kossova, ohne dem eigenen 
Programme in irgend welcher Weise Abbruch zu tun, nach Möglichkeit zu befriedigen.“ ÖStA HHStA PA, 
VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.15.1909., No.44/pol, 8. 
516 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 11.11.1909., No.78/pol, 6. 
517 On the activity of the Constitutional Club, see: Hacısalihoğlu, Die Jungtürken, 237. 
518 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8 and 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 8. 
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beginning. But the recognition of the Serbian national community and cultural rights 
were still missing from the relationship.519 Another Serbian desire was to appoint a 
Serbian metropolite to the Debar-Veles diocese and to get official governmental 
support for Serbian propaganda.520 So, local Serbian policy was also able to show its 
peaceful side to the new Ottoman government, but it did not resign or refrain from 
the use of ’less peaceful non-parliamentary methods’.521 
While political relations between the Young Turks and the Serbians were 
moderate and relatively consolidated, the debate on churches and schools produced 
more conflicts between Serbians and Bulgarians. The ecclesiastical conflict reached a 
new level in 1902, when a Serbian episcopate was established in the city of Skopje. 
The struggle between patriarchists and exarchists for positions, institutions and 
hearts and minds had been going on for years, but the arrival of the new Serbian 
metropolite changed the situation and exacerbated the conflict,522 because a diocese 
had to be detached from the Bulgarian episcopate, the churches and schools had to 
be redistributed, and the scope of his activity had to be clarified.523 This was very 
important, as national propaganda only reached as far as the organisation of the 
national Church did. Debate was raging about the rights over the 14 churches to be 
detached and on the right of the Serbian metropolite to establish new churches. The 
solution of the problem was hindered by the leaders of the vilayet as well: although 
they set up a committee to handle the question, but all the members of the committee 
were Exarchists (Bulgarians), who opposed the Serbian wishes, not to mention the 
hesitation of the local population that refused to be attached to a Serbian diocese.  
The same factors generated conflict on educational questions and schools, as these 
determined the national identity of the local communities.524 When the Serbian 
metropolite wanted to increase his influence over churches, he also wanted to extend 
it over schools. The Serbian metropolite wished to establish 28 new schools with the 
support of the province leadership in those kazas that witnessed the most bitter and 
bloodiest fights between the Bulgarian and Serbian national propagandists (Kriva 
Palanka, Kumanovo, and in other territories of the vilayet: Tetovo, Gostivar).525 
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Another peculiarity of the situation is that, beyond the antagonism with the 
Bulgarians, the Serbian metropolite in Skopje also had conflicts with Belgrade and 
with one of the Serbian parties concerning authority over schools. This was a regular 
rather than unique phenomenon, as the quotation below on the situation of Prizren 
in 1903 confirms. The rivalry between the Serbian state and Orthodox Church over 
finances and souls (over supremacy) hindered efficient work in the early years. 
According to the Russian consul:  
 
Serbia here conducts propaganda and spends 100,000 Francs per year to obtain the 
love of the populace (narod). However, … rather than acting for the interests of the 
community, it only creates intrigues and damage... First of all, it is reckless to 
support consul Avramović, whom people loathe, and the silly metropolitan 
(vladika) Nićifor… In Peć, the metropolitan’s regent, Obrad the priest, defended 
Albanian criminals to the Ottoman authorities, and, as a result, people in Peć no 
longer invite him to their homes… However, Nićifor does not care. In Prizren he 
does not recognize the municipality, and he does not engage with national 
work…526 
 
In the case of Skopje this ended in a compromise, and the Serbian Minister of 
Education agreed to give back schools financed by the Serbian state to the Church. 
This meant the implicit recognition that the Serbian state had neither enough 
financial assets nor enough experience in tackling local questions, not to mention the 
often weak confidence of the local population in the Serbian government, which 
often tried to impose its ideas regardless of local interests. It also meant that teachers 
were also replaced, and the system of requirements became standardised once again. 
This enlightens two facts: (1), the Serbian consulate was unable to maintain the 
school system, and (2), since 1909 the Ottoman government had hindered the 
establishment of national clubs, and many public activities were able to survive only 
under the aegis of the Church.527 The conflict with the Constitutional Party was 
caused by the latter’s appeasement policy, which was rejected by the Serbian 
metropolite who supported the national club only. Villages under the dominance of 
the Constitutional Party were threatened with the closure of local schools.528 
As well as political and cultural demands, politicians also tried to use economic 
instruments to improve Serbian positions by increasing the number of real estates in 
Serb hands. They decided to buy back lands formerly sold to Muslim owners, or 
                                                 
526 Volarić (575-76.) cites Višnjakov, Jaroslav Valerijanovič. ‘Македонски покрет и преврат у Србији 29. маја 
1903.’ Tokovi istorije 3, (2010): 19. 
527 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910., No.15/pol, 5. 
528 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 7. 
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lands of expelled Bulgarians, who could then never return. The financial support 
needed was given by the Serbian bank, Zadruga, that decided to establish 10 branch 
offices of savings banks in the Sanjak of Skopje. But as the approval of local Turkish 
authorities was missing, therefore the action was delayed.529 
As it can be seen, the activity of Serbian government bodies was not always 
fruitful, nor did it enjoy the consent of the local inhabitants. According to Volarić, the 
effectiveness of institutions established to promote propaganda were often 
inadequate. For instance, the four consulates in Priština, Salonika, Bitola, and Skopje 
barely communicated with each other, according to Branislav Nušić (1894). The 
Serbian administration in the Ottoman Empire suffered from sluggishness and 
ineffectiveness in the early phases.530 Tacit Ottoman support and finally the shift of 
support policy from creation to destruction after 1907 increased the rate of success. 
But the conciliatory and moderate Serbian policy towards the Young Turks was 
by no means accidental. After 1908, due to their relatively small proportion and to 
fruitful Bulgarian denominational and national propaganda, the position of the 
Serbian minority had significantly weakened in Skopje sanjak. The most obvious sign 
of this trend was that many Pravoslav inhabitants and villages considered ‘Serbian’ 
in the eyes of active members of the Serbian national movement became ‘Bulgarian’ 
(again) (Table 5). According to Austro-Hungarian consular reports from 1909 on, the 
Serbian Voivodes in the sanjak and their irregular troops committed more and more 
retributive murders in order to put an end to this tendency. The number of Serbian 
attacks against the ‘Bulgarisierte Serben’ increased, particularly in the Kriva Palanka, 
Kumanovo and Veles kazas. These attacks naturally triggered counterattacks by 
IMRO.531 
Unlike the other sanjaks of Kosovo vilayet (like in Prizren), in the Sanjak of Skopje 
Serb politicians tried to improve their positions against the Bulgarians by means of 
the Albanian question.532 Since the CUP was reluctant to satisfy the wishes of local 
Serbs, they tried to sharpen the tensions between Albanians and the CUP in this 
sanjak. It is noteworthy that Albanian national clubs were often also the 
                                                 
529 Ibid. 8. For background on the activity of Zadruga Bank, see Mishkova, Diana. ‘The Nation as Zadruga: 
remapping Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Southeast Europe.’ In: Disrupting and Reshaping. Early 
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Nation and of its State under the Ottoman Rule.’ In Disrupting and Reshaping. Early Stages of Nation-Bulding in 
the Balkans, 37-45. 
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organisational and supporting basis of the CUP, and the loss of Albanian sympathy 
could easily mean the shrinking of the social groups supporting the CUP. The 
worsening of the Albanian-Young Turk relationship was advantageous for the Serbs, 
as they thought the CUP had to rely upon them after losing the alliance of Muslim 
Albanians. The Serbs counted on the improvement of their negotiating positions 
through the escalation of Albanian-CUP tensions. This is why the local Serb 
newspaper, Vardar, referred to Albanians as ‘brethren’ in March 1909, and supported 
their wish to implement the Latin alphabet,533 while earlier a different stance was 
observable. The gradual turn was accelerated after the deposition of Abdulhamid II 
in April 1909, when the activities of many Serbian societies were forbidden, lands 
were confiscated from churches and monasteries, the work of schools and religious 
committees was hindered. Local Serbs turned against the CUP, but at the same time 
they were weak alone, they searched for new allies. This also coincided with the 
changing tactics of Belgrade that tried to deepen the tensions between Albanians and 
the government. 
It seems that official Serbia also tended to accept the regional interests of Serbs in 
Macedonia and did not want to pursuit a policy without or against the will of local 
Serbs. The skupština in Belgrade decided to pay compensation to the former Muslim 
landowners. This friendly act brought a positive response among the Muslims in the 
Sanjak of Skopje, providing a sphere to manoeuvre for local Serbian politicians.534 
Nevertheless, these ’soft methods’ were rare. 
As for ‘tough’ methods, it was primarily the Belgrade government that played an 
active role.535 First, the number of band leaders arriving in the Sanjak of Skopje 
increased (in winter 1909, this meant 28 bands – compare it to Table 6); second, the 
Serbian government wanted to improve the armaments of irregular troops. One of 
the main target locations for the rifles, revolvers, explosives and ammunition 
arriving from Serbia was the Preševo-Gjilan-Kumanovo triangle, where the primary 
objective of Nikola Pašić’s government was to arm the Serbian population so they 
could defend themselves against Muslim attacks.536 According to the Austro-
Hungarian consulate in Skopje, it was the local Serbian consul’s responsibility to 
organise the transportation and distribution of weapons and to direct the operation 
of the irregular troops. In order to make illegal weapon transportations more flexible, 
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some Muslim officers from the police were bribed as well.537 Bulgarian villages also 
received weapons transportations and ammunitions from Bulgaria with the help of 
the Church and consulates.538 In Bulgarian villages local teachers (and priests and 
perhaps monks)539 were responsible for the storage and distribution of weapons,540 
which confirms the significant role they played in the achievement of national goals. 
The realisation of ’moderate’ Serb national aspirations (the maintenance of the 
status quo in the Skopje Sanjak as regards Ottoman-Serb relations and Bulgarian-
Serbian ethnic proportions) was promoted by the fact that the local Bulgarian 
population also had to confront factional in-fighting between the different wings of 
IMRO (leftists-autonomists and Verhovists). The Ottoman authorities were also 
burdened and engaged by Orthodox assaults on Pomak villages along the border, and 
this also provided the Serbs with greater room for manoeuvre.541 
 
 
Strategies of intimidation and strategies of survival 
 
Despite their relatively low number in Macedonia, the continuous foreign support 
and the energetic activity of Belgrade’s local agents made the Serbian factor 
nonnegligible in the region.  The increase in the number of ‘players’ left Macedonian 
Slavs in a desperate situation as the following report by Simić (a leading official at 
the Foreign Ministry) testified.542 This also gives an insight to political intentions of 
the Serbian government and the fears of the local Slavic (not Serbianized) population in 
Macedonia. “The Macedonians have been afraid that the Bulgarians and we agreed to divide 
them… They would like to make an agreement with us, but such as to sacrifice nothing of 
what they call their autonomy. They have come to see more and more that there are obstacles 
before them, which they cannot fight successfully, and as a consequence of this they gradually 
lose their importance as an authoritative factor in the development of the Macedonian 
                                                 
537 A so-called Ibrahim efendi in the sanjak of Skopje was named. ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth 
Eduard Otto, 14.10.1910., No.73/pol, 8. 
538 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8 and ibid. Rappaport to 
Pallavicini, 05.02.1908., No.9/pol, 12. 
539 Data from the sanjak of Prizren, 1910. ÖStA HHStA PA, XXXVIII/Kt.405, Prochaska to Berchtold, 27.08.1912., 
No.86. 
540 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910., No.56/pol, 8 and ibid. 14.10.1910., 
No.73/pol, 8. Similar to Serbian villages as we discussed earlier.  
541 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8; ibid. Adamkiewicz to 
Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12; ibid. Heimroth to Pallavicini, 04.11.1910., No.80/pol, 3 and ibid. 
Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 14.10.1910., No.73/pol, 8. 
542 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents I. No. 313. 07.02.1902. Janko Atanasov, a retired Bulgarian colonel, visited the 
department leader of the Serbian Foreign Ministry responsible for propaganda activities in 1902, suggesting 
cooperation. The quotation represents the reflections of the Serbiian official. 
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question. This is what hurts them immensely. They are divided among themselves, just as 
before… The people, craving for freedom, would like to shake off their yoke… but their 
distrust both of their competing leaders and Bulgaria prevent them. Under the influence of the 
news about the Imperial Alliance a mood has been created in which they would like to be freed 
from their yoke at any cost, even if they were compelled to come under Bulgaria and Serbia. 
And if these two did not help them, they would gladly accept Austrian occupation, as 
well…“543 The bilateral external pressure forced many Macedonians to abandon the 
idea of independence or autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, because they 
considered any territorial devision (and Serbian-Bulgarian rivalry threatened with 
this outcome) even more harmful, than the incorporation of the region into one of the 
small states (even it would be Serbia and not Bulgaria). Even an Austrian occupation 
was considered less harmful by the local groups, than dismemberment. 
From 1906/1907 on, Serb(ian)s changed tactics and abandoned defensive to hinder 
the further ’Bulgarization’ of the ’Serbs’. Their offensive policy is testified not only by 
Bulgarian, but also by Austro-Hungarian consuls.544 One of the tactics was for 
Serbian vojvodas to visit those villages where the male population was working far 
away from their homeland (cases observed in Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo and Skopje 
kaza) to exert pressure on local inhabitants (female, old and children). According to 
the Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade, the following settlements were the most 
exposed to such violent Serbian propaganda: Orlanci in Kumanovo kaza, Bigor-
Dolenci, Gorno Dolenci, and Dvorci from the region of Kičevo. In addition to the 
presence of Serbian četas, another problem was caused by the harassment of those on 
pečalbarstvo: Macedonians working in Belgrade or in Pirot. These migrating Macedo-
Slavs were threatened with the confiscation of their earnings or with the impediment 
of their free return to their homeland unless they claimed themselves to be Serbs (not 
to mention the constant threat of irregular troops invading their homeland). These 
workers were often compelled to ask for a written oath from their community in 
which the whole family or community declared its loyalty to Serbdom. Mihail 
Georgiev asked for such a document from his brother in Dvorci.545 From the village 
of Orlanci more than 100 men were working in Belgrade by 1909. The Serbian 
government offered 3000 levas for their consent to open a Serbian school in Orlanci, 
                                                 
543 Simić, representative of the Kingdom of Serbia in Bulgaria, to Jovan Jovanovich-Pizon, head of the consular 
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade. On the occasion of the visit of Damian Gruev. From 
‘Arhiv SFR Jugoslavije (Belgrade) – Fond Jovan Jovanovic-Pizon, 80 (1905)’. 
544 Sources for this: ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12. 
545 ЦДА, ф. 315k. oп. 2. a.e. 10. л. 7.  
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and thus managed to get 68 supporters out of the 100.546 This clearly displays the 
success rate of tough Serbian propaganda (68%). 
Neither did violence decrease against the thin but influential class of the 
intelligentsia: alongside with simple labourers, priests and teachers, its members 
remained primary targets after 1908. In the spring of 1909 a Bulgarian teacher, 
Alexander Mankov, was murdered in a Serbian raid (Rahovdol village, Veles kaza), 
and Alexandar, the Serbian teacher of Kozle (Skopje kaza, Zeleniko nahije), was also 
killed by Bulgarians in Novoselo. The Bulgarian Mane Miklarov, priest of Štip, was 
killed because he became a propagator of Serbian national ideas, while the sin of 
priest Aršov from Radibuš (kaza Kriva Palanka) was that he wanted to become 
Bulgarian. Even leaders of monasteries were convinced or bribed to change sides. 
The igumen of the ortodox monastery in Stalkovce, who earlier had some 
disagreement with local Bulgarian starešinas, was offered a huge sum to claim to be 
Serbian. These methods were not specific or confined to the Sanjak of Skopje; the 
same events and methods occurred elsewhere. 
When writing about societies of violence based on the Gewaltmarkt (marketized 
violence), we have encountered many individual survival strategies, some of them 
dramatic, some resulting in rather comic outcomes, like the following ones. (1) The 
story of Adem Zaimi (the Ottoman police officer who kidnapped Lol Kuka547  and 
who murdered Haxhi Molla Zeka)548 and Alexa Bogosavljević is only indirectly 
related to violence.549 For the reader’s further edification we share the story as it 
appeared on the pages of the Austro-Hungarian consular reports – leaving the 
interpretation to the reader. (One of the morals of this story is that the Balkans is the 
place where everything can happen. The naivety of experienced perpetrators of 
violence is amazing, and reveals that they lived in a society which hardly had any 
knowledge of how things work even in their close surroundings. Those leaders of the 
local community who moved safely within their accustomed circles became easily 
deceivable victims in a different environment.)550 
Alexa Bogosavljević, a Serb born in Austria-Hungary, was an adventurer. He was 
a student of the military academy in Wiener Neustadt, from where he was dismissed. 
                                                 
546 Ibid. 
547 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Pára to Braun, Üsküb, 16. December 1901, No. 165; i.e. Pára to Braun, Üsküb, 6. 
January 1902, No. 2.  
548 Haxhi Mula Zeka (1832-1902): an Albanian polician in Ipek, leader of the conservative-nationalist League of 
Peje (1899-1902), which planned an all-Albanian alliance modelled on the Prizren League – against the 
Ottoman Empire. He was murdered by Adem Zaimi, who was secretly encouraged by the Ottoman 
authorities.  
549 The story came to light in connection with the murder of Zeka. 
550 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Kt. 434, Pára to Calice, Üsküb, 17 April 1902, No. 46, appendix (the report of consul 
Bohumil Pára is also included, 17 April 1902, No. 72, p. 5) 
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Then he went to Serbia during the Serb-Bulgarian war in 1885 and served as an army 
officer. Later he served at the state border, which enabled him to meet many 
Albanian leaders. He spread the rumour about himself that he was an expert of 
Albanian relations and that he had improved relations between the two nations with 
his writings in Old Serbia (he was the editor of the Serbian-Albanian paper 
‘Bratimstvo’ – brotherhood). He was decorated with many Austrian and Italian 
medals and claimed that he received them for his services. He also wore the barrel of 
a rifle and claimed that all his medals had been achieved with that very rifle.  
As he was a very conspicuous phenomenon, he was soon ’discovered’ by consul 
Kurtović, who earlier knew him from Niš. Kurtović was surprised at his decorations 
and when he asked the leaders of his military units, he received the answer that 
Bogosavljević was a well-known swindler in Serbia, but he was allowed to wear the 
medals and decorations because this made a good impression on the Albanians. 
Once, when his colonel questioned his right to wear these decorations, Bogosavljević 
attacked him through the press, and therefore no one wanted to press the question 
any further. 
As he could not count on too much success with his behavior, he soon left the 
army. Once Bogosavljević received news that a Montenegrin priest has been 
searching for 17 years for his lost son, he soon came up with the plan that he would 
play the role of the lost boy. He managed to play the role well until he seduced his 
new ‘sister’, the wife of a teacher at Šabac, and even his ‘mother’. So he had to leave 
the house in a great hurry and escaped to Constantinople, where he continued his 
swindles. He claimed to be pretender to the Bosnian (!) throne and thus managed to 
receive huge sums from a widow. But a few years later he returned to Serbia, where 
became a tobacco inspector at Prokuplje. From here he renewed his connections with 
the Albanians and got in touch with the young Adem Zaimi, who became his foster 
brother. Later he became the leader of the fire brigade in Belgrade, but by this time 
he had such bad reputation, he was unable to fit into Belgrade high society. Then he 
decided to renew his relationship with Adem Zaimi, whom he told that he had 
connections to the royal palace and to political circles and he promised Zaimi an 
audience if he visited Belgrade – an empty promise, as the Albanian had never left 
his homeland. But on 1 September 1901 Adem Zaimi committed a murder driven by 
political motives in the konak (governmental palace) of Ipek and soon had to 
escape.551 Remembering Bogosavljević’s tales, which he thought were realistic, he 
chose Serbia as his shelter. He started to demand the promised royal audience from 
Bogosavljević, who put himself in great trouble with his lies. But soon he pulled 
                                                 
551 It was not the Zeka murder, it happened a year later! 
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himself together and organized a comedy for his visitor. He convinced a professor to 
lend him hundreds of francs for “national purposes” that had to be kept in secret. 
With this money he borrowed a carriage and drove through the town – with the 
secret thought that the urban leaders might think that a guest of high rank had 
arrived and would be eager to give the stranger an official audience. As neither were 
the leading classes of Belgrade society prone to take Albanians seriously, nor had the 
latter abandoned their plan to have an audience, Bogosavljević continued his 
comedy. He said that the king could not give an official audience in the Royal Court 
to somebody accused of murder, because it would draw the attention of foreign 
ministers and the Ottoman government to the fact that Zaimi was in Serbia, and 
would discredit Serbia, while the publicity would hinder Zaimi’s secret return to his 
homeland. But the king promised to meet the Albanian in a private house instead.  
The ‘king’ of Serbia soon met Zaimi – wearing a decorated fireman’s uniform. At the 
end of the audience the ‘king’ ordered Bogosavljević to donate watches and rifles to 
the Albanians. 
The lies of Bogosavljević were thus not revealed (lies had serious consequences in 
Albanian society), but the story was not over yet. The presence of Zaimi in Serbia 
was unpleasant for the Ottoman ambassador, Fettah Bey, who called for Zaimi and 
drew his attention to his conspicuous behavior. He promised him he would be 
appointed to the rank of lieutenant if travelled to Constantinople and gives 
assurances about his loyalty. This way Zaimi soon returned to Turkey with an 
amnesty. But this brought no relief for Bogosavljević, as in the hotel everybody was 
convinced that it really was the king who had visited them, and Bogosavljević had 
promised 1000 francs to the owner to secure the meeting. Of course he ‘forgot’ to pay, 
and so the hotel owner went to the Royal Court, where he recognized that he had 
been tricked, and the Court also learned of the abusive deception, which became 
very inconvenient for the king as well. And the story was still not over. Bogosavljević 
promised to give weapons to the Albanians, but – in order to avoid problems at the 
border – he proposed to send the rifles later. And the Albanians did not forget the 
weapons. When they warned Bogosavljević that they had crossed the border and 
were still waiting for the transport, the Serbian had to step into action once again. He 
managed to steal 15 rifles from the stocks of the fire station, but he was discovered 
and arrested. And though he claimed to act for patriotic purposes – telling only 
selected parts of the story outlined above – he was condemned to one year of 
imprisonment, though he was soon offered an amnesty.  
The story was told by consul Kurtović to the Austrian authorities, because Adem 
Zaimi visited him demanding the promised watches and rifles. Kurtović wrote to 
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Belgrade, where no one knew about the promise. Thus were Bogosavljević’s 
machinations revealed, making the Serbian court look ridiculous.552 
                                                 
552 ÖStA HHStA, Ministerium des Äußeren, VII. Gesandschafts- und Konsulatsarchiv; (IV. Politisches Archiv, 
Jüngere Serie; Albanien). 
Botschaftsarchiv Konstantinopel,Fasz. 434.: Albanien – politisch: Üsküb (1899-1913) A4m 
- Pára an Heinrich Freiherr Calice, Üsküb, getippt, 17.04.1902., p. 1., No. 46., Verkehr des gewesenen Redacteurs 
des Belgrader serbisch-albanesischen Blattes ‘Bratimtsvo’ Alexa Bogosavljević mit dem Mörder des Ipeker 
Notablen Hadźi Mula Zeku, Adem Zaim: 
- Beilag:  Abschrift eines Berichtes des k. und k. Consuls Bohumils Pára an Seine Exz. Den Herrn Minister des 
Aeussern de dato Uesküb, 17. April 1902 No. 72. pp.5.: 
„Anlässlich eines Besuches, den ich am 15. dieses Monates dem hiesigen serbischen General-Consul Herrn 
Kurtović machte, brachte derselbe das Gespräch plötzlich auf Adem Zaim, den bekannten Mörder des Hadźi 
Mula Zeko [sic!], und erzählte mir über dessen vormaligen Belgrader Aufenthalt folgende romanhafte 
Geschichte, die ich nachstehend Euerer Excellenz zu unterbreiten die Ehre habe: 
“Ein gewisser Alexo Bogosavljević, ein leichtsinniger Abenteuer, der als österreichischer Serbe auch eine Zeit lang 
Zögling der Wiener Neustädter Akademie gewesen, dann aber ausgeschlossen worden war, kam zur Zeit des 
serbisch-bulgarischen Krieges nach Serbien und diente als Officier. Später wurde er zum Grenzdienst 
verwendet. 
So wurde er mit verschiedenen Arnautenführern bekannt, und rühmte sich, ein genauer Kenner der 
albanesischen Verhältnisse zu sein und in Wort und Schrift sehr viel für das gute Einvernehmen der beiden 
Volksstämme in Altserbien getan zu haben. Er trug ein gebogenes Stück Gewehrlauf auf der Brust, auf dem 
österreichische, italienische und andere Decorationen dutzendweise baumelten und behauptete, alle jene 
Ehrenzeichen mit diesem Gewehr errungen zu haben. 
Damals fiel er Herrn Kurtović, der ihn zufälligerweise in Nisch traf, auf; als er sich beim vorgesetzten Obersten 
über den Ursprung dieses Medaillenreichtums erkundigte, antwortete ihm dieser, Bogosavljević sei ein 
landbekannter Schwindler, lasse sich aber seinen Ordenschmuck nicht verbieten, da er nur so den Albanern 
imponieren könne. Tatsächlich hatte eine Frage des Obersten nach diesbezüglichen Legitimationen keinen 
weiteren Erfolg als heftige publicistische Angriffe des Bogosavljević. 
Da aber sein Weizen nicht sonderlinch blühte, gieng er bald wieder auf Abenteuer aus. Zunächst hörte er von 
einem Popen in Montenegro der seinen vor 17 Jahren verschollenen Sohn suche. Um diesen betrübten Vater 
zu trösten, gieng Bogosavljević zu ihm und stellte sich als der geraubte Sohn vor. Nachdem er einige Zeit dort 
Gast gewesen war, begab er sich zu seiner neu erwerbenen Schwester, die mit einem Lehrer in Schabatz 
verheiretet ist, musste, aber schliesslich – angeblich wegen mehr als geschwistlicher Beziehungen zur Frau des 
Gastgebers – das Haus verlassen und wandte sich nach Constantinopel. Dort setzte er seine Schwindeleien 
fort, entlockte unter anderm als Prätendent auf den zu errichtenden bosnischen Thron einer Witwe 
bedeutende Geldsummen, tauchte aber nach einigen Jahren wieder in Serbien auf, wo er schliesslich eine 
kleine Beamtenstelle bei der Tabak-Regie in Prokuplje erhielt. 
Von dort knüpfte er seine Beziehungen zu den im Grenzgebiete wohnhaften Albanesen wiedre an und schloss 
mit dem jungen Adem Zaim Blutsbrüderschaft. 
Er kam dann auf andere Posten und wurde endlich Leiter der Belgrader Feuerwehr, in welcher Stellung es ihm 
aber nicht gelingen wollte, eine Rolle zu spielen, da er – im schlechten Sinne – stadtbekannt war. 
So kam er auf den Gedanken, sich wieder mit Adem Zaim in Verbindung zu setzen, prahlte diesem gegenüber 
mit seinen hohen Verbindungen, bei Hofe wie in der Politik und stellte Adem Zaim eine Audienz beim König 
in Aussicht, ohne daran zu denken, dass er so rasch beim Wort genommen würde. 
Nun hatte eben Adem Zaim am 1. September 1900 im Konak von Ipek einen Mord verübt, der ihn zur Flucht 
zwang. Er wählte zu seiner Zufluchtstätte Serbien, kam mit drei Begleitern nach Belgrad und verlangte von 
Bogosavljević die Erwirkung einer Audienz beim König. Dr Prätendent im Feuerwehrrock war in peinlicher 
Verlegenheit. Aber kein Fremdling im Schwindel, ersann er eine unglaubliche Komödie. Er lieh von einem 
ihm befreundeten Professor einige hundert Franken für den nationalen Zweck aus, fuhr im Fiaker mit der 
albanesischen Gesandtschaft in der Stadt herum und suchte auf jede Wiese die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zu 
lenken, erregte aber nur allgemeine Heiterkeit. Da die leitenden Kreise sein Treiben nicht beachteten und die 
Albanesen auf der Audienz bestanden, sagte er ihnen schliesslich, der König könne sie nicht im Palais 
empfangen, da die fremden Minister dies gleich nach Constantinopel melden würden und Adem dann nicht 
mehr in die Türkei zurückkehren dürfte. Darum werde er abends in einem Privathause mit ihnen 
zusammentreffen. Dort empfieng sie einer seiner Spiessgesellen als „König” in einer phantasievoll 
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(2) There were individual decisions with even more dramatic consequences. Very 
often family members turned against each other when they decided to adhere to a 
different national identity. The influence of national ideas was so strong that 
personal decisions were able to destroy traditional family structures. Here is an 
example. 
The father of Theodosi Mihajlov, Mihail Kralev, a tailor in Kumanovo, was 
imprisoned due to his revolutionary and other wrongful (not political) activity, and 
was freed with an amnesty in 1908. In order to restart his life and to educate his son, 
he asked for material and financial support from the Bulgarian community in 
Kumanovo, but he was refused. After the refusal, he turned to the Serbomans in the 
same town, who gave him 10-15 Turkish lira (300 francs), and also some tasks to 
promote Serbian propaganda. He accepted the conditions and soon he became totally 
Serbianized. He decided that his son, who was studying in a Bulgarian school, had to 
continue his studies at the Teacher Training College in Belgrade. Later, at a četnik 
meeting, he was advised to send his son to military school in Belgrade to become a 
non-commissioned officer. His son refused to do so, and he asked for help from the 
Bulgarian consul in Belgrade, who promised him immunity and Bulgarian higher 
education at the Teacher Training College in Kjustendil, if he gave him a full account 
of his father’s activities. According to the account of the son, the father was agitating 
                                                                                                                                                        
geschmückten, ordenbesäten Feuerwehr-Uniform, zeigte sich über ihre Verhältnisse genau informiert und 
befahl schliesslich dem Bogosavljević, ihnen goldenen Uhren und Gewehre zu geben. 
Dem türkischen Gesandten Fettah Bey wurde die Anwesenheit der Albanesen unbequem, über ihre Bedeutung 
getäuscht und fürchtend, sie könnten trotz der officiellen Dementis verschiedene Fäden anspinnen, liess er 
Adem Zaim zu sich rufen, stellte ihm die Gefahren vor, in die er sich durch so verdachterregendes Vorgehen 
begebe, und versprach ihm den Hauptmannsrang in der Gendarmerie, wenn er nach Constantinopel gehe, 
um dort jenen Zweifel über seine Treue und Loyalität zu zerstreuen. So geschah es, dass Adem bald darauf 
mit Amnestie und Officiersrang aus Constantinopel in seine Heimat zurückkehrte. 
In Belgrad hatte diese Episode zwei Nachspiele. Bogosavljević hatte in einem Hotel auf den Namen des Königs 
für seine albanesischen Freunde mit dem Bemerken ein Diner bestellt, von demselben dürfe niemand etwas 
wissen. Da er aber mit der Zahlung der an 1000 Francs betragenden Rechnung den Wirt stets vertröstete, 
wandte sich dieser endlich an das Hofmeisteramt, wo er jedoch zu seiner Enttäuschung erfahren sollte, dass er 
von Bogosavljević hintergangen wurde.  
Mittlerweile hatte aber der politische Feuerwehrmann noch eine unerquickliche Affaire. Er hatte den Albanesen 
die Gewehre erst nachzusenden versprochen, damit Unannehmlichkeiten an der Grenze vermieden würden. 
Tatsächlich entwendete er 15 Gewehre aus dem Depot der Feuerwehr, wurde aber dieses Diebstahls 
überwisen und obwohl er sein Vorgehen als patriotische Pflicht darstellte, zu einem Jahr Gefängnis verurteilt, 
welche Strafe er in Poźaverac antrat; er wurde eben dieser Tage begnadigt.” 
Diese Daten, schloss Herr Kurtović, habe ich in den letzten Wochen mühsam zusammengetragen, da es  mir 
darum zu tun war, das grundlose Gerücht von einer seinerzeitigen Audienz des Adem Zaim beim König 
aufzuklären. Adem Zaimm, der hier gefangen ist, wendete sich obendrein noch an mich wegen angeblich ihm 
damals versprochenen Uhren und Ringen. Von Belgrad wurde mir aber mitgeteilt, dass man Adem nie etwas 
versprochen habe. 
Diese sonderbare Geschichte, unzweifelhaft vom Herrn Kurtović auf Grund der ihm über seine an das 
Ministerium gerichteten Anfrage zugekommenen Instructionen [...] zusammengereimt, lässt schliessen, wie 
gerne man in Belgrad die seinerzeit dem wegen eines Mordes geflüchteten Adem Zaim gewährte Audienz 
ableugnen möchte. 
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in Pirot and Niš against Bulgarians, and forced or convinced Macedonian peasants 
searching for a job to claim themselves as Serbs, and sent them back to Orlanci and 
Orahovac (Kičevo) to agitate against Bulgaria. The father also eliminated Bulgarian 
agents, and informed Serbian police about private individuals who were in 
correspondence with Bulgarians. For his activity he received a monthly 80-100 francs 
(equals to the monthly salary of a teacher at a secondary school). In this case both the 
necessity of subsistence, and revenge against the former community (the Bulgarians) 
that refused to help, were motivating factors.553 
The conflict in which son turned against father is an individual adaptive strategy 
of survival. But not only individual strategies existed; strategies of survival were 
adapted at the community level as well.  
(1) Pusta-Bresnica was a small village located south-west of Skopje, five hours’ 
walk from the sanjak centre, on the right bank of the Vardar River, in a mountainous 
area.554 In this ethnically heterogeneous area, this Bulgarian settlement was 
surrounded by the Albanian-populated Sveta Petka, the Serbophile Zdunje, and the 
mixed Bulgarian-Turkish Jablica. The inhabitants of Pusta Bresnica were working on 
the čiflik of Ahmad bey, who had not visited his tenants for 15-20 years, leaving two 
kehajas to arrange issues concerning the land and the tenants. Villagers were ordered 
to give them accommodation and food, but kehajas had no juridical power over the 
village.555 The inhabitants of the settlement had no land property until the bey offered 
them to buy his fields for 6000 Turkish lira (partly because of the problems discussed 
in Chapter 5), which was bargained down by the villagers to 4200 liras, to be paid in 
three parts. Villagers sold their draft animals and cut-down wood to pay the price, 
but they were unable to settle the last 1000 liras (20 thousand francs). Villagers 
thought that the yearly tax was included in the price, but the bey refused to accept 
this condition. Therefore the peasants asked for help from the Bulgarian state 
through the Bulgarian metropolite in Skopje. In their petition, the villagers argued 
that Pusta Bresnica is the only Bulgarian village in the neighbourhood, surrounded 
by settlements inhabited by other nations. The villagers emphasized the favourable 
geographical location of the settlement, as it was situated half-way between Kičevo 
                                                 
553 ЦДА, ф. 315k. oп. 2. a.e. 10.  л. 21. 
554 The data source is an application of Pusta-Bresnica to the Bulgarian government from 1908-1909. ЦДА, ф. 
335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 8-10. 
555 When a teacher arrived at the village, sent by the Serbian metropolite, the kehajas let him work after they had 
been bribed. But the bey learned of the situation and forbid him to teach. This case testifies to the drawbacks 
of a feudal hierarchy for the local community – the villagers were able to influence and bribe only the kehajas, 
but not the bey, with whom they had no direct contact. The kehajas were to obey the bey, the peasants the 
kehajas, and therefore the ambitions of the peasants were not realized. From a rhetorical aspect it is also 
interesting that the school-question later appeared in the document again, but this time to prove the 
determination of villagers in the face of Serbian propaganda. 
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(Poreč) and Skopje, cutting the lines of communication between these two centres of 
Serbian agitation. On the other hand, this meant that the settlement was under 
constant siege from Serb propaganda.556 A few decades earlier, identity and ethnic 
differences had no significance here – at least not for the bey, and not from an 
agricultural perspective – but due to the growing propaganda the importance of 
differences increased, and commitment to any national identity also presented 
threats. But villagers thought that time had come to profit from their national 
identity beyond the many inconveniences it had caused. Emphasizing its loyalty to 
Bulgaria the village wanted a reward to make up for its former miseries: the 
population required land and a school to become self-sufficient and educated, and 
thus villagers applied for the financial support of the Bulgarian state for the missing 
1000 liras. “There is a state where patriotism is still alive, and it would be the sign of 
governmental wisdom to send the sum to the metropolite.”557 In their application they 
drew the attention to the activity of the Serbian metropolite in Skopje, who tried to 
open a Serbian school in the village, but local people had thus far resisted:558 “…Our 
village is a granite cliff on which Serbian propaganda always broke its neck up to now… the 
local people have always defended their Bulgarian identity, although it has created only 
drawbacks and disadvantages for them”.559 But, on 6 February 1909, Sofia refused to give 
financial aid, citing the law. 560 This created a very unfavourable situation for the 
community, which had already begun the transaction and paid two-thirds of the 
total sum for the land.  
The question is why the Bulgarian government decided not to support the village. 
Was the reason that the settlement stood alone, isolated, surrounded by villages of 
different ethnicity and the government considered it hopeless and not cost-effective 
to support such a community? Was the main problem that Pusta Bresnica was 
located in the conflict zone, where the influence of Serbia and Bulgaria was nearly 
equal? Did the Bulgarian state refrain from supporting insignificant localities on the 
right bank of the Vardar? Was such support focused mainly on the towns? Did the 
Bulgarian government suspend its support after the revolution of the CUP? Was it 
not worth undertaking economic investments in a conflict zone? Or was the sum 
simply too high? 
                                                 
556 This was also a rhetorical exaggeration; as to the significance of the location, the opposite was true (see Map 
7). 
557 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 8-10. 
558 It was the bey who refused the establishment of the school, and not the villagers. The villagers used this 
argument once against the bey, and once against the Serbs in a very clever way, which confirms our suspicion  
that the petition was written not by local people, but by a literate person (a cleric) who had studied rhetoric. 
559 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 8-9. 
560 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 15. 06.02.1909. 
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Perhaps all such considerations are realistic, perhaps not. In 1907, when the 
church of the distant Gostivar was violently taken away from the Bulgarian 
community, the Bulgarian government raised an objection, showing that it was 
indeed deeply concerned by events taken place on the other side of the Vardar.561 
Had Pusta Bresnica been located in the safe zone of Bulgarian influence, it should 
have been more reasonable not to support it. Settlements located in the safe zone and 
situated in the ’contested zone’ had the same likelihood of receiving support. The 
school of Gradec and Gorno Vodno on the right bank of the Vardar River received 
350 levas from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 April 1908, while Smilovci on the 
left bank was granted 600 levas on 13 November 1908, through the National Bank.562 
Of course we do not know whether these sums were actually spent on educational 
purposes or simply covered the transportation and distribution of weapons. 
Nevertheless, the 20 thousand levas mentioned in the case of Pusta Bresnica seemed 
high, but just one year before the Bulgarian metropolite in Skopje received a similarly 
huge amount of money (6-7 thousand levas) for educational purposes – true, there 
were more pupils there than in Pusta Bresnica.563 Was the reason for the refusal that 
Sofia supported mainly ideological goals (churches, schools) or propaganda activity 
and buying land was not among its supported activities? Maybe. But the villagers of 
Pusta Bresnica asked for the money to buy land and establish a school. Or did the 
ambivalent rhetorical exaggerations of the application (the school question, the 
insignificance of the location) became too obvious for the Bulgarian officials reading 
the document? Pusta Bresnica was located on the top of a mountain ridge, and could 
not effectively disturb the connection between the Serbs of Skopje and Poreč, as 
villagers had originally claimed.  
Pusta Bresnica was a small village, and sometimes not even urban communities 
were lucky enough to be supported with such a huge sum. In Skopje the Bulgarian 
metropolite also had to give a thorough explanation as to why he asked for the 
financial support of the Bulgarian state when he wanted to establish a new church in 
Čair Mahala, a precinct of Skopje (2). Although the Sultan signed a firman which 
allowed the Bulgarian community to build a new exarchist church, he did not allot 
financial support, and until 1911 the required sum had not been collected from local 
supporters. The metropolite’s first main argument was that the church would be 
located in the outskirts of the city, and therefore many villagers entering the town 
would use it and thus would become influenced by Bulgarian ideology. He astutely 
mentioned that the Serbs had offered financial aid, but the community had refused 
                                                 
561 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 355. (1907) 
562 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 5., л. 7., 04.09.1908., 13.11.1908. 
563 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 352. (1907) 
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(that is some form of blackmail of the state, while emphasizing the loyalty of the 
population). And the last reason: if the church in the outskirts remained unfinished, 
the population would visit the church in Tophane Mahala, which is exposed to 
Serbian propaganda - since the other exarchist church in the city centre is far away 
from Čair Mahala.564 This case also enlightens us about the tactics that local 
communities used. 
 
Map 7. The geographic location of Pusta Breznica and its surroundings on the 3rd military mapping 
survey of Austria-Hungary (originally 1:200 000, cca. 1910) 
http://lazarus.elte.hu/hun/digkonyv/topo/3felmeres.htm 
 
It is also possible that the answer is to be found elsewhere. Similarly to Serbia, the 
Bulgarian government became aware of the fact that it was easier to destroy than to 
create. Churches, schools and land needed large levels of investment, and this was a 
very risky enterprise due to the spread of violence. Cultivation of land – compared to 
schools and churches – could not contribute to the deepening of Bulgarophile 
sentiments in the countryside in the long run. These cultural and infrastructural 
                                                 
564 ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 402. л. 16., 10.06.1911. 
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investments had small rates of return, and efforts could easily be annihilated or 
ruined by violent acts. Therefore construction was not considered cost-effective when 
financial sources were limited, unlike destruction, which was cheaper, while fear could be as 
strong motivation as national enthusiasm. This recognition from 1908 on led to the 
escalation of violence and the unlimited intervention of paramilitary troops. The 
revolution of the CUP, and soon the disappointment of the policy of the Young Turks 
as analysed above, created a boom for destruction. When in 1907 Serb bands around 
Štip and Kočani received 300,000 francs to promote the Serbianization of villagers, 
this sum was, as we have already mentioned, not spent on purchasing land or 
erecting schools, but rather on bribing or intimidating influential local people, and on 
purchasing guns.565 If the loyalty of a village could be bought for 20 thousand 
francs/leva566 (equal to the yearly grain income of 20-30 peasants with 5 hectares of 
arable land, or to the salary of 20 officials, or to the annual pay of 6 lieutenants), then 
the Serbs could buy only 15 villages from the mentioned sum, which would not be 
decisive for power relations. Instead, the Serbs decided to create self-supporting četas 
(buying weapons, kidnapping people, requisitioning sheep, etc.) by relying on the 
financial aid of the Serbian state. Under these circumstances it would have been futile 
for the Bulgarian government to maintain the old-fashioned support system. 
 
 
VI. Epilogue 
 
During 1911, the internal crisis of the Ottoman Empire deepened further.567 The 
reports of the Austro-Hungarian consuls focused almost only on violent acts. In May 
1912, at least 4 Serbian četas arrived in the territory of the Sanjak of Skopje from 
Vranje.568 Irregular Bulgarian troops enhanced their activities against state property 
and officials, paralyzing communication lines and infrastructure (post offices, banks, 
railways, etc.).569 State officials were unable to defend themselves; military forces 
were also under constant harassment. The authorities were so demoralised (partly 
because of not being paid for months), that bands could appear in the centre of 
towns, with weapons, even in daylight. At night local inhabitants refrained from 
                                                 
565 ЦДА, ф. 335. oп. 1. a.e. 396. л. 5-6. 
566 The sum that Pusta Breznica asked for. 
567 Ottoman Diplomatic Documents, II No. 1829. 04.09. 1910. The Bulgarian sources put the number of Macedonian 
refugees in Bulgaria at 20-30,000. 
568 The aforementioned Ivan Babunski (Table 6) and his 14 men were around Veles, Stojčo vojvoda was Skopska 
Crna Gora, Todor Algunski - formerly teacher in Kumanovo – “visited” his hometown, while the četa of Boško 
vojvoda turned against Prilep. ЦДА, f. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 367. л. 6. 
569 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Franz Kolossa, 04.06.1911., No.26/pol, 2. 
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staying on the streets; only the gendarmerie and military troops were in patrol, often 
clashing with infiltrating paramilitary units.570 
The Serb political groups - unlike četa members - tried to maintain good relations 
with the authorities,571 while Serbian bands were engaging in ethnic cleansing along 
the border, targeting Bulgarian priests. Assaults became more and more brutal. A 
četa with more than a hundred members expelled Exarchist/Bulgarian monks from 
Karpina monastery.572 Contrary to the fact that Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations on 
diplomatic cooperation and a military alliance (the Balkan League) were rumoured,573 
along the border a state of bellum omnium contra omnes was about to evolve: 
Bulgarian, Serbian and Ottoman bands and military forces were fighting against each 
other, destroying harvests, pillaging villages considered as hideouts,574 and 
intimidating the local population considered to be a reserve for Bulgarian troops.575 
The population was deprived, demoralised – villagers gave up registering 
complaints about evil-doers to the authorities, because they feared immediate 
punishment, and the violence that raged across the land had also paralyzed the 
courage of the authorities.576 Even the Bulgarian government had officially declared 
as early as January 1912 that it was unable to hinder the activity of Bulgarian bands 
any more.577 Grown men would rather become četa members and pursuit everyday 
violence rather than suffer from it while cultivating land. This general tendency was 
catalyzed by the disarmament operation of the military forces in the previous years: 
if villagers wanted to defend themselves, they had to join a band, since there were no 
weapons at home any more, and as smuggling was controlled by bands of different 
commitment, bypassing them became impossible. Staying neutral was not a choice 
any more, insecurity, destruction became general.  
Another type of reaction was that of the Albanians, unleashing a revolt in each 
year after 1910. Their activity became more and more ethnicized, and by the end of 
1911 it evolved into a national movement, irrespective of denominational differences 
among Albanians. The major cohesive force of these multi-religious groups was the 
                                                 
570 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.11.1911., No.58/pol, 4. 
571 “Die Serben aber zeigten den Türken gegenüber [...] viel Rücksicht und Zurückhaltung – ich möchte fast sagen 
Freundschaft.“ ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911., No.6/pol, 12. 
572 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911, No.6/pol, 12. 
573 Austrian consuls also came to know this (but not the conditions of cooperation): ÖStA HHStA PA, 
VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911., No.6/pol, 12. 
574 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 28.07.1912, No.52/pol, 6.  
575 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911, No.58/pol, 4. 
576 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911, No.58/pol, 4. 
577 ЦДА, ф. 331k. oп. 1. 371. л. 1. The Bulgarian government could not have limited the activity of the bands in 
order not to give any space for Serbian agitation among the intimidated population. Furthermore, Bulgarian 
četas were preparing the area for the invasion of the Bulgarian army, since the government had decided to 
wage war against the Turks when the time came. 
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cultural demand for the educational and official emancipation of the Albanian 
language and the demand for territorial autonomy. 
The vali, Hadi pasha, personally visited the main centre of the crisis, leading a 
loyal army to punish atrocities. He did not make any distinction between Christians 
and Muslims. As a result of a conflict in January 1911 in Štip kaza, 76 Bulgarians 
were punished: 6 were condemned to death, and many were sentenced to lifetime 
imprisonment.578 But violent methods, executions and arrests could no longer bring 
relief. By the end of 1911 the situation has worsened in some kazas so much that even 
the vali did not dare enter (Kratovo, Štip, Veles).579The units of the gendarmerie and 
military forces were in constant motion, but were unable to engage in battle with the 
guerrillas. Minor weapon storage sites were eliminated, some assaults were 
hindered, but troops were unable to pacify the territory.580 Due to the pressure, the 
reliability of officers and the morale of enrolled privates was brought into question. 
The demoralization of Ottoman forces is indicated by the fact that between June and 
December 1911 Bulgaria gave shelter to more than 20 soldiers deserting the army. 
Not only Macedo-Bulgarians, but also Anatolian Christians (2), Rumelian (6) and 
even Anatolian Muslims crossed the border.581 The leaders of the sanjak and vilayet 
gave up their last forlorn hope of settle these questions when the most reliable nizam 
units of the province were sent to Jemen to put down the rebellion there.582 The 
massive agony of the central power was interrupted by the outbreak of the Balkan 
Wars. 
The central government also failed to resolve the Albanian question, which was 
growing more and more acute. As the government lost the sympathy of Albanians it 
also lost an instrument that could be used and turned against Bulgarian and Serbian 
bands, while at the same time it had to engage in a struggle on two fronts. The old 
policy of ’divide and rule’ did not work any more.  In 1911, the Catholic and the 
Muslim Albanians finally unified their forces thanks to Terentio Tocci, an Italo-
Albanian lawyer and the Montenegrin weapon supplies. This was another step 
towards creating a language-based nation. Though the 13 points articulated by Ismail 
Qemali in Montenegro were still quite conservative – they included the reinstallation 
                                                 
578 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911, No.6/pol, 12. 
579 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911, No.58/pol, 4. 
580 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Franz Kolossa, 04.06.1911., No.26/pol, 2. 
581 The massive scale of desertion is revealed by the fact that the Bulgarian government even had to create a new 
type of registration sheet for this purpose to quicken the pace of administration. ЦДА, ф. 335k. oп. 1. a.e. 435. 
Deserters were mainly privates of 18-26 years. In this archival unit, only one Bulgarian soldier, Shakir 
Shabanov, a Muslim originally from Radomir, deserted to Turkey.  
582 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911., No.58/pol, 4. 
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of the Sultan’s power, application of the sheriat and the Dukagjini kanun583 – modern 
elements also appeared of which also Muslims approved (Albanian schools, the Latin 
alphabet, the administrative unification of Albanian territories).584 
The officials in Shkodra first managed to convince the Muslims that the rebellion 
was against the sultan’s rule (as Montenegrin weapons were involved, this could be 
partly verified); furthermore, they promised to fulfil some of the demands in order to 
divide the forces of the rebels. The Kosovars gained nothing but the sultan’s mercy – 
the privileges given to highlanders were not extended to the area of Kosovo – but 
they remained silent, being aware that the neighbouring small states were interested 
in a general uprising, which would give them a good pretext to occupy the Ottoman 
areas. Though the Young Turks withdrew the pension of Isa Boletini (who, thereby 
losing the financial resources that were needed to maintain his private army, was 
threatened by losing his authority, and was forced to rely on external, Serbian 
sources), they were unable to win over any of the Albanian leaders to the Young 
Turk cause. Traditionalist leaders Isa Boletini (now financed by Serbs), Riza bey 
Kryezhiu, Bajram Curri and even Hasan Bey Berisha-Prishtina585 all agreed in their 
joint communication that the policy of the CUP had failed. The Albanians, albeit for 
different reasons, decided to unify these forces against the Young Turks.  
Though the Albanians knew what they were fighting against, they still did not 
know what they were fighting for: on the eve of the great uprising in 1912 the leaders 
were still divided concerning the content of the joint programme.  In July 1912, a new 
insurrection spread over all of Kosovo;586 refusing to shoot Muslims, the rebels were 
joined by officers, soldiers and gendarmes. The Ottoman response to the Albanian 
revolt – the interning of women – was unexplainable according to the Albanian 
moral code and soon the governor of Prizren was forced to flee to Tetovo in disguise. 
The number of Albanian troops soon increased from 15 thousand to 45 thousand 
(which also meant that blood feuds were suspended in order to mitigate the 
frequency of personal showdowns that would affect the efficiency of the assembly), 
when finally an envoy arrived promising the dissolution of the Parliament. Many of 
the assembled demanded the decentralization of the Empire, contrary to the political 
conceptions of the Young Turks (even their legal opponents refused 
                                                 
583 This came directly from the demands of the conservative Peje League in 1901-02 (composed of the opponents 
of the liberal-nationalist Prizren League). 
584 We may consider the Prizren League of 1878-1881 to be a precursor of these demands. 
585 Despite the fact that the last of these was autonomist-democratic and a follower of Abdyl Frasheri. 
586 Malcolm, Kosovo, 246. Hasan Prishtina, in the name of the subsequent insurrection in 1912 demanded special 
laws for Albania based on the common law; the right to carry arms, amnesty for all rebels; assignment of 
officials who speak the Albanian language and are familiar with their customs in four vilayets (Kosovo, 
Scutari, Bitolj and Janjevo); recognition of the Albanian language as official; curriculum and religious schools 
in the native tongue 
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decentralization).587 The immediate realization of this might have mobilized the 
Albanian masses against the Slavic small states that were ready to attack the 
agonizing empire. But the government was paralyzed and no one had the authority 
to negotiate with the rebels. This further angered the Albanians, who finally 
occupied Skopje.  
Behind these events one can also find the agitation of the small states, who 
promised weapons early in the summer to Bajram Curri, Nexip Draga and Isa 
Boletini, if they stepped into action against the central government (it was 
Dimitrijevič-Apis himself who negotiated with Boletini). After the small states had 
managed to exacerbate the tensions between the Albanians and the Ottoman 
government, and recognized that Albanians were unwilling to give any concessions 
to them,588 they saw the moment as opportune to declare war on Turkey. But Idris 
Sefer, Isa Boletini (2000 fighters) and Bajram Curri (5000 warriors) - though they had 
received their weapons from Serbia (and despite being rivals) - finally turned against 
the Serbians and resisted, although the official Ottoman army retreated without 
having engaged in any serious battle.  
This strange story, where everyone fought everybody else, symbolizes the 
impossible situation in Macedonia as well as the pitfalls inherent in Albanian 
attempts at nation-building.  
 
 
Notes in the margin: the limits to Muslim-Christian cooperation 
 
We have already pointed out that there were many reasons for Muslim-Christian 
tensions. They could be traditional in origin (with socio-economic tensions in the 
background), but there were a growing number of ethnicized conflicts as well. We 
have also pointed out that in certain circumstances the opposing parties were 
prepared to cooperate, putting their grievances and presuppositions aside, but the 
examples mentioned – ethnically mixed četas, enterprises living from violence – were 
less constructive and small-scale. The transnational weapon-smuggling network was 
large in scale, but not a positive phenomenon. After ten years of fighting, the 
                                                 
587 But fficial Albanian petitions did not contain demands on the territorial autonomy of ethnic Albanians. 
Fearing from the intervention of the Balkan states, Hasan Prishtina and Nexhib Draga, the major negotiators, 
were satisfied with the resolution of the Albanian issue within the framework of Ottoman legitimitism.  
588 Bataković stated that many leaders were paid large sums from the funds of the Serbian government and were 
given weapons. Owing to this, in a draft of demands, an article was inserted which anticipated the recognition of 
rights demanded by the ethnic Albanians to apply to Serbs as well. Due to the insistence of several Albanian 
leaders, particularly of the pro-Austrian Hasan Pristina, this article did not enter the official Albanian requests. 
See: Bataković, Dušan, T. The Kosovo Chronicles. 
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surviving participants knew their rivals’ merits and negative features only too well. 
What chances were there to establish a (1) constructive, (2) large-scale, (3) long-
lasting cooperation? Could distrust and ancient grievances be overwritten in case of 
necessity? 
Prior to 1912 the activity of Albanian bands (e.g. those led by Mersim Dema, Halil 
Kaljosh) was considered hostile towards the exarchist population, based on the tone 
and content of many Bulgarian consular reports.589 But in the early days of 1912 
Hasan Bey Prishtina asked IMRO and official Bulgaria to contribute to the Albanian 
revolt against the Ottoman Empire.590 According to the documents, he came up with 
the plan to create an autonomous province from Albanian and Macedonian 
sanjaks.591 The Albanian-Bulgarian cooperation then failed, because the Bulgarians 
(especially the government) were afraid of creating an autonomous Greater Albania 
under the suzerainty of the Sultan that incorporated vilayets with Macedo-Bulgarian 
population. This was clearly expressed in a letter written by IMRO’s Central 
Committee to the Bulgarian Prime Minister. Another problem was the fact that the 
Christian Albanians wanted autonomy guaranteed by all Great Powers,592 while 
Bulgaria refused not only autonomy as a solution at that time, but also the 
interference of Powers after their failure in 1908.  
The lack of strong ties between IMRO and the Albanian movement in 1912 is 
confirmed by the fact that Albania was not mentioned in the published compilation 
of the writings of the Central Committee up to 1 August 1913.593 
In the event of Albania’s admission into the alliance (the Balkan League), Kosovo 
- based on the principle of nationality - would have become a disputed area, 
reducing Serbia’s territorial aggrandisement and also its willingness to cooperate 
with the League members against Turkey. Contrary to these considerations, 
Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria, repeated his offer of 1908 to the Monarchy in June 1912 
                                                 
589 See: История на българите в документи, I/2. See documents cited on p. 328. and p. 327. These Albanian 
leaders later fought together with the Bulgarians against the Serbs. 
590 Георгиев, ‘Бежанският въпрос’, 56. 
591 See: http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts20_2/AH1921_3.html by Robert Elsie. Hasan Prishtina to the 
Bulgarian deputy in Skopje, Pavlov: “Since the 1908 Constitution, the Turks have been and are committing 
massacres in Albania and Macedonia. They have never shown any respect for the rights of the Albanians and Bulgarians. 
The terror that they are exerting is getting worse and worse and they are pursuing exclusively pan-Turkish policies. I 
believe that the time has come to throw off this cruel yoke by means of a joint uprising with a view to creating an 
autonomous Albanian-Macedonian state.” 
592 Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация, Vol. 2. Архивите говорят, 46. No. 261 (19 March 
1912). 
593 Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация, No. 366.  January, 1913. “Албанското движение се 
яви с неимоверни претенции относно етнографическата граница на Албания, и коетосе насърчава от една 
велика сила и толерира от известни турски кръгове, предизвикаха общо опасение в балканските държави, което 
ги обедини.” 
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to create a Greater Albania.594 This could have meant the total denial of Serbian 
pretensions, contrary to the principles of the Serbian-Bulgarian treaty already signed 
in March 1912; therefore, the Bulgarian government protested against the plans of the 
tsar. At that time neither was the Protogerovist wing of IMRO595 thinking of 
cooperation with the Albanians. They were of the opinion that the organisation 
should appease Bulgaria’s official policy, because Bulgaria was fighting for 
Macedonia and not for dismembering it.596 (IMRO tried to convince the Bulgarian 
elite not even to give up on the contested zone). In this respect the disputed zone in 
Macedonia was more important (and more of Bulgarian character) than the area to 
the west of the Vardar river. According to their data sent to I. E. Geshov, more 
Bulgarians lived in Skopje than in Prilep, Veles or in Bitola (where 18 thousand 
inhabitants out of 38 thousand were Turks or Albanians), while in Kumanovo 
(north), even according to Serbian sources, 5000 Bulgarian houses could be listed, 
while only 315 were ‘Serbomans’. Contrary to this, only 32 thousand of the 80 
thousand inhabitants were Bulgarians around Gostivar and Tetovo, the area where 
the joint Albanian-Macedonian uprising broke out later in the autumn of 1913. 
Another account shows how unstable the national consciousness or national identity 
was, if even IMRO leaders were thinking that “in five years the youngsters will be Serbs 
and Greeks” if the territory became dismembered.597 
Prior to the signing of the London Peace Treaty (30 May 1913), neither IMRO nor 
official Bulgaria wanted close relations with the Albanian movements: Bulgarian 
ambassadors even raised the idea of the partition of Albania in 1913, aspiring for 
Berat and Valona if the state was not functioning as a viable entity.598 However, as 
                                                 
594 Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik. Eds.: Bittner, Ludwig. - Pribram, A. F. - Übersberger, Hans. Wien-Leipzeig: 
Österreicher Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930. Vol 4. No. 3549. 1 June 1912. “… Ein 
kulturfähiges Volk von 3 Millionen.” 
595 This wing of IMRO, led by Todor Alexandrov and Alexandar Protogerov, relied upon Bulgarian support, and 
fought for the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria (more or less opposing Sandansky, who preferred an 
autonomous Macedonia). 
596 Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация, No. 372, pp. 1056-1057 (18 July/1 August 1913) 
and No. 364, p. 1043. 14/27 January 1913. 
597 Ibid. The principle of nationality was a key element in the argumentation of the Bulgarian government, which 
(beyond historical arguments) also referred to San Stefano, and to the Tirnovo Constitution accepted by 
Macedonians.  
598 “The Montenegrin delegates - as they were not brave enough to complain openly on Serbs - adviced to dismember 
Albania together, so we might get Berat and Valona” – wrote Danev from the peace negotiations in London. ЦДА, 
ф. 176к, oп.2, a.e. 1369, л. 147; and ЦДА, ф. 176к, oп.2, a.e. 1369, л. 140 (20.05./02.06.) 1913. See also: „Засега 
нас ни интересува поведението на Сърбия, а в по-далечно бъдеще, съдбата на Албания, ако тя се откаже не 
жизнеспособна. В първия случай, ако Сърбия потъпче договора и ни нападне, и в резултат България получи по-
изгодна граница спрямо нея, както и във втория случай, ако България излезе на Адриатическо море, според 
моето мнение, може да се обещае на Румъния компенсация, като се гледа, щото в първия случай да обхваща 
само сръбска територия…” (ЦДА, ф. 176к, oп.2, a.e. 1369, л. 53). 
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relations between the allies were worsening, Albanian military capacity became more 
and more important for IMRO. 
During the interallied war (second Balkan War), Hristo Matov, a prominent 
member of IMRO, in his letter from the front line written to Javorov, admitted on 18 
July/1 August 1913 that the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria had become a 
dream, as the current military situation could not afford this concept to be realised. 
In this instance autonomy was still preferable to a dismembered Macedonia. (The 
recognition of an autonomous (and not dismembered) Macedonia would have been 
possible only if Austria-Hungary had interfered and given effective support. But 
Austria-Hungary was either unable or unwilling to exert diplomatic pressure on this 
question – and also on other questions, like the territorial aggrandisement of Bulgaria 
– and therefore the Macedonians had to search for a new opportunity. In another 
letter, Todor Alexandrov suggested the idea of an Albanian-Macedonian dualist 
union, repeating the offer of Hasan Prishtina that had been ignored one year ago.599 
Unfortunately, this idea only emerged later.  
On 8 October an agreement was outlined between IMRO, Bulgaria and Turkey, in 
which the parties agreed to organise a new revolt in Macedonia in the future, after 
the stabilisation of Albania as the first step (as Djemal Pasha advised). Beyond 
’official Bulgaria’ as represented by Rizov and Andrei Toshev, the IMRO leader 
Alexandar Protogerov was also negotiating with Djemal pasha.600 The Turks were 
also entering into a conversation with the Albanian Essad Pasha Toptani, and the 
organisers were planning to send Petar Chaulev and Pavel Hristov once again into 
Albania to promote cooperation.601 
After having sent substantial humanitarian aid to mitigate the consequences of 
the collapse of the Albanian-Macedonian uprising,602 the Bulgarians were also 
planning to set up ethnically mixed četas. The political organisation of districts was 
also planned on the same basis: creating mixed territorial committees with the 
participation of the local population.603 Besides this, the Bulgarians also urged for 
opening schools in Albania (i.e. in Starevo near Lake Ohrid), attracting Bulgarians 
                                                 
599 Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация, No. 375, pp. 1059-1060. 
600 Ibid. No. 385, p. 1072. 10 Nov. 1913. 
601 Ibid. 1066. 
602 In this critical situation, the Bulgarian government decided to send humanitarian aid of 500 tons of wheat and 
flour, with the intention of promoting Bulgarian-Albanian relations and to take home those Bulgarians 
(including civilians and četa members) who were expelled from Macedonia to Albania. See: Георгиев, 
‘Бежанският въпрос.’ The step of the Bulgarian government gave helping hand for the stabilisation of the 
Kemal cabinet favoured by Austria and Italy. 
603 ЦДА, ф. 3k.oп.18, л. 62, 49. 
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from Macedonia, thus increasing the abundance of the Bulgarian element in Albania 
and the expansion of the Exarchate’s boundary.604 
Even the establishment of a joint Bulgarian-Macedonian-Albanian force of 5-6 
thousand men was mooted. The Bulgarians offered the best organisers, like 
Darvingov, Midilev and Kirpikov, officers of the MOO. It was decided to select one 
delegate from each nation to organise the army and prepare the population. The 
Albanian delegates asked for 20 officers from Turkey. The possibility that the 
Albanian army would be organised without Italian, Austrian or Western interference 
was not negligible, as the Turks wanted to avoid the rule of Wilhelm Wied.  
But the cooperation ultimately failed, due to the conceptual contradiction 
between the Bulgarian, Turkish and Albanian parties regarding priorities. Distrust 
and the financial problem of organising a permanent army instead of temporary četas 
came to ruin the plan. As 500 private soldiers each needed three Turkish liras per 
month (60 francs), the 54 vojvodas expected 10 liras monthly, and the 20 officers 
required a salary of 15 liras, the costs would have come to a total of 2.5 thousand liras 
a month (more than 50 thousand leva for 500 persons), which means that an official 
army would have been more expensive than the few hundred rebels of Chaulev, who 
received only 5500 leva official support over half a year in 1913. 
Some leading Bulgarian politicians were quite pessimistic about the value of such 
an alliance. The assumption that former enemies could fight together (like Mersim 
Dema, who was still sacking exarchist villages prior to 1912) was not deep-rooted. 
Toshev (the diplomat who signed the Peace Treaty of Constantinople) thought that 
the whole idea was a Turkish trick to regain control over Saloniki, because, for the 
autonomy of Macedonia and Albania (to be realized in the future), Bulgaria should 
have resigned from Western Thrace.605 
 
 
The new order 
 
What did the freedom or Serbian occupation bring to the people of the Macedonian 
provinces? Hardly much in the way of relief. The population got rid of the Ottoman 
authorities, but not of the abuses. It was more a change of empire than a change of 
régime, and even social reforms remained on a low scale.  
But at least public security was restored – though at huge costs. After the 
occupation, the Serbian government, instead of extending Serbian laws to all those 
                                                 
604 Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация, No. 385, p. 1072. 10 Nov. 1913. 
605 Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация, No. 379, pp. 1063-1064 (29 Sept. 1913). 
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living in Macedonia, or granting some kind of liberal self-government that Pašić had 
in mind, introduced martial law in October 1913 to avoid disturbing the Serbian 
political palette with the emergence of a Macedonian Party. The text testifies that the 
Serbs learned from the strict methods of the Ottomans. In order to put an end to četa 
activity, not only was ’habeas corpus’ neglected, but measures were also taken to 
discourage local communities and force them to refrain from hiding anybody 
suspected by the authorities. “Any attempt on rebellion against the public powers is 
punishable by 5 years’ penal servitude. The decision of police authorities in the respective 
communes is sufficient proof of the commission of crime. If the rebel refuses to give himself up 
as a prisoner within 10 days from such publication, he may be put to death by any public or 
military officer… Where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels do not 
return to their homes within 10 days from the police notice the authorities have the right of 
deporting their families whithersoever they may find convenient. Likewise the inhabitants of 
the house in which armed persons or criminals in general are found concealed, shall be 
deported… Any person who uses explosives without any evil intention shall be punished by 5 
years’ penal servitude.”606 The same was applied if somebody harmed the roads 
unintentionally. Anyone who knew a malefactor and did not denounce him to the 
authorities might suffer the same punishment as the evil-doer.607 Nevertheless, most 
of these measures could be found among the instruments of Ottoman government, 
not to mention IMRO, that also tended to use oppressive measures if inhabitants 
refused to cooperate willingly, as discussed earlier.  
Neither settlement policy nor violence resulting in the death of thousands (Leo 
Freundlich even made a record of Serbian atrocities)608 could stop the process of 
gradual ethnic replacement in Kosovo (Table 34). But the social structure was 
irreversibly changed by the land reforms. Until 1936 in Macedonia 20 thousand out 
of the 40 thousand former chiftchi received a total of 120 thousand hectares (6.5 ha on 
average). For security reasons (hindering the emergence of beys, Albanian warlords 
again) Muslim owners in Kosovo were limited to possess 5-15 ha after 1920.609 
Colonization in Macedonia (30 thousand families from the overpopulated 
                                                 
606 Citation from the Report of the International Commission to Inquire about the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan 
Wars. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington D. C. 1914. 160-61. 
607 Ibid. 
608 Freundlich, Leo. Die albanische Korrespondenz. Agenturmeldungen aus Krisenzeiten (Juni 1913 bis August 1914). 
München: Oldenbourg, 2012 
609 Müller, Dietmar. ‘Property between Delimitation and Nationalization: the Notions, Instittutions and Practices 
of Land Proprietorship in Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland.’ In: Property in East Central Europe: Notions, 
Institutions, and Practices of Landownership in the Twentieth Century, edited by Müller, Dietmar – Siegrist, 
Hanness. Berghahn, 2015. 126–27. 
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Montenegro and Dalmatia received a total of 160,000 ha), in order to strengthen loyal 
elements in the occupied regions, was also serving security considerations.610 
 
Table 34. The ethnic distribution of the population in Kosovo, 1911-31 
 Albanians (in 
thousands) 
Serbs (in thousands) Total (in thousands) 
1911 390 207 600 
1921 280 (-110, -28%)611 156 (-51, -24%) 436 (-160, -26%) 
1931 347 (+67, +25%) 205 (+35% increase 
owing to settlers) 
552 (+116, +26%) 
Based on Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama,  60. and 91. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Summarizing the above, we can draw the following conclusions:   
 the boundaries between the different types of violent acts, triggered either 
by sectarian and school conflicts or by customary law, gradually faded; 
 the supporting policy of small states shifted irreversibly from construction 
to destruction;  
 the activity of the irregular troops became limitless (neither the Ottoman 
authorities nor the withdrawal of support or the change of the seasons 
could impede them any longer);  
 četas were transformed into highly organized and self-subsistent groups 
through involvement in agriculture (opium, tobacco, smuggling) or the 
expropriation of state and private property; 
 loyalty to the state also faded: in addition to troops pursuing nationalist 
ideas, ethnically and religiously mixed mercenary bands also existed and 
were hired on the ‘market of violence’ to promote various goals beyond the 
nationalistic aims;  
 the representatives of the state did not even attempt to address economic 
and political problems, an if did it failed because of the discrepancies 
between local actors, local authorities, central authorities and Powers’ 
ideas. The multiplayer situation, the intermingling of local customs and 
central laws, the violent and intolerant character of interference (despite 
                                                 
610 Tomasevich, Jozo. Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1955. 361. 
611 The number of migrants was approximately 120 thousand, while the number of deaths was as high as 25 
thousand, according to Noel Malcolm (Malcolm, Kosovo, 254, 258). 
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some temporary successes), hastened the escalation of conflict into 
anarchy;  
 the ‘usual’ social conflicts (between public officers and citizens, security 
forces and inhabitants, etc.) also got out of control,612 and became 
overshadowed by the new types of conflict and were gradually ethnicized; 
the practices of četas spread across and were adopted by more and more 
violent organizations, which forced the authorities to apply the same 
methods and follow the same strategy based on intimidation; 
 the nationalistic movements declared total warfare, in which, compared to 
the years prior to 1903, not only were the Ottoman administration or 
military forces and the active members of movements (ideologists, like 
teachers and priests) regarded as targets, but the passive masses as well, as 
they could provide shelter, information, ammunition and an economic 
base for rivals;  
 these circumstances triggered a process of dehumanization in which 
human beings lowered themselves to the level of instincts. And the instinct 
of survival is among the strongest. Under the given circumstances of 
general insecurity the population had no choice: violence remained the 
only answer. Kill or to be killed, tertium non datur: as neutrality and 
national indifference was not a solution any more, this also escalated the 
conflict; 
 the economy had collapsed by 1912; fields remained uncultivated due to 
the wave of violence, accelerating emigration. 
 On the eve of the First Balkan War there was no functioning state 
administration and economy in the Sanjak of Skopje, which had turned 
into a frontier zone. 
 
                                                 
612 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, 28.01.1908, No.5/pol, 14. 
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Map 8. Main routes used by band and Ottoman patrols. BOA –HRT-0310. 
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Map 9. Constructed and still missing roads around Skopje and Prizren in 1870. BOA – HRT – 0309.  
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